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ABSTRACT
The Strategic Manipulation of American Official
Propaganda During the Vietnam Var 1
 1965-1966,
and British Opinion on the War.
This thesis examines the American official propaganda
campaign on the Vietnam war, and its impact on both the
British Government, America's main non-combatant ally, and
British public opinion, from the time of the escalation of
the war, in February 1965, to mid-1966.
Concentrating on Administration statements, the study
assesses the Administration's knowledge of events in South
Vietnam and its secret planning on the war, compares this
knowledge and planning with its propaganda, and evaluates
the truth and accuracy of Administration propaganda. An
assessment is also made of U.S. propaganda techniques and
the utility of American official propaganda themes.
The thesis then examines the information on the war
that was available to the British public on a daily basis
in the British press. The role of the press during the war
is assessed both as an information medium, and as an
audience for American official propaganda - an audience
which then disseminated its own analyses of the war and
U.S. propaganda.
The British Labour Government's reaction and opinion
on the war is traced in relation to its own policy of
support for its U.S. ally, and the domestic political
difficulties that this policy caused. British public
opinion on the war during this period is evaluated through
public opinion polls, and press accounts of opposition to
the war, including accounts of demonstrations.
The theme of this thesis is that when the war began
escalating in February 1965, the British Government, the
public, and much of the press, supported 135. involvement
in Vietnam. But by mid-1966, the British Government had
dissociated from the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam's oil
storage depots, henceforth offering qualified support to
its ally; the British public no longer supported U.S.
action in Vietnam; and sections of the British press
opposed U.S. involvement. The British Government's
dissociation was a blow to the U.S. Administration, and
thus the American official propaganda campaign had failed
to retain the desired degree of support from its British
ally.
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1IJTRODUCT ION
America's involvement in the Vietnamese War was one
of the most important events in the post-World War II
period. It was the leitmotiv of the 1960's, when its
impact was felt in every corner of the globe, in many
aspects of international and national life. The political,
social and military consequences of both American
involvement and defeat are keenly felt In America and the
International community to the present day.
America's position as leader and guarantor of the
Western Alliance ensures that America's rhetoric, actions
and their consequences, past and present, reflect on
America's allies and form the major point of reference for
opponents. One of the reasons the war became so important
was that America chose to make Vietnam the battleground
for a 'decisive' confrontation, on behalf of her free
democratic bloc, with the 'unfree' Communist bloc. Without
American intervention it seems unlikely that the outcome
of a conflict in a remote (from Europe) part of the world
would have been the focus of such widespread attention.
American perceptions of the importance of the Vietnamese
conflict also tended to alter the initial perceptions of
other nations, whether friendly or hostile, just as
America's actions raised the stakes of success or defeat
for both sides.
2American involvement in the Vietnam War required
explanation and Justification, as is usually the case with
most conflicts, and though commentators vary in their
estimates of the degree of importance that propaganda can
now attain generally in the modern wor1d, it still
appears that the presentation of a government's position
in the best possible light, to both its home audience and
foreign observers, is an important feature of policy. The
information that Lyndon Johnson's Administration felt
compelled to issue is illustrative of this contemporary
feature.
During the Vietnam War 'presentation' was of
particular importance due to a number of factors, which
can be divided into those concerning South Vietnam and the
war itself and those centring on advances in
communication. The first group of factors concerned
Vietnam's remoteness from the American continent, which
made it difficult to uphold the U.S. Administration's
claim that it was an area vital to America's national
security.
The second factor was that the length and nature of
the conflict was bound to strain the propaganda apparatus
to the utmost given that America itself was not directly
under attack: this poses the question for how long can a
democratic government keep the supportive interest of its
people and allies when that nation is not directly
threatened?
3Third, the type of regime that America was supporting
in South Vietnam (mostly ever-changing military .juntas
lacking legitimacy and popular support) contradicted all
the political and human ideals that the American
Administration professed to be preserving and pursuing in
South Vietnam and was also seen as making a mockery of
America's own allegiance to these ideals.
Fourth, because of the secrecy and low-key approach
which characterized American involvement in this area in
the beginning, most observers of the conflict became aware
of the extent of the American commitment only when the war
was escalating. At this time the Administration had
decided that America's prestige and credibility were at
stake, not to mention South Vietnam's physical existence.
So against a background of allied ignorance, publics in
both America and Britain (to deal only with those of
interest to this thesis) awoke to find their governments
already committed to a war - though obviously committed in
different degrees and with different roles. The American
Administration was caught in a trap of its own making and
the British Government shared in some of the consequences
because of close support for American policy.
Concerning the second group of factors, the spread of
modern day communication networks while enlarging the
Administration's communication scope also enlarged the
potential number of rival viewpoints that the
Administration might have to counter, and limited the
possibilities for the successful promotion of distinctive
4propaganda campaigns in different parts of the world. For
instance, official American statements made in Saigon to
reassure their South Vietnamese allies were frequently in
real, or apparent, contradiction to American statements
made to reassure America's Western allies. Not
surprisingly, when the conflicting statements were
compared considerable confusion and dismay resulted among
America's allies.
The speed of communications ensured that it would be
difficult to contain the damage caused when propaganda
errors committed in one area were transmitted to other
arenas.
A.) Primary lines of enquiry
The major concern of this thesis is the interaction
of U.S. official propaganda with British opinion, both
public and governmental. The aim is to examine U.S.
official information about the war in a period comprising
the first two years of escalation and encompassing
different climates of opinion. It will then be possible to
trace the Administration's pattern of response to
different eventsin relation to their efforts to influence
opinion on the war. This should also reveal whether
opinion on certain events in turn influenced the
Administration's handling of information.
There are a number of reasons for studying the
relationship between American official propaganda and
British opinion. First, the British have theoretically,
and usually in practice, been close allies of the United
5States, whether or not a 'special relationship' exists.
During the period under examination, after refusing to
participate militarily in the conflict, the British
Government was the staunchest supporter of American policy
in Vietnam.
Second, Britain was co-chairman, with the Soviet
Union, of the Geneva Conference in 1954 which 'settled'
the First Indo-China War. Thus Britain was intimately
connected with the earlier diplomatic agreements and
certain sections of the British public therefore expected
the current British Government to involve itself in
diplomatic initiatives to end the current war. On the
other hand, Britain's ability to act as a mediator in the
crisis was frequently held to have been undermined by her
identification with American policy.
There are three main lines of enquiry in this study,
embracing the basic theoretical and empirical problems
which need to be addressed. The first objective is to
examine the change in British public opinion on the war.
This change was apparent in the ever-larger protests
staged by active opponents of American involvement in the
war, and more widely in responses to opinion polls
measuring the views of the general public. A study of the
role of the media as principal conveyors of information to
the public will form a central part of the thesis. The
scope of the enquiry and volume of material to be examined
will be reduced by concentrating on a limited number of
events and themes.
6The second objective is an assessment of the nature
and effectiveness of the Administration's propaganda
effort and divides into two parts. The first part focuses
on the basic justifications used in American official
statements. The second part focuses on the information
available in the British press on a day to day basis about
certain events and certain long term themes and the way in
which these were handled by the Administration. The events
are selected on the basis that they required a special
effort to justify them (often as a result of past
Administration statements) and, or, that they had a
special significance for Britain.
The third objective is to draw conclusions from the
above studies as to why British opinion changed, why the
Administration's propaganda effort failed and whether
there might have been ways to prolong acceptance of the
Administration's viewpoint, or conversely whether the
Administration would always have failed in this endeavour.
Finally more general conclusions are drawn about a
propaganda campaign directed at a foreign audience.
Within this broad framework special attention will be
focused on the following questions and issues: First, at
what point did a credible alternative point of view emerge
to challenge the Administration's view and why? Second,
when did the propaganda audience begin to disbelieve the
Administration? Third, what role did the Administration
assign to propaganda during the war and what degree of
effort at what level went into coordinating the
7information and presenting it? Fourth, how suitable were
American propaganda themes and techniques for their
purpose? Fifth, were there any American information errors
of particular magnitude which helped to turn the tide of
public opinion and, or constituted a turning point? Sixth,
what were the effects of the military situation on the
audience's reaction to Administration propaganda and how
was the military situation reported? Seventh, what level
of effort did the Administration direct towards keeping
the British Government informed compared with America's
other allies? Eighth, how important were extraneous
factors such as general anti-Americanism in forming
opposition to the war?
B.) Period of the Study
The period 1965-1966 is being examined for several
reasons, but overall, in terms of a propaganda campaign
these years virtually pre-select themselves. To begin
with, 1965 was the year in which the U.S. began bombing
North Vietnam and U.S. troops were committed to combat.
Due to these actions, the Administration had to contend
with increasing press and public interest in the conflict,
after some years of effective public unaccountability. The
Administration had to 'sell' a number of alarming events
and had to try and justify American involvement in this
area; and it also had to weather two serious incidents
concerning the conduct of the war: the gas warfare episode
and negotiations that the Administration was involved in
immediately prior to escalation of the conflict, The
8incident concerning the use of non-lethal gas against
enemy troops, while being objectively unimportant (and a
failure in practice) was immensely important politically:
the United States was roundly condemned worldwide and the
Administration and its propaganda organs showed themselves
both incapable of understanding the reasons for the furor
and incapable of dealing with the consequences in such a
way as to limit the political damage. This pattern of
events was to be repeated time and again.
In concrete terms, 1965 was the year when North
Vietnam was first subjected to aerial bombardment; the
American presence in South Vietnam grew from approximately
23,000 military advisers, at the beginning of the year, to
180,000 combat troops by the end of year; there were some
public demonstrations in America against the war and the
'teach-In' became ±ashionable, spreading quickly to
Br I t a I n.
Between 1965 and 1966 the war escalated rapidly. The
American Administration poured men and equipment into
South Vietnam and mounted energetic diplomatic and
military recruiting drives amongst its allies, On the
other side, the Vietcong received increasing assistance
from the North Vietnamese, Chinese and Russians. As the
war expanded in scale and intensity, so it grew in
brutality. ObvIously all this Increased the burden of
explanation and justification that the Administration had
assumed in 1965 and the sheer passage of time very soon
constituted another propaganda problem.
9Concerning Britain, these years witnessed a change in
British public opinion and press coverage from support far
the American involvement in Vietnam to hostility. In 1965
opinion polls registered a broadly favourable reaction to
American handling of the war and the British Government's
response. By mid-1966 these polls were monitoring a
considerable degree of public dissatisfaction with the
British Government's policy on Vietnam and and its
continued support for U..S. po1icy. 	 -_
The events highlighted in this period trace the
development of the Administration's information campaign
and the growth of a counter-press view from the time of
escalation in 1965 to the U.S. bombing of the North
Vietnamese oil installations in June 1966.
There are two major episodes to be studied in 1965.
The first is the American bombing of North Vietnam in
February and the successful shift in emphasis on the
nature of the bombing, from being a reprisal for a
specific guerilla attack to being a method of fightIng the
wax-. The second episode in mid-1965 concerns the increase
in American troops bound for South Vietnam and the
transformation of their role in the war from defence to
combat. Once the idea and fact of American participation
in the war had been accepted, as It generally was, it
became possible, and easier, to both escalate the war and -_
justify successfully that escalation.
As mentioned earlier, two incidents occurred in 1965
which epitomize the pitfalls that the Administration's
10
propaganda campaign was subject to and indeed, on
occasions, helped to create. They also illustrate the
shortcomings of the American propaganda machine and
fore-shadow the two most persistent queries directed at
the Administration: on the practical conduct of the war
and the Administration's attitude to negotiations. The
'gas warfare' episode took place in March 1965 and despite
being of no military significance and somewhat comical in
character, it created a world-wide furore lasting several
months, In November 1965 it became known that just before
escalation of the war in March 1965, the Administration
had apparently turned down an opportunity to meet the
North vietnamese. The meeting had, been proposed and
arranged by the UN Secretary General in December 1964.
This lost opportunity would probably not have mattered
except that in April 1965, in his Baltimore speech,
President Johnson helped foster the impression that it was
the North Vietnamese alone who would not discuss the
conflict. Until November 1965 the prevailing opinion of
the press had been that the Administration was genuinely
ready to negotiate (though not unconditionally) but was
encountering Communist intransigence. The revelation of
Washington's earlier reluctance to meet the North
Vietnamese disturbed this image and was the subject of
much press comment.
In June 1966 the war was extended when the Americans
bombed Hanoi and Haiphong. The British Government had
always stated publicly that it would not support an
11
American attack on the North Vietnamese capital - whatever
the target, Following its previous warnings, Her Majesty's
Government for the first time issued a statement
dissociating itself from the American action, although
reaffirming its support for American limited objectives as
defined in the President's Baltimore speech. By this time
the British public no longer supported American policy. It
seems likely that the combination of the bombing and the
British Government's avowed disapproval (if the reference
to the Baltimore objectives was ignored) could have
affected public support.
C.) Themes of the Study
The themes which will be covered will be those which
appeared repeatedly in the press: the Administration's
attitude to negotiations; the image of successive South
Vietnamese Governments; and the conduct of the war.
Concerning negotiations, only those peace initiatives
involving the UK Government will be examined. The UK
Government's principal peace move in this period, took
place in June 1965. There was also a UK/USSR peace
initiative in January/February 1967, which will not be
examined in detail, being outside the period of this
thesis, but it is considered briefly in relation to the UK
Government's dissociation from the U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam's oil installations in 1966. For the UK
dissociation engendered a lack of trust In President
Johnson which affected the 1967 peace initiative, and the
confusion, suspicion and American high-handedness that
12
attended this abortive initiative, soured Anglo-American
relations in private for some time.
The image of successive South Vietnamese Governments
was a theme of great importance in the media. Merely to
count the number of governments that had come and gone
since America first supported South Vietnam, seemed to
contradict the simplest American justification of aiding
an allied government by invitation. The press were quick
to point out the contradictions between the American
justification and their policy, which resulted in support
for any government in Saigon (long after the original
government America had pledged to aid had vanished),
regardless of how it achieved power or how little popular
support it commanded.
The other principal subject of media comment was the
way the war was conducted by the South Vietnamese and the
American armies. The media questioned both the methods
used to fight the war and the predictions about the
progress of the war issued by the American Army command on
the basis of current operations and statistical data
gathered from the combat zones. Far instance, one of
America's main methods of fighting the war was the use of
bombing campaigns to destroy North Vietnam's war-making
capacity and Vietcong supply lines; this was a method
which was particularly abhorrent to Britain after her
Second World War experiences as the target of German
bombing campaigns. Furthermore, as the war continued there
was mounting evidence provided by the media that far from
13
damaging enemy morale and their will and ability to
continue the fight, the bombing raids were achieving
precisely the opposite result. Thus, at a relatively early
stage of the war, the utility of a major American tactic
was questioned; later the morality of such a method was
raised.
D.) Sources of the Study
Newspapers comprise the major primary source of
information on the Administration's propaganda campaign,
for they carried both 'news' and 'news analysis' to the
public as well as the text of important official speeches.
Newspapers were also the most prolific disseminators,
initially, of the official point of view, but as their
support faded, the newspapers constituted a powerful
opponent of the Administration, relaying an alternative
view of the war to the public.
While being of interest, the role that television and
radio broadcasts played in the war was basically the same
as that of the newspapers and has therefore not been
studied in this thesis, In general, news bulletins on
radio and television were then much shorter than today's
bulletins and although televison had its 'news'
programmes, by comparison, on a daily basis newspapers
carried far more 'news' and analysis than the other two
media branches. Also, in this early period, information on
the war disseminated in the British media tended to come
from sources in Washington, and television equipment and
technology was then far more cumbersome and resulted in
14
far fewer programmes from South Vietnam Itself. Of course
in the later stages of the war there were British
Journalists stationed in South Vietnam. In any case, at
this time public reactions to television programmes of
note, were manifested in letters to the British press. A
further reason for not studying the role of television
lies in the fact that access to the BBC's archives is
extremely difficult and expensive. As the nature and
impact of U.S. official propaganda and British reactions
to this propaganda can be fully studied from press
sources, the absence of a study of television and radio
broadcasts does not impair the thesis.
The publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971
provided an invaluable yardstick by which to measure the
Administration's propaganda campaign. In the light of
America's adherence to Western liberal democratic
principles, It is of immense importance to distinguish
between Administration propaganda based on honest belief,
including misperception, and propaganda based on
deliberatedeception. The Pentagon Papers enable such a
distinction to be made to some extent by allowing a
comparison of public statements with private information.
The Pentagon Papers also detail the Administration's
awareness of Image problems it might face and its. attempts
to control potentially awkward public announcements. They
thus give some idea of the Administration's attitude to
mediation efforts and contain some information on
relations with allies.
15
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. See Leo Bogart, Premises For Propaganda, (New York:
Free Press, 1976), and discussions of below.
2. Information is used interchangeably with propaganda
throughout this thesis - therefore does not establish the
accuracy or inaccuracy of statements merely because it is
used.
3. National Opinion Polls, Gallup Poll, March 1965.
4. National Opinion Polls, Gallup Poll, July 1966.
5. The Baltimore Speech was given on 7 April 1965 at the
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. In it Johnson
defined U.S. objectives in the war - a South Vietnam free
from Northern aggression, stated that the U.S. sought no
wider war and offered economic aid to Southeast Asia,
including North Vietnam. See Chapter 2, Section A ii.) and
Chapter 4, Section A, B and C for further analysis of this
speech.
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CHAPTER 1
ThEORY AD ORGANISATION OF PROPAGAIWDA
A.> Theoretical aspects of propaganda
For the purpose of this study the amoral definition
of propaganda formulated by T. H. Qualter in Prcpaganda
nd Psychological Warfare will be used:
"Propaganda is thus defined as the deliberate
attempt by some individual or group to form,
control, or alter the attitude of other groups
by the use of the instruments of communication,
with the intention that the reaction of those so
influenced will be that desired by the
propagandist. ' 1
There are other definitions which claim to be less
narrow - and It is stated, more accurate - than
Qualter's, but definitions of propaganda will not be
examined exhaustively for the following reasons:
(I) As the Johnson Administration was fighting a war -
even if undeclared and limited to start with - by 1965, it
is reasonable to assume that it had every intention that
its view of the conflict should prevail (one of the most
basic propaganda goals) and that it therefore directed
some effort to this end. That is to say, the context of
war now predetermines the use of propaganda, for then
every government is possessed of the desire to persuade
others of the justice of its case.
(ii) Other definitions which claim to be more accurate
than Qualter's also run into problems when they are
examined closely. For example most definitions centring on
17
persuasion and reaction could equally well be applied to
fund raising activities on behalf of charities, or the
Salvation Army, as to the activities of government
information departments.
Because of the pejorative connotation still attached
to 'propaganda' by the public it might be argued that,
though in war every government wishes to put its case most
favourably, nevertheless Western democracies could still
put out 'information' as opposed to 'propaganda' . This
distinction arises from the equation of 'propaganda' with
the manipulation or suppression of the 'truth' and thus
manipulation of the audience. 'Information' tends to be
equated (at least by the public) with 'fact' and 'truth'
in the light of knowledge. But information, or even such a
neutral term as 'communication' can have within definition
an element of suppression and manipulation which is not
immediately apparent.
In his essay "What is Information", in Communication
Culture, Anatol Rapoport gives an explanation of the
term:
"As Warren Weaver has remarked, the amount of
information in your message is related not to
what you are saying but to what you could say.
This relation links the amount of information in
a message with the amount of pre-conceived.
knowledge about its content (i.e. if the
contents of a message are already known or
guessed the message has no information in it)...
"In order to define the amount of information
in a message, then we must know the total number
of messages in the repertoire of the source from
which the message is chosen."
This is a somewhat unusual way of defining
'information' (as acknowledged in this work), which is
18
found in the mathematical theory of communication. But it
does serve to illustrate the point that 'information' is
not the neutral term it is thought to be. Discussing
communication in "The Nathematics of Communication",
Warren Weaver writes:
"In communication there seem to be problems at
three levels: 1) technical (concerned with
accuracy of information transmission from sender
to receiver), 2) semantic (concerned with
interpretation of meaning by receiver compared
to the intended meaning of the sender) and
3) 1nfluential."
And in explaining the problems of influence in
communication, Weaver comes very close to a definition of
propaganda:
"The problems of influence or effectiveness
are concerned with the success with which the
meaning conveyed to the receiver leads to the
desired conduct of his part. It may seem at
first glance to be undesirably narrow to imply
that the purpose of all communication is to
influence the conduct of the receiver. But with
any reasonably broad definition of conduct, it
is clear that communication either affects
conduct or is without any discernible and
provable effect at a1l"
These are just definitions o the terms 'information'
and 'communication'; add to this the	 in which
information (using it in its ordinary sense as a piece or
body of knowledge) can be used and the distinctions
between information and propaganda blur.
However, the unpleasant connotation of 'propaganda'
and the popular image that it conjures up of mass audience
manipulation through the use of, at best, slanted
information and at worst, lies, means that governments in
Western democracies refer to their 'information
1c3
programmes' instead of their propaganda output. In the
view of Western publics, only opponents 	 particularly
Communist governments - indulge in propaganda, both
internally and externally. And the underlying moral and
political principles on which Western democratic societies
are based, restrain (or are supposed to restrain) the
information/propaganda techniques that these governments
may use.
Discussing propaganda and the morality of the
techniques used, Qualter first defined the task of a
modern-day propagandist in completely amoral terms:
"The propgandist is one seeking to control the
attitudes of other groups for certain specific
purposes. No considerations of the moral or
political nature of those ends or of the means
he adopts is relevant."7
But Qualter then went on to discuss his idea of the role
of a propagandist in democratic society, and came to a
totally different conclusion:
"However, while the existing facts of human
behaviour and the political world make some
recourse to emotional propaganda necessary, the
basic ideals to which the democrat owes
allegiance make it impossible for him to make
use of any and every propaganda tactic.
Although he may colour his material to give it
more popular appeal and to make it stand out in
a competitive background. . . he cannot adopt
practices that would make a mockery of his
professed belief in the worth of human dignity.
He must eschew tactics which would go beyond
mere recognition of human weaknesses, which
would tend to the further debasement of
political morality. The moral limitation on the
propaganda techniques available to the democrat
is of fundamental importance in separating a
democratic from a non-democratic approach to the
use of propaganda.huB
20
Of the two versions that Qualter proposed, the latter
does seem to sum up the popular feeling in Western society
about the use of propaganda/information, even externally.
And the consciousness of the dividing line between the
democrat and non-democrat does seem to extend to some
propagandists too. Even when information techniques have
been within the accepted boundaries, an extension of the
propagandist's role has been seen as contravening the
democratic ethic. Rober Elder's study of the United States
Information Agency (USIA), described the problems:
"In January 1967, Agency officials ,just back
from Vietnam or about to visit there considered
the level of USIA operations in Vietnam and
Thailand fascinating, but were ambivalent in
their feelings as to whether USIA should be
carrying out what would normally be the domestic
information activities of foreign governemnts.
In fact USIA was drawn into its contemporary
role because the job was not being done locally;
and while the Agency is not really qualified to
conduct such activist policies, it is in a
better position than any other agency to do the
required job, which supports the American
military effort, though directed at civilians,"9
Internally, the spectre of Hitler and Goebbels and
the loud condemnation of the techniques used by communist
regimes ensure that Western democratic governments usually
preserve a relatively low-key approach when 'educating'
their publics. And of course the ideas and information
these governments disseminate are by no means the only
viewpoints and facts to be aired publicly. As well as
political opposition and interest groups of every variety,
the media itself, which carries the government's message
to people, also offers comment and criticism.
21
Obviously there is a difference between these
information centres (government and groups) in the ease
with which the government and its agencies can command
attention and make their views known simply by being the
national focal point. Only the media itself can make its
views known with this ease - other groups must compete for
attention and coverage. However, on the whole modern
Western democracies do foster and disseminate a plurality
of opinions. This is one of the most fundamental
attributes of a democracy - the obvious expression of
freedom and the initial safeguard against political
repression, which fact is recognised by those who seize or
hold power undemocratically, for their first action is to
establish and subsequently maintain an absolute monopoly
of the instruments of communication and to suppress any
expression of opposition.
However, the free expression of differences
(articulated politically through the ballot box) so
necessary to democratic life, is not the best mode of
social and political organisation when fighting a war.
This is a time when unity and conformity are needed to
project a national image of strength; an image which is of
great practical and political value to leaders In this
situation. The knowledge of a united nation In the
backgound frees the leader to face an enemy and
concentrate purely on victory rather than facing two
fronts at once - home critics as well as foreign
opponents. In addition, an image of national unity offers
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little in the way of obvious targets to an enemy
propagandist.
On the other hand, if national divisions and
differences of opinion do emerge, as happens in democracy,
even in wartime, then this is an obvious weapon and
weakness which may be exploited by opponents. Much of a
professional propagandist's task is concerned with
identifying, prior to exploiting, such divisions in the
ranks of the enemy. If differences emerge quite naturally
as a result of the politcal system, then not only is the
propagandist's job made easier, but also the propaganda
targets (in this case the divisions in society) are
obviously authentic, whereas the professional
propagandist's speculations about possible differences in
another society may be incorrect. During the Vietnam War,
the U.S. anti-war groups and the arguments used to
criticise U.S. involvement in the conflict were of value
to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Here were ready-made
divisions to exploit and arguments to use in addition to
their own propaganda lines. This was probably doubly
welcome in view of the vast differences in culture and
society between America and Vietnam, which would pose the
first problem for a propagandist, as stated earlier
understanding the enemy environment in order to attack it
most effectively. The corollary of this though, is that a
wrong assumption on the part of a propagandist and the
resulting dissemination of a 'wrong' propaganda line to
another society can have the effect of strengthening an
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opposing united front where such dunity might have been
fragile. The other result is to diminish the effectiveness
o± future propaganda, in proportion to the gravity of the
original error.1'
In a state of war, a liberal democracy is thus
usually at a practical disadvantage compared with more
tightly controlled regimes, which practice censorship as a
matter of course and suppress opposition and can
therefore create an impression of national unity whether
or not it actually exists, When liberal democracies do
introduce censorship it is an obvious departure from the
norm, requires justification and may be regarded with
suspicion. Nevertheless, it has been tolerated in wartime;
justified on the grounds of denying the enemy information
which might be useful in any way - a definition which can
be interpreted very widely. And censorship can aid a
propagandist considerably, allowing him to create the
optimum picture of his own state and to suppress the
dissemination of disturbing features - for example low
morale or any difficulties experienced in maintaining the
war effort, or containing the spread of enemy propaganda
(total censorship being practically impossible to achieve
in any society).
Given that liberal democracies have practiced
censorship in war, even though this strikes at the
foundations of democracy, the question must be asked as to
whether there are different 'types' of war which make it
more, or less, easy to justify - and to be accepted as
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justifying - censorship and the loss of certain democratic
rights.
The sort of war that has been waged twice in this
century - the total wars of World Wars I and II - were
seen by the democracies as justifying the sacrifice of all
activity except that directed to pursuing and winning the
war. The loss of complete freedom of expression, or the
monoploy of information output by the government were
accepted as part of the war effort. In World War II
particularly, the danger to the nation was felt to be
sufficiently acute (bombs do speak louder than words) to
warrant the suspension of some democratic rights in order
that the battle might be fought more effectively and thus
allow the nation a better chance of survival.
This was the crux of World War II and the mark of its
distinction; it was a matter of survival in the face of a
direct threat - physical destruction - and the longer-term
threat contained in the thought of defeat: the destruction
by the enemy, possibly once and for all, of the life and
values that had been accepted as of right. Both World Wars
I and II, however, had an element in common with many
other conflicts: they began, nominally, because of treaty
obligations. But in the case of Britain and France,
especially in World War II, the initial threat to an ally
(Poland) was perceived as the beginning of a threat to
their own pl2ysical existence. 1 Whereas in other
conflicts, the correlation has not always been so direct
and immediate between treaty obligations, requiring
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assistance to a beleagured ally, and the threat to home
territory. In the latter circumstance, principles, without
the threat of physical destruction, must be the basis for
justifying the fight. This could have a number of
consequences. Firstly, the reasons for fighting and the
consequences of either victory or defeat may not be so
clearcut, and therefore the case for entering the conflict
- that is, the precise nature of, and reasons for
obligations to an ally - must be all the more clearly
explained. This applies even if the conflict involves only
a professional volunteer army and not conscripts. If
conscripts are concerned then the need for clear
explanation becomes even more acute, for the war then
touches more than just those who choose the possiblity of
fighting and death as a job - the ordinary citizen becomes
involved. 14.
Secondly, the very distancing of the conflict from
home territory might tend to sharpen the focus on troop
casualty rates and the reasons for the conflict. And thus,
at a time when the political leadership may be emphasising
the need for a united stand, using the media to convey its
message, the media might also engage in a debate on the
conflict. Though the media may well support the
leadership's position - and Is quite likely to initially
if only because the first interpretation of events is
likely to be the government's - the capacity obviously
exists from the beginning for government and media to pull
in opposite directions. The initial factors likely to
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prevent this happening are the practical and emotional
ones of backing the political leadership, particularly
once it has set a course, and then backing the f±gh±ng
troops. The urge to close ranks and not to undermine the
war effort takes precedence and generates the endeavour to
maintain morale at home and at the front. However, the
length of a conflict, its nature and extent, and its
remoteness (in terms of both distance and its isolation
from domestic life) can make inroads on these emotional
responses. This is the time when a more concrete/rational
justification is most needed, in order to sustain emotion
and morale. In particular the length of a conflict and
troop casualties seem to be factors which can most affect
public morale.
In some cases, for example the Korean War, high troop
losses may act as a stimulant to continuing the conflict
(assuming negotiation/withdrawal is an option), for once
troops are killed it becomes that much more difficult to
withdraw, because to do so would appear to invalidate
their deaths. The common reaction is to plough grimly on
in order to justify the losses and gain something from the
investment in lives. But in some other cases, even though
heavy losses have been incurred, the length and nature of
the conflict and its effects on society have eventually
resulted in a serious split between those wishing to
continue ploughing on, and those prepared by this time to
cut the losses. The Vietnam War was the cause of such a
split in American society,
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From even such a cursory analysis as this, it is
apparent that a number of factors may affect continuing
support for, or hostility against, such a war. It is the
handling of these factors, their inter-relationship and
their effect on public morale that a propagandist seeks to
control, within his general operational environment.
B.) Immediate Operational Environment
In chapter 4 of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare,
Qualter sets out the factors a successful propagandist
must take into account when planning a propaganda
campaign:
1) The size and broad intellectual level of the audience.
2) The existing attitudes of the audience to both the
situation envisaged by the propagandist, and their
attitude to the latter himself.
3) The extent to which the audience has access to the
various media of communication.
4) The presence of competing propaganda and. other
non-propaganda influences. 17
These form both the immediate factors with which, and
the parameters within which, a propagandist must work. To
a large extent, whether or not they are accurately
assessed, they shape the propaganda message. And this is,
or should be, a continuous process, taking account of the
constant flow of information, about public opinion (at
home and abroad, arid including the media here) and about
other government's views. Only by checking reactions
constantly can a propagandist assess whether his message
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is having the desired effect; whether changes need to be
made and in which direction; and which rival influences at
any particular time it will be necessary to counteract. 19
Within this broad framework both long term/strategic
aims and short term/tactical manoeuvres are planned and
executed. The long term optimum aim for a propagandist
must be to have his interpretation of reality/eventE
believed by his audience - no easy ask in a democracy with
varied sources of information. Nevertheless, even if his
interpretion of certain incidents is queried, it is vital
(and still possible) to aim for, and maintain, the general
long term goal of credibility. Without this attribute,
even if rival propaganda does not hold sway or begin to
gain ground (though this is unlikely), no propagandist's
message will be fully believed, or possibly, believed at
all.
Assuming that an operational level of credibility
exists (and although the ideal is to control completely
the picture an audience receives) then according to the
pressure of events, and probably, other viewpoints - both
fluctuating variables - the emphases in a propaganda
message can be altered to explain or counter particular
points. These are tactical manoeuvres, and they may or may
not be incorporated into the long-term propaganda message.
In an ideal propaganda world, whether or not they endure
would be under a propagandist's control: as the democratic
environment is far from ideal in this respect, it can
happen that what was envisaged as a short-term propaganda
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palliative must become a long-term aim because the point
is remembered and reiterated by influential sections of
the audience, for instance, the media or other
governments. This certainly happened during Vietnam War
when the question of negotiations came up. The
Administration made a statement on the matter, for a
variety of reasons, partly tactical, partly as a response
to public/media pressure, and thereafter had to keep
relating and interpreting many of its subsequent moves in
the light of its publicly expressed attitude to
negotiations. Ultimately the gulf between the
Administration's views on negotiations and its ways of
achieving such talks - primarily through escalation - and
its refusal of various opportunities for actual
negotiations (for a variety of reasons which were not
always entirely comprehensible to observers) proved
impossible for the Administration to reconcile, or the
public to accept.° (The precise aims of the Johnson
Administration's propaganda campaign, what it was trying
to achieve and the methods it used, are delineated In
Chapter 2).
The above forms the Immediate working environment for
a propagandist, but the fourth of Qualter's points
contains a very important factor, in addition to competing
propaganda: "other non-propaganda influences", Into this
category come a whole series of inter-connecting factors,
the most important of which is the international
environment that a propagandist must work in. Interwoven
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are historical, political and economic factors which
affect the way other nations view another nation's foreign
policy of war. And the way a particular nation's policy or
war is viewed by others can go some way to helping or
hindering that nation in its alms. In ensuring that his
nation's foreign policy or war is viewed as favourably as
possible by other nations, these other factors must be
taken into account by a propagandist. Not to do so -
unless the opinion of allies is of no interest (a rare
phenomenon) - is to court disaster.
C.) Organization of U.S. Propaganda
The principal agency for disseminating U.S.
propaganda abroad is the United States Information Agency
(USIA), with a headquarters in Washington and posts in
U.S. Embassies overseas. This is the agency which is
effectively intended to support the U.S. Administration's
foreign policy objectives, and more generally aims to
'sell' America to the rest of the world, 1 To aid USIA in
Its task of supporting American policy, USIA is
represented in a number of committees and groups with a
foreign policy-making function and thus there should be a
USIA contribution about propaganda issues to the
decision-making process.	 In theory this should provide
an adequate framework for using USIA's expertise both on
the likely reception of U.S. foreign policy decisions by
foreign governments and publics and in planning and
disseminating propaganda to foreign audiences, and for
this expertise to Influence U.S. foreign policy. However,
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for a number of reasons it appears that during this period
USIA's role in the foreign policy process was more that of
a supporter of policies already determined by Johnson and
his top advisers. Thus in his comparative study of the
United States' and United Kingdom's propaganda agencies,
Black noted that President Johnson used the formal
foreign-policy making machinery - in which USIA was
represented - less than his predecessor:
"President Johnson gradually tailored the
system for conducting U.S. foreign relations to
his own preferences. For example, he made even
less use of formal National Security Council
meetings than did his predecessor, preferring to
meet his top national security advisers more
informally.
Concerning the role that the President played in USIA's
status and role in the government, Black observed:
"The nature of the U.S. system of government
places the focus of attention regarding the
'executive branch' on one man - the President.
For the USIA, relations with the President are
particularly vital since the Agency's status and
place in the execution of foreign policy largely
depends on the Chief Executive's view of its
role and the support he provides. The USIA has
no domestic constituency or pressure group to
fight for it and hence the need for Presidential
support and interest becomes greater.
After describing the varying degrees of interest that
former presidents took In USIA, Black then assessed
President Johnson's view of USIA and its status under his
Administration:
"Under President Johnson interest in the Agency
again dropped and its status in official circles
appeared to suffer somewhat as a recult. From
his days in the Sonate, Lyndon Johnson had
displayed a less than enthusiastic view of the
Agency and its personnel and he tended not to
hide these feelings. Perhaps it was simply a
'let down' after the 'high flying' years which
immediately preceded, but under President
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Johnson the USIA appeared to lose some of the
'self-confidence' it had. begun to show only very
recently before.
Thomas Sorensen, a former deputy director of USIA during
Johnson's Administration put the case more bluntly, noting
that Johnson's viewed USIA as:
• .an oversized mimeograph machine spewing out
information, rather than as a source of expert
counsel in Washington and a means of persuasion
abroad. "
Endeavouririg to arrive at an overall assessment of USIA's
role In foreign-policy making, after a reorganisation
aimed at strengthening the Secretary of State's role in
l'tarch 1966, Black offered the following estimate:
"Apart from the knowledge that the USIA was a
full member of these various groups, it is as
yet difficult to assess the role it played In
their proceedings. It is probable, however, that
Agency participation did not have any great
impact on the particular policies under
consideration, but at least it provided an
opportunity to bring foreign opinion factors
directly Into the discussions.
Thus It appears that USIA, the Administration's
formal propaganda apparatus, played a secondary, rather
mechanical role during this period, with the President and
his advisers maintaining firm control of policy. This
estimate is corroborated In The Pentagon Papers, where
there is considerable evidence of Johnson's top advisers
considering the propaganda implications of declsons and
planning the public relations/propaganda campaign
accordingly.	 And in any case, as Black observed, the
U.S. government structure concentrates attention on the
President, and therefore, what the President, or his top
advisers said, constituted the highest-level expression of
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U.S. propaganda - USIA spread the word. Thus President
Johnson's and his top advisers' speeches and activities,
their press briefings and those of the departmental
spokesmen, informal talks with journalists, meetings with
other politicians, both domestic and foreign, all formed
the fabric of the U.S. official propaganda campaign during
the Vietnam War. Ultimately the primary burden of
justifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam devolved on Johnson
as Chief Executive. Thus domestic and foreign opinion
focussed on these speeches and press briefings and the
press reporting and analysis of them. Although USIA did
eventually assume a greater propaganda role in South
Vietnam, elsewhere in the field the Agency often appeared
ill-equipped to support U.S. policy if events in South
Vietnam moved at a faster pace than Washington's
policy-making - as frequently happened. 29 In this
situation, not only was the Agency bereft of policy
guidance, but the policy-makers themselves were left
floundering and the U.S. propaganda effort suffered as a
result.
However there was one other role which USIA played in
addition to supporting U.S. foreign policy, and that was
to act as a research service, commissioning public opinion
surveys and analysing world media treatment of major
issues from radio, wire service and Agency sources. Thus
the Administration was supplied with analysis of foreign
media reaction to its policies and actions concerning
Vietnam. °
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D.)	 ctors Aiding and Hindering American Propagandists
1.) The Image of America
One of the major factors affecting the planning of a
propaganda campaign is the way in which the propagandist's
country is perceived by other countries, that is, the
image that other countries hold of this country. This is
important because in general terms images can facilitate
or hinder the implementation of a state's policies, for
example by forming one of the factors influencing a
state's behaviour towards another state. In forming an
image of a particular state decision makers take into
account both the rhetoric and the current and past actions
of a state.1
In the case of America, one of the most potent images
aiding U.S. propagandists was that of American
'invincibility', This image was created primarily by U.S.
participation in World Wars I and II, America being
reckoned in each war to have made the decisive
contribution that brought victory to her allies. Despite
the post-World War II complexities of relations with the
communist countries and occasional diplomatic 'defeats',at
the time that U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened into
combat in 1965, America was popularly credited with never
having 'lost' a war.	 In addition to this, the other
enduring image associated with America, resulting from her
history and strengthened by her participation in World War
II against Hitler, was that of a state which pursued
'just' causes. Thus American involvement in Vietnam could
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be seen in the framework of past American actions aimed,
it was believed, at promoting 'justice' and ultimately
peace' •
The foundation of American 'Invincibility' lay in
America's wealth and economic power, expressed in the form
of world-wide commercial concerns, level of technology arid
possession of nuclear weapons. By virtue of the latter
America was a super-power, a determining force in
international relations along with the USSR. However, the
image created by U.S. wealth and technology was
potentially very much a double-edged weapon for U.S.
propagandists. On the one hand. this wealth bespoke huge
resources to pursue such policies as the U.S. chose to
espouse - including the Vietnam War - thereby adding to
the image of will and capability. And on the other hand
America's huge wealth could be seen as conferring a
disproportionate advantage in a regional conflict, that
is, America could be viewed as a rich 'bully' when facing
smaller, poorer nations. Also America's far-flung
commerical ventures, while being a natural part of a
trading nation's concerns, could easily be portrayed as
global exploitation and nec-colonialism by opponents of
America. Overall, American wealth could be seen to be
supporting an increasingly interventionist role in world
affairs against the background of America's post-World War
II foreign policy of 'containing' coiiimun1sm. 	 It was
primarily this image of American wealth allied to an
active foreign policy that frequently activated the latent
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anti-Axnericanism in other countries, an emotion that U.S.
propagandists had to try and counteract.
Another important factor in the American image in the
1960's was the battle over civil rights. The civil rights
disturbances forcibly highlighted the inequality and
discrimination that existed in American society and
focused attention on a particularly unsavoury aspect of
this society. Much of the propaganda explaining U.S.
support for South Vietnam, for example the claims about
fighting for democracy and freedom, contrasted very
strongly with events in America itself where a section of
society was still fighting for basic democratic rights.
As U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War both embodied
and affected most aspects of the American image, U.S.
propagandists had a wide-ranging and complex task to
either maintain favourable impressions of the U.S. or
influence other states' perceptions of the U.S. in the
desired direction.
ii.) British Factors Aiding American Propagandists
The British experience fighting the communist
insurgency in Malaya proved to be useful for U.S.
propagandists. Firstly, along with the Philippines
insurgency, it was thought to demonstrate that the West
could defeat a communist insurgency and thus boosted
confidence that the U.S. could do the same in Vietnam -
leaving aside the question of whether these sets of events
were similar. Secondly, on the basis of the success in
Malaya the Americans specifically sought to use
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counter-insurgency techniques in South Vietnam that had
been developed by the British in Malaya. In addition
President Kennedy and President Diem both used British
advice and expertise in the form of the British Advisory
Mission in Saigon. This Mission existed from 1961-1965
advising the South Vietnamese Government on pacification,
and the Mission's head, R.G.K.Thoinpson also advised
President Kennedy.	 When the Mission was disbanded in
1965, Britain continued to help train the South Vietnamese
police through the British Embassy in Saigon. So from
1961-1965 there was a tangible British commitment to South
Vietnam and this continued in a small way even after the
war escalated in 1965. This small amount of aid that
Britain granted to the South Vietnamese and Americans was
still useful to U.S. propagandists in that it could be
used to identify Britain with the South Vietnamese-U.S.
cause, despite Britain's position as co-Chairman of the
Geneva Conference.
Another factor aiding American propagandists with
regard to Britain was the 'special relationship' between
Britain and America. Although the warmth of this
relationship has varied considerably in different periods,
nevertheless in the 1960's British policy-makers acted on
the assumption that a 'special relationship' did exist,
indeed Harold Wilson took special pains to nurture the
relationship as Paul Foot notes:
"... the December confrontation (with the US
president] did not shake Wilson from his main
scheme: that an economic military and diplomatic
special relationship with the United States
should form the basis of British foreign policy.
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That had been the basis of Ernest Bevin's
foreign policy from 1945 to 1950 and It had., as
Wilson remembered it, worked very well indeed.
It had also carried distinct advantages for
Britain in the world's council chambers."7
Thus in general terms U.S. propagandists could expect
to encounter a more sympathetic climate in British
official circles than they might in other countries. In
addition, the close economic relationship that Prime
Minister Harold Wilson desired certainly did inaterialise:
the British economy was heavily dependent on American
support, primarily to avoid any devaluation of sterling.
Paul Foot sums up the results of this dependency:
"On 6 December, six weeks after he had assumed
office, Wilson set off for Washington with one
of the biggest retinues ever to accompany a
Prime Minister on a trip abroad. He clearly
regarded the confrontation with the American
President as crucial to the whole of Labour's
foreign policy - a foundation for the rebuilding
of a 'special relationship' in a constructive
and radical form. To his surprise, however,
Johnson was abrupt, almost rude. He harped again
and again on the sterling crisis and the dangers
to the international monetary system in a
British devaluation. He reminded Wilson that
while in crisis Britain depended almost entirely
on American support to keep sterling strong, and
urged the British Prime Minister to construct a
foreign policy in keeping with Britain's
economic situation. Wilson gave assurances
that Britain's 'commitments' in the Far East,
the 'defence' of Singapore and other expensive
idiosyncracies of Empire, would scrupulously be
maintained. Above all, he promised support for
the American cause in Vietnam."
The fact that Britain's economy was underwritten to
such a large extent by America underlined the latter's
role of senior partner in the relationship, with America
obviously wielding the greater amount of influence and
leverage. Wilson, however, had hopes that British support
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for America in Vietnam would confer the ability to
exercise some influence over U.S. policy in Vietnam.
Despite being made aware at the earliest stages of
escalation of the war that the U.S. had no intention of
being swayed by its British ally, Wilson nonetheless
persevered for some considerable time on these lines,
until the Administration bombed oil installations near
Hanoi and Haiphong in July 1966, and then helped to wreck
a British peace initiative in early 1967. The sequence of
events leading to the failure of this initiative further
soured relations, to some extent, between the two
countries. However, overall from 1965 to mid-1966
Britain's economic dependence on the U.S. coupled. with
Wilson's views on the 'special relationship' and on
supporting his U.S. ally in the hope of political
influence, meant that the official U.S. version of the war
was generally publicly supported by the British
Government.
The accession to power in 1964 of the Labour Party
with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister was also a particular
boon to the Americans, in that the Labour government could
support the U.S. without being instantly labelled
war-mongering or neo-colonlalist. Had the Conservatives
been in power it would have been much more difficult for
them - being identified with the right - to support the
Americans in Vietnam, had they been so inclined. As it
was, the Labour government, securely identified with
peaceful international traditions, rendered what
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assistance it wished to the Americans. In addition, Wilson
was aided in his policy of supporting the U.S. by the fact
that the first Labour government had a majority of only
five in the House of Commons. This Blender majority tended
to define the limit of Labour HPs' - even left-wing Labour
?tPs - opposition in the House to the government's
policies, since rebellion could have led to an
unnecessarily early election.
The above factors were of considerable importance to
U.S. propagandists, but they formed only part of the
picture, for there were also a number of British
experiences and perceptions which posed difficulties for
U.S. propagandists.
iii.) ritish Factors Hindering American Propagandists.
British factors hindering U.S. propagandists can be
divided into perceptions about the U.S.; perceptions about
U.S. war methods in Vietnam and about Vietnam in general;
and Britain's diplomatic role during the Vietnam War.
Prior to America's involvement in the Vietnam War, a
major source of British perceptions - particularly public
perceptions - about the U.S. lay in American involvement
in the two World Wars, especially the Second World War. At
a time when American soldiers were stationed in Britain
and were fighting alongside the Allies, the ordinary
British people gained more acquaintance with 'Americans'
than they would otherwise have been able to do. The
relationship between the British population and the
American troops and officials was complicated by the
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higher standard of living generally enjoyed by American
troops in Britain, for while the local population might
benefit, British troops were said to resent the disparity.
Although the conclusion reached by the British authorities
was that public reaction was favourable, nevertheless
there had been some anti-Americanism intially:
"The complaints and accusations levelled at
the American troops were many. They were said to
drink too heavily, to be boastful and
contemptuous of the British armed forces. . . to be
too highly paid, to corrupt young women, and to
practise discrimination against their black
comrades.
It is possible that the anti-Americanism that existed for
some time during the war could have grown again
afterwards, with America's further growth in wealth and
power. Thus British opinion polis on U.S. involvement in
Vietnam could have tapped a latent anti-Americanism in
some of the population rather than simple straightforward
opposition to the war. The U.S. Administration was aware
of this feeling in other nations when it followed opinion
on the war through the channels at its disposal: contacts
with foreign governments; Embassies; foreign media, both
print and broadcast; and USIA surveys of foreign opinion
on the war. Again, anti-Americanism, as well as attitudes
to authority in the youth of the 1960's, helped fuel the
anti-Vietnam War riots of this period.
Resentment of American wealth did not end with World
War II. On the contrary, America's rise in the world
wealth and power structure coincided with, and was fuelled
by, Britain's and the rest of Europe's decline. America's
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economic strength and acquisition of nuclear weapons put
her into the super-power category that Europe could not
now attain after the devastation wrought by the two world
wars. Thus both economically and politically Britain and
the rest of Europe could not play the international roles
they had done formerly: it was America which was now a
principal international actor. America's role in the world
was conditioned by and expressed through two major
concerns: firstly, her widespread trading ventures, called
neo-imperialism by some observers; and secondly her
anti-communism, expressed as it was in the Truman
Doctrine. Taken together these two concerns virtually
guaranteed a 'high profile' American presence in world
affairs. So In the 1960's American wealth and power could
provoke the same resentment in some sections of the
British population that it had during World War II, while
her new world role, so different now from Britain's, could
provoke accusations of interference in other nation's
affairs.
If the British public's attitude to America was
sometimes equivocal, exhibiting both support and
hostility, there was far less ambivalence about the
attitude of some sections of the Labour Party to the
America. Their political convictions were directly opposed
to everything America epitomised and the Vietnam War was
another issue to confront. Thus the Labour Government was
likely to come under pressure from these sections because
of its support for the U.S. on Vietnam.4
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Concerning U.S. war methods, the British experience
of bombing during World War II did pose some difficulties
for U.S. propagandists. For, according to National Opinion
Polls (NOP) in July 1966, although the British public
thought the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam
was justified, the public emphatically disapproved of any
bombing of civilian targets. And this view was expressed
when military targets around Hanoi and Haiphong - near the
civilian population - had been bombed for the very first
time.	 Interestingly, during this period of the war
(1965-1966), apart from general questions on support for
American policy or "American armed action" in Vietnam,
neither of the major polling organisations (NOP and
Gallup) in Britain investigated public reaction to U.S.
bombing in South Vietnam, where civilian casualties in
1966 were already much higher. One possible reason for
this apparent lacuna could be that it was assumed that
what America did in South Vietnam it did with its ally's
help and approval and was thus not a matter necessitating
an opinion poll.
Officially the British Government viewed the U.S.
bombing campaign as a legitimate method of fighting the
war and having assured the U.S. Administration of support
for the war it seemed unlikely that U.S. official
propagandists would need to be unduly concerned about the
reaction of this particular audience on this issue.
However, there were clearly stated limits to the British
Government's support for U.S. bombing: just as the British
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public disapproved of North Vietnamese civilian
casualties, so too did the Government. This meant that any
change in U.S. bombing targets which might involve the
civilian population could be expected to displease the
British Government - a potential problem which the U.S.
Administration had been made aware of by the British
Government itself. Thus, although this stance of the
British Government could pose difficulties for U.S.
propaganda - Britain being considered America's staunchest
supporter - there was advantage in the fact that the U.S.
would have known for some time beforehand and would not
therefore have been taken by surprise.
The bombing campaign was the most striking feature of
U.S. warfare in Vietnam, but there were also other aspects
which tended to focus attention more generally on the U.S.
effort in Vietnam. Firstly, there was the sophisticated
technology used, which was constantly developed throughout
the war. Although North Vietnam came to possess a
sophisticated air defence system which could pose problems
for the U.S. bombers, overall, U.S. technology was ranged
against an enemy using much more basic equipment in the
field. Secondly, there was the way in which the U.S.
military used this weaponry; in general their major
concern was to maximise the weaponry's destructive
capabilities, with apparently scant regard for the
consequences of such a policy. The 'gas warfare' incident
in March 1965 was reported to have been inspired partly by
the desire of a U.S. troop commander to minimise civilian
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casualties by declining to order a preparatory airstrike
on a suspect village. But to Britain and the world the
substitution of CS gas appeared scarcely more humane. The
logic which the Americans applied to fighting the war
seemed to leave little room for humanity, an approach
which on occasions disturbed foreign observers, as in the
case of this incident - ironic in view of the stated
reasons for using the gas. 47
Where perceptions of Vietnam generally were
concerned, most of the British public's Information came
from media sources and was only as comprehensive as the
source itself. Few people in Britain, apart from
journalists had first-hand knowledge of Vietnam, either
North or South. There were, however, a few Labour MP's who
did possess such knowledge, having visited the country in
1957. These KP's thus had a different basis from which to
view the U.S. Involvement and escalation - a different
yardstick by which to measure U.S. information, especially
on the origins of the present conflict.4
Lastly, one of the factors that U.S. propagandists
had to deal with and which should have tempered British
support for U.S. policies in Vietnam, particularly
military policy, was Britain's co-Chairmanship, with the
Soviet Union, of the Geneva Conference of 1954. This was
the reason put forward to Justify Britain's refusal to
accede to the U.S. request to send troops to Vietnarn.9
The co-Chairmanship committed both countries to finding a
diplomatic solution to the war even while they supported
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opposing sides (though the degrees of support differed
greatly), and in Britain the Government was frequently
urged to negotiate an end to the war.
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CHAPTER 2
lAIN LINES AID PROBLENS OF A](ERICAI PROPAGANDA OH THE VAR
The main problem that the Administration faced (a
problem that it inherited but thereafter increased far
beyond that legacy) and which made the Administration's
propaganda campaign a complex operation, was that it was
fighting an undeclared .and remote war during peacetime.
Though the North Vietnamese and Vietcong waged 'total
war', the effort made by the South Vietnamese varied and
the Americans certainly did not wage 'total' war. Except
for those either fighting the war, administering It, or
providing war materials for it, the majority of Americans
were not directly involved in the war. The tempo of their
lives continued undisturbed - unless they chose to concern
themselves with the morality of the conflict. The economy
of the country was not put on a war footing - guns and
butter could be provided, so said the Administration - and
politics revolved around a great many other problems in
addition to that of winning the war.
This, together with the type of war fought, had a
great impact on the type of information campaign that the
Administration pursued at home and abroad. Of course
propaganda policy was meant to complement the
Administration's war policy. The results frequently
backfired, but the initial aim, as with any such campaign,
was to control public opinion and to create a. climate
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enabling the Administration to prosecute the war to its
desired pattern. However, as the war dragged on the
Administration's aim rather than controlling public
opinion became increasingly that of placating public
opinion.
Continuing the low key approach that had
characterised past American involvement in South Vietnam,
Lyndon Johnson's Administration initiated an information
programme that laid great stress on information about the
enemy - their culpability, tactics and ultimate aims - but
which said far less about the Administration's aims and
tactics. The former stress would be expected, in order to
explain the reasons for the Administrations's broad
policy, but the lack of detail about the Administration's
own policy was intended to conceal its plans for
escalation and also avoid any possibility of public
pressure. 1 The aims that the Administration laid claim to
in the early stages of the conflict in 1965 appeared to be
quite modest: honouring its commitments (and previous
administrations' commitments) to South Vietnam in the
latter's fight to remain independent and free; standing
firm against communist North Vietnam's aggression,
although seeking "no wider war"; and generally ensuring
America's own security in repelling aggression in Asia. In
Johnson's simple language, the U.S. goal was "peace in
Southeast Asia" which would "come only when aggressors
leave their neighbors in peace."
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These aims, as well as forming the Administration's
early 'goals', also contained its initial public
articulation of the Administration's perception of the
conflict and will therefore be discussed in greater detail
later, when the accuracy and. utility of these perceptions
will be assessed. The point here is that though the
Administration gave some indication of its aims and
reasons for involvement in South Vietnam, nothing was said
publicly about how these vague phrases were to be
backed-up. In this way the Administration laid the
foundation for building up a picture of enemy aggression
and infiltration Into South Vietnam for its audience which
would justify any future action of the Administration. At
the same time care was taken to avoid either alerting or
alarming the audience into thinking that a major war was
in the offing. However, in case events should escalate,
the blame for any escalation was shifted in advance onto
the enemy, thus absolving the Administration of any
war-like intent, hence the oft-repeated slogan of the
Johnson Administration about seeking no wider war. Thus
early American official propaganda concentrated on
establishing a pattern of enemy action and American/South
Vietnamese reaction. This approach initially minimised the
American role in the war both as an initiator of events
and policies and also as a fighting partner in the
conflict. B
This pattern of concentrating attention on the enemy
was mirrored in the Administration's early method of
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presenting information during 1965. Announcements about
enemy actions or broad statements on American policy
regarding commitments to allies, or later, on
negotiations, were almost always the province of the top
echelons of the Administration - usually the President or
the Secretaries of State or Defense. Statements by these
figures were of course guaranteed wide coverage by the
media: the information -or lack of information - in their
statements would be dissected carefully. By contrast,
after the first reprisal bombing raids on North Vietnam in
February 1965, which were announced by the White House and
the President, information on the details of American
policy and actions on a daily basis, including the Rolling
Thunder bombing strikes, was frequently relayed by
relatively minor officials to the public. This would have
been a normal enough arrangement in a conflict, except for
the fact that some major American policy decisions were
introduced as mere changes in the details of a current
policy by these minor off icials.This 'low key' method of
announcing major decisions frequently caused a furore in
the press, thereby affording the Administration even more
unwelcome publicity than would have been engendered by a
top level announcement.
For instance, it was via a routine press conference
in June 1965 that the State Department Press Officer
announced the vital change in the role of American troops
in South Vietnam, from static defence of American
installations, to combat, Although initially the new role
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of the U.S. troops was to support the South Vietnamese
Army, when and where they were needed, this was recognized
by the press to be the thin end of the wedge and to signal
a major policy change. Not unnaturally the press,
particularly in America, was uniformly astounded, and in
most cases angry, to learn of this decision in this
manner. This 'quiet' approach to public information by the
Administration was also the subject of comment in British
newspapers, though in not so caustic terms as the U.S.
press, as befitted the press of a country not directly
involved in the conflict. However, even the Dai1y
Telegraph, a stalwart supporter of the Administration's
Vietnam policy, suggested in an editorial that President
Johnson would have to be more 'communicative', especially
now that casualties would start to mount, unless he wished
to find himself in serious trouble.
Occasionally this pattern of public relations
varied', but by and large the Administration's preferred
strategy was to flg.bt the war with as little publicity as
possible, though of course negotiation offers from the
Administration were usually well advertised. Unless a
particular action was likely to be so dramatic that it
could not be played down or disgulsede (and some of these
types of action were not recognised early enough by the
Administration) or unless the government had a particular
reason for desiring widespread publicity, then camouflage
was the usual practice.
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The results of this policy were certainly criticised
by the interested press in both America and Britain from
an early stage. However this criticism, in most cases, was
initially not levelled at the Administration in order to
demonstrate opposition to it and the war, but to convey
the feeling of confusion and uncertainty that the
Administration was engendering in its audience, and to
warn of possible adverse general public reaction if the
Administration was not more communicative. It was later in
the war that there was more general criticism in the
British press, centring on the war itself and U.S. methods
of fighting the war, for the British press did not have
the emotional pressures to support the Administration and
the war - come what may - that the American press
obviously had°. Though there was a feeling on occasions
that the Administration was being less than forthcoming
and telling less than the whole truth, it was not until
the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 that the
extent of the Administration's efforts to control the
public's perceptions of the conflict became apparent, and
of course the meticulous planning accompanying most stages
of the war.
So, for some considerable length of time the Johnson
Administration was able to count on the goodwill of the
press in America and Britain, resulting in a favourable
interpretation being put on most Administration statements
and actions, Any propaganda errors during this period
therefore were purely the result of official ineptitude
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and miscalculation, and not due to an intense and hostile
press scrutiny seeking to stir up trouble for, or
resentment against, the Administration and the war.
Indeed, the feedback that the American Government received
through the press should have been of great practical
value in alerting it to the aspects of information policy
requiring modification. Yet in comparatively few instances
did official statements appear at the right moment in
relation to public coiriment. Undoubtedly this is a
difficult exercise to accomplish without falling into the
trap of being accused of making statements purely for
press and public consumption, intended only to allay
public fears and not therefore intended to serve as a true
indication of policy. But somehow the Administration, even
though few of its statements were of such a timely nature,
fell into this trap with consummate ease. By the end of
1966 the historian Arthur N. Schlesinger could write:
"Expansive rhetoric is the occupational disease
o±Inational leaders. But serious leaders preserve
a relationship, however tenuous, between
rhetoric and reality. One cannot remember a more
complete disassociation between words and
responsibility than in the United States
Government today: Official speeches are always
manipulative in part, but now they are almost
nothing else,"11
Fortunately the press in America still generally
supported the Administration's stated aims in South
Vietnam and were therefore more inclined to give the
Administration the benefit of the doubt - unlike
Schlesinger - although their patience and faith were tried
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bard. But by this time the British press had Joined the
opposition to American involvement.
In brief the aims of American official propaganda
were:
First, to persuade its audience to perceive the
conflict as the Administration wished it to be perceived,
whether or not this view coincided with the actual
perceptions of the policy-making members of the
Administration.
Officially the war was a case of North Vietnamese
aggression - backed by China - against South Vietnam. In
setting the conflict within this framework the
Administration required that its interpretation of a
number of related facts be accepted: that the 17th
Parallel marked the boundary between two separate
countries, and that the North Vietnamese were therefore
violating South Vietnamese sovereignty, that is, that the
conflict was not a civil war. This view in turn required a
reinterpretation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements which had
stated that the 17th Parallel was a temporary demarcation
line, until reunification was achieved. The assumption
that the problem was caused by North Vietnamese aggression
necessitated a new look at South Vietnamese history and
current policies, in order to minimize the political unrest
in the south that had existed almost as long as the state
itself and to further deny the possibility that the
conflict had an affinity with, and the roots of, a civil
war. Additionally, the Administration obviously felt that
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it had to produce evidence for its audience of North
Vietnamese aggression and infiltration This was expected
to serve the purpose of absolving the Administration of
responsibility for escalating the war: the blame for this
was laid squarely on the North Vietnamese, while the
Administration insisted that it simply reacted each time
to a new, higher level of enemy activity. According to
this view of events, it was assumed that enemy aggression
conferred on the South Vietnamese the right to seek
assistance from its ally America and thus translated their
actions into self-defence. 1
The second requirement of American official
propaganda was to convince its audience of the necessity
for, and importance of, this war and the increasing
American commitment to it. All wars must be justified to
those required to fight it, even those wars in which the
population is under physical attack and in which immediate
catastrophe would follow defeat. A war fought as far away
as Vietnam was from America, in a land to which America
had not had a long-standing commitment, and during which
the American population would never be attacked, required
careful handling from the start. Thus the Administration
emphasised the importance of the Vietnam war in an
international context. The war was portrayed as a test
case for all national wars of liberation rather than just
a localised conflict, and was also effectively presented
as being subject to the domino theory: to lose the Vietnam
war, so the Administration's argument ran, would expose
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the surrounding countries to communist subversion and
subsequent conquest. The primary threat to U.S. and world
stability was seen to come from China, and according to
the Administration, what was threatened by Chinese
ambitions in Southeast Asia was not only South Vietnam's
independence, but also American national security and
peace in general, and it was these high stakes that
necessitated the commitment to Vietnam.
President Johnson apparently believed in this thesis, for
in his memoirs the UN Secretary General U Thant observed
after meeting Johnson:
"I do not remember having met any head of state
or head of government so informal and warm
toward me, and at the same time so juvenile in
his concept of international developments. He
once told me that if South Vietnam were to fall
to the communists, then the next target would be
Hawaii! SI 1 &
The projection of a regional and then a global
framework onto the conflict increased its importance
beyond the immediate boundaries of the war. Those
countries in the vicinity such as South Korea, the
Philippines and two further away, Australia and New
Zealand, felt themselves justified in actually joining in
on the South Vietnamese side, on the assumption that if
South Vietnam fell then they would be next in line. If on
occasion a more concrete factor was needed for
justification, then the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty
Organisation) Treaty was cited as the legal basis for
Intervention, requiring that allies render what assistance
they could to South Vietnam.
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America's European allies, while far enough away to
avoid being engulfed in the first wave of falling
dominoes, nevertheless took a keen interest in the outcome
and rendered all the verbal assistance that they felt
America's efforts on their behalf demanded, apart from
France which deplored the U.S. commitment. Occasionally
the Administration made it known that it considered its
European allies and audience - especially the British - to
be taking insufficient action towards securing their own
future in the face of the communist menace: diplomatic
solidarity was the least the Europeans could provide, but
troops would have been a more convincing indicator that
they appreciated the importance of the war. 17
One of the problems in pursuing this propaganda line
though, was that while the Administration wished to raise
its audience's consciousness of the war's importance in
order to secure support, it did not want the audience too
concerned about the possibility of a general conflagration
resulting from America'a involvement in Vietnam. Not, that
is, if this resulted in public discussion of a possible
World War III and so generated pressure on America to
negotiate, rather than generalised pressure on the
communists. 1 This was a classic case for a test of a
propagandist's skills: the need to be able arouse a
sufficient degree of fear/concern in the audience and then
to be able to control and channel the concern in the way
desired by the propagandist, that is, to support the
propagandist's policies.
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The other strands in the Administration's arguments
on the value of the war centred on its commitments to its
South Vietnamese ally, and. by extension, its commitments
to its other allies. The Johnson administration justified
its actions partly by referring to three previous
President's pledges to South Vietnam, stating that this
present administration had inherited the problem of
Vietnam, not made it. The corollary to this view was that
while the current policies for solving the Vietnam problem
might differ in degree from previous policies,
nevertheless they were essentially of the same kind. This
line of defence was used by the Administration against any
observers who questioned in any way the commitment to
South Vietnam (the substance of such questioning is
discussed later) and for a while this explanation was
generally accepted by its audience. 1 Elaborating on this
theme American official propaganda also wove in the idea
that if the former commitment to South Vietnam were to be
reneged on, then other allies around the world would
immediately begin to doubt the American will to honour
other treaty obligations. Defeat in Vietnam might then
cause these same nations to doubt the American capability
to help others.°
Thirdly, the last broad goal of the Administration's
propaganda effort was to try and convey the lasting
impression - despite any actions pointing to a different
conclusion - that its intentions were peaceful and that
the use of force was a justified last resort. In this way
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the escalation of the conflict was blamed on the
coxrmiunists: if the Administration desired peace, then war
was obviously not its fault. Subsequent escalatory steps
were similarly explained away with the added justification
that each step was in search of peace.	 And the
Administration certainly hoped that that each new
escalatory step would bring 'peace' on its terms. 	 The
danger was that observers would finally realise that the
Administration's actions could only be seen as
straightforward escalation rather than 'peace' steps or
reaction to communist originated escalation. This in turn
would pose a problem for the Administration on the issue
of negotiations, for if U.S. policy was perceived to be
offensive rather than defensive then observers might also
perceive U.S. policy itself as an obstacle to
negotiations, and public pressure could then build up for
the Administration to modify its policy in order to
achieve such negotiations. 2
The lack of negotiations was publicly said to be the
result of communist intransigence. The explanation for the
coininuni.st attitude tied in neatly with Administration
views on escalation. It was agreed that as long as the
communists felt they could win the war outright (the
monsoon season was said to be their best period) then they
would not negotiate. So the logical outcome for U.S.
policy of such a projection of the communists' strategic
thinking was to demonstrate to them that they could not
achieve a military victory. Hence the numbers of troops
64
poured in and the progressive tightening of the screw
through air strikes: it was argued that once the North
Vietnamese realised the error of their aggression and
ceased fighting, then the Administration would stop the
bombing that the communist bad made necessary in the first
place. 4 There were two bombing pauses in this period, in
May 1965 and December 1965/January 1966, during which the
Administration said that it was waiting for a sign from
the North Vietnamese that they were willing to bargain,
but for one reason or another privately, and one reason
publicly - the communist refusal to negotiate - these
opportunities, caine to nothing.
To further complicate the issue - and this issue did
appear murky despite the Administration's repeated attemps
to simplify It for public consumption - the attitude of
China was initially assumed, by both the Administration
and observers, to be crucial in determining the success or
failure of negotiation bids.	 In addition, as Soviet aid
to the North Vietnamese increased, the Administration had
to ponder the Kremlin's ideas of what was In Hanoi's, and
Its own, best interests. The practical effect of
apparently having to deal with at least two, and sometimes
three countries' ideas on negotiations should have been a
propaganda bonus for the Administration. For some
considerable time it was, because the confusion and
disagreement concerning the issue of negotiations that
surfaced publicly from time to time between the communist
countries Involved - particularly in the context of the
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ideological rivalry between Russia and China - was
perceived to constitute an obstacle that would have to to
be overcome before negotiations could start. And while
Hanoi was seen to be heavily influenced in its policy by
Peking, which flatly rejected talks, then the
Administration hardly needed to say much more to be able
to put the onus on the communists for the lack of progress
towards negotiations.	 While this was happening,
Communist statements were invaluable for American
propagandists.
The various devices that were used in American
official propaganda to build up the desired image of the
war will now be discussed in detail, together with the
problems that U.S. official propagandists faced. Some of
these problems were simply a part of the war, while others
were created by the propagandists.
A.) Historical Aspects and Analogies
1.) The Geneva Agreements of 1954
The most striking feature of both the American and
the North Vietnamese public negotiating positions was that
they agreed that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 formed an
acceptable basis for peace. Both countries argued that if
the other side had honoured these Agreements then there
would have been no conflict and hence, a return to the
Agreements now would remove the cause for hostilities.
However, this was as far as their mutual understanding
extended: their interpretations of the provisions of the
1954 Agreements differed radically, as might be expected
6from opponents claiming the same source as authority for
their actions.
The American interpretation initially laid its
greatest emphasis on the independence of South Vietnam -
as a political entity. Thus the provisional demarcation
line of the 1954 Agreements became an International
boundary for the South Vietnamese and Americans, and South
Vietnam, rather than being a part of a temporarily divided
country, became a sovereign state. Elections to reunite
North and South Vietnam should have been held in 1956, but
were not. The then head of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh diem,
refused, with American support, to hold them, claiming
that the conditions for free and fair elections did not
pertain; that is, that North Vietnam would rig the
elections. However, several times after Diem's repeated
refusal to cooperate in the matter of elections, the North
Vietnamese contacted the Geneva Conference co-Chairman to
complain about the deadlock and pressed for country-wide
elections. 9
 Whether or not the South Vietnamese and
American claim about probable election rigging could be
supported by reference to the Geneva Agreements, the fact
is that for future propaganda purposes the South's refusal
to participate in any election arrangements was a decision
that might be hard to justify in anything but a favourable
climate of opinion. It was also a major potential, if not
at the time actual, propaganda weapon for the North
Vietnamese. While the American and South Vietnamese
version of events was trusted, then factors such as these
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might remain hidden, or if known might be overlooked in
favour of the overall American interpretation. However,
these actions and interpretations could be difficult to
defend when set against the provisions of the 1954
Agreements.
Additionally, the Administration's method of handling
infringements of the Geneva Agreement provisions was to
highlight North Vietnamese violations while omitting any
mention of its own and South Vietnam's transgressions.
Again, while the Administration was trusted as a source of
information on the conflict, then its version of this
aspect prevailed; but there was easily-available
documentary evidence of the infringements committed by
both sides in the dispute. This fact alone should have
been enough to make the Administration take a more
accurate approach to such allegations. However, not
content with simply living with documents which could, if
quoted in full, cause doubts to be registered which might
then influence attitudes to future official explanations,
the Administration actually used one such report to
buttress its own case. Through the simple expedient of
quoting only the sections of the International Control
Commission's report dealing with North Vietnam, the sole
blame for violating the treaty and the origins of the war
were traced back to the North Vietnamese decision to
intervene in South Vietnam's affairs and to support the
Vietcong.1
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This method used. by the Administration to justify its
course of action is a difficult one to handle even in the
best of conditions. The 'best' of conditions would consist
in the type of information control exercised by
totalitarian regimes, where the full report would never be
available to any section of the public, merely selected
quotations. For the Administration to try and use this
method in an environment in which censorship could never
be imposed on the relevant document, either at home or
abroad, was short-sighted, at the very least.
Nevertheless, due to a general early presumption in favour
of the American and South Vietnamese cause, this ploy
worked with most observers, for a while. 2 However, as
with the earlier examples of American interpretation, this
approach was quite obviously potentially damaging to the
Administration - even more so, because this was deliberate
distortion and, therefore, not even dependable as one
government's perception/interpretation against another
government's version. Again, this particular element was
used. as an important part of the Administration's
arguments in proving North Vietnamese culpability.
However, once it was pointed out that both sides had
infringed the Geneva Agreements, then this alone could
damage the Administration's credibility in the eyes of the
public.
ii,) The Lessons of Munich and Korea
The theme of aggression was a major component of the
Administration's propaganda campaign. Obviously North
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Vietnamese aggression was the foremost element to be
stressed, and its effects, if it was to continue
unchecked, explained to the public. China's - and
subsequently the Soviet Union's - support for the
Vietcong/North Vietnamese immediately widened the scope of
the aggression and the propaganda framework was
correspondingly widened. The conflict was thus pictured as
a vital episode in the fight to preserve freedom and
democracy and to stem the advance of world communism, In
this way the Administration linked and. likened the
onslaught of the communist 'bloc' to that of the Axis
powers before and during World War II: 'Munich' was used
as a propaganda device that operated on several levels. 4-
Firstly it was intended to recall explicitly the
dishonour associated with that event, particularly since
World War II; the betrayal of a country which led
inexorably - the general feeling is now - to the later
miseries of the war, By the same token it also summed-up
the short-sightedness of the policy of appeasement - not
only was it dishonourable but it also failed to check the
appetite of the aggressor; indeed it merely increased
Hitler's desire for, and expectation of, further triumphs.
Thus the emotions of Munich - shame, failure and stupidity
- were transferred and translated by the Administration
into a refus&Z to commit the s.me mistake in the Vietnam
War.
Secondly, the linkage of Munich and South Vietnam, in
attributing to North Vietnam and China (and world
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cornniunisin) the expansionist and unlimited desires of
Hitler's regime, was intended to legitimise American
actions, not only on behalf of South Vietnam but also on
behalf of other American allies - throughout the world.
The struggle in Indochina was invested with the same
historical significance as World War II, with the
difference that the aim now was the prevention of another
war on that scale, by, if necessary, fighting a smaller
war first.
Thirdly, 'Munich' at the time meant the destruction
and denial of freedom in one particular country and the
later fight to retain freedom and democracy in others.
Used in connection with South Vietnam, 'Munich' symbolized
the will of, and necessity for, the Americans and. South
Vietnamese to fight for the same freedom and democracy,
but without the initial betrayal that 'Munich' also
represented. This particular analogy was much used in
Administration rhetoric, whether the primary purpose of a
statement was to stress peaceful intentions or a
determination to pour men and money into the conflict:
most Adminstration statements on the war included both of
these elements. Two important occasions, when Lyndon
Johnson used the 'Munich' analogy occurred during 1965.
The first speech, at Johns Hopkins University in April,
contained the Administration's offer of 'unconditional'
discussions, but also included the following words:
"We are also there because there are great
stakes in the balance, Let no one think for a
moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an
end to the conflict. The battle would be renewed
in one country and then another. The central
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lesson of our time is that the appetite of
aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from
one battle field means only to prepare for the
next. We must say in Southeast Asia - as we did
in Europe - in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto
shalt thou come, but no further.'"
Approximately four months later at the end of July,
in an address announcing an increase in the number of
combat troops destined for South Vietnam, the necessity
for additional troops later and, therefore, an increase in
the draft over a period of time, Johnson again used the
'Munich' analogy as a justification and an emotional
rallying call:
"We did not choose to be the guardians at the
gate, but there is rio one else.
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace,
because we learned from Hitler that success only
feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle
would be renewed in one country and then another
country, bringing with it perhaps even larger
and crueler conflict, as we have learned from
the lessons of history."
The use of such emotive events is intended to
short-circuit thought among the audience - to produce
feeling from hearing, not analysis. For along with the
analogy - if It is at all apt or relevant - comes a set of
emotions and values that are shared, if the correct
calculations have been made by the propagandist, among the
audience. 7 The danger of course when using this type of
basic propaganda technique is that it is open to attack on
the grounds that the sets of circumstances are totally
different and have no bearing on one another - even if the
events bear sufficient resemblance to make an analogy
resonably apt. The analogy Is useful for only so long as
it stirs up the required sympathy and identification with
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a cause. But if sympathy begins to wane in an audience
generally and, or, there are observers (who need not
necessarily be critics) capable of analysing official
rhetoric and making their views known more widely, then
this particular propaganda technique is probably the
easiest and weakest link in the chain of arguments to
attack.
Korea (and also, sometimes, Greece, Iran, Turkey, the
Philippines, Indonesia, the Formosa Strait, Cuba, and
Lebanon), which was at least in the same part of the world
as Vietnam, was referred to as a successful example of
curtailing aggression through firmness. Again, the use of
this war analOgy simply assumed that the two events, Korea
and Vietnam, were similar. The picture was blurred by
concentrating mainly on the aspects of aggression and
freedom:
"In the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia and
elsewhere we were on the side of national
independence. For this was also consistent with
our belief in the right of all people to shape
their own destinies.
That principle soon received another test in
the fire of war. And we fought in Korea, so that
South Korea might remain free.
Now, in Vietnam, we pursue the same principle
which has infused American action in the Far
East for a quarter of a century."9
This statement was a masterly piece of obfuscation.
South Vietnamese political wrangling was ignored; and the
roots of the conflict were assumed to lie in aggression by
another state - not a part of a temporarily divided
country. By the same implication the principle at stake
was the right of the South Vietnamese to their national
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independence. Finally, the differing nature of the two
wars was ignored. The Korean War began through a
straightforward invasion of South Korea and a series of
conventional engagements, as opposed to the origins of the
Vietnam War, which the Administration, despite its later
propaganda, had earlier acknowledged to be an
insurgency°, but which it now claimed was overwhelmingly
a product of North Vietnamese and Chinese territorial
ambition.
In addition, the Korean experience was used when the
subject of negotiations was raised by the Administration,
or discussed by the press. This example was cited both by
obervers who were general supporters of U.S. involvement
In the war, and those less enthusiastic about some aspects
of the venture.' The lesson learned then, and reiterated
during the Vietnamese War, centred on the negotiations in
1951 in Panmunjom. These negotiations dragged on for two
years during which time, it was felt, the communists took
unfair advantage of the supposed lull and continued to
wage war by way of numerous local engagements along the
front line. Whenever negotiations were mentioned in the
context of Vietnam, Panmunjom and the loss of American and
allied lives were cited, or implied, to justify the
Administration's pre-negotiation stance: cessation of
North Vietnamese/Vietcong infiltration into, and activity
in, South Vietnam before American bombing would stop and
negotiations could begin on how to achieve a durable peace
with an Independent South Vietnam able to determine its
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own future, Notwithstanding these terms, the
Administration publicly insisted that it was always ready
for 'unconditional discussions'. But the Administration's
stance was later undermined on two grounds: firstly that
it was setting conditions for talks with the North
Vietnamese; and secondly that while conducting
'unconditional discussions' the Administration would
continue to bomb North Vietnam.
iii.) The French Connection
America entered into its commitments to South Vietnam
by way of aiding the French in their effort to defeat Ho
CM Minh's Communist regime, between the years 1946-1954.
After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 and
the subsequent temporary partition of Vietnam, the
Americans then became the principal supporters of South
Vietnam. France quietly faded from that scene to engage in
the Algerian Civil War, which lasted until 1962. After the
end of that war France became much more active in
international diplomacy, re-emerging vigorously at about
the time that the Administration's commitment to South
Vietnam hardened into the aerial bombing of North Vietnam
and subsequent actions.
The effects of the links between France, South
Vietnam and America were important in propaganda terms.
For the Americans could be seen as following in the
footsteps of the French, who had fought a war against the
Vietininh - after signing a Treaty in 1946 recognising the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free state within the
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French Union. During World War II numbers of former
colonies assumed that they would gain national
independence once the war was over. Under Ho Chi Minh, the
Vietminh had given some aid to the Americans against the
Japanese, on the assumption that Vietnam would afterwards
gain some form of autonomy. During World War II, America
certainly championed the cause of national independence
which meant the disintegration of the colonial empires,
primarily of France and Britain. 	 Yet from 1950 onwards
America poured vast sums of money (paying for 80 percent
of the French war effort in Vietnam according to some
estimates) into helping the French regain a foothold in
part of its empire. 4 Of course America could claim that
it was still supporting a decolonisation, for the French
had been forced to take note of some nationalist demands
and had set up a Vietnamese government in 1949. This, as
Bernard Fall remarks in Vietnam Witness, transformed "what
had been essentially a colonial war into a civil war".
However, considering that the new Vietnamese chief of
state installed by the French was the former Emperor Bao-
Dal - who had even been retained in that capacity when the
Japanese granted "nominal" independence to Vietnam almost
at the end of the Second World War - the new state and
its head seemed both artificial and a creature of the
French.
While the Cold War existed and various moves by the
Communist bloc added to the atmosphere of tension between
East and West, then the American emphasis on the
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containment of Communism as being the most important goal
to pursue could be seen to be aimed at keeping other
regions free - that is, non-communist. However, in
pursuing this goal America would always be open to the
basic criticism - and a criticism hard to counteract -
that America's very foundations and ideals were being
compromised in the types of regimes that the U.S.
Administration was supporting in its anti-communist
'crusade' and in the effects on the countries in which the
battles were fought. And where its commitment to Vietnam
was concerned, the Administration was aware that America
itself might appear to the Vietnamese in the guise of the
old colonial power of France.7
In addition to being labelled as France's successor
in Indochina, the Americans had another spectre haunting
them which gained public mention. This concerned the
general chaos which constituted the First Indochina War
leading to the defeat of the French.	 However once the
American war machine swung into action and despite the
periodic gloomy press assessments of the war, it was
expected that American military might would eventually
prevail over the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. 4 However,
as the war dragged on, seemingly ever more confusing and
frustrating, doubts began to grow on this score and were
aired in the press.
B.) Political Aspects
i.) The Administration's View of China, National
Liberation Wars and the Domino Theory
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Early in the war the most frequent method used by the
Administration to connect the North Vietnamese with China,
was to lay the emphasis on North Vietnamese aggression
backed by China. In this way China featured in most
statements containing references to North Vietnam; to a
large extent the two countries were treated as
inseparable, as in Johnson's announcement on 28 July,
1965:
"But we must not let this mask the central
fact that this is really war. It is guided by
North Viet-Nam, and it is spurred by Communist
China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to
defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic
dominion of communism,
Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield.
If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam,
then no nation can ever again have the same
confidence in American promise or in American
protection. "'
This version of events was sometimes reflected in the
press and occasionally made its appearance in a stronger
form. In November 1965 for example, the New York Times,
after a brief reference to the growth of the war, stated
in an editorial:
"All the time there are the Communist Chinese,
sitting back calmly without losing a man; yet
Communist China is the real opponent in Asia."
The corollary of the view of China as the real enemy
or driving force behind North Vietnam was that when the
question of negotiations was discussed, the attitude of
China was assumed to be crucial. Given that Chinese
rhetoric could only be described as abusive where America
was concerned, the response of the Chinese to any American
moves - whether these moves concentrated on war or peace -
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was generally predictable. This was of great value to the
Administration, for after American bombing pauses or
speeches about possible discussions, the Chinese could
invariably be relied upon to heap scorn upon these
gestures, thereby exonerating the Administration's policy
in the eyes of the West.	 The depiction of North
Vietnam's refusals of U.S. negotiating terms, or peace
moves, varied: sometimes Hanoi was depicted as following
its own course in such refusals; sometimes the heavy hand
of Peking was detected.	 Whichever view was taken, the
Administration's protestations that it was genuinely
searching for a negotiated solution were believed for a
considerable length of time. This was no mean feat for a
government which, to mention but a few incidents:
initially ruled out negotiations in the early part of
1965; turned down a peace proposal in that year by the
Secretary General of the United Nations; was publicly
stated to be 'cool' towards its principal ally's peace
efforts (that is, Britain's); and quoted conditions and
stipulated an end result of negotiations - that is, South
Vietnamese independence - terms which were largely
characterised in the press, following the Administation's
viewpoint, as 'unconditional'. 	 The following example of
press reporting illustrates many of these features. Under
the headline, 'America Cannot Lose By Viet-Nam Offer:
China Target of Talks', the Daily Telegraph's Washington
correspondent wrote two days after President Johnson
presented his Baltimore peace plan on '7 April 1965:
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"The American Government expects to benefit no
matter what happens to its offer to negotiate
now on Viet-Nam without any pre-conditions on
either side...
Officials in Washington were confident today
that if it does not get a ride on the
negotiating roundabout, it will have its turn on
the propaganda swing. If negotiations get under
way, there is the prospect of a settlement that
would meet the American desire for South-east
Asia.
From the view as China as the main driving force
behind North Vietnamese actions it was only a short step
to the idea that the principle motivation behind American
actions was the containment of Chinese expansionism. This
was a view that made its appearance in this form in the
media.' However, any fears that the U.S. intention of
frustrating China's aims might lead to war with China were
countered by the Administration's insistence that it
sought no wider war, and in practical terms by its careful
control of the bombing of North Vietnam - away from the
Chinese border. For as stated previously, the U. S.
Administration needed a sufficient knowledge of, and
interest, in the war from its audience in order for it to
support the government's viewpoint and actions. But what
the U.S. Administration did not require, or want, was the
level of interest and alarm that could be generated
through the impression that America and China might be
teetering on the brink of a shooting war.
As the war progressed, some members of the
Administration developed a more subtle approach to China's
role in the war and hence its global and regional role.
But although the new approach loosened the virtually
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automatic link that had previously been made between North
Vietnamese actions/aggression and Ghinese influence,
nevertheless it still tied the war neatly to national wars
of liberation and via this to China's influence regionally
and globally.
This change in approach may have been helped by the
great increase in Soviet aid to Hanoi from mid-l966,
although according to Kahin and Lewis, Russia had "always
been the North's principal suppliers&o, and also the
increasing acrimony between Russia and China. 	 Bearing
these factors in mind it could be argued that the earlier
American view of China's role would have to have been
modified to correspond more to this new reality. It could
also be the case, however, that tying China so closely to
the origins and progress of the conflict was
counter-productive: that approach certainly helped to
concentrate attention on the conflict and its wider
implications and this was not always useful to the
Administration.
Thus the new line, from the point of view of
propaganda, was an improvement on earlier versions. It was
rather vague on China' s exact role and was therefore more
difficult for opponents to challenge. Also it was probably
a more accurate reflection of the then current situation,
yet still incorporated one of the Administration's main
propaganda lines on national wars of liberation.
The other main component of the Administration's view
of the dynamics of Southeast Asian relations was the
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domino theory and linked to national wars of liberation it
was a mainstay of American official propaganda during the
Vietnam War.	 The concept of Southeast Asian nations
being a row of dominoes that would automatically fall if
South Vietnam was lost to communism, was a rigid,
mechanistic theory that took little account of each•
nation's individual circumstances, and it was therefore
easily attacked on these grounds by critics. Nevertheless
the Administration still clung to this theory and it was
used in various attenuated forms to explain and legitimise
the U.S. commitment to the war, and also to recruit
support for the U.S. involvement.
ii.) The Image of the South Vietnamese Government and.
'Democracy' and 'Freedom'
The major problem facing American propagandists
concerning South Vietnam centred on the relationship
between America and South Vietnam. American aid to its
ally was on a vast scale; American force levels rose
dramatically in 1965 arid continued to rise throughout
1966, as did the amount of weaponry that these troops
wielded; and South Vietnam's economy was receiving va9t
amounts of U.S. aid. 	 The only sphere of life which
appeared to be free of American control was the political
arena, and though nominally the most important sphere in
national life, the result here was a mainly South
Vietnamese shambles with American assistance. In theory
the relationship between the two states was that of
sovereign equals and thus, at least publicly, American
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actions and rhetoric were limited by the attributes of
South Vietnamese sovereignty. Additionally, because North
Vietnamese and Vietcong propaganda always referred to
South Vietnam as America's puppet state, it was necessary
to counter this by stressing South Vietnam's independence
of America. So the question of American influence in South
Vietnamese affairs via America's aid and war effort was a
delicate one for propagandists to tackle. Their task was
to portray a newly independent nation, ready and willing
to fight an enemy which was being heavily reinforced and
armed by another nation - North Vietnam - and also
equipped by other outsiders, that is China and Russia; and
all these circumstances thus laid the burden on America of
helping its gallant ally in a hitherto unequal struggle.
Impressions that America was the prime war-maker, even if
these were a more accurate reflection of reality, were
unwelcome. Yet even in the information field, leaving
aside the battlefield, the Americans assumed the greater
role, even in South Vietnam itself:
"In conducting massive psychological efforts to
counter insurgency against the existing regime
in South Vietnam, the Agency [United States
Information Agency) is performing a i-ole which
would normally be carried out by a government
with its own people. Although attempts are being
made by USIA personnel to train local government
officials to take over this responsibility, they
are not as yet very successful, for the
population of Vietnam is not too nationally
oriented and lacks motivation to learn to do
what USIA is now doing for it."
The assumption by the Americans of the major role in
the information field simply on the basis of their greater
experience would have constituted enough of a drawback,
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when they were trying to portray South Vietnam's
independence and willingness to fight all aspects of the
war. Still, had the Americans been acting primarily as
tutor to a willing pupil, their lop-sided relationship
would have held some future hope of the South Vietnamese
Government network running perhaps one aspect of the war
on Its own. However, judging from the above assessment by
United States Information Agency (USIA) officials, the
South Vietnamese were both unwilling pupils and to a large
extent lacked a sense of identity with their republic,
proclaimed 12 years earlier. There is, of course, the
possibility that these government officials were lukewarm
about South Vietnam because they were more oriented to the
concept of a wider nation which included the North. There
is also the liklihood that the leadership in Saigon
inspired neither confidence nor loyalty, being drawn
mainly from the top echelons of society with a high
proportion originally hailing from the North and adhering
to the Catholic religion.	 This all suggests that in
addition to the gulf between the Saigon leadership and the
mass of South Vietnamese peasants, there was also a divide
between the South Vietnamese leadership and its own
lower-ranking government officials.
Whatever the reason for this lack of South Vietnamese
national feeling, American propaganda consistently
emphasised those very qualities which USIA privately
believed were virtually non-existent. And the U.S.
Administration devoted much rhetoric to trying to convince
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its various audiences that South Vietnam was a nation.
Here the Administration was, of course, caught in the
usual cleft stick: To admit that the South Vietnamese were
unenthusiastic about their nationhood destroyed one of the
major pillars of American propaganda - that this was a
case of nation fighting for survival against an outside
aggressor. The only way out of the dilemma was to stress
the newness of the South Vietnamese nation and the
difficulties caused by North Vietnamese aggression. A more
sophisticated official explanation of American
intervention in the war centred on the thesis that South
Vietnam needed time to sort out its problems and American
troops were helping to buy that time by staving off the
North Vietnamese and Vietcong.
	
Obviously this still left
open the question of South Vietnamese 'motivation' , or the
lack of it, but as an explanation at least it avoided some
of the pitfalls that previous statements were subject to
and thus did not actively erode what credibility the
Administration retained.
Logically the central part of American government
propaganda should have been concerned with South Vietnam
itself, for America claimed to be fighting to preserve
South Vietnam's independence. Much of the Administration's
propaganda campaign did revolve around South Vietnam.
However, rather than lauding the achievements of South
Vietnam, it was mostly aimed at counteracting the
published details of the more unfortunate aspects of its
ally's behaviour. Naturally the Administration would have
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preferred to say nothing about the darker side of its
commitment, but in the absence of systematic censorship on
information leaving South Vietnam, the Administration was
frequently forced into commenting on the latest press
allegations about the South Vietnamese leadership or Army
and thereby added to the publicity and controversy.
One of the most prominent features of South
Vietnamese political life, which could scarcely be
ignored, was the tendency for unsatisfactory goverments to
be replaced through the machinery of the coup. In the last
analysis the South Vietnamese armed forces were the judges
of which faction should be in power at any given moment,
while other political forces such as the Buddhists and
students could, on occasions, create sufficient chaos to
make yet another change of government inevitable, or
alternatively, force their set of demands on the
government. During the first half of 1965 there were
approximately eight severe political crises in Saigon,
involving three changes of government. 	 While 1966 began
promisingly, with Prime Minister Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen
Cao Ky offering a referendum which would lead to a new
constitution and elections in 1967 for a civilian
government, it then deteriorated with a political crisis
beginning around 10 March that lasted until the middle of
June. In order to regain control of Danang and Hue and
quell the South Vietnamese dissident factions, the Saigon
leadership had to use the South Vietnamese Army. While Hue
was still under Buddhist control the United States
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Information Service (USIS) library and cultural centre and
the U.S. Consulate and Residence were attacked and
burned. 70 In short, the image that South Vietnam presented
to the world was one of chronic instability, with the war
against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese taking
second place to domestic political in-fighting.
This one aspect alone was enough to cause observers
to question Administration statements that American troops
were fighting to preserve democracy and freedom in South
Vietnam. Also, Johnson's tactic, when under pressure, to
invoke the pledges that earlier administrations had made
to the then South Vietnamese Government, was inclined to
boomerang when commentators enumerated the changes of
government that bad taken place in Saigon and suggested
that the original pledges to a specific government were
rapidly becoming an open-ended commitment to any Saigon
'government'. When the Administration broadened the
American commitment so that it embraced the South
Vietnamese people, as opposed to just the South Vietnamese
Government, this proved a scarcely more satisfactory way
of either explaining American policies or deflecting
criticism. For as observers pointed out, the wishes of the
South Vietnamese people were hard to deduce from the
political chaos in South Vietnam - unless the chaos itself
was taken as an indication of their wishes - for South
Vietnam was not a democracy and in addition the Vietcong
and North Vietnamese controlled large portions of the
87
countryside, so the chances of the people being able to
express their true wishes were indeed remote.71
The very fact that the Administration could state
that to win this war it was necessary to win the battle
for the 'hearts and minds' of the people suggested that at
best the latter were uncertain as to where their
sympathies lay. However, amidst this uncertainty, the
Administration apparently detected signs that, but for the
Vietcong use of assassination and terror, the South
Vietnamese peasants would support Saigon and the
Americans. Thus American propaganda emphasised repeatedly,
for the benefit of its audience, lists of Vietcong
assassinations of South Vietnamese Government employees
and supporters and issued descriptions of Vietcong
atrocities in order, amongst other aims, to help justify
the Administration's assumptions about the sympathies of
the South Vietnamese people. 7 As with so much American
official propaganda, these two potentially conflicting
views of the South Vietnamese people's sympathies ran side
by side: on the one hand it was necessary to win over the
South Vietnamese, and on the other hand it was apparently
obvious that only Vietcong coercion was preventing the
South Vietnamese from declaring their allegiance to
Saigon. Such unexplained contradictions in Administration
propaganda invited dissection and ridicule by the
Administration's opponents, or by those observers who
found the Administration's approach to the 'truth' and
'information' too idiosyncratic.
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Overall, the broad image most frequently created by South
Vietnam's concentration on internal politicking, was of
America ensnared by a corrupt and unstable ally, whose
people sometimes demonstrated a violent anti-Americanism.
Unfortunately, even when this disquieting public
impression was occasionally contradicted, and the
Americans appeared to be influencing their unruly ally in
a more acceptable direction, the improvement in image of
either the South Vietnamese Government or the American
Administration was rarely great and usually short-lived.
For example in February 1966, approximately one week
after the resumption of U.S. bombing raids and two days
after the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee began
another round of open hearings on the Administration's
Vietnam policy, Johnson and his top officials held a
conference in Honolulu with the particpation of South
Vietnam. The main theme of this meeting concerned economic
and social reforms and the issue of pacification; that is,
specifically non-military issues. Chester Cooper, who was
then Assistant for Asian Affairs in the White House and
was involved in the meeting, summed up its effects:
"The conference was a success both in terms of
reaching significant decisions and of
establishing closer working relations between
the top levels of the two governments. The
Saigon Government, Ky especially, improved its
image in the United States. But there was,
nevertheless, a persistent feeling in Washington
that the Administration had hastily contrived
the whole affair to direct public attention from
the bombing resumption. In addition many felt
the Honolulu meeting had been a gimmick to steal
the spotlight from Senator Fulbright, whose
Foreign Relations Committee was just about to
start a new round of Hearings on the
Administration's Vietnam policy. The latter
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suspicion was given added credibility by the
President's sudden decision on the last day of
the Honolulu Conference to send Vice-President
Humphrey on a trip to Asia to 'explain' the
development at Honolulu. This applied
particularly to our 'third country' allies in
Vietnam who were annoyed at not having been
invited. "'
That there was suspicion about the timing and motives
for this conference indicated again both the existence and
extent of the famed 'credibility gap' concerning the
Administration, and of course added to it, while the
clumsiness of Administration public relations was amply
demonstrated in the abruptness with which the conference
was called. As Kahin and Lewis wrote:
"Considerations of domestic U.S. politics
evidently outweighed those of diplomatic
courtesy and respect for South Vietnamese
sensibilities, as Ky and General Thieu, Saigon's
Chief of State, were summoned to this meeting
withthe President - on U.S. soil - a scant two
days before the opening of the conference.17B
This manoeuvre was, as usual, only partially
successful even in its most immediate objective of
spotlighting the conference instead of the Congressional
Hearings, for there was press comment later on the timing
of the conference.' The attempt to create an impression
of two countries united in their fight against communism
and in their desire for reform in South Vietnam, expressed
in the Declaration and Joint Communique of the Honolulu
Conference, was shattered the following month in March
when a four-month-long political crisis erupted in South
Vietnam. The use of South Vietnamese troops to recapture
majOr South Vietnamese cities from rioting anti-government
demonstrators, coupled with Johnson's public disapproval,
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contrasted strongly with the optimism and amity expressed
in the Honolulu Conference. 	 The irony was that the
Administration had., by its own efforts and with great
success in one sense, focused attention on South
Vietnamese affairs and thereby highlighted the contrast.
By this time, after a number of years of
collaboration with such a volatile and unstable ally, it
should have been obvious to the Administration that
predictions about future social and economic progress in
South Vietnam were a hazardous form of propaganda.
However, in this instance it seems likely that the
Administration perpetrated an even greater blunder than it
appears at first sight. For according to Kahin and Lewis,
the political crisis in March in Saigon was a direct
result of the Honolulu Conference:
"The Honolulu Conference had serious and
largely unanticipated consequences in Saigon. On
the one hand, the prestige of the Ky government
plummeted within South Vietnam as the story of
the Premier's summons to Honolulu and his
embrace by the American President circulated
freely in Saigon. On the other hand, the
conference encouraged Ky to believe that the
United States was now so committed to him that
he could act more freely against his rivals in
the military junta. Ky obviously concluded that
so soon after the Honolulu Conference Washington
simply could not afford to withhold its backing
from him. ii7B
Such a syndrome was not without precedent. In broader
terms the same political calculations had been made by
Diem and the Nhus when they were in power; that is, that
America was so committed to the fight against communism
and had sunk so much money and prestige in South Vietnam
and Diem that it could not afford to abandon them. Until
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Diem and Nhu's assassination in November 1963 these
assumptions were fairly accurate and gave them a vast
amount of leverage with Washington. Ultimately Washington
did abandon this particular ruling clique, but only after
years of increasingly desperate support.7
Many of the Administration's problems with the South
Vietnamese Government's image can be traced back to
Washington's manifest inability to influence its ally's
behaviour, to any lasting degree, in acceptable
directions, concerning both the conduct of the war and
internal progress in the country. Naturally preferring a
government publicly committed to fighting the communists,
even if privately engaged more in political manoeuvering,
whether representative of the people or not, Washington
helped to fashion a cleft stick for itself. For the
Administration could not risk 'rocking the boat' through
taking too tough a stance, such as for instance on
internal progress. This was not only because of public
American commitments such as Ky received, but also because
if the war was to be fought by any South Vietnamese units
at all, then the additional political instability that a
tough Administration stance might have provoked had to be
avoided at almost any cost. In order to counteract and
explain its unpredictable conduct, South Vietnam was
depicted in American propaganda as a 'young nation' which
needed time to 'mature politically', but which, under
constant attack from the communists, was being denied the
opportunity to develop as rapidly as it might otherwise.°
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•	 However, though the political ruthlessness and
inefficiency of the various South Vietnamese governments
could be 'explained' in this way, defending their conduct
of the war, when many of the same characteristics were
exhibited, was an entirely different matter. The South
Vietnamese tendency to subordinate fighting the war to
domestic politics was clearly an immense handicap to the
Americans, When the latter were bearing the brunt of the
fighting, having key South Vietnamese units shifted around
according to political moves in Saigon rather than those
of the Vietcong was obviously a propaganda disaster, even
if not a military one. In addition, promotion in the South
Vietnamese Army depended on political loyalty to the
current Saigon rulers, rather than military efficiency.8'
These aspects of the South Vietnamese conduct of the
war were difficult enough to deal with, but an even worse
aspect was the treatment meted out to prisoners. Observers
found this to be one of the most repugnant features of the
regime. At the same time that American and South
Vietnamese propaganda highlighted the brutality of the
Vietcorig and. life as it would be under communist rule,
America's ally committed similar barbarities with both
political prisoners and prisoners of war. 8 Here, the
relationship between the American and South Vietnamese
Armed Forces appeared in a particularly unfavourable
light. This relationship was bound to be a complex one, as
is the case where any two sovereign armies are concerned
in a joint venture. For this was the crux of the matter:
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that these were sovereign armies, because the last image
that Washington wanted to convey to the world was that of
South Vietnam as a puppet state and army, subordinate to
American aims - as Hanoi's propaganda so claimed.
Nevertheless, though it was recognised that the South
Vietnamese Army was autonomous and. not simply under
American command, it was American money that was keeping
the entire operation afloat and equipping the South
Vietnamese Army. As a result, publication of South
Vietnamese cruelty damaged not only South Vietnam's
standing in the eyes of the world, but also, by
association, tarnished America's reputation. The constant
barrage of American propaganda stressing that both armies
were fighting for freedom and democracy merely added to
the outrage.8
The general impact of the American intervention on
the social and economic structure of South Vietnam was
little discussed publicly - fortunately for the American
war effort. Obviously a foreign army, the size of which
amounted to a friendly occupation force, was bound to
cause a considerable amount of disruption; this was only
to be expected. But, for instance, the level of
corruption, or the disintegration of the moral and social
fabric of Vietnamese life were only occasionally commented
on by journalists. The explanation for this apparent
stroke of luck benefitting the Americans, at least as far
as the Western nations were concerned, seems to be that
firstly there were other aspects of the war which were
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more highly visible - for instance, the physical
destruction and the refugee problem - and secondly, other
aspects were more compelling to reporters (either
determining and/or satisfying audience tastes), such as
combat descriptions and. film footage. Phillip Knightley
suggests a further reason for the paucity of information
on corruption:
"Neither British nor American correspondents
did very well in writing about the unimaginable
scale of corruption in Vietnam, perhaps because
few correspondents could claim to be completely
untainted themselves. Most of them changed
dollars and pounds on the black market, and many
bought stolen army goods. . . . In fact, as Murray
Sayle, in 1967 the correspondent for the Sund.y
Times of London wrote: 'Economic activity in the
South has practically ceased, except for the
war; Saigon is a vast brothel; between the
Americans who are trying more or less sincerely
to promote a copy of their society on Vietnamese
soil, and the mass of the population who are to
be • reconstructed' , stand the fat cats of
Saigon.
Knightley goes on to say:
"Most correspondents considered corruption
stories peripheral to the war itself. It seemed
to many of them more important to devote their
time to the army or Marine Corps, to attach
themselves to a unit going into action and to
write about it, usually in simple Second World
War terms."
Thus the Administration came off lightly in the press
with regard to, in some ways, the more long-lasting
effects of their friendly occupation. Of course official
propaganda focused on the amounts of aid donated by
America; on appeals for aid from other countries; and on
efforts to improve life for the South Vietnamese people.
Nevertheless, the overall impression gained of the South
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Vietnamese state was not one to inspire the ina.joriity of
observers with a sense of progress achieved in any field.
iii.) Domestic Politics. Influences, and American Foreign
Policy
On a general level, the intertwining of domestic
politics with foreign policy is a feature which Is
well-known to observers of the American political
system.	 During the Vietnam War this feature was
manifested in the way In which the Johnson Administration,
when presenting Its policies, took into consideration
their possible impact on a number of broad opinion groups
- which were not necessarily pressure groups. These
overlapping groups can be divided as follows: firstly
there was the largest, most amorphous group which is
traditionally 'uninformed' about, and uninterested in,
foreign policy, comprising the American 'public', who are
also voters; and secondly there were the groups which,
though part of the overall 'public' are generally
'informed' and interested In, foreign policy ) including
politicians, both past and present; the communications
industry; university 'faculties and students; and anti-war
groups and groupings. ee
The degree of attention paid to these groups by the
Administration varied, but domestic opinion mattered
because the Administration did require public support for
its policies. The 'bottom line' was that the public would
have to accept the deaths of Americans - their own flesh
and blood - as Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton
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noted in a memorandum about U.S. policy and 'image' for
Secretary of Defense McNamara in March 1965: "In this
connection the relevant audiences are. . . [Communists,
South Vietnamese and allies] and the U.S. public (which
must support our risk-taking with U.S. lives and.
prestige). S'B There were also electoral considerations for
Johnson to take into account, with Congressional elections
due in 1966, and the rather more distant Presidential
election due in 1968.	 . -.
When considering the effect on the public of its war
policies, the Administration apparently bore in mind a
number o± traditional public preoccupations, which
included the fear of communist expansion, the 'loss' of
China, and the various evils associated with the Korean
War.. Commenting in September/October 1966, in an article
entitled, "The President, the Polls, and Vietnam", Seymour
Martin Lipset offered the following view of the
interaction between Presidential policies and the public's
traditional anti-communism:
"The findings of the surveys clearly indicate
that the President, while having a relatively
free hand in the actual decision-making to
escalate or to de-escalate the war, is more
restricted when considering the generic
issues of action or inaction. He must give the
appearance of a man engage, of being certain of
what he is doing, i.e., that the anticipated
consequences do in fact come about.
The President seems to present his program
along two parameters:
as part of a plan to secure peace,
particularly if the action involved is actually
escalation;
pacific actions are presented as ways to
contain communism, or even to weaken it.
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The President knows that in order to get the
support of the American people for a war they
wish they were never in, he must continually put
his 'best peace foot' forward - he continually
talks and offers peace, so that he may have
public endorsement for war.
And conversely, any effort to make peace, to
reach agreement with any communist state, would
best be presented as a way to 'contain'
communism, to weaken it by facilitating splits
among the various communist states, or to help
change it internally so that it will be less
totalitarian, more humane and less
expansionist.
As well as illustrating the President's concern with
particular public attitudes, Lipset's short analysis gives
some idea of the confusion which must have beset observers
of the Administration's actions and rhetoric. For its
part, Hanoi frequently complained that every time the
Administration talked of peace it then escalated the
war.
In 1965, a year before Lipset's article appeared,
James reston, writing in The New York Times, had pointed
to the popular foundations of Administration thinking,
while deploring the resulting policies. In an article
entitled, "Washington: Where Did We Go Wrong?", Reston
wrote:
"President Johnson's only consolation about
Vietnam is that the public opinion polls seem to
support his conduct of the war. He keeps them
close in his pocket, as a reassurance to himself
and a rebuke to his critics, but they really do
not prove him right or wrong.
All they prove is that the American people
rally around the flag in trouble. The more the
nation has become involved in the leadership of
dangerous and complicated events all over the
world, the more the people have tended to back
the President's judgement.9
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Reston then related a series of events in which the
public had supported previous presidents' decisions,
however contradictory, returning to the theme of Vietnam
by way of a reference to the "not unpopular" landing of
Marines in Santo Domingo in the recent Dominican republic
crisis:
"And the popular assumptions about Vietnam have
led us into even more serious troubles.
It is popular in this country to oppose
communist aggression or expansion wherever it
appears. It is popular to assume that whenever
Uncle Sam appears on the battlefield the
opposition will knuckle under. It is popular
here to believe that even if the French lost
187,000 casualties and a war to the North
Vietnamese regulars and guerillas, we are
different and not subject to the same disasters.
But these assumptions, though popular, are not
necessarily true.
Moving on to the question of forthcoming decisons on
the war, namely the pressure to extend the bombing to
"industrial installations" near Hanoi and Haiphong, Reston
commented that as regards this decision:
"Maybe this should be done and maybe it
shouldn't, but the popularity poils are a poor
basis for judgement. Nothing irritates President
Johnson and his principal advisers more than the
suggestion that they allow popular feelings at
home to influence their foreign policy decisions
abroad. They both defend their support of
popular attitudes and deny that they act on
these attitudes, but it is perfectly clear from
the record that in both Vietnam and the
Dominican Republic they have been influenced
profoundly by popular assumptions and have
confused popularity with effective policy.
[Reston then relates a series of past popular
policies which were disastrous and unpopular
policies which later proved successful. ]"
However, the public's attitude to Vietnam had not
always been so easy to 'determine' . For in the 1964
Presidential contest, faced with a choice between the
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hardline Goldwater and the more moderate Johnson, the
public had chosen the latter, which appeared to indicate
that the public wished to stay out of a land war with
Asian communists. But Kegley and Wittkopf point out that
subsequent studies showed that both 'hawks' and 'doves'
had voted for Johnson and that he could thus interpret the
election result as he wished. 	 However, whether or not
the public had voted to stay out of an Asian land war, the
fact is that during the 1964 election the Administration's
rhetoric on Vietnam had been pacific, concerned with
allaying any fears that U.S. troops would be sent to fight
in the conflict; and this rhetoric contrasted strongly
with its subsequent escalatory actions in early 1965.
Regardless of any possible earlier public ambiguity,
as Reston states, once in the war - having been presented
with a fait accompli - the public rallied to the flag,
dutifully if unenthusiastically. This early lack of
enthusiasm would make the official propagandists' task
more difficult; for they would have to work to instill a
basic emotion in the public which is often present
initially in a nation at war - even if this enthusiasm
later drains away.
Though both Lipset and Reston espouse circular
arguments in their respective articles concerning the
cause and effect of Presidential policies - both point to
the public backing the President's policies and then state
that the President's policies derived in part from popular
attitudes - what does emerge clearly is that once Johnson
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decided on a course in Vietnam he paid attention to public
opinion. And on occasions there were attempts to 'prepare'
the public in advance of certain actions, and efforts to
keep a check on public reactians,9
Concerning other opinion groups Johnson also devoted
time to explaining and seeking support for his policies.
For instance he expended much effort in ensuring that the
majority of Congressmen supported, and continued to
support, his Vietnam policies - at least publicly.
Congressional opinion was important both in its own right,
as a source of support and funds for the war, and as an
opinion group with views that were widely disseminated and
which could exert some influence on the American
electorate and on world opinion. The obvious way to have
secured congressional support would have been to obtain a
majority congressional vote specifically authorising the
war. However, Johnson preferred to enlist support without
resorting to a public declaration of war and also he used
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as evidence of congressional
authorisation for his policies. 	 Thus he sought support
atid understanding on a private and frequently individual
basis, as Alistair Cooke noted in The Guardian:
"The truth... . is that since last spring he
[Johnson) has canvassed the ideas of 5E Heads of
Government, innumerable professors, liberals,
Democrats, Republicans, Tories, and Labour men,
Negroes, trade union leaders, churchmen and
soldiers; he has talked with every Senator and.
Congressman; had frequent bouts with the leaders
of both parties; and had flown in the fifty
Governors en masse • 100
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Again, in addition to being important in their own
right, these were groups and individuals whose views on
the war, when disseminated, might be of interest to, and
exert influence on, the general public. The amount of
attention paid to the various opinion groups by the
Administration tended to vary according to how widely
their views might be broadcast - that is, how much
attention the media was giving, or might give, to a group
or individual - how prestigious and well-known the group
or individual was to the public, and what views were held.
Although the Administration did spend time preaching to
the converted, great efforts were made to convert
doubters. Failingconversion, there was the secondary goal
of muting criticism through the devices of stressing the
sheer complexity of the war, the necessity to honour
commitments, and the Administration's overwhelming desire
for peace. •'°"
In the short term, in the early stages of the war's
escalation these tactics worked fairly well: few
opponents were able to resist a personal appeal from so
prestigious a figure as the President, or one of his top
aides, '° in addition, to begin with, the President and
his advisers were able to profit from the idea that in
this confusing war only they possessed sufficient and
extensive enough information to form a true picture of the
situation. 10 Over a longer period, however, what was
initially flattering and unusual in the personal approach
inevitably began to pall as it was seen to be the
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customary method of dealing with critics - if they were
judged to be of any importance - and as Johnson and his
Administration's prestige and credibility began to wane.
And as casualties increased the press demanded more
information - and more accurate information - from the
Administration.
In its statements on the war the Administration
endeavoured, to keep what it defined as its majority
audience - leaving aside both doves andhawks - happy,
while to a large extent pursuing the war separately. For
instance, the knowledge that the American public might be
uneasy about involvement in another land war in Asia
(after the experience in Korea which, though successful,
was unpopular) was a factor which led the Administration
to disclaim repeatedly its desire for a wider war,
contributed to the Administration's failure to declare war
in the first place, and influenced its desire to pursue
the war with minimum publicity. '°
In the very short term, that is, approximately five
to six months, the lack of a declaration of war did not
hamper the Administration's freedom of action or rhetoric.
The first bombing raids in February 1965 on North Vietnam
were publicly stated to be retaliatory and not the
beginning of a long-term campaign. The long-term bombing
campaign that began soon after in March 1965 was also
justified as retaliation for North Vietnamese aggression
against its neighbour, South Vietnam. The increased
commitment of troops was initially passed off as an
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increased commitment to static defense of South Vietnam,
and when their offensive role was later revealed, this was
still stated to be a part of the same defensive policy,
rather than the prelude to an American offensive against
the North Vietnamese and Vietcong which would continue,
regardless of cost, until the Administration had achieved
its aims. With official statements such as these, and an
as yet limited number of ground troops, it was still
possible for the Administration's audiences, both domestic
and foreign, to be uncertain about the Administration's
intentions and where these actions were leading to.
However, the revelation in June 1965 of an offensive role
for the U.S. military and the July announcement of the
dispatch of yet more troops to South Vietnam and other
measures, began to alter audience perceptions. 1O
However, over a longer period the absence of
Congressional ratification of the war through a specific
Congressional declaration of war was to prove a costly
error. Had the conflict been of a short duration and, or,
had it shown signs of being concluded successfully, then
the fact that this was an undeclared war might have been
tolerated. But as the war dragged on and as casualties
rose and it became more obvious that this was both an
undeclared and a major war, the Administration discovered
that it had provided its opponents with a useful
propaganda weapon) for, in failing to obtain a Congressional
declaration of war, the Administration left itself open to
the charge that it was fighting a war without the people's
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consent, as expressed through the will of Congress. In
defense Johnson cited the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as
sufficient authority for his war policy. °" However
despite Johnson's belief in the legitimacy of his
authority to conduct such a major war without a further
congressional Resolution, when the Nixon Administration
finally curtailed U.S. involvement in the war in 1972,
steps were taken - as a direct result of this war - to
ensure that In future no President could Introduce
American troops into a long war without Congressional
consent:
"It was the hubristic excesses (and disasters)
of the Vietnam War which Impelled the nation to
look afresh at the President's sweeping powers
in foreign policy and war-making. The result was
the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973
which obliged the President to report to
Gongress within forty-eight hours of committing
armed forces abroad."10
C.) Propaganda Problems Posed by Military Aspects of the
i.) The Nature of the War
One of the most difficult problems that the American
propaganda organs faced during the Vietnam War was the
nature of the conflict. The Administration most often
portrayed the conflict politically as a straightforward
contest between communists and non-communists and hence
America's role in it was part of the moral crusade against
Communist expansion. This, though a gross
over-simplification, was comprehensible to the public.
However, explaining the war militarily to the public
was an entirely different matter. For instance, It was no
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easy task to give a clear picture of the Southern enemy
facing American troops. The Vietcong adopted no special
uniform to denote their combat status, but like
traditional guerilla forces elsewhere merged into the
local population. In addition, guerillas who came from
North Vietnam to aid the Vietcong, had frequently
originated in the South and so they too spoke the local
dialect, were familiar with local customs and could blend
into the background. Visually, the black pyjamas which the
guerillas wore, in common with the local peasants, did not
present a military aspect, particularly when contrasted
with the uniformed American and South Vietnamese
troops.
Another problem facing the Administration was how to
measure, and thus be able to publicise, progress in the
field. There appeared to be no pattern to this war as
there had been in most previous wars. Instead of being a
series of engagements yielding territory, or key points,
that were then held as part of a general objective of
advancing on other enemy positions or headquarters, this
war appeared to be a random conglomeration of terrorist
incidents in villages and towns and seemingly isolated
engagements between American and South Vietnamese troops
and the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. The enemy forces
appeared to come and go as they pleased, sometimes staying
to fight in force and sometimes fading away. However
though there were no front lines to focus on and by which
judge the 'progress' of one or the other side in the war,
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the fact that the war continued, and continued to expand,
in itself constituted a negative comment on U.S.
'progress8 1
However, for a certain period of time this confusion
was of use to the Administration. While its credibility
still held in the eyes of the public, then the
Administration's overall assessment of the tangled and
chaotic events was likely to prevail, even with the
existence of other interpretations, given the initial
advantage that any government possesses - or is thought to
possess by its public - in the range of information
available to it. Obviously as the war dragged on and as
observers and journalists became more familiar, through
more exposure, with the events they were dealing with,
then the Administration's view of events was open to
challenge. But it was not only the passage of time that
fostered different interpretations: the Administration, by
lying on some issues and then being publicly shown to have
lied, helped to undermine its own credibility.'11
As the progress, or otherwise, of the war could not
be determined by the usual criteria, the American milItary
turned to such methods as the body count of enemy dead in
order to both measure and demonstrate their success. In
fact the numbers game, as It was called, was used in this
way in most facets of the American war effort. For
instance, pacification was measured in terms of the
numbers of hamlets controlled by each side, the Hamlet
Evaluation System. But as Kolko points out in Vietnam.
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Anatomy of A War 1940-1975, not only were the monthly
statistics inaccurate, but they could not measure the
South Vietnamese villagers' allegiance, and he states:
"The war was a monumental human, political and social
event whose complex effects required nuanced analysis."'1
Furthermore, this reliance on statistics to evaluate
progress in this aspect of the war had already been
criticised by U.S. officials involved in earlier
pacification schemes, as noted by the Director of
Provincial Operations for the Agency for International
Development, in his study of the pacification effort in
South Vietnam up to 1965:
"Finally, there has been a tendency to haste
in Vietnam and to insist on statistics even
though they do not really reveal the true nature
of progress or lack of it in political, social,
and economic development. It is important to
realize that the basic problems being dealt with
cannot be solved quickly. People's loyalties and
beliefs and actions do not change quickly, nor
do their customs and social institutions. Thus,
evaluations of certain programs cannot be made
on a weekly or monthly basis."1
Where military planning for the war and evaluation of
progress were concerned the body count system was equally
suspect, for the figures themselves could easily be
inaccurate, either by accident or design. For example,
South Vietnamese males killed in the battle zones, unless
positively identified as 'friendly', tended to be
classified as enemy dead - and others slipped into the
statistics too - thus inflating the figures for enemy
losses. However from these body count figures the American
military planners calculated their assessment of how badly
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the enemy 'was hurting' and at what rate they were
recruiting to fill the gaps, indeed at what rate the enemy
would .bave to recruit to keep going. 4 And President
Johnson himself sometimes used the figures to illustrate
progress in the war.
Eventually the flaws inherent in this system became
apparent; indeed the U.S. military produced its own
critical survey of the figures in late 1968, and earlier,
the Systems Analysis Office in the Pentagon had not only
reported the inaccuracy of the figures but had also
produced pessimistic evaluations of the war. 1	For the
drawbacks to these particular figures are obvious: firstly
they said nothing about the morale, will and capability of
the enemy, which were supposedly the prime target of
American ground and air attacks. Secondly, no inference
could be drawn as to the state of the war itself: whether
headway was being made with peasants in enlisting their
support for the South Vietnamese Government's cause, or
whether support for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese was
strengthening. The body count figures said nothing about
territorial control, or whether the war was being won or
lost. As indicators to judge the war's progress these
figures were useless, but there were few other ways in
which the war could be measured and this statistical
method of analysing the war suited the Pentagon: the
figures could be used. as evidence to prove success; only
as the war dragged on could it be seen that the figures
proved nothing."' 7' Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts
109
suimxned up the dilemma thus in The Irony of Vietnam: The
System Worked:
"But statistics by their very nature could not
go deeply enough. Much of the most important
information about Vietnam was essentially
unquantifiable, and. even when it could be
quanitified the dangers of misinterpretation and
overinterpretation were ever present. . . . Many of
those who derived genuine hope from these
indicators suffered from either a lack of
knowledge about Vietnam or a lack of sensitivity
toward politics, or both. On balance, data
generally made Americans unduly optimistic."11
ii.) The American Troop Build-Up
At the end of December 1964 U.S. military strength in
South Vietnam had reached 23,300 troops, stationed there
in the advisory role that America was still playing. By
July 1965 U.S. troop strength was 75,000, and on 28 July
President President Johnson announced that a further
50,000 American troops would be dispatched to Vietnam
bringing U.S. troop strength up to 125,000 "almost
immediately". 11 Thus in seven months American troop
levels escalated by over 100,000 men and their role also
changed officially from advisers to combatants. The
problems that American propaganda had to resolve
concerning the troop build-up were contained in the
dramatic leap in force levels and the change in role.
Though these are both events that are to be expected in a
war and which may be more or less difficult to explain
depending on the 'popularity' of the war, the way in which
the Administration chose to fight this war - without a
declaration of war - and the way in which it decided to
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present information to the public, constituted a more than
usually difficult problem for U.S. propagandists.
The arrival of two Marine battalions in Danang on 8
March, in effect the beginning of the American troop
build-up, was presented publicly as a defensive move to
protect Danang airfield following the start of the bombing
campaign against North Vietnam in February. Any offensive
role was pointedly ruled out in the Administration's
announcement of the troop dispatch. However this static
security mission was shortlived, for on 1 April Johnson
approved a change in the Marines' role from defence to
offence and authorised a further dispatch of two more
Marine battalions and an increase in support forces in
South Vietnam. Thus less than one month after denying any
change in the Marines' mission in South Vietnam, the
Administration had reversed its position and decided to go
over to the offensive. But this part of the 1 April
decision was not to be made public, by specific order of
President Johnson and officials were to present these
moves as part of the existing policy, based on past
presidents' policies. So at the beginning of the troop
build-up U.S. officials were under orders to conceal a
major policy change from the press and public. °
Effectively Johnson was already laying the foundations of
the 'credibility gap' which came to characterise his
administration's conduct of the war.
Even without the President's wish for minimal
publicity about the troop dispatches to South Vietnam, and
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his desire for secrecy over their changed mission,
official propagandists could well have encountered
problems over this increased commitment due to Johnson's
earlier apparently pacific statements on the conflict
during the 1964 Presidential election. For Johnson had
specifically told American voters that U.S. troops would
not be sent to Vietnam to do the fighting for the South
Vietnamese and nor would North Vietnam be bombed. ' 	 Yet
only three months after the elections American planes were
bombing North Vietnam, and the following month Marines
were disembarking in South Vietnam, in direct
contradiction of Johnson's public statements. -
After the realisation by the press and public in
mid-1965 that America was at war in South Vietnam, the
initial propaganda problems created by the desire for
secrecy over the change in the size of military force and
role were superseded by a different set of problems
centring on the length of the war and the ever-increasing
numbers of troops needed to fight it. For as the war
continued, so the numbers of casualties increased and the
Administration came under pressure to show some progress
in the war - either towards winning it or negotiating a
settlement - from both hawks and doves among its
audiences. These were problems that U. S. propaganda had to
tackle if public support was to be maintained for this war
and the Administration's war policies.
The growing size of the military operation in Vietnam
soon posed another problem for propagandists, a problem
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which grew with each increase in troop levels. For this
war, which seemed to appear so suddenly and escalate so
rapidly, was being fought in what was supposed to be peace
time. Although the American economy was not on a war
footing and although the battle was 'limited' to South
Vietnam and selected bombing targets in North Vietnam, yet
this was no minor conflict, and nor could it be passed off
as such. 1	 As U.S. troops poured into South Vietnam, the
scale of destruction and the casualties mounted, and the
media spotlight stayed firmly on events in Vietnam and the
war which America had never declared.
iii.) The Portrayal of the Bombing
America used air power in the Vietnam War in two
roles. Firstly it was used to attempt to cripple North
Vietnam's war-making capacity and to interdict its supply
lines to the South. Secondly air power was part of the war
effort in the South, used to clear areas before troops
moved in, and supporting military operations with air
strikes.
Taking the first of these two roles, it was the
bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965 which in effect
began America's involvement in the Vietnam War. Initially,
the bombing raids were portrayed by the Administration as
reprisals for Vietcong attacks in South Vietnam.
Specifically, the first raids on 7-8 February and 11
February were announced as retaliation for the attacks on
the American installations at Pleiku and Quinhon. In
bombing North Vietnam in response to Vietcong actions in
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South Vietnam, the Administration sought to emphasise the
idea that North Vietnam was the motivating force behind
the continuing unrest and violence in South Vietnam. This
rationale was used by the Administration as justification
not only for the early retaliatory raids, but also for the
policy of sustained bombing of North Vietnam, code-named
Operation Rolling Thunder, which was authorised by Johnson
on 13 February.
The propaganda problems posed by the early bombing
raids differed in degree from those created by the
sustained bombing programme. Initially the Administration
required public and allied acceptance that the U.S.
response was "appropriate and fitting", which was no small
requirement given the geography of the Vietcong attacks
and the American response. In addition the Administration
needed to overcome the notion that the bombing was an
over-reaction, particularly as there had been previous
Vietcong attacks on American installations which had not
occasioned bombing raids on the North. Thus it was also
necessary for Johnson and his advisers to differentiate
between earlier Vietcong attacks and Pleiku and Quinhon,
and to justify their reaction to the latter. The next step
on the way to Rolling Thunder was to loosen the connection
between specific Vietcong attacks and bombing the North:
to use the bombing not just as a reprisal, but as a method
of fighting the war,
Once the sustained bombing programme was underway
then the problems of maintaining audience support
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multiplied. Firstly there were the effects of the bombing:
the destruction it caused. Although North Vietnam's major
cities were not attacked, there were plenty of other
targets for the U.S. Airforce. In Britain (and other
nations), the spectacle of this persistent bombardment
brought back memories of World War II blitzes - not the
sort of image to aid American propagandists.
Secondly there were doubts about the efficacy of such
bombing, expressed bothas a measure of the current
campaign and with reference to studies of the World War II
blitzes. For as the war lengthened it became obvious that
the North Vietnamese were not going to be bombed to the
negotiating table by this programme and nor were they
going to cease aiding the war in the South. This
perception was reinforced by the American studies of the
bombing campaigns in World War II, which had concluded
that strategic bombing aimed at breaking a population's
will to resist had not succeeded. Interdiction bombing was
similarly assessed as unable to achieve its goals. Yet the
Administration continued with the bombing programme,
despite the lack of results, which rendered the public
justification for bombing increasingly inval1d.1
America's use of air power gave the war its
overwhelmingly technological character, with the massive
bombardments seemingly requiring a lesser degree of
manpower to achieve a greater degree of devastation while
risking fewer American forces. Although the results of the
air strikes against North Vietnam could only occasionally
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be assessed at first hand by observers, the consequences
of using air power to fight the war in South Vietnam were
only too visible: great destruction and vast numbers of
refugees. This was the other role for the U.S. Airforce:
carpeting an area with bombs prior to U.S. military
operations; bombing specific villages thought to be
'unfriendly'; and reinforcing military operations with air
strikes on enemy positions. The problem was that the
enormous devastation caused by the bombing laid waste the
territory of America's ally. Even if a village was
correctly identified as 'unfriendly' - which obviously
required reliable and accurate intelligence - and was then
bombed, it was still the dwellings and livelihood of the
South Vietnamese peasants which disappeared in the bomb
craters along with the Vietcong. Of course mistakes were
made, and then 'friendly' villages were obliterated - this
could happen if a pilot overshot his target, or if the
coordinates for an air strike were incorrect, or if U.S.
intelligence was defective. The net result was that ever
greater areas of South Vietnam were turned into wasteland
and far from seeming 'limited', the U.S. war effort
appeared to wreak unlimited destruction on the very people
it was trying to save. And this was the irony, that while
officially no populated areas in North Vietnam were
targetted for bombing raids in an endeavour not to kill
civilians, the methods used to fight the war in the South
and the desire to avoid troop casualties guaranteed a high
proportion of civilian casualties. And so, with this
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jndiscriminate method of warfare the Americans compared
badly with the Vietcong and North Vietnamese, who, though
ruthless, were far more selective in the people they
killed.
The other great by-product of the war was the
refugees, the greater proportion of whom were created when
their villages were destroyed, or when they were forced to
move in order to avoid air strikes. From 1965 onwards the
numbers of refugees grew steadily, straining the already
slender organisational resources of the South Vietnamese
and the funds available to cope with them. As Lewy writes:
"No reliable statistics on the number of
refugees are available until 1968, but it was
estimated that between December 1965 and June
1968 there were 1.2 million officially recorded
refugees and a far larger number who blended in
with the general population as best they could
and received no government assistance whatever.
During the first eight months of 1966 alone the
number of refugees officially processed was half
a million. Between 1964 and 1969, as many as 3.5
million South Vietnamese, over 20 percent of the
population, had been refugees at one time or
another. "
The effects of the bombing in South Vietnam were
easily ascertainable, even without the aid of statistics,
in terms of ravaged countryside and displaced people.
iv.) War Casualties
In any conflict casualties are a prime concern for
propagandists, because troops and civilians killed and
wounded are one of the most obvious and emotional results
of war. Thus a reason is required to justify these deaths
and injuries to the audience in the homeland and, on
occasions to outside observers. It would seem logical to
1l'7
suppose that the more casualties there are, then the
greater the need for a satisfactory - to the audience -
explanation and justification for the carnage. The latter
also applies to the length of a conflict, and where the
two factors coincide, of a lengthy and a bloody war, then
the requirement for propagandists to justify casualties is
vital. In addition, either of these two factors might lead
an audience to scrutinise a conflict more carefully,
reviewing the official reasons given for participation,
and seeking indications of progress towards officially
stated goals.
America's participation in the Vietnam conflict would
always have required careful explanation and
justification, for in addition to being a bloody and long
conflict it was fought 8,000 miles from the American
homeland in an area with which few Americans were familiar
until the war began and American troops were killed. Once
U.S. military involvement began in earnest, inevitably the
casualty figures started to rise,fairly slowly at first,
but then more quickly as the war continued to escalate. In
1965 the number of U.S. troops killed in action was
1,363, a monthly average of roughly 113. 	 However
according to Lewy, during 1966 the monthly average of
American troops killed in action was 477, while in only
the first half of 1967 the monthly average jumped to 816
killed in action. 129 Overall, the number of U.S. military
casualties, during Lyndon Johnson's term in office from
1964 to 1968, including both wounded and dead, totalled
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222,351. 1	That American official propaganda had to do
was to make these casualties seem worthwhile to the
American public in order to retain their support.
In addition to the U.S. military casualties there
were the civilian casualties in the war. Again the effects
of the conflict were obvious in South Vietnam: increasing
numbers of civilians were killed and wounded. The type of
war waged and the weapons used by the U. S. , such as
napalm, ensured a high casualty rate among civilians,
accepting that such casualties were unintentional. As Lewy
points out, in general arriving at accurate figures for
civilian war casualties is difficult. However, using the
figures and calculations Lewy provides, from 1965 to 1966
the approximate figures for civilian casualties were:
50,944 civilians admitted to hospital as a result of
military action; 19,224 civilians killed outright; and
7,641 civilians deaths after admission to hospital. In the
period of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency, overall from 1965
to 1968 the approximate number of civilians admitted to
hospital due to military action was 215,193; the
aproximate number of civilians killed was 81,204; and the
approximate number of civilians who died after admission
to hospital was 32,279. 	 Considering both U.S. military
and civilian casualty figures, whereas American casualties
would concern mainly the American public, civilian
casualties could be expected to be of concern to outside
observers. And irrespective of approval or support for the
U.S. war effort, observers were concerned about the
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carnage in South Vietnam. Civilian casualties were
perceived as a particularly unjustifiable outcome of the
conflict, and thus likely to generate considerable
opposition to the war on humanitarian grounds alone.
Lastly there were the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
casualties. North Vietnam sustained both military and
civilian casualties, the former while fighting the war in
the South and the latter due to American bombing in the
North. Whilst the U.S. military could assess to a certain
extent what North Vietnam's battle casualties were, there
was no reliable means of assessing the number of civilian
casualties caused by American bombing, although on the
rare occasions when correspondents visited North Vietnam
an effort was usually made to evaluate the effects of the
bombing on civilians. Such efforts by correspondents could
produce a startling impact, as The New York Times edition
of The Pentagon Papers notes in connection with civilian
casualties from the bombing:
"During the prolonged internal debate [in the
Administration from late 1966 to early 1967),
the Pentagon account discloses, such issues as
stalemate in the ground war and civilian
casualties of the air war were of much more
concern to some policy makers than the
Administration publicly acknowledged.
Press dispatches from Hanoi in late 1966
stimulated what the analysts call an 'explosive
debate' in public about civilian casualties.
Privately, the analysts add, the Central
Intelligence Agency produced a summary of the
bombing in 1965 and 1966 that estimated that
there had been nearly 29,000 civilian casualties
in North Vietnam - a figure far higher than
Hanoi itself had ever used."1
Vietcong casualties too were not easy to estimate,
due to the difficulty of distinguishing between guerillas
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and peasants in South Vietnam, and the concoininitant
tendency, as already discussed, for the U.S. military to
inf late the figures for guerilla deaths. However, in 1965
there were reported to be 35,436 enemy dead; by September
1966 there were 40,149; and. in 1967 the figure was 88,104
enemy dead.
	 However, even if these figures were
debateable, again the carnage was easily visible in South
Vietnam and the supply of guerillas seemed inexhaustible,
whatever the casualty rate. As the war lengthened and
casualties on all sides rose, increasingly the willingness
and ability of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to both
sustain losses and replace them, and ultimately their
sheer tenacity, caused some observers to ponder the
reasons underlying the depth of commitment displayed by
America's enemies. This too was a. phenomenon that U.S.
propaganda had to address.
V.) Conduct of the War/Negotiations.
One of the most striking features of the war in
Vietnam was the way in which the Administration increased
both troops and bombing in graduated steps. This was a
deliberate policy designed to prevent a North Vietnamese
and Vietcong victory and hence avoid an American defeat,
and also to try to limit any domestic outcry over
America's commitment. In addition this gradual approach
enabled Lyndon Johnson to pursue his preferred strategy of
consensus politics, which sudden huge increases in troop
and bombing levels would not have permitted.
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The Administration initially presented bombing raids
on North Vietnam as a means of pressuring the North
Vietnamese leaders to cease the war in the South and to
negotiate. Each increment in the bombing level was
publicly justified as a step on the road to negotiations
and ultimately peace. In this way the Administration
blamed the North Vietnamese for the continuation of the
war and also endeavoured to avoid the impression of
punitive bombing raids aiming at reducing the whole of
North Vietnam to ruins. 1
The time factor posed a major problem with this
justification for the U.S. propaganda effort, for as the
war lengthened and the bombing was stepped up it became
increasingly apparent that North Vietnam was not going to
negotiate. Indeed the North Vietnamese were quite explicit
about their refusal to negotiate under the threat of
bombs. Thus in the summer of 1965 the purpose of the
bombing programme privately shifted from endeavouring to
break Hanoi's will to Interdicting North Vietnam's supply
lines.
As a corollary to the bombing raids the
Administration conceived bombing pauses, used both as a
diplomatic device and as a means of conducting the war. In
diplomatic terms, the bombing pauses were presented as an
inducement to North Vietnam to negotiate and thus provided
the Administration with an opportunity to ascertain
whether or not Hanoi was prepared to talk. These pauses
were also used to demonstrate to America's allies and
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public opinion in general that U.S. policy was not based
solely on force. As a device for conducting the war, the
pauses were used to legitimize further escalation of the
bombing after Hanoi had predictably turned down an
Administration offer of talks, or negotiations, on U.S.
terms. To the Administration the bombing programme was a
means to negotiating from strength - through Intensifying
the 'pain level' before a bombing pause - and also
constituted a vital bargaining counter, to be reduced or
halted completely only in return for important
concessions. Hanoi recognised and responded to the
functions of the bombing pauses: for instance by delaying
reaction to the pauses Hanoi bypassed the bargaining
counter stategy and by stating publicly that U.S. bombing
pauses and talk of peace was always followed by escalation
Hanoi drew attention to the 'legitimizing' function of the
pauses, Not surprisingly, the U.S. military opposed the
bombing pauses which in their estimate merely allowed the
enemy to reinforce and resupply freely. Thus the
Administration encountered resistance from the U.S.
military whenever a pause was under consideration and then
pressure to resume the bombing programme as soon as
possible. 1
Clearly the questions that U.S. propaganda had to
address on the bombing pauses centred on the credibility
of the initiatives: firstly, were these pauses genuine
attempts to initiate a dialogue, or were they primarily
for public consumption; secondly, if Hanoi did not respond
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to these bombing pauses could this alone justify the U.S.
resuming and escalating the bombing; thirdly, would
Hanoi's lack of response prompt a critical examination of
its reasons for rejecting talks and hence probably a
closer examination of the U.S. terms for talks; fourthly,
could Hanoi justify its lack of response to U.S.
overtures, and if so how would this affect audience
perception of the U.S. bombing pauses and escalation of
the bombing program'?'
On the issue of negotiations the Administration
endeavoured to create the impression through its rhetoric
that it was always ready for unconditional discussions, as
for example in Johnson's major speech on the war at Johns
Hopkins University on 7 April 1965. By emphasizing its
desire for peace in Vietnam and willingness to enter into
'unconditional' talks, not only did the Administration
endeavour to highlight its own 'peaceful' intentions but
it also tried to throw the blame for the lack of
negotiations - and hence the continuation of the war - on
the North Vietnamese. Thus the central arguments on the
Administration's position on negotiations hinged on
whether the Administration genuinely desired peace;
whether it was actively seeking a peaceful solution; and
whether the offers of 'unconditional' discussions that the
Administration always claimed it was ready to conduct
actually were without conditions.
For U.S. official propaganda, one of the pitfalls
over negotiations lay in part in the eagerness with which
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observers seized on any hint of peace talks or approaches:
a speech by a top official containing references to either
peace or talks usually received wide media coverage and
close scrutiny. Concomitantly a phase of the war which was
unaccompanied by any Administration remarks on peace also
tended to provoke media reaction, as Joseph Alsop, writing
in the New York Herald Tribune on Johnson's Johns Hopkins
speech, noted:
"For many weary weeks on end, the president
has been beseeched, urged, even bullyragged to
announce his war aims, to explain his decisions,
to declare his willingness to negotiate. Under
this incessant barrage of advice he kept
obstinately silent.. •1'141
Alsop's article itself illustrated the
Administration's dilemma, for in addition to the above
comments, it also contained an interesting analysis of
Johnson's speech, focussing on elements that were not
favourable to the Administration. But the particular irony
of this article was that Alsop's criticism of the
Administration stemmed from his hardline, hawkish position
on the war, and thus he exposed the contradictions in the
Administration's rhetoric and war policy that followed
from Johnson's efforts to pursue a middle course between
hawks and doves in his administration as well as among the
public.
The progress of time also compounded other problems
concerning the rhetoric of negotiations for the
Administration. For instance, the Administration always
claimed publicly that it would welcome serious efforts by
other nations to help the peace process. So as the war
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lengthened and negotiations still did not begin, other
nations took the Administration at its word and either
offered to mediate or endeavoured to begin the mediation
process on their own iniative. Thus the Administration was
faced with various peace proposals and initiatives which,
in general terms, it had previously stated it would
welcome, but which might have arrived at an inauspicious
stage of the war, or be unwelcome for other reasons. When
these peace moves were undertaken by individual nations,
then usually the Administration made a reasonable case for
dismissing the initiatives, However, in addition to
individual peace-makers, the United Nations and the
Nonaligned Movement attempted to initiate peace moves and
though these efforts were also dismissed the
Administration ran more of a risk. For naturally the media
devoted considerable attention to any peace moves by these
two organisations, and the failure of their initiatives
evoked comment and analysis. Thus it behoved the
Administration to treat these peace moves with more
respect than it accorded to others - if only to avoid
adverse press comment - but this rarely happened. For
instance, In 1965 the Administration faced a heavy barrage
of press criticism when it became known that the
Administration had rejected a peace initiative for talks
with North Vietnam undertaken by UN Secretary General U
Thant with U.S. concurrence. And the fact that Hanoi now
denied the legitimacy of UN efforts at mediation, in no
way moderated criticism of Washington for its dismissal of
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this UN initiative. 1	 The onus was on the U.S.
Administration to act according to its own rhetoric, for
the Western media could sensibly examine and document only
the rhetoric and actions of the United States.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BEGINNING AND ESCALATION OF THE VIETNA)( VAR:
JAN1JARY-NARCH 1965
As stated in Chapter 2, the U.S. Administration's
propaganda campaign was waged with three broad goals in
mind: to persuade the audience to perceive the war as the
Administration wished it to be perceived; to convince the
audience of the necessity and importance of the war; and
to persuade the audience that the Administration's
intentions were peaceful, with force used only as a last
resort. Within this broad framework there are several
issues to consider when examining and judging the success
or failure of the Administration's propaganda campaign.
This campaign can be judged both as a whole and as a
series of propaganda operations, either initiated by the
Administration, or as a response to a particular incident
during the war and the subsequent publicity. The issues to
consider are: Administration planning and knowledge at
different stages of the war, mainly contained in Th
Pentagon Papers; what the newspapers reported at these
same stages; how this reporting fitted in with the
Administration's plans; how the British Government acted
and what the British public thought, according to opinion
polls; and the effects of Administration propaganda
policies and moves as reflected in the newspapers, and as
they affected the British Government and public opinion.
139
For a number of reasons Administration planning and
knowledge is especially important in relation to the early
stages and subsequent escalation of the war.
Firstly, from the Administration's point of view this
was a crucial stage in the conflict itself. In only three
months the Administration switched from the previous
policy of limited involvement with American advisors, to
air raids, and then the dispatch of ground troops, even
though in a defensive role, In the short term, the tactics
that the Administration used to handle publicity at this
early stage, before greater involvement, and growing
casualties, and while the possiblity of withdrawal was
still thought to be an alternative, could affect more
seriously the way that the next set of policy decisions on
conducting the expanded conflict would be received and
perceived by both the press and public.
Secondly, in view of the Administration's previously
expressed reluctance "to go North", during this early
stage of increased activity it was necessary to fix in the
press and public's perceptions the necessity for the
Administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam and then
to convince them of the Administration's basically
peaceful intentions, reluctance to escalate and desire for
negotiations. In propaganda terms this could then be used
to justify the Administration's future conduct of the
conflict.
Thirdly, from the point of view of assessing the
Administration's propaganda campaign, examining the
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Administration's knowledge and planning in early 1965 will
show whether and to what extent the Administration
privately realised what lay ahead, that is, the massive
growth of the conflict with its attendant casualties.
Having ascertained the Administration's private
perceptions of the future course of the conflict it will
then be possible to compare these perceptions with the
Administration view of the conflict contained in official
statements and speeches disseminated through the press, and
to determine the accuracy and veracity of Administration
statements.
During this vital period the parameters of U.S.
policy were established: no withdrawal and negotiations on
U.S. terms. Within these parameters though, U.S. policy
was fluid and reactive, rather than purposive.
A.) Administration Planning
According to The Pentagon Papers, the Administration
planned a "major policy review"' on Vietnam at the end of
1ovember 1964, consisting of a series of "strategy
meetings" which included the U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, followed by meetings with Johnson.
The preliminary strategy meetings evaluated the policy
options previously submitted by the NSC Working Group on
SVN/SEA. The Working Group's options were:
"Option A essentially was a continuation of
iilitary and naval actions currently underway or
previously authorized, to include prompt
reprisals for attacks on U.S. facilities or
other VC 'spectaculars' in South Vietnam. These
were to be accompanied by continued resistance
to a negotiated settlement unless stringent
preconditions, amounting to agreement to abide
by U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Accords,
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were met. Option B consisted of current policies
plus a systematic program of progressively heavy
military pressures against North Vietnam, to be
continued until current objectives were met.
Negotiations were to be resisted, as in A,
although to be entered ultimately, but they were
to be carried on in conjunction with continued
bombing attacks. Option C combined current
policies with (1) additional - but somewhat
milder - military pressures against North
Vietnam and (2) a declared willingness to
negotiate. Once negotiations were begun,
military pressures were to stop, although the
threat to resume was to be kept alive."
Following the preliminary "strategy meetings", the
final policy proposal was drafted by Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy and
reviewed again before submission to President Johnson.
Bundy's draft paper essentially contained a combination of
Options 'A' and 'C', with Option 'A' actions to be pursued
for the first 30 days followed by:
". . . a mixture of suggested actions and
rationale similar to that in Option C. The air
strikes would be 'progressively more serious'
and would be 'adjusted to the situation,' The
expected duration was indicated as 'possibly
running from two to six months. '". . "The
approach would be steady and deliberate, to give
the United States the option 'to proceed or not,
to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or
not. '"a
There were differences between the President's
advisors over how gradual and how forceful the air strikes
should be, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff favouring
dramatically forceful action designed to affect Hanoi's
will to continue and inflict maximum damage. The State and
Defense Departments and the White House preferred a more
gradual application of incremental pressures, "in which
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the prospect of greater pressure to come was at least as
important as the damage inflicted.
The Pentagon Papers explain that "apparently several
[language) changes were made [to Bundy's paper) in order
not to ask the President to commit himself
unnecessarily" . In addition, proposals concerning U.S.
publication of evidence of north Vietnamese infiltration
into South Vietnam and presentation of this evidence to
Congressional leaders and allied heads of state, and a
major presidential speech, were deleted from Bundy's
paper. According to The Pentagon Papers these changes
were significant in that the actions now recoimnended -
described afterwards by the Administration as 'phase one'
and 'phase two' - "would represent the least possible
additional commitment. This represented a considerable
softening of the positions held at the end of the first
Principals [senior NSC members] meeting, on the 24th [of
November]. e
 Finally one of the most important changes
concerned the Principals' attitude to negotiations, which
now ruled out the previously favoured "formal" Geneva
Conference and wanted."U.S./GVN ternis for cessation of
attack&' sent to Hanoi privately, not declared
publicly. 10 The senior officials' position was summed up:
"Thus, it is fairly clear that the policy
position formulated by the Principals before
presentation to the President included no
provision for early bargaining at the conference
table. '111
According to The Pentagon Papers at the meeting with
President Johnson on 1 December the participants discussed
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Bundy's paper, were briefed by Taylor on the situation in
South Vietnam and also considered the help given by U.S.
allies to South Vietnam. Johnson apparently approved the
"general outline" of the paper's proposals but only agreed
to the implementation of 'phase one' actions. On the
overall results of the meeting The Pentagon Papers
conclude:
"In effect, the December strategy meeting
produced little change except to make more
concrete the concept of possible future
operations against North Vietnam arid to
authorize steps to include GVN in preparation
for these possiblities. It is clear that the
President did not make any commitment at this
point to expand the war through future
operations against North Vietnam."12
Although The Pentagon Papers analyst states that
"Phase one actions to exert additional pressures on North
Vietnam were quite limited" with only the "GVN maritime
operations and U. S. armed reconnaissance missions in Laos"
being "military actions", the fact is that the original
military measures being supplemented were secret
operations that the public knew nothing of until U.S.
planes were shot down over Laos in January 1965. The other
'phase one' actions were "stage-managing the public
release of evidence of increased Communist infiltration"
and getting more help from other countries. 14. In the
latter sphere UK officials were briefed by William Bundy
on 3 Decemberl& and subsequently Harold Wilson was also
"thoroughly briefed" 1 during his visit to Washington in
December 1964. What emerges clearly from the Bundy
briefing on 3 December is that the U.S. ruled out
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"dramatic action" against North Vietnam partly because of
the political instability in South Vietnam and the "still
slowly deteriorating" situation: the initiation of 'phase
two' actions depended on an improvement in South Vietnam
and Hanoi's response to 'phase one' actions. After the
briefing Bundy also suggested that the UK increase its
police advisors in South Vietnam as part of the "vital.
increased third country contributions" necessitated by the
possiblity of "more serious decisions" on South Vietnam. 17
Thus, although President Johnson may not have
committed himself to expanding the war in December 1964,
nevertheless some quite detailed planning had been
undertaken to increase already existing military pressures
on North Vietnam and stronger actions were eschewed in
part because of South Vietnam's "fragility" and not simply
because of the Administration's reluctance to widen the
conflict. In addition the Administration was actively
seeking increased assistance from a number of third
countries. So, at the very least, the Administration
clearly had no intention of withdrawing, or it seems,
negotiating, except on its own terms to achieve its
obj ectives.
Publicly the Administration had earlier "sought to
dampen" the intense press and congressional speculation
concerning a possible expansion of the conflict. '. And
after the 1 December meeting an Administration press
statement merely confirmed U.S. assistance to South
Vietnam and Ambassador Taylor's instructions to consult
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the Saigon government; nothing was said officially about
the substance of discussions or the decisions that had
been taken. 19
However, the Administration's 'gradual' method of
handling the conflict was overturned by a serious
deterioration politically in South Vietnam, including one
of the Vietcong (VC) 'spectaculars' that had previously
been judged unlikely when the Administration briefed
friendly countries in early December. 2° On 19 December a
military coup in South Vietnam sparked off an internal
political crisis, with repercussions on relations with the
U. S., which continued throughout January 1965 and was not
finally ssettleds until late February. On 24 December the
Vietcong bombed the Brink Hotel in Saigon, where U.S.
Officers were billeted, killing two Americans and wounding
a number of others, including some South Vietnamese.
Despite appeals for retaliatory action from various
sections of the Administration, including the Saigon
Embassy, the President and his principal advisors
eventually decided not to retaliate, mainly because of the
political turmoil in South Vietnam. 2 ' Added to this, for a
variety of reasons22 no 'phase one' maritime operations
had effectively been undertaken and the 'intensified' aIr
strikes over Laos had not apparently been perceived by the
communists as any different to earlier air activity2,
thereby robbing the program of its significance as a
signal and warning to the communists. So, by late December
1964 the Administration's calculations, underpinning the
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late November/early December policy decisions, were
already redundant.
Thus, January 1965 found the Administration yet again
reviewing its policy on South Vietnam, against this
background of political deterioration in Saigon, which had
also generated another outbreak of criticism at home from
Congress and the press. The January policy review focussed
on both the internal effects of the crisis in South
Vietnam and also its wider impact on neighbouring
countries, with the concomitant implications for U.S.
foreign policy. Summing up the Saigon Embassy's advice,
which was naturally mainly concerned with the situation in
South Vietnam, The Pentagon Papers state:
"One very significant and probably influential
viewpoint was registered by the Saigon
Embassy. . . .the thrust of the advice seemed to be
to move into Phase Two, almost in spite of the
political outcome in Saigon.
According to The Pentagon Papers analyst, State
Department officials concentrated mainly on the wider
impact of a debacle in South Vietnam:
"The perceived impact of a collapse in Saigon
on other nations - perhaps even more than the
political fortunes of South Vietnam itself -
were a significant part of the State Department
calculations. If a unilateral 'Vietnam solution'
were to be arranged, so the thinking went in
January 1965, not only would Laos and Cambodia
be indefensible, but Thailand's position would
become unpredictable. "&
The study then quotes Bundy's written assessment:
"Most seriously, there is a grave question
whether the Thai. in these circumstances would
retain any confidence at all In our continued
support. . . . As events have developed, the
American public would probably not be too
sharply critical, but the real question would be
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whether Thailand and other nations were weakened
arid taken over thereafter."
In effect, the State Department was worried about the
impact that a South Vietnamese collapse would have on the
American image of will and capability in the eyes of other
nations and thus on America's position as a bulwark
against communism, particularly in South East Asia. Also,
according to The Pentagon Papers, Bundy and other
Administration officials apparently believed that U.S.
policies had appeared so ineffective to Asian nations
since the presidential election, that these nations
believed that the U.S. insistence "on a more perfect
government than can reasonably be expected, before we
consider any additional action. . . "' was an Indication
that the U.S. "'was possibly looking for a way out.'"9
The study also cites "current developments in the
cominunis-t world" as part of the State Department's
concern: in addition to the USSRresumption of an active
role in South East Asia, China was viewed as a country
supporting revolution and Indonesia was mentioned as a
possible Chinese ally along with North Vietnam and North
Korea.
In the Pentagon, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) arrived at conclusions similar to the State
Department's. If anything, OSD was even more blunt than
the State Department about the value of South Vietnam
itself to the U.S.:
"In the event of inability to prevent
deterioration within South Vietnam, he
[Assistant Secretary McNaughtonJ urged
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development of plans to move to a faliback
position by helping shore-up Thailand and
Malaysia.
An OSD assessment made immediately after the
Khanh coup in late January adds persepctive to
this viewpoint. CDoc.249] In it, McNaughton
stated and Secretary McNamara agreed, ' U.S.
objective in South Vietnam is not 'to help
friend' but to contain China. ' In particular,
both Malaysia and Thailand were seen as the next
targets of Chinese aggressiveness.
The advice tendered by the State Department was yet
again to increase the pressure on North Vietnam, although
not to move into 'phase two' operations at this stage. The
specific measures suggested were:
(1) 'an early ep1y occasion for reprisal
action...'; (2) 'possibly beginning low-level
reconnaissance of DRy . . . ' ; (3) 'an orderly
withdrawal of our dependents, ' which was termed
'a grave mistake in the absence of stronger
action'; and (4) 'introduction of limited U.S.
ground forces into the northern area of South
Vietnam. . . concurrently with the first air
attacks into the DRV.'"
OSD concurred with the view that air attacks should be
launched on North Vietnam:
"...both [McNaughton and McNamara] favored
initiating strikes against North Vietnam. At
first, they believed, these should take the form
of reprisals; beyond that, the Administration
would have to 'feel its way' into stronger,
graduated pressures. NcNaughton doubted that
such strikes would actually help the situation
in South Vietnam but thought they should be
carried out anyway. McNamara believed they
probably would help the situation, in addition
to their broader impacts on the U.S. position in
Southeast Asia."
By 11 January the Administration had abandoned its
former condition for stronger measures, that is, an
Improvement in South Vietnam's political situation, and
was prepared, if necessary, to cooperate with a military
government.. On 25 January the withdrawal of U.S.
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dependents from South Vietnam was under consideration.
Despite the appearance of an inexorable march towards
bombing North Vietnam, at this point The Pentagon Paers
analyst states clearly that the Administration was only
considering reprisals, not 'phase two' actions. However,
set against this Judgement it seems that at least two of
Johnson's advisors - McNamara and McNaughton - expected
that the Administration would have to take stronger
measures, with reprisals acting as simply a preliminary
stage.
The method chosen by the Administration to trigger
reprisals was to authorise a provocative U.S. destroyer
patrol - eventually scheduled for 7 February - in the Gulf
of Tonkin (termed DESOTO patrols in Th Pentagon Papers>.
Under the code-name Flaming Dart a list of targets to be
struck in North Vietnam was drawn up in the case of an
attack on a destroyer patrol or a Vietcong 'spectacular'
In the event the DESOTO patrol was cancelled due to Soviet
Premier Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam and the U.S.
desire to avoid offering a provocation In the hope that
the USSR might act as a restraint on North Vietnam. The
Administration's choice of a DESOTO patrol appeared to
hark back to the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, when
U.S. air strikes were launched on North Vietnam in
retaliation for a North Vietnamese attack on a DESOTO
patrol in the Tonkin Gulf, If, in August 1964, the
Administration had not expected a destroyer patrol to be
attacked, now It clearly thought that such a patrol would
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act as a provocation to the North Vietnamese, arid if
attacked would trigger justifiable U.S reprisals.-
However, despite U.S. efforts to avoid a provocation
at this particular time, when the Vietcong attacked two
U.S. installations (Pleiku and Camp Hollaway) and other
targets on 7 February causing heavy casualties, the
Flaming Dart reprisals were launched. On 8 February U.S.
planes bombed targets in North Vietnam, According to
Vietnam: The Defintive Documentation of Human Decisions,
on 6 February McGeorge Bundy, who was then in South
Vietnam on a fact-finding mission, had already drafted a
recommendation for sustained reprisals, not merely
retaliatory strikes, in order to "influence the course of
the struggle in the South." Bundy recommended developing
"the necessary public and diplomatic statents to accompany
the initiation and continuation of this [reprisal)
program" and he also stated:
"At its very best the struggle In Vietnam will
be long. It seems to us important that this
fundamental fact be made clear and our
understanding of it be made clear to our people
and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the
past we have conveyed the impression that we
expect an early solution when those who live
with this war know that no early solution Is
possible. It is our belief that the people of
the United States have the necesary will to
accept and execute a policy that rests upon the
reality that there is no short cut to success in
South Vietnam."
Three days later the Vietcong launched another
spectacular attack on a U.S. barracks at Qui Nhon and
again the Administration responded with air strikes on
North Vietnam. On 13 February President Johnson authorised
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the sustained bombing of North Vietnam, a programme
code-named Rolling Thunder, which was also to be publicly
announced. On 19 February U.S. air strikes against
Vietcong positions in South Vietnam began.
Initially the Rolling Thunder non-retaliatory air
strikes were scheduled to begin on 20 February, but they
were successively postponed, first because of more
political upheaval in Saigon; then because of a UK-USSR
peace initiative which the U.S. Government did not want to
appear to be wrecking with air strikes; and lastly because
of bad weather.	 Just before the first Rolling Thunder
air strikes were finally launched on 2 March, the State
Department published a paper on North Vietnam's efforts to
"conquer" the South, containing details of North
Vietnamese infiltration and supplies of weapons to the
Vietcong.
The next step taken by the Administration on 6 March
was to deploy two Marine Corps battalions in South Vietnam
to guard the U.S. airfield at Danang. The U.S. military
commander in Vietnam, General Vestmoreland, had requested
these troops on 22 February and President Johnson had
approved the request on 25 February. 	 The U.S. troops
landed in South Vietnam on 8 March.
Secretary of Defense McNamara had already started
examining the efficacy of the U.S. air strikes on North
Vietnam after the initial reprisal raids on 8 and 11
February and had concluded that future raids would have to
inflict more damage. On 17 February he told the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman General Wheeler:
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"Our primary objective, of course, was to
communicate our political resolve. This I
believe we did. Future coirirnunications, or
resolve, however, will carry a hollow ring
unless we accomplish more military damage than
we have to date. . . .
According to General Vheeler this matter was already
In hand - for example President Johnson authorised the use
of napalm on 9 March - and he recommended loosening
Washington's tight control over the air strikes, giving
more flexibility to the field commanders in attacking
targets.	 This recommendation was also supported by
General Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, who had been
dispatched to South Vietnam on 5 March on another
fact-finding mission by President Johnson. 	 However, not
only did General Johnson recommend loosening restrictions
on the air strikes, expanding the bombing programme
(Ambassador Taylor had already pressed vigorously for
this), not relating the strikes to Vietcong incidents
and curtailing publicity on them, but he also proposed
sending to South Vietnam either a division Of U.S. troops
or four divisions of U.S. and SEATO troops. On 15 March
President Johnson approved most of General Johnson's 21
recommendations, but not the troop proposals.
As The Pentagon Papers make clear, by 21 March the
U.S. military chiefs were proposing a bombing programme
that was designed to destroy North Vietnam's military
capabilities. Although this programme was not approved as
a package, some proposals, such as cutting North Vietnam's
lines of communication and striking its radar stations,
were incorporated into the expanded bombing campaign.
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According to The Pentagon Ppaers, the purpose of the
bombing programme had by now changed radically and so had
the original expectations concerning its efficacy:
"Operation Rolling Thunder was thus being
shifted from an exercise in air power 'dominated
by political and psychological considerations'
to a 'militarily more signiuicnt, sustained
bombing program' aimed at destroying the
capabilites of North Vietnam to support a war in
the South.
But the shift also meant that 'early hopes
that Rolling Thunder could succeed by itself' in
persuading Hanoi to call off the Vietcong were
also waning.
Thus once again the Administration was forced to
review the options available to achieve its objectives,
because current policy was not achieving the desired
results. On 24 March Assistant Secretary McNaughton
evaluated the current policy, its aims and problems in a
draft "Plan for Action for South Vietnam" for Secretary of
Defense McNamara:
"1. U.S. aims:
70% - To avoid a huniliating U.S. defeat (to
our reputation as a guarantor).
20% - To keep SVN (and the adjacent)
territory from Chinese hands.
10% - To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a
better, freer way of life.
ALSO - To emerge from crisis without
unacceptable taint from methods used.
NOT - to 'help a friend,' although it would
be hard to stay in if asked out."
McNaughton then posed the question of whether South
Vietnam could be "bottomed out" without taking "extreme
nieasures" against North Vietnam or sending large numbers
of combat troops to South Vietnam. His answer to the
question was "perhaps, but probably no." 4
 He then
detailed the "trilenima" of U.S. policy:
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"U.S. policy appears to be drifting. This is
because, while there is consensus that efforts
inside SVN (para 6) will probably fail to
prevent collapse, all three of the possible
remedial courses of action have so far been
rej ected:
a, Will-breaking strikes on the North (para 7)
are balked (1) by flash-point limits, (2) by
doubts that the DRV will cave and (3) by doubts
that VC will obey a caving DRy . (Leaving strikes
only a political and anti-infiltration
nuisance. )
b. Large U.S. troop deployments (para 9) are
blocked by 'French-defeat' and 'Korea'
syndromes, and Quat [current South Vietnamese
Prime Minister] is queasy. (Troops could be net
negatives, and be besieged. )
c. Exit by negotiations (para 9) is tainted by
the humiliation likely to follow."
Under the section dealing with air strikes on North
Vietnam in "Important miscellany", McNaughton listed:
keeping the enemy "aware of our limited objectives";
keeping allies "on board"; keeping the USSR "in passive
role"; and "Information program should preserve U.S.
public support.
At the same time that McNaughton was recommending
troop deployment as a "possible course of action" while
acknowledging that it would take "massive deployments
(many divisions) the GVN/U.S. :VC ratio to the optimum
1O+:1", General Westmoreland also submitted his analysis
of the situation in South Vietnam. He requested
reinforcements which would bring U.S. troop strength in
South Vietnam up to approximately 70,000. Westmoreland
wanted the troops by June and "indicated that more troops
might be required thereafter if the bombing failed to
achieve results.
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All these proposals were scheduled for discussion at
a White House National Security Council meeting on 1-2
April. Just before the meeting took place on 2 March the
Vietcong staged another of its 'spectaculars' and bombed
the U.S. Embassy in Saigon: apparently, U.S. bombing of
North Vietnam had not affected the Vietcong's will and
ability to blow up any target it chose.
B.) Administration Propaganda Techniques
Analysing the Administration's prtvate views on
handling public Information about the conflict at this
stage, it can be seen that the Administration was very
much aware of the need to keep the public - and U.S.
allies - informed on what the Administration knew would be
a long and hard struggle, entailing U.S. losses and with
an uncertain outcome. Many of the policy documents
submitted for discussion to the President or his principal
advisors - by for instance McNaughton, or McGeorge Bundy
or William Bundy - contained recommendations on the type
of information to release to the public and U.S. allies
and the method of release: whether by Presidential speech,
White House statement, background briefings, press
conferences, Congressional consultations, or public
report.
At first glance this might seem to betoken an
Administration emphasis on actually keeping the public
informed. However, In the case of one of the most
Important Administration decisions about sustained air
strikes on North Vietnam, It was also recommended that
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after initial announcements on reprisals the U.S. should
then implement this policy "with as low a level of public
noise as possible", while publishing regularly "a running
catalogue of Viet Cong offenses.. .".	 The rationale given
was that it was not in the U.S. interest to "boast"
aboutits actions. But, whatever the rationale, the
Administration was clearly open to charges on this
important issue that it did not intend to keep the public
fully informed about its own actions, only about the other
side's actions. Thus the Administration's main propaganda
effort at this point was concentrated on explaining why it
was bombing North Vietnam, not how it was doing this or
what the results were. The potential problem of
negotiations was encompassed in the explanation for the
air strikes:
"In the closing days of February and during
early March, the Administration undertook
publicly and privately to defend and propound
its rationale for the air strikes, . . Secretary
Rusk conducted a marathon public information
campaign to signal a seemingly reasonable but in
fact quite tough U.S. position on negotiations,
demanding that Hanoi 'stop doing what it is
doing against its neighbors' before any
negotiations could prove fruitful.
So, the Administration's propaganda argument for
bombing North Vietnam rested on North Vietnam's general
'aggression' against the South and the air strikes after
Pleiku were deliberately set within this wider context of
attacks on the South Vietnamese as well as on Americans. 54
Recommendations to the President on handling public
information explicitly stated that the focus was to be
concentrated on this Northern aggression. 	 However,
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underpinning this argument was a particular
interpretation, or reinterpretation, of two important
factors. Firstly, the demarcation between North and South
Vietnam, which in the 1954 Geneva Agreements had been a
temporary dividing line pending elections on
reunification, in Administration propaganda became an
international boundary dividing two separate nations, not
two sectors of the same country. Classifying South Vietnam
as an Independent nation meant that the U.S. could
justify bombing raids to help this independent nation -
South Vietnam - to repel outside aggression. As a
corollary, elevating South Vietnam to full nationhood also
dealt with the potentially damaging accusation that the
U.S. was interfering in a civil war and thus allowed the
U.S. to expand its involvement in the conflict and still
remain within United Nations stipulations on other
nations' Involvement in conflicts as opposed to civil
wars. In this context U.S. commitments under the SEATO
Treaty were also cited as justifying U.S. actions to help
South Vietnam repel this armed attack.
Secondly, the original justification for the reprisal
air strikes were Vietcong attacks in South Vietnam. So, to
justify bombing North Vietnam the Administration had to
link Vietcong attacks in the South to Northern direction
and support; in other words a Northern war of conquest
using Southern guerillas, but with increasing numbers of
North Vietnamese infiltrators. This interpretation also
explained the unrest and political turmoil in South
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Vietnam by putting the blame on North Vietnam's
interference and further assuming that South Vietnam's
parlous internal condition would then improve. 	 But,
there were potential propaganda problems with the
Administration's interpretation of these factors.
Concerning the demarcation between North and South
Vietnam, there was no foundation in the Geneva Agreements
to consider the 17th parallel as a permanent division,
much less an international border, which was how the
Administration's propaganda arguments treated this
dividing line. Indeed a year later in March 1966, in a
Memorandum on "The Legality of United States Participation
in the Defense of Viet-Narn", presented to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, the State Department's
Legal Advisor, while concluding that defending South
Vietnam was legal, also stated: ".. . the fact that South
Viet-Nam is a zone of a temporarily divided state. . .
thereby disposing of South Vietnam's independent
nationhood and negating one of the Administration's
propaganda arguments. This admission also laid the U.S.
open to the charge that it was involving itself in a civil
war. Even without the Administration's own officials
pointing out such flaws, the Geneva Agreements were openly
available and the accuracy of the Administration's
interpretation of those Agreements, as they related to
South Vietnam's political status, could easily be checked
and disputed. This could not only damage the
Administration's propaganda effort, but could also damage
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its general credibility, leading to a loss of public
confidence concerning the Administration's statements on
the war, which in turn would affect how future
Administration propaganda was publicly received and
perceived.
The nature of the conflict in South Vietnam was also
very much open to different interpretations, the most
obvious being that the conflict was an insurgency and/or
civil war. Despite the Administration's public emphasis on
this being a war of aggression by North Vietnam, in
private there were references to the conflict being
primarily an insurgency. Thus in March the U.S. Ambassador
in Saigon in a telegram to Rusk referred to "U.S.
involvement in the counterinsurgency"°, and McNaughton' s
24 March evaluation of the situation referred to "doubts
that the VC will obey caving DRV."' These private, or
intergovernmental views and analyses such as McGeorge
Bundy's	 at the time of Pleiku tended to contradict the
Administration's justification for the reprisal air
strikes:
"Moreover, these attacks [Pleiku] were only
made possible by the continuing infiltration of
personnel and equipment from North Vietnam. This
infiltration markedly increased during 1964 and
continues to increase.
However, in addition to differences in the
Administration's private and public views on the nature of
the conflict, the public views expressed by the
Administration in March 1965 were also different from its
earlier public stance:
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"Until the February raids, and especially
throughout the election campaign of 1964, the
case had regularly been made that the
insurrection in the South was essentially a
home-grown affair and largely self-supporting;
now the argument had to be turned around and
public opinion persuaded that there really
wouldn't be much difficulty cleaning up the
South if infiltrators from the North would just
go home and 'leave their neighbors alone. '"
Thus, in the light of the Administration's previous
statements, its reprisal air strikes on North Vietnam and.
introduction of troops into South Vietnam in March 1965
left it open to the charge that it was now interfering in
a conflict it had previously regarded as an insurgency.
And even if North Vietnam poured troops and materiel into
that conflict, unless North Vietnam was classed as a
foreign country the U.S. was still open to accusations of
interfering in a civil war proper - as well as an
insurgency. Furthermore, the offical U.S. view that North
Vietnam was the prime cause of South Vietnam' s troubles
was not consistent with reality - as the Adminisration
well knew from its Ambassador in Saigon, from intelligence
reports	 on the situation and from various fact-finding
missions to South Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy pinpointed some
of the problems in his 7 February evaluation. Discussing
one of the root causes of unrest and mentioning the groups
involved in the political in-fighting, he stated:
"Vietnamese talk is full of the need for
'revolution. ' Vietnamese practice is empty of
action to match the talk--so much so that the
word 'revolution' sometimes seems to have no
real meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a
deep and strong yearning among the young and the
underprivileged for a new and better social
order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are
groping toward; this is what the students and
young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning
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does not find an adequate response in American
policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause
of latent anti-American feeling. "
And discussing the then head of government, General Khanh,
Bundy wrote:
"Khanh is not an easy man to deal with. It is
clear that be takes a highly tactical view of
the truth, although General Westmoreland asserts
that Khanh has never deceived him. He is
intensely ambitious and intent above all else on
maintaining and advancing his own power. He
gravely lacks the confidence of many of his
colleagues--military and civilian--and he seems
not to be personally popular with the public. He
is correctly assessed as tricky. 	 -.
our principal reason for opposing any sharp
break with Khanh is that we see no one else in
sight with anything like his ability to combine
military authority with some sense of
politics. "'
Clearly the Administration knew that much of South
Vietnam's politcal instability was self-generated - and
that U.S. policies were perpetuating the very situation -
and leaders - that was frustrating many Vietnamese.
To make its case that North Vietnamese aggression was
the cause of trouble in the South, the Administration
published its report on North Vietnamese infiltration.
This report needed to be convincing because it was
intended to convey to the public the Administration's hard
evidence on infiltration - the facts on which the
Administration based its actions and public statements on
the conflict. However when published it received a mixed
reception which did not augur well for the
Administration's propaganda effort.
The Administration was also aware of the potential
image' problems it might face, particularly if great
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numbers of U.S. and Third Country troops were to be
introduced into South Vietnam. When Westmoreland wanted
o.ne U.S. division sent to South Vietnam, Ambassador Taylor
stated:
"It will increase our vulnerability to
Communist propaganda and Third Country criticism
as we appear to assume the old French role of
alien colonizer and conqueror.
McNaughton too suggested that with the dispatch of
large numbers of troops: "anti-U.S. 'colonialist' mood may
increase in and outside SVN." 7'° However, there was little
the Administration could do about this particular 'image'
problem other than to note it, for the prime consideration
of U.S. policy was to prevent South Vietnam collapsing and
with the failure of the air strikes the option left was
that of large troop dispatches - given that
"will-breaking" air strikes and negotiations had been
ruled out.
Attention was also paid to public perception of the
military methods to use in achieving U.S. goals. In his 24
March memorandum McNaughton mentioned this aspect twice:
first when he stated that in general the U.S. must "emerge
from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used"
and second when he outlined more intensive bombing
programmes and military measures, including mining North
Vietnamese ports, and noted the risk of "World-wide
revulsion against us <against strikes, blockades,
etc. ) . "71
To sum up, in its polic'y deliberations the
Administration invariably included a review of propaganda
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techniques and goals and also noted some potential
pitfalls relating to its central methods of fighting the
war. Already the basic propaganda framework had been
established, which continually emphasised enemy
aggression, actions and intentions and minimised publicity
about U.S. actions after the initial major announcement on
the air strikes. The approach was outlined in a State
Department message to U.S. Ambassadors in Asia on 18
February:
"Careful public statements of USG [U.S.
Government] , combined with fact of continuing
air action, are expected to make it clear that
military action will continue while aggression
continues. But focus of attention will be kept
as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on
joint GVN-U.S. military operations. There will
be no comment of any sort on future actions
except that all such actions will be adequate
and measured and fitting to aggression."7
Thus any errors in the Administration's propaganda
campaign could not be attributed to either a lack of
attention to, or ignorance of, the role and importance of
propaganda in a conflict.
C.) Press Reporting and Reaction
Throughout January 1965 U.S. and British newspapers
were reporting the deteriorating political and military
situation in South Vietnam. 	 The coup in Saigon on 26
January had been preceded by rioting during which the
United States Information Service Libraries in Saigon and
Hue had been attacked as a protest over U.S. support for
the then Premier Huong. Militarily, the Vietcong were
reported to be extending their control. A Daily Telegraph
editorial summed up the situation on 20 January:
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"What the Americans have been trying to
promote ever since the fall of DIEM more than
two years ago is a government that would unite
all political factions behind the military drive
against the Viet Cong guerillas. What has,
intead, been taking place is a succession of
coups, counter-coups, intrigues and
demonstrations in which rival generals quarrel
between themselves and with the civilians, while
politically-minded Buddhist monks stir the brew.
This deplorable political background might not
matter so much if military operations against
the communists were nevertheless proceeding
satisfactorily. They are not. For all the
massive American commitment of arms, aircraft
and technical support, the guerillas are gaining
ground. While holding much of the countryside in
terror, they are now, significantly, making more
frequent attacks on urban areas and also on
American billets and clubs. Their next step may
be attempted subversion in the Viet-namese
Army. "
The general impression in British newspapers, using
reports from their Washington-based correspondents, was of
an increasingly desperate situation in South Vietnam which
was correspondingly decreasing the options available to
the U.S. Admlnistration.Th These reports reflected the
assessments of U.S. Administration sources and the U.S.
military chiefs, as well as American critics of
Administration policy. 	 For instance on 16 January, Th
Guardian reported Senator (cGovern's critical speech to
the Senate on South Vietnam with the headline: "Some Harsh
Words on Vietnam". Under the subheading "'Not Winning'",
the report stated:
"He began with the assertion:
'We are not winning in South Vietnam. We are
backing a Government there that is incapable of
winning a military struggle or governing its
people. We are fighting a determined army of
guerillas that seems to enjoy the co-operation
of the countryside and that grows stronger in
the face of foreign intervention. ' He thought
victory was farther away than 10 years ago."77
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On 18 January, under the headline "U.S. Army Chiefs
Urge Bombing of N. Vietnam", The Times wrote:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff, convinced that the
present policy for South Vietnam can only lead
to disaster, are pressing for more direct and
immediate military measures. Their plan would
involve the bombing of North Vietnam and the
dispatch of an American expeditionary force.
In view of President Johnson's determination
not to extend the war it could be said that this
plan is of no account.I7e
On 23 January, The Times reported the U.S. State
Department's "concern over increased movement of North
Vietnamese troops through Laos. " The report continued:
"If this is correct, and the Pentagon would
have the press believe that it is, the situation
must be serious; but Mr. McCloskey [State
Department spokesman] said there was no cause
for alarm.
Meanwhile, the United States Information
Library in Saigon was attacked by a mob today.
It was yet another sign of the deterioration in
South Vietnam, but the State Department could
only say that it was regrettab1e."
While on 31 January, Henry Brandon writing from
Washington in the Sunday Times stated:
"WITH THE latest developments in South Vietnam
the Johnson Administration feels like a ship
with the rudder broken, the anchor chains torn
away, the hull leaking and one mutiny after
another on the bridge. The American passengers
are tossed about, holding desperately to the
railings...
With the political uncertainties in Saigon and
the American freedom of choice being constantly
narrowed, it is not easy to develop a policy. As
a consequence no one close to the top wants to
assume responsibility for taking the lead. '80
Thus both those who supported U.S. involvement in
Vietnam and those who criticized this involvement agreed
on two propositions in January 1965: that the situation in
South Vietnam was deteriorating; and that President
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Johnson had no intention of widening the conflict.
However, there was disagreement as to the cause of this
deterioration and how to resolve the whole problem of
Vietnam. The Administration laid the blame for the
deterioration on North Vietnamese infiltration, while
critics of U.S. involvement stressed the political
instability in Saigon. Journalists reported both aspects
of the situation and also the various solutions under
consideration.
In support of its case the Administration released
some figures on North Vietnamese infiltration, prior to
its full-blown report released at the end of February, and
on 25 January the press cited U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State William Bundy on the implications of this
development:
"A top U.S. spokesman for Far Eastern Affairs
said today that U.S. withdrawal from South
Vietnam is 'unthinkable,' but he held open the
possibility of enlarging the war in response to
Communist actions."1
The report also explained that while in previous
years the Administration had said the Vietcong were
basically South Vietnamese, now infiltration meant that
the communists had more manpower and this in turn affected
their view of their chances of winning:
"U.S. officials agreed that if any other
evidence were needed that the Communists think
they are winning and therefore have no interest
in negotiating a settlement, this development
[infiltration] supplies it."
The explicit statement that the war might be expanded
in response to communist moves and that the communists
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were not interested in negotiating encapsulated two
interrelated Administration's propaganda goals, aimed at
shifting the blame for escalation and lack of negotiations
onto the communists. The propaganda technique the
Administration used was to emphasise communist
infiltration, supplying detailed figures, and then to
interpret this development for its audiences within the
Administration' s own conceptual framework.
A fairly detailed break-down of North Vietnamese
infiltration, based on "informed sources in Saigon", was
provided by USIS in London in a Washington datelined
report on 28 January.	 In addition to drawing the
conclusion that Hanoi was supplying troops for the
Vietcong, USIS also concluded that the number of Southern
guerillas trained in the North was "drying up" and the
number of "irregulars" supporting them had not changed.
The implication was that there was no longer the Southern
support for the Vietcong that there had been previously
and therefore the North was becoming the dominant element
- a more sophisticated version of the 'foreign invasion'
thesis. USIS also attempted to ward off possible
allegations that infiltration figures had been provided
for some purpose other than mere public information:
"American officials pointed out that these
figures were being made public at this time not
as a prelude to new policy decisions, but to
update the record now solidly established. They
also now have a better insight into the methods
and the geography of infiltration,"
And the report concluded by reproducing a somewhat
different official view of the course of the conflict
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compared with Buridy's comments on a possible expansion of
the conflict:
"The picture emerging from firm evidence is a
matter of concern in Washington, but officials
at this point do not see the war in South
Vietnam entering a new phase."
The USIS report was inaccurate in the most important
respects. Concerning infiltration and the composition of
the Vietcong, in November 1964 the National Security
Council Working Group on Vietnam in its Intelligence
Assessment concluded:
"Despite a large and growing DRV contribution
to the Viet Cong insurrection, the primary
sources of Communist strength in the South
remain indigenous. "
Also the figures on infiltration were being released
as the prelude to a new policy - DESOTO patrols having
been authorised and long-considered reprisals planned for
the next Vietcong attack.	 indeed collating infiltration
evidence had been put in hand in December 1964 with that
purpose in mind - to explain U.S. involvement In attacks
on North Vietnam.	 And the new policy of reprisals was
quite likely to lead to a new phase in the war, as was
recognised in considering the evacuation of U.S.
dependents from South Vietnam by 25 January.
As can be seen, although the general Information
provided by the U.S. official propaganda organ fitted in
with the Administration's propaganda goals, already there
was something of a discrepancy between Buridy's reported
remarks on the conflict and the information put out by
USIS subsequently.
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Despite the USIS reassurance that the war was not
entering a new phase, when the Vietcong atacked Pleiku,
the Administration responded with air strikes on North
Vietnam. As The Pentagon Papers make clear, these air
strikes constituted a conscious break with past U.S.
policy and the introduction of new 'ground rules' in the
conflict.	 The U.S. justification for the air strikes
explicitly associated the North Vietnamese with Vietcong
attacks in the South and also linked the U.S. with South
Vietnam by mentioning attacks on South Vietnamese as well
as U.S. facilities.	 In addition President Johnson also
stated that U.S. dependents were being withdrawn from
South Vietnam because of Hanoi's "more aggressive course
of action"; that the U.S. must "make absolutely clear our
determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to
maintain its independence"; that a Hawk air defense
battalion was being deployed to South Vietnam and that:
"Other reinforcements, In units and individuals may
follow.
The press reporting that followed these air strikes
covered not only the events and U.S. jusifications, but
also focussed on the ensuing wave of pleas for
negotiations and plans to achieve these - including
British statements and moves - and U.S. reactions to
these.
Concerning the events and U.S. jusifications, despite
the Administration's careful emphasis in its statement on
the Pleiku attacks that both South Vietnamese and U.S
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installations,"several villages" and a South Vietnamese
town were attacked, press reports focussed on the attacks
on U.S. installations. Indeed The Times on 8 February ran
a report with the headline, "Reprisal For Attacks on
American Troops" and stated:
"The surprise of yesterday's attacks was
enhanced because they were directed mainly
against American installations. "
Keeping the focus on the U.S. , press reports then
dissected the events, analysing the Administration's
statements on the situation and justification for the air
strikes, Two press reports in particular highlighted the
propaganda weaknesses in the U.S. version of Pleiku. On 9
February The Guardian reported that U.S. public opinion
supported the U.S. retaliation, but then stated that not
everyone in Washington believed that the Administration
had proved that Hanoi was behind the attacks:
"Why, it is asked, should it be assumed that
these particular night attacks were the
handiwork of Hanoi rather than the VietCong
guerillas unless it has suddenly become
Washington policy to attribute any successful
and dramatic attacks against them in South
Vietnam to Hanoi. Or, as one commentator asked
in today' s 'New York Times, ' was not the main
responsibility for these successful attacks a
lack of field Intelligence by the South
Vietnamese and a failure to prosecute the anti-
guerilla war in a more vigorous and successful
way?"
After mentioning The New York Times' belief that the
war was going to escalate, the report then put events in
Vietnam Into a general South East Asian context, pointing
to a Peking broadcast calling for the overthrow of the
Thailand Government and stating:
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"It is this that seems to have brought home
with new force the need to stop communism at the
17th parallel in Vietnam if it is not to sweep
ineluctbly over the whole of South-east
Asia.
On balance, despite the comments on the reasons for
the U.S. retaliation and the damning assessment of South
Vietnamese capabilitities and performance, this report was
of use to the Administration in setting the Vietnam
conflict within the wider struggle against communism and
specifically Chinese aggression - a feature of
Administration propaganda. However a Guardian editorial on
the same day criticised the turn of events, suggesting
that Britain should try to reconvene the Geneva
Conference, despite the U.S. disinclination to attend such
a conference, and stating that the Foreign Secretary
should:
make clear to Washington the defects -
obvious almost everywhere outside that capital -
in the present U.S. policy, and to show how it
is leading ever further from the goal it has set
itself.
The Times also immediately questioned the
Administration's version of Pleiku, in a 9 February report
headlined, "U.S. Decision on Vietnam Not A Hasty One" with
the sub-headline: "Evidence of Preparations". The report
stated that U.S. objectives were "unchanged, including the
hope of a negotiated settlement" and that: "The conflict
is not to be expanded into a major war." The report
explained that Johnson had decided to embark on
"'controlled escalation'", using "controlled bombing" to
persuade Hanoi to cease supporting the Vietcong. On the
retaliatory air strikes the report stated:
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"The decision was not made in the heat of the
moment last Saturday night; indeed, it could be
said that the attacks on American cantonments
were a long-awaited provocation. "
Citing the "unusual" presence of U.S. aircraft carriers in
the Tonkin Gulf the report continued:
"The targets in North Vietnam had been
selected long ago, and it can be assumed that
the flight plans did not have to be drawn up in
a hurry. President Johnson had literally assumed
his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief weeks
before, and has since been acting as an Air
Force wing commander.
Some officials deny that the United States was
ready and waiting, which is difficult to
understand. Apart from the information
available, it is at least comforting to know
that the President did not act hasti1y."9
There were several potential problems for the
Administration's propaganda effort raised in this report:
Firstly, the correct assumption that Pleiku was a
provocation that was awaited; secondly the natural
corollary that the targets had been preselected; and
thirdly that some U.S. officials had denied the U.S. state
of readiness. All of these points could have damaged U.S.
credibility at the time, for the Administration was
disseminating an official version of the situation In
which some facts were present and others entirely lacking,
and some U.S. officials were denying even obvious
conclusions that could be drawn from available
Information. However alongside comments which might have
reflected badly on the Administration, the report also
supported U.S. propaganda lines, in stating that the U.S.
still hoped for negotiations and that the war was not to
become a major conflict, ' Thus the Administration was still
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presented as wanting peace, despite the air strikes, and
this counteracted the remarks on being ready and waiting
to retaliate. The following day, under the headline, "U.S.
Press Calls For Vietnam Talks", The Times repeated its
remarks on U.S. readiness, with greater emphasis, and
added a new comment on the official U.S. handling of the
air strikes:
"There can be no doubt, however, of the
general dismay, the secrecy with which the
President first conducted a clandestine war and
then ordered the bombing of North Vietnamese
targets without regard to public opinion is one
serious cause, which should not be ignored by
the White House.
It has been established that the retaliatory
act was planned two months ago. While the
President could not be expected to divulge
future military planning, he had ample time in
which to test public opinion and prepare it for
what be must have regarded as an unavoidable if
unpleasant act.
The Times report then suggested that the main factor
in the Presidential secrecy may have been the "widespread
opposition to any further involvement."
Again these were potentially very damaging comments
on U.S. policy and handling of events. The charge that the
White House was either oblivious to, or careless of,
public opinion was ironic in view of the attention paid to
this factor in its policy deliberations, as evidenced in
The Pentagon papers. And the Administration had created
this potential pitfall itself by deliberately keeping
quiet about its policy reviews and discussions, giving
scant information on the options under consideration and
by refusing to reveal its infiltration evidence and make
its case earlier as recommended by those in the field.
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As a result it was accused of one of the most basic
propaganda errors, appearing both overly secret in general
and inept politically. But the suggestion that the
Administration's secrecy may have been due to "widespread
opposition" to further involvement and the earlier remark
about a "clandestine war" implied that the Administration
was aware of public opinion on the war and was fashioning
its policy away from the public gaze precisely because of
this knowledge. However this report also mentioned the
connection between the U.S. bombing and its objective of
negotiations, thus setting the air strikes in a more
reassuring framework that implied that the U.S. was not
embarking on a major conflict.
Clearly the belief that the Administration was
seeking peace was a major factor in counteracting the
impression created by its obviously warlike actions, and
to some extent this helped legitimise the bombing. This
was important in view of the fact that the U.S. air
strikes on North Vietnam were first portrayed as reprisals
and then became a method of pursuing the war, unrelated to
North Vietnamese or Vietcoiig activities except in the
general sense that they were the enemy in South Vietnam.
This belief in the basically peaceful nature of U.S.
policy was demonstrated again in the press reports dealing
with the second set of U.S. reprisals after the Vietcorig
attacked Qui Nhon barracks on 10 February. For instance
The Guardian report pointed to the generalisation in the
U.S. statement about Vietcong actions likely to provoke
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U.S. retaliation and stated that this "appears to move the
whole war on to a new footing."° But the report summed
up the purpose of these air strikes as an effort to force
Hanoi into negotiations. Other articles focussed on the
possibility of a long drawn out war if the U.S. was
preparing for a major conflict and highlighted the U.S.
predicament in having involved its prestige in support of
an ally Incapable of even producing a stable
government. °'
It was after this second set of U.S. air strikes that
the pressure for negotiations began building up. The
various peace moves and proposals for negotiations
received widespread press attention. Concerning the
British Government, the press focussed on the Government's
reaction to negotiation proposals - often urged by the
Labour Government's left-wing MPs - in its dual role as
America's ally and as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva
Conference. The latter role obliged the Government
publicly to deal with the conflict on a basis other than
simply being America'a ally. However the British
Government's primary aim was to support America and Its
role as co-chairman suffered accordingly.
The British Government's contacts and sympathy with
the Administration were clear from an early stage. On 9
February The Guardian reported that Britain had been aware
"for the past three months" of U.S. plans for military
measures against North Vietnam; had not objected to the
measures and considered them justified by communist
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aggression. The same article also reported the
Government's view that there was no basis for negotiations
and therefore no reason to reconvene the Geneva
Conference. lO The Times reported that the Foreign
Office's "vigorous and forthright" reaction to the bombing
reflected Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart's views that
the U.S. was "bound to hit back". Reconvening the Geneva
Conference was stated to be "premature" but:
"The British Government have been and still
are, however, in constant touch with the United
States Government on the next steps to be
taken. '
Prime Minister Harold Wilson's support for President
Johnson was reported 1	and also his anxiety over the
possibility of the conflict escalating. By 18 February
Wilson was reported to have seen the U.S. Ambassador twice
and discussed only Vietnam the second time. These early
reports created an impression of close contact and
coincident views between the Administration and the
British Government. However subsequent events and reports
revealed that there were divergences between the two
governments over the issue of negotiations, that the
British Government's firm public support for the U.S.
carried no concomitant influence on U.S. policy, and that
this support was held to vitiate the British Government's
own ability to work for a diplomatic solution.
The first British attempts at negotiating a peaceful
solution centred on the Geneva Conference. As far as
reconvening this Conference was concerned, both Britain
and Russia initially stated that the co-chairmanship had
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lapsed. '° However, later in mid--February, in the wake of
Labour left-Wiflg pressure on the government to try to
negotiate a cease-fire and settlement and reports of U.S.
disinterest In negotiations, the notion was revived. Both
Britain and Russia were reported to be interested in
reconvening the Geneva Conference, with the Russians also
supporting French initiatives, The New York Times reported
that Britain was, "Willing But Dubious", on the
Russian/French proposals and it was widely reported that
Britain was also conducting its own diplomatic
consultations. 1O However the value of British efforts was
publicly undercut by the Administration's stated and
widely publicised lack of interest in negotiations unless
the communists ceased their activities in South
Vietnam. 109 In addition, some press reports suggested that
the British Government's moves were designed to placate
its left-wing critics and The New York Times also reported
that while the British efforts were acknowledged publicly
by Administration officials, in private they were
"belittled". 1 ' 0 The British Government's credibility as a
potential peace-broker was further diminished when
President Johnson was reported to be annoyed by Wilson's
peace moves and it emerged that U.S. officials judged
these moves to be mere politicking aimed at forestalling a
left-wing Labour back-bench rebellion. 111 And The Sunday
Telegraph stated that Russia preferred France as a partner
in moves for negotiations:
"Over Vietnam, Britain has shown herself, in
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both Russian and French eyes, too much the loyal
seconder of American policies to be fully
acceptable." 1 1
February ended with the announcement of sustained
U.S. reprisals against North Vietnam and Britain's peace
efforts appeared to be obsolete. The 'special
relationship' between Britain and America was apparently
of little importance in the context of Vietnam, as
Times noted. 11 While publicising its evidence on North
Vietnamese infiltration, the Administration was still not
publicising its intentions about Vietnam, other than to
restate its position on the requirements for negotiations.
The press continued to report that the U.S. wanted
negotiations, but also noted the Administration's
brusquely negative response to negotiation proposals such
as U Thant's on 25 February.114
However from the point of view of the
Administration's propaganda campaign the impression that
the U.S. could not be influenced on the issue of
negotiations, even by a supporter such as Britain, carried
an obvious danger of creating the appearance of U.S.
unwillingness to negotiate, despite its public statements
to the contrary. And as the U.S. emphasised the importance
of this war against communism, widened its significance
beyond Southeast Asia, and deepened the U.S. military
commitment, so its public audience became more alarmed
about the dangers involved in escalation.
The U.S. announcement about the Rolling Thunder air
strikes and. the first raids on 2 March immediately
179
reinforced fears about escalation of the conflict. Labour
MPs publicly opposed this development and tabled a motion
calling on Wilson to dissociate the Govenment publicly
from this U.S. policy of nonretaliatory air strikes,
viewed as an expansion of the war despite U.S. denials to
the contrary. 1l
 U.S. Marines then landed at Danang on 8
March to assume security duties.
These two events taken together placed the British
Government in a difficult position vis-a---vis its critics,
particularly as the Government's diplomatic approach to
Russia on 20 February had evoked no response by mid-
March, as reported' 1 , and Labour MPs were pressuring the
Government over Its support for U.S. policy.
Meanwhile the British press was reporting and
discussing all the dominant themes of the war. Immediately
after the Marines landed there was speculation about an
expansion of the conflict, due to a Pentagon leak - a leak
which was itself curious given the Administration's much
discussed and criticised public silence on its Vietnam
policy.' 1 ' The Times reported Washington rumours of
increased air strikes and 10,000 more Marines being
dispatched to South Vietnam. '' Concurrently some U.S.
officials were reported to think that the real enemy was
China, with a minority of 'war hawks' believing that a war
against China could be won using U.S. military technology
- a view which The Times castigated as "insidious
propaganda". 11 At the same time President Johnson was
privately persuading members of Congress that U.S. policy
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in Vietnam remained basically the same as that of the last
ten years, stressing the Eisenhower and Kennedy
commitments. 12Q
The U.S. image engendered by its involvement in
Vietnam was also discussed and set in the context of the
Geneva Agreements, although as a Guardian editorial
stated:
"President Johnson, understandably, cannot see
the United States 'advisers' as successors to
French colonial troops".
This editorial then analysed the inherent problems in the
Administration's propaganda line on the war, disputing the
nature of the war and the U.S. chances of winning:
"Raising these points [about the U.S.
interpretation of Geneva Agreements and
violations] might seem unfriendly were it not
that President Johnson, Mr McNamara, and Mr Rusk
constantly give the impression of believing
their own propaganda by disastrously running the
war accordingly. If the war were as they say -
predominantly an international war - the
Americans might be expected to win it, being
vastly the stronger side. They would also, if
they were right in their views, be acting
irresponsibly, for they would be risking
escalation towards a world war. If they are
wrong, as they seem to be, that risk is not so
great; but the more they exert their strength,
the worse things go with them, as formerly with
the French in Algeria."1
The editorial exposed the Administration's propaganda
dilemma of how to keep its allies 'on board' using an
argument emphasising the war's importance, which, if it
was believed, also raised fears of a general
conflagration. If it was not believed, then one of the
Administration's main justifications for fighting the war
collapsed in its audiences' eyes, raising further
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questions about the U.S. reasons for, and wisdom of,
involvement in Vietnam.
Lastly the British press was already concerned about
the U.S. methods of fighting the war, On 26 February, the
Times' Washington correspondent had suggested that if the
U.S. used its military technology extensively against
villages then, "the talk of fighting for the minds and
souls of the villagers would be utter cant." 1
	Ih
Guardian reinforced this with the observation that
although both sides perpetrated "horrors and indignities",
still "technological superiority counts.
As far as events were concerned, towards the end of
March there were two difficult episodes for both the U.S.
Administration and the British Government. After the
Russian Foreign Minister's visit to Britain, producing no
progress on Vietnam, the Administration's propaganda line
on negotiations was aided by reports that neither Hanoi or
Peking were interested in negotiations. ' 	 This was
followed almost immediately by reports on 23 March that
the U.S. was using non-lethal gas as a weapon in South
Vietnam and on 24 March the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon was
reported to have stated that the war would be extended
without limit.	 Another Commons motion was signed by
Labour back-benchers protesting against the use of napalm
and gas.
The potential damage to the U.S. propaganda effort
caused by Ambassador Taylor's remark was defused in a
subsequent Presidential statement on 25 March. This
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announcement reiterated the standard propaganda line about
the cause of the war; stated that the U.S. still sought no
wider war; emphasised that the U.S. would "never be second
in seeking a settlement"; and requested a return to the
Geneva Agreements. In addition the President mentioned the
possibility of aid for all nations in Southeast Asia. Ih
New York Times suggested that in addition to neutralising
the Ambassador' s remarks, the statement was intended to
"reassert that American policy was reasonable" in view of
the furor over the revelations about the use of non-lethal
gas.
As far as the British Government was concerned, the
problems caused by the the U. S. Ambassador' s remarks,
which were potentially far more serious than the gas
issue, were dealt with by requesting U.S. elucidation of
the Taylor statement. Once President Johnson reaffirmed
that no wider war was sought, the British Government could
continue to support America's limited war in Vietnam. In
addition, Government critics were reassured that the main
objective of Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart's visit to
Washington was to discuss Britain's role in trying to end
the war Vietnam. '
However, the use of non-lethal gas in South Vietnam,
although militarily worthless, produced a world-wide
barrage of criticism directed at the U.S. It was a
propaganda disaster for the Administration. The incident
is worth discussing in greater detail to illustrate the
183
damage that was done to the U.S. propaganda effort and the
inept methods used to counteract the criticism.
On 23 March an Associated Press (AP) correspondent
reported that the U.S. was "experimenting" with gas
warfare in South Vietnam. '	 There were comical elements
in the story about a gas-laying operation which an AP
photographer had attended after a military spokesman had
confirmed the experiments.
The U.S. Defense Department issued a statement to the
press in Washington and Saigon defending U.S. actions.
This defence was incorporated in a USIS bulletin on the
issue, which also included other departments' views. °
The justifications were:
1.) The non-lethal, temporarily disabling gas was only
used in situations where the Vietcong mingled with or took
refuge amongst non-combatants.
2,) The gas was supplied by the U.S., but was dispensed by
South Vietnamese personnel, and it was the same gas used
by the British in Cyprus.
3.) The use of tear gas in riots or tactical situations
ws not contrary to international law and practice, and,
as the State Department Press Officer pointed out, America
had never ratified the 1925 Protocol on gas warfare.
4.) Other U.S. officials felt that it was more humane to
use tear gas than to subject innocent citizens to
firepower.
The world-wide press furore that began on 24 March did
not finally subside until August. The day after the news
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broke, James Reston outlined the main effects of the
disclosure, in a New York Times article headlined, "Just A
Little Old Benevolent Incapacitator":
"One unfortunate aspect of the incident was
that it occurred precisely at the moment when
the U.S. was beginning to gain a little more
understanding in the world for its policy in
Vietnam. [Reston relates that the principal
foreign offices in the world were beginning to
believe Johnson when he said that he would go
anywhere to serve the cause of peace but that
the communists were not interested; even -the
French had conceded that their Peking and Hanoi
explorations had been rebuffed.] Accordingly the
propaganda war over Vietnam was beginning to
turn a little to the American side, when the gas
incident was disclosed, incapacitating our owi
propagandits and not very benevolently
either.
The Times pointed out that American military
spokesmen could only blame themselves for the outcry,
which they had generated themselves "by releasing driblets
of information in imprecise language. . . "' 	 Articles in
other newspapers pointed out that the incident and
controversy were a propaganda gift to the communists.
The North Vietnamese and the Chinese then issued
statements about the use of "poison" gas through their
press agencies and radio broadcasts. These reports were
then relayed to the West through dispatches from Tokyo and
Hong Kong which expressed the anxiety felt by many Asians
about the use of special weapons by White men against
Asians. In their anxiety these dispatches tended to blur
the distinction between poisonous and non-poisonous gases.
The New York Times then pointed out that although the
communists had said that • the gas had been used two or
three months before the first news report, the communists
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had not reacted until after the furorin the West had
alerted them to the propaganda potential. Yet the
Administration had not even grasped the possibilities of
attacking the communist propaganda campaign on that
delayed reaction.
The Russians put out a measured condemnation of U.S.
actions, which they said flouted international law and
common humanity. Then they delivered a note to the U.S.
Ambassador in Moscow which deplored the, use of "toxic"
gases in Vietnam. The American Ambassador refused to
accept the note and the press reported that too.
In Britain, a Commons motion was tabled by seven
Labour MPs deploring the use of gas and a telegram of
protest was sent to Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in
Washington. According to an Observer report, Stewart was
caught unprepared, but responded to the telegram
"After a tolerably successful, most cautiously
conducted 90 minute talk at the White House on
Tuesday, Stewart made his gas gaffe at the
National Press Club, calling for the U.S. to
show 'a decent respect for theopinion of
Mankind' in a quote from the Declaration of
Independence. It was like blowing one's nose on
the American flag. President Johnson and other
officials were peeved and said so."'1
There was a march by sixteen Labour MPs to the U.S.
Embassy in Grosvenor Square, to protest against the use of
gas and. napalm in Vietnam. The MPs were reported to have
shown appreciation of the Embassy's lack of concrete
Information and policy direction and only one XP made
unhelpful comments.
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The mood of exasperation which seemed to be felt and
expressed by most newspapers over the Administration's
incompetence and surprise over the furor€. was forcefully
stated by the foreign editor of the Daily Express:
"A few whiffs of tear gas - long since
dispersed in the steaming heat of the Vietnamese
jungle - have produced in the last 48 hours
enough crocodile tears to irrigate the Sahara
Desert. . . The left wing of the Labour Party is
weeping. The Belgians are sobbing. The Indians
are practically hysterical. But the people who
really ought to be crying their eyes out - from
frustration and depair - are President Lyndon
Johnson and his cabinet.
Last night Mr. Dean Rusk gave a press
conference to state that America was not
embarking on gas warfare in Vietnam.
It looks like a climbdow-n in the face of
left-wing led world opinion. In fact, it is
nothing more than the sorry conclusion to one of
the most ineptly handled pieces of public
relations in recent diplomatic history. "'
The Times sumiied up the incident in more sedate
language though with an equally damning conclusion:
"The whole incident, which naturally hinges on
one's faith in authoritative sources, seems to
indicate incompetence and insensitive handling
rather than dark deeds. The original news agency
dispatch came openly from South Vietnamese
sources, and the American military spokesmen,
apparently at a loss, were sufficiently
ill-advised to talk about such an emotive
subject before referring to the experts, from
whom precise information was said today to be
freely available.
In addition to the criticism about the
Administration's handling of the gas issue, later reports
focussed on why the gas was used in villages, concluding
that there something wrong with the handling of the
conflict if the alternative to gas was bombs or napalm.
The main effect of the controversy was pinpointed in
an Observer analysis stating that the political impact was
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"symptomatic of spreading fears about United States
policy".
This incident highlighted a number of basic
propaganda errors committed by the Administration. The
speed of modern day communications demonstrated the
difficulty of containing, or even limiting the propaganda
damage.
Firstly, since one of the basic requirements for a
propagandist is to know the audiences receiving
communications and the intermediaries transmitting the
message - in this case the press, which also constituted
an audience - American propagandists should have known
that the very word gas had been anathema to Europeans
since World War I and the use at that time of mustard gas.
It should also have been known that this weapon could be
portrayed in the context of the Vietnam War as something
being used only on Asians, even if administered by South
Vietnamese Asians, thus setting it in a racial context.
Other Asians might therefore be expected to be
particularly anxious, over and above the type of weapon
used.
Secondly, the U.S. propaganda defense also embroiled
its main ally, Britain, in the row, forcing the Government
to explain the use of gas in Cyprus. Thirdly, pointing out
that the U.S. had not ratified an International Protocol
on gas warfare merely drew attention to a general
deficiency in U.S international conduct. Fourthly, the
justification that it was better to use gas than to bomb
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villages highlighted what many observers already thought
was wrong in the U.S. conduct of the war and further
concentrated attention on the nature of the war. Fifthly,
although Britain had been implicated in the incident, U.S.
representatives in Britain were shown to be ill-informed
about their own government's policy.
In addition, this incident took place just before the
Administration planned to escalate the war in April, when
the U.S. would need its allies support, and its main ally
Britain would again have to face opposition from its own
ranks.
However, despite this incident the Administration's
propaganda campaign at the end of March, as reflected in
the British press, had achieved more or less what it set
out to do. So far the impression conveyed was that the
objective of the Administration's bombing campaign was
negotiations. This also reflected the erroneous belief,
according to evidence in The Pentagon Papers, that the
Administration did want negotiations. Reports at the end
of March that the Administration approved of a trip by
Patrick Gordon Walker to Southeast Asia to try to make
contact with all sides in the conflict, including all the
communist states involved, helped both the Administration
and the British Government defend themselves against
criticism on the negotiations issue. 	 The belief that
the Administration had peaceful intentions would
subsequently ease the Administration's path into using
bombing pauses to 'test' North Vietnam's desire for
189
negotiations and thus allay public fears about the course
of the war, and then, after a suitable interval, the
Administration could escalate the air strikes on the
grounds that North Vietnam did not want negotiations.
Also, Administration statements that the U.S. sought no
wider war were false according to The Pentagon Papers,
although they were still credible to the press.
The British press, however, had also focussed on
additional problems in U.S. propaganda. Firstly, the
portrayal of the Vietnam conflict as part of the general
communist conspiracy for world-wide expansion was
disputed 1	by sections of the British press, for this
portrayal ignored the rifts within the communist bloc.
Secondly, although the press considered more credible the
U.S. argument that the conflict was a new phase in
communist strategy using national wars of liberation,
nevertheless the press also pointed to the weakness in
using Vietnam as a battle ground. 	 In addition, for
observers who noted the communist bloc rifts and
ideological struggle, the U.S. tactic of bombing North
Vietnam to try to force a conclusion was perceived to
carry the danger of actually forcing China and Russia
closer over the issue of aid to North Vietnam. '
	 The U.S.
view that the conflict itself was purely the result of
North Vietnamese communist aggression was disputed in some
press reports, and North Vietnamese control of the
Vietcong was inadvertently disputed even by a newspaper
supporting the American venture. 	 The political turmoil
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and multitude of coups in Saigon undercut not only the
U.S. claim to be fighting for freedom and democracy but
also the U.S. thesis that South Vietnam's troubles were
caused by conmiununist aggression. The destruction caused
by U.S. war methods was already beginning to be of
concern, as well as the type of weapons used.
The U.S. propaganda device used to justify the
bombing, that it was bombing to achieve negotiations,
carried the obvious risk that bombs might not always be
perceived as a suitable signal of a desire for peace. The
continuous repetition of the Administration's desire for
negotiations also meant that the Administration either had
to achieve these negotiations or show beyond any doubt
that it was the communists who refused to negotiate. On
the President's 25 March statement on U.S. objectives, Ih
Times wrote that this statement was "the most
positive. . . in recent weeks" but also noted that the
President "did not depart from the previous requirement
for a cessation of hostilities, which is clearly
unacceptable to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese."17'
This article also disputed the Administration's version of
the Geneva Agreements, pointing out that the Agreements
had provided for a cease-fire and division of Vietnam, not
a security arrangement for Southeast Asia as the •President
had interpreted them in his speech. In fact The Times was
inaccurate in referring to a division of Vietnam, for
under the original Agreements, the division was only
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temporary, but still the article's interpretation was more
accurate than the President's.
The problem of negotiations was also connected with
the Administration's portrayal of the conflict as an
international concern in order to generate wide public and
foreign support. The danger of the conflict further
escalating generated, in turn, more public pressure on the
U.S. to negotiate and forced the Administration to justify
its apparent refusal to consider negotiations on grounds
other than requiring a cessation of communist aggression.
The propaganda line that the U.S. relied on, that it was
the communists who refused to negotiate, was always liable
to be publicly disputed, because in late 1964 the
Administration turned down the possibility of negotiations
under UN auspices. The public revelation of this, later in
1965, damaged the Administration's credibility and its
propaganda effort.
Finally the methods used by President Johnson to
contain or combat criticism of his policy were being shown
to be unsuitable and unsustainable over even a short
period of time. Briefing groups of Senators or Congressmen
privately might stifle or combat their own personal
doubts, but the arguments used by Johnson to counteract
criticism did not filter down to the general public
through press briefings or statements, thus Johnson was
not communicating to a mass audience.
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D.) British Government Reaction and Opinion
Publicly the British Government was a staunch
supporter of U.S. policy on Vietnam. However from the
beginning of the conflict there was a stated limit to this
support. This limit centred on the extent to which the war
affected the North Vietnamese civilian population, that
is, whether or not the civilian population would become a
target - even indirectly - of U.S. bombing. This limit was
also reinforced for the Government by the knowledge of the
limits of its own left-wing's tolerance on the issue of
Vietnam. Thus early official British statements stressed
that Britain was supporting the U.S. in its attacks on
limited objectives in North Vietnam. When the U.S.
Ambassador in Saigon was then reported to have remarked
that the war would be carried on without limits, the Prime
Minister, under pressure in the Commons, was obliged to
seek clarification of this remark. Such parliamentary
pressure on the Government, over its support for U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, was to become a typical
occurrence.
Undoubtedly the U.S. Administration was aware of the
pressures on the British Government and appreciative of
its support for U.S. policy. The Administration also
endeavoured to help the Government continue its
assistance. For instance on 31 March, McGeorge Bundy
telephoned Wilson's Private Secretary, Oliver Wright, to
explain some aspects of U.S. policy:
"I also told Wright of the importance of not
giving specific signals even inadvertently to
the communists with respect to our military
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intentions. I told him that the Prime Minister
had handled matters very well in limiting
himself to statements that he knew we did not
intend any war without limits. Such general
statements were quite correct and understandably
necessary in the light of the quotation
attributed to General Taylor. What would give us
more trouble would be statements indicating any
specific American decision not to attack a
specific area or target in North Vietnam.
In the first place, it was impossible for
us to give specific assurances as to what we
would or would not be doing three or six or nine
weeks from now. It might very well be
embarrassing for the British if they should give
assurances one week which they had to take back
a week later. . . I told Wright that we were
carefully using such indefinite phrases as
'measured, fitting and adequate.' I hoped the
British could do the same. He told me that he
understood the point clearly, and he seemed to
accept it." 1•4-
From McGeorge Bundy's account of this telephone
conversation, the Administration was clearly anxious to
keep its military options open.
However the Administration's appreciation of British
support did not extend to British peace initiatives, which
reduced the British Government to the role of passive
supporter when these initiatives were dismissed by the
Administration. The public image of the British Government
then also suffered. Discussing a British-Russian
diplomatic initiative just prior to the Pleiku air
strikes, The Pentcn Papers state that this initiative
ws regarded in Washington "not as a potential negotiating
opportunity, but as a convenient vehicle for the public
expression of a tough U.S. position." 4 Johnson's
publicly reported annoyance over British peace initiatives
has already been mentioned. It can thus be seen that the
British Government could expect to encounter difficulties
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in the future concerning its support for U.S. policy in
Vietnam, and its concurrent efforts to promote a peaceful
settlement of the conflict. For the Government used
suggestions of such peace moves to allay left-wing
criticism of the Government's policy of supporting U.S.
policy in Vietnam. The Government's tactics were thus
undermined when the U.S. Administration publicly
discounted British suggestions of peace initiatives.
B.) British Public opinion
British public opinion can be divided basically into
two sections. The first section comprises mass public
opinion, traditionally 'unconcerned' and 'inactive'
especially on foreign policy issues. The second, much
smaller section comprises 'concerned' and 'active'
opinion.
British mass public opinion, as expressed in Gallup
Polls10, supported the U.S. involvement in Vietnam at the
beginning of 1965, A poll published in December 1964
reported that 41% of those polledapproved of U.S. armed
action, while 33% disapproved. However there was no
inclination to help the U.S. if asked - 46% of those
polled in January opposed taking any part in the war; 10%
agreed to sending troops; 17% agreed to sending war
materials; while 29% had no opinion. But in addition to
supporting U.S. armed action, the majority of the public -
77% - also favoured the notion of a Southeast Asia
conference.
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In March the proportion of the public supporting U.S.
armed action was much the same as in December 1964; the
proportion against, 40%, stayed the same, while those with
no opinion went up by 1%. THere was also support by 40% of
the public for the notion of the U.S. continuing its
'present efforts' in Vietnam, although 33% favoured an
American withdrawal. But opposition to Britain taking any
part at all was growing, now 50%, although the proportion
favouring sending war materials had also increased to 22%,
and the number favouring sending troops was 14%; 15% had
no opinion. A National Opinion Poll (NOP)l&1 however put a
different question to those polled on American
Involvement, asking whether U.S. handling of the situation
had been "too firm, not firm enough, or about right". The
poll recorded that 17% thought U.S. handling was too firm;
17% not firm enough; and 36% thought U.S. efforts were
about right; the poll thus recorded criticism from both
'doves' and 'hawks' among the public. On the gas warfare
Incident though, both Gallup and National Opinion polls
reported a majority disapproval of the use of gas. The
National Opinion Poll put a straightforward question on
the U.S. using "non-killer" gas and recorded 58%
disapproval. Gallup poll asked if there was support for
the protest by Labour and Liberal MPs against the use of
gas and recorded that 55% disapproved. ie
In general it can be stated that in the period from
January to March 1965, a plurality of the British public
did approve of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, although
196
the public opposed any British involvement and favoured
efforts to solve the conflict peacefully. However, the
methods by which the U.S. conducted the war appeared to be
important to the public and could generate public
disapproval.
However, the 'active' section of British opinion was
already beginning to make its views known on the Vietnam
war. For instance, when the U.S. began its Rolling Thunder
air strikes on North Vietnam, 800 students protested
outside the U.S. Embassy, as The Guardian reported:
"A straggling but noisy crowd of about 800
students demonstrated all yesterday afternoon
and evening outside the American Embassy in
London against last week's US bombing in
Vietnam.
They shouted that Americans were warmongers
and murderers, and advised Yankees to go home
and wage war on want, not Vietnam, and (somewhat
irrelevantly) to give negroes the vote. After a
contingent of Communists arrived from Hyde park
things warmed up a bit, and three US Marines in
uniform were booed as they entered the
Embassy. 1
In addition, later in March there was the gas warfare
episode as discussed above, which prompted a march by
Labour and Liberal Ml's to the U.S. Embassy, and the
dispatch of a condemnatory telegram to the Foreign
Secretary, who was then in Washington discussing Vietnam
with the U.S. Administration.
Thus the early stages of the escalation of the war
provoked opposition from certain sections of British
public opinion. As the war escalated more rapidly during
April to July this opposition also grew, becoming more
more discernible and organised. Therefore this section of
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'active' and 'concerned' British public opinion will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EXPANSION OF TIlE VILE IN 1965: APRIL TO JULY
A.) Administration Planning
By the end of March 1965 the Administration had
managed to justify, largely successfully, first the
retaliatory air strikes and then the non-retaliatory air
strikes on North Vietnam, although public pressure was
mounting on the issue of negotiations. However the
Administration had also concluded that the air strikes
would not achieve their objective and so further measures
would be needed. Another policy review was thus undertaken
in Washington from 1-2 April to determine what would be
militarily necessary to achieve U.S. objectives.
The decisions taken at the White House policy review
meeting had far reaching consequences for U.S. involvement
in Vietnam in that the focus shifted from using air power
to try to affect North Vietnam's will, to using ground
troops to force a conclusion in South Vietnam. This was
the beginning of America's ground war in Asia.
The White House policy review decisions were embodied
in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 328 which
was signed on 6 April. Most important was the decision to
change the role of troops deployed to Vietnam from a
defensive to an offensive role. An additional
18,000-20,000 military support personnel were to be
dispatched to Vietnam and two more Marine battalions and a
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Marine air squadron were to be deployed. Rolling Thunder
operations were to continue increasing slowly, aiming at
North Vietnamese lines of communication. Also a study was
to be undertaken on blockading or aerial mining North
Vietnamese ports for possible future actions. The full
implication of the latter in the context of the conflict
was well understood by the Administration, for the
Memorandum stated:
"It would have major political complications,
especially in relation to the Soviets and other
third countries, but also offers many
advantages.
However, most important of all was the decision not
to publicise these changes and to represent the actions as
a continuation of the same policy, not a new one:
"The President desires that with respect to
the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature
publicity be avoided by all possible
precautions. The actions themselves should be
taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways
that minimize any appearance of sudden changes
in policy, and official statements on these
troop movements will be made only with the
direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State. The
President's desire is that these movements and
changes should be understood as being gradual
and wholly consistent with existing policy."
U.S. involvement in a ground war in Vietnam thus
began with the same secrecy that had characterised much of
U.S. military involvement in the region until the air
strikes on North Vietnam, According to The Pentagon Papers
the Administration realised the implications of changing
the Marines' role, in that the decision was taken
"grudgingly" and the new role was to be undertaken
"cautiously and carefully', for once ground troops were
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committed offensively it would be harder to withdraw,
especially after U.S. casualties. Nevertheless, whether it
would be more difficult to disengage or not, the decision
was taken to commit U.S. troops.
After the initial troop commitments, recommendations
for further reinforcements quickly followed. By 20 April
U.S. troop strength was recommended to be increased to
82,000. By '7 June another 44 battalions had been
requested to deal with increased Vietcong activity in•
their summer offensive, resulting in high South Vietnamese
Army casualties in already under-strength battalions.
Westmoreland also indicated that further troops could be
required in 1966, but in fact, before the end of July he
had requested a another 100,000 troops. Johnson approved
the deployment of 34 battalions on 17 July and by 30 July
the entire request had been approved, bringing U.S. troop
strength in South Vietnam at the end of the year to
l84,314.
At the same time the mission of the U.S. forces was
changed, from the initial defensive - later enclave -
strategy. In June Westmoreland requested, and was
subsequently permitted, to commit U.S. troops in battle in
support of the South Vietnamese Army, when necessary. By
mid-July his other request had been authorised: to engage
in search and destroy operations aimed at defeating the
enemy in the South. 8
 The latter decision altered the
entire U.S. strategy, which had formerly been aimed at
denying victory to the other side. The Pentagon Papers
state:
2 O
"'Final acceptance of the desirability of
inflicting defeat on the enemy rather than
merely denying him victory opened the door to an
indeterminate amount of additional forces. '"
Precisely what President Johnson and Secretary
McNarnara. expected their decisons of July to
bring within the near term 'is not clear,' the
study says, 'but there were manifold indications
that they were prepared for a long war. '"s
Immediately after NSAM 328 was issued, Johnson made a
major speech on peace at Johns Hopkins University in
Baltimore on 7 April offering "unconditional discussions"
to North Vietnam on the Vietnam conflict. According to Th
Pentagon Papers the timing of the speech was linked to
public pressure about the Administration's attitude to
negotiations and peace, which had formerly consisted of
blaming Hanoi for the war and demanding an end to
communist aggression. Now Johnson sought "a more
spectacular way of dramatizing his peaceful intent,"10
On the same theme Johnson ordered a supposedly
'secret' week-long halt in the bombing of North Vietnam in
mid-May. On the genesis of this move The Negotiating
Volumes of The Pentagon Papers state:
"But while the public clamor persisted and
became more and more difficult to ignore, the
President was receiving intelligence assessments
from Saigon and from Washington that tended to
confirm his reading of Hanoi's disinterest in
negotiations, but that provided him with a quite
different argument for a bombing pause at this
time: if the conflict was going to have to be
expanded and bombing intensified before Hanoi
would 'come to reason, ' it would be easier and
politically more palatable to do so after a
pause, which would afford an opportunity for the
enemy's intentions to be more clearly
revealed. " 1
The study also states that photographs had been
obtained of the first SAM missile site being constructed
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near Hanoi, and that Russia was beginning to provide
"considerably increased quantities" of military equipment
to North Vietnam and was therefore becoming more committed
to aiding North Vietnam. The study suggests that because a
"decision involving a a major Soviet 'flas1apoint,'
therefore, would soon have to be faced" the President "may
well have wished to provide a prior opportunity for a
quiet Hanoi backdown, before proceeding with more forceful
military activity." 1 Thus, as before, negotiations were
to be on the Administration's terms only.
Johnson informed the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam
of the proposed bombing halt privately beforehand on 10
May, stating:
"This fact [completion of the week's bombing
operations] and the days o± Buddha's birthday
seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity
for a pause in air attacks which might go into
next week and which I could use to good effect
with world opinion...
You should understand that my purpose in this
plan is to begin to clear a path either toward
restoration of peace or toward increased
military action, depending upon the reaction of
the Communists. We have amply demonstrated our
determination and commitment in the last two
months, and now I wish to gain some
flexibility.
However, despite the reference to restoring peace and
waiting for communist reactions, the private message in
which the Administration tried to inform North Vietnam of
this temporary bombing halt laid the blame for the
conflict on North Vietnam; in effect required the
Immediate cessation of enemy activity in South Vietnam;
stated that if the pause was taken for weakness the U. S.
would demonstrate its determination to withstand
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aggression "more clearly than ever"; and emphasised that
the pause could be reversed at any time if there was enemy
action. Iortb Vietnam refused to officially accept the
message, despite several attempts through different
channels including the British Consul in Hanoi, but later
denounced the bombing pause.	 On 18 1'ay U.S. bombing of
North Vietnam was resumed.
In early June the Administration was forced to
acknowledge publicly that the troops in Vietnam were now
used being offensively.
Finally at the end of July, after another policy
review session during which a reserve call-up was
considered and rejectedl&, President Johnson publicly
announced the decision to send 50,000 more troops to
Vietnam, bringing the total number of troops to 125,000.
Johnson did mention that more troops would be needed later
and would be sent as requested, but he did not say that
60,000 more troops had already been requested and were
about to be authorised, nor did he mention Westmoreland's
latest request for 100,000 more troops. In addition the
President announced that the conscription draft would
increase.
B.) AdminIstration Propaganda Techniques
On the issue of the changed role for the Marines in
South Vietnam, the Administration decided that silence
would be the best propaganda technique to use. Under NSAK
328 any statement at all on the increased troops and
movements was subject to tight control exercised by
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McNainara and Rusk, The objective was to avoid any form of
public speculation in the press and amongst the public.
Furthermore, as with previous Administration policy
decisions, the new decision on troop deployments was to be
represented, and thus sanctified, as a continuation of
previous U.S. policy under previous presidents, not as a
new escalatory stage in the conflict and therefore a break
with the past. The policy of silence on the new role of
the Marines was adhered to until 8 June, when the State
Department Press Officer inadvertently referred to the
change and sparked off another press furore. The
Administration was then attacked not only on the change in
role, but also on the fact that It was a low-ranking
official who announced the change. This was another
propaganda disaster, compounded by the contradictory and
uncoordinated manner in which the Administration attempted
to rebut the press allegations.
At the same time that the Administration was
controlling information on the troop deployments, the
issue of negotiations was to be given wide publicity. As
mentioned above, the President's Johns Hopkins speech was
scheduled to defuse the public pressure that had been
increasing in March. This speech incorporated the main
lines of Administration propaganda on the cause and
importance of the war. Thus China was cited as the
instigator of Hanoi's aggression; emotive analogies were
used, linking the Vietnam conflict with World War II
aggression; the long-standing nature of the U.S.
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commitment to South Vietnam was stressed; and there was
also a more sophisticated portrayal of the enemy troops,
acknowledging Southern participation as well as Northern
aggression. And again there was an offer of Southeast
Asian development, beginning with an American investment
of one billion dollars. Most of the speech was concerned
with these aspects; the part dealing with peace and
negotiations was much shorter and far vaguer and also
reaffirmed the intention to use military power in pursuit
of a final settlement as defined by the U.S.:
"There may be many ways to this kind of peace:
in discussion or negotiation with the
governments concerned; in large groups or small
ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or
their strengthening with new ones.
We have stated this position over and over again
50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And
we remain ready with this purpose for
unconditional discussions.
And until that bright and necessary day of
peace we will try to keep the conflict from
spreading. . . We will use our power with restraint
and all the wisdom that we can coinniand.
But we will use it."17
In general the public reaction to the Baltimore
speech was favourable, indicating that it had achieved its
objective of dampening criticism about the
Administration's attitude to negotiations.
Shortly after the Baltimore speech a British peace
initiative was rebuffed by the communists, which also
helped the Administration's public position on
negotiations. This incident highlighted what was to become
an interesting feature of the Vietnam conflict: the
detailed dissection of the language of communist
statements and rejections of negotiations, with officials
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sometimes seeing what they were wanted to see in such
statements and rejections. The type of minute examination
of language by British "experts", mentioned in a New York
Times report of 15 April, headlined "London is Hopeful",
and relating to the communist rejection, was a technique
which was usually employed by the Administration.
	
This
was partly due to the general scarcity of concrete
information about North Vietnam's aims and war effort, the
fact that any such information was strictly controlled by
the North Vietnamese Government, and the language
difference. The U.S. monitored the North Vietnamese media,
but could obviously learn only the official North
Vietnamese line. Apart from information that the U.S. and
other Western countries could glean via diplomatic
contacts, with the U.S. using indirect and often tortuous
channels, most information was available to the West only
through official statements, infrequent visits from
western journalists and occasional official interviews, or
visits from American anti-war activists.
The draw-back to information gained from westerners
who visited North Vietnam was that by virtue of wanting
to, and being allowed to visit North Vietnam these people
were viewed as being sympathetic to North Vietnam's cause
and whether or not this was a correct assumption the
information they brought back was viewed with suspicion by
U.S. officials and often assumed to be merely part of
North Vietnam's propaganda campaign. This left the
Administration trying to assess information about North
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Vietnamese Government aims, particularly on the issue of
negotiations, coming via these indirect diplomatic
channels or from rare interviews with high-level North
Vietnamese officials granted to journalists. Publicly the
Administration always claimed to examine this information
carefully.
At first glance, the difficulty of obtaining what the
Administration might consider to be reliable information
about North Vietnam's position and the need to examine the
'nuances' , would seem to be a draw-back, especially
concerning an acceptable basis for negotiations. But to a
large extent, whether this situation did hamper the
Administration depended on how genuine the
Administration's desire was for negotiations. For
instance, a lack of what the Administration considered to
be reliable information on North Vietnam's views on
negotiations could be used by the Administration to
demonstrate North Vietnam's lack of interest in
negotiations. The need to scrutinise communist statements
so carefully and the concomitant linguistic analysis after
translation of communist statements, could also aid the
Administration, for if 'nuances' could be detected which
showed a softening of Hanoi's position, the reverse was
also true: 'nuances' could indicate a hardening of Hanoi's
position.
The bombing pause in May was handled quite
differently to Johnson's Baltimore speech. Firstly, it was
not publicly announced. Secondly knowledge of the project,
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code-named Mayflower, was restricted to only a few
officials. And thirdly, any queries from the press about
U.S. officials' statements in Saigon that only
reconnaisance flights were being undertaken, were to be
subtly redirected to Washington, thus allowing Washington
to maintain control over public knowledge. The Negotiating
Volumes of The Pentagon Papers state:
"Much additional attention was lavished by
Washington upon maintaining near-absolute
secrecy, preserving a plausible front vis-a-vis
the press, and other aspects of stage
management 19
After Hanoi's rebuff, the bombing resumed on 18 May.
There was no public announcement, but Commonwealth
governments had been informed beforehand of the resumption
and of the lack of communist interest in negotiations.
Other friendly governmentE were similarly briefed after
the bombing resumed. In answer to press questions U.S.
officials were to state that pauses in the bombing were
due to "operational factors" and might occur again in the
future.° Thus the Administration's freedom of action was
preserved, uninfluenced by the pressures that might have
been generated by public knowledge of the pause.
By contrast with the June propaganda debacle over the
U.S. troops' offensive role, the President's announcement
on 28 July of further troop deployments was much better
handled. In mid-July there had been press reports, based
on remarks by the President and McNamara during press
conferences, that the reserves might be called up, draft
calls Increased, the defense budget increased and other
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serious measures taken. During the last week in July, when
the White House was reviewing its policy again, there had
been increasing speculation about the situation. Thus,
after this build-up of tension, the President's
announcement that the situation did not demand a reserve
call up, but merely an increase in the draft, and an extra
50,000 troops, tended to generate relief in the U.S.,
rather than anxiety about the troop deployments. 1
Concerning U.S. public opinion on the conflict, after the
policy review a warning was sounded by Senator Mansfield,
who told the President that the public was supporting him
because he was President, not because of "any
understanding or sympathy with policies on Viet Nam;
beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great
deal of confusion which could explode at any time; in
addition racial factors at home could become involved."
C.) Press reporting and Reaction
March ended with the announcement that the British
former foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, would
travel to Southeast Asia on a form of peace mission, at
the behest of the British Government and with the
Administration's concurrence. There was also press
speculation on the talks then beginning In the White
House. Using a New York Times article as a basis, Ih
Times explained on 30 March that although the U.S. bombing
campaign had apparently failed, because U.S. prestige had
been "fully committed" withdrawal was "probably
impossible", and therefore the choice was "almost
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certainly not between increasing the pressure or
withdrawing but how the pressure can be increased without
provoking China." 	 And on 2 April The Guardian reported
that Johnson was discussing "new proposals for pursuing
the war more vigorously". 	 On 3 April The Times reported
that the "main decision" to be announced after the talks
was an increase in South Vietnam's army and police force
and also that the U.S. had concluded that there was little
risk of Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war.
Concerning future U.S. involvement the article displayed a
wariness about the life-span of Administration statements
on this issue:
"For the next few weeks at least - a necessary
reservation because the Administration has
reversed itself before - there is apparently to
be no change in strategy or the size of the
American commitment. The Administration is
preparing for a long hard war, with no prospect
in the forseeable future of a negotiated or a
de facto ceasefire.2&
Against this background of reporting on probable U.S.
escalation)
 in Britain the House of Commons debated foreign
affairs, with Vietnam as the major topic. The foreign
Secretary's speech defended both the Administration's
version of the causes of the war, and the British
Government's attitude to peace initiatives and to U.S.
policy on the war. Both aspects of the speech were
criticised in the British press. During the debate the
weak points in the Administration's official propaganda
lines were again revealed, the nub of which was the
Administration's contention that the war was caused by a
North Vietnamese communist invasion. In an editorial on
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the debate The Guardian listed some of the critical points
that had been raised:
"The debate showed that there are many
important facts about Vietnam which the House of
Commons can look in the face but on which
American spokesmen seldom dwell. For example it
looked to several members as if the House was
discussing a war which the Americans and the
South Vietnamese had almost lost. Another such
fact, aired last night, is that whatever
President Johnson may think, the war in South
Vietnam is not just an invasion. 'However great
the reinforcement from the North' as Mr Philip
Noel-Baker said, 'this is a civil war in South
Vietnam.' The proposition that the South
Vietnamese are universally contented with their
rulers and loyal to them is false, and the
Government of the United States is taking a risk
in pretending otherwise.hG
The Observer dwelt on the other aspect, criticising
the Government's support for the U.S. version of the cause
of the war:
"It was understandable that the Foreign
Secretary, Mr Michael Stewart, chose not to
criticise United State policy publicly in his
Commons speech on Vietnam. But there was no need
for him to go to the opposite extreme: to
endorse without reservation the official
American view of the causes of the crisis.
The Vietnamese war is not, as the American
Administration argues and as Mr Stewart
maintained, a straightforward case of aggression
by Hanoi. Nor is it a matter simply of
containing Conmiunism: of setting an example of
firmness to encourage the West's allies
throughout Asia. It is essentially a complex
civil war, in which nationalism is as important
as communism.
Mr stewart's speech made it clear that the
Britii Government wants to help about
negotiations. . .But the role of America's loyal
ally may require Britain also to assume the part
of the candid friend."
This particular belief that Britain's role as
America's ally did not preclude the expression of
different views, but indeed carried a duty to make
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differences known to the Administration, was generally
held. by the British press, though with different emphases.
For instance Sunday Times editorials generally supported
the Government's policy towards U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. But, on the issue of U.S. tactics possibly
leading to a "wider international conflict", an editorial
urged Wilson to "talk very frankly to Washington about
British doubts and hesitations", reckoning that Wilson's
hitherto steadfast public support for the U.S. should
equip him better to do this.
Almost immediately after the accurate reports about
anticipated U.S. escalation came Johnson's Baltimore
speech on 'peace'. The speech was made against a
background of public pressure on the subject of
negotiations and the furor over the gas warfare incident,
and was partly by way of reply to the 1 April peace appeal
for negotiations from the nonaligned countries conference
in Belgrade, to which the Administration replied formally
on 8 April. The Baltimore speech was also delivered one
day after NSAM 328 was signed by McGeorge Bundy, which
authorised additional troop deployments to Vietnam,
intensified bombing of North Vietnamese communication
lines and proposed a study on mining Hanoi and Haiphong
ports for possible future operations. During this speech
President Johnson offered "unconditional discussions" to
North Vietnam.
The Baltimore speech received the wide coverage
desired by the Administration, but the anticipated close
221
attention paid to the speech by the press generated varied
reactions and reports. After the initial straightforward
reporting on it, subsequent reports and reactions analysed
the speech on two levels; firstly for the content and what
it said about future U.S. policy on the Vietnam conflict
and on Southeast Asia in general; and secondly for the
effect that the speech would have on U.S. allies.
A Daily Telegraph report on 9 April neatly outlined
the parameters of the Baltimore speech with an article
headlined: "America Cannot Lose by Viet-Nam Off er". The
article analysed the speech as a policy change on
negotiations but also dwelt on the propaganda value,
explaining that if negotiations did not materialise the
Administration would still benefit from the propaganda
angle:
"If the move fails, it will have at least cut
the ground from under critics who have been
urging America to 'escalate' the diplomatic
efforts along with the military conulict."
A Daily Telegraph editorial welcomed Johnson's speech
unreservedly, stating that he had "thrown wide open the
door to any sort of talks aimed at a peaceful settlement
in Viet-nam" and continued:
"His abandonment of the implied pre-condition
that Hanoi should first cease its aggression
against the South is wise as well as
conciliatory. It removes any obstacle to
negotiation that might arise from genuine
uncertainty, in this clandestine war, whether
Northern help to the guerillas had actually
stopped. By proposing unconditional negotiations
the President offers the Hanoi Government - and
China too - a face-saving approach to the
conference table. . . [the non-communist world
should approve this U.S. sacrifice of faceJ
"It is however, to the Communists that Mr.
Johnson's appeal is addressed. There is only one
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reason why they should refuse to enter the
opened door: that they are uninterested in
negotiation, but are determined to fight it out.
This may well be their resolve. The President's
speech is not the first opportunity they have
had to show otherwise: it has been preceded in
recent weeks by several private, indirect
approaches, none of which has revealed the least
willingness to negotiate.
This editorial basically disseminated the
Administration propaganda line on the lack of
negotiations. The assertion that Johnson had offered
"unconditional negotiations" was completely inaccurate on
two grounds firstly, Johnson had offered unconditional
discussions, not negotiations; and secondly, these
discussions were not offered unconditionally - they were
preceded in the speech by an American definition of what
constituted a final peaceful settlement in Vietnam, which
was an independent South Vietnam; by a definition of the
main enemy as being North Vietnam, thus leaving aside the
Vietcong as a negotiating party; and by a warning that the
U.S. would "not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak
of a meaningless agreement." And then there was a further
warning that until peace arrived, U.S. power would be used
with "restraint" and "wisdom", but it would be used. 1 It
required a great stretch of the imagination, a
considerable degree of anti-communism and a concomitant
belief in the Administration's peaceful intentions, to
term as 'unconditional' what Johnson was offering.
However the Daily Telegraph was not the only
newspaper to report that Johnson's talks were
unconditional. A Financial Times editorial captioned, "An
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Olive Branch in Washington", also referred to Johnson's
"decision to drop any conditions for peace talks on
Vietnam."	 This editorial too was pessimistic on the
prospects for a settlement, citing the Communist
preconditions for negotiations, which, it said, the
Americans were unlikely to comply with. On the subject of
the effect of the speech on U.S. allies, the editorial
stated:
"The United States has given its impatient
allies proof of its genuine desire to put an end
to the war. Mr Harold Wilson, who lost no time
in welcoming the President's initiative, will
now be able to face his left-wingers with a
clear conscience.
In effect this editorial too supported the
Administration's propaganda effort, in the expressed
belief in the U.S. offer of unconditional talks and then
taking this as proof of a desire to end the war. But while
this Financial Times editorial lauded the Baltimore
speech, a report printed the same day written by the
paper's Washington correspondent offered a contradictory
reading of the speech. Analysing both the Baltimore speech
and the subsequent formal U.S. reply to the nonaligned
countries appeal, this report concluded that the U.S.
objective was "still to win the war even if other means
are used." The report also discussed the reasons behind
the U.S. offer at Baltimore:
"The main consideration which prompted the
shift to 'unconditional' talks are clear enough.
First, the State Department had grown
increasingly uneasy about the damage done to the
American image in the uncommitted world by an
appearance of uncompromising and unreasonable
hardness. Embarrassing criticism from American
allies also seemed to be growing.
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Secondly, the President, who is acutely
sensitive to Congressional and public opinion,
no doubt felt that the 'consensus' on foreign
affairs which he regards as indispensable was in
danger of disappearing. The chorus of praise and
relief from moderate Senators as well as from
the American Press this morning justifies this
calculation.
However, possibly the most damning section of the
report lay in its evaluation of this offer of
unconditional talks:
"Diplomatic observers are this morning
understandably sceptical, however, about what
this superficial change amounts to. Senator
Church remarked, shrewdly enough: 'Even if the
offer of discussion is rejected, nothing is lost
by making it' - and this, one suspects, is the
real basis of the present position."
This report thus offered a completely different view
of the Baltimore speech, concluding that it had been made
for effect, not in order to achieve negotiations. Given
this objective therefore, the report judged that the
speech had achieved what it was meant to do - maintain the
U.S. consensus on foreign affairs and deflect allied
criticism of the U.S. position. However, the success of
this speech was somewhat vitiated by the existence of
reports such as this, implicitly exposing the negotiations
offer as a propaganda gesture.
The Guardian's editorial greeted the Baltimore offer
with the caption: "Generosity is not enough". The
editorial focussed initially on the U.S. offer to develop
the Mekong valley and the apparent absence of the usual
U.S. inisistence on Hanoi ending its aggression. Then the
editorial pointed out that Johnson's 'unconditional
discussions' were not in fact unconditional and cited the
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phrase on the U.S. not withdrawing; the exclusion of the
Vietcong from talks; and the demand for an independent
Vietnam. On this latter point, the editorial stated:
"Thirdly, President Johnson gave as his
objective 'the independence of South Vietnam,'
thereby apparently ruling out reunification.
This was a retreat from some of his earlier
speeches, in which he used to invoke the Geneva
Agreements of 1954. Perhaps he has read them
since; they say specifically that the 17th
Parallel must not be taken as a political or
territorial boundary. At any rate the name
'Geneva' was not uttered at Baltimore. But you
cannot, by insisting that South Vietnam is an
independent nation' beg one of the main
questions and then claim to be imposing no
conditions.
The editorial thus revealed the inherent weakness in
the Administration's use of the Geneva Agreements to
bolster its case, while in the act of disposing of the
idea that 'unconditional talks' had been proposed. The
editorial summed up the Mekong valley offer as being
another method used by the Administration to achieve U.S.
objectives in South Vietnam: the U.S. display of military
superiority having failed to persuade Hanoi to negotiate,
the Administration was now using its superiority in
wealth. Doubtful that this would work better than the
bombing, due to a lack of understanding by the U.S. of
what the war was about, the Guardian editorial finally
suggested that a bombing halt might help achieve
negotiations.
The Times also examined the Mekong valley project,
explaining that the official who had proposed it "last
winter" had since resigned, partly because of the
pre-eminence of war hawks in the Administration, but that
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the President's view "obviously underwent a change in the
past few days", perhaps because of mounting domestic and
foreign public anxiety about the war after its recent
intensiuication.	 Thus, whereas The Guardian saw the
entire Mekong project proposal as a way of gaining U.S.
objectives, The Times focussed on the timing of its
resurrection, seeing this as an attempt by the
Administration to combat criticism of its policy. Once
again therefore the propaganda purposes behind the
Administration's offer were exposed, thereby putting the
offer itself in a different context - that of winning the
war and retaining public support, rather than a
straightforward Administration attempt to start
negotiations and Southeast Asian development.
Another Times article described the immediate welcome
accorded the Baltimore speech by Harold Wilson and pointed
out that "the American proposal went a long way towards
satisying" Labour left-wing demands addressed to the
Government for a peace initiativeto end the war. The
Opposition too praised "President Johnson's attempt to
break the deadlock". In addition the article also
mentioned that Wilson had been informed of the speech
beforehand by Johnson and was now using diplomatic
channels to ascertain "the next moves". 9 The impression
was that there were peace moves afoot.
An interesting analysis of Johnson's Baltimore speech
was provided by a supporter of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, Joseph Alsop, an American columnist syndicated in
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the New York Herald TrIbune. Alsop lauded the "craftiness
and toughness" of Johnson's speech, linking these
qualities to the timing of the speech, and in the latter
part of his column, to the 'unconditional discussions'
offered:
"No one can any longer say that 'Johnson won't
even talk, ' But 'unconditional discussions' mean
discussions in which neither side accepts
conditions, and therefore discussions permitting
our side to keep the pressure on until the
desired final results begin to be in sight."
Alsop then stated that the "toughness" of this "grim
speech" could not be exaggerated, and analysing Johnson's
words about the U.S. not withdrawing, "either openly or
under the cloak of a meaningless agreement", he drew the
following conclusion:
"That closes all the doors except one. That
means that this strange man, who dislikes
painful decisions and is so clever that he
generally manages to elude them, has made the
grim decision, this time, to go to the very end
of the road, if need be, in order to avoid the
terrible defeat that seemed to threaten in
Vietnam only a little while ago."'°
The one door left open that Alsop mentioned referred
to the Mekong proposal which, he had explained, was
offered to the North Vietnamese Communists as an
inducement to cease being "instruments of the Chinese
Communists aggressive will."
Alsop's analysis was clearly based on a belief that
events in South Vietnam were the result of communist
expansionism which had to be repelled militarily. He thus
Viewed U.S. policy on Vietnam as a 'hawk', and as such he
found the Baltimore speech reassuring. However, in
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proclaiming Johnson's decision "to go to the very end of
the road," he undercut the supposedly peaceful nature of
the speech. In common with other observers, Alsop too
pointed to the timing of the speech which he linked to the
"tough policy" of air strikes, stating that it was because
this policy was beginning to work that the President could
now offer his Mekong "carrot" without appearing weak.
Another well-known American columnist, also
syndicated in the New York flerald Tribune, was Walter
Lippmann, who was regarded by the Administration as
influential enough to warrant particular efforts aimed at
soliciting Lippmann's support for the President's Vietnam
po1icy.	 Lippniann, writing from a liberal standpoint -
the antithesis of Alsop - and critical of U.S. policy on
Vietnam, was bluntly sceptical about the Baltimore speech,
stating:
"While the President's Baltimore address
introduced a certain change in the tone of the
official policy, it was quite evidently not
intended to bring about any marked change in the
course of the war. d2
As can be seen, the Baltimore speech was not a
complete success as a propaganda gesture on negotiations,
partly because it was seen as 'propaganda' in the
pejorative sense, by some observers, for it was already
clearly recognised as 'propaganda' in the sense that the
speech was an effort to disseminate the Administration's
viewpoint and persuade public opinion to accept it. In
addition this speech was followed a day later by the U.S.
Reply to the nonaligned nations' appeal, and this Reply
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explicitly restated the former U.S. position that peace
could be achieved "the moment that aggression from North
Vietnam is eliminated" and when this stopped then "the
need for American supporting military action will also
come to an end." 4 Thus the "unconditional discussions" of
the Baltimore speech were undermined only the following
day in this Reply, and the efforts the Administration was
making to influence the public were publicly mentioned.
For instance a New York. Times report on' -9 April on the
Baltimore speech and the Reply stated:
"The Administration was staging a major
propaganda effort effort around the President's
speech, distributing it and 'commentaries' on it
by radio, pamphlet and film clips.
The White House distibuted Kr. Thant's letter
and let Adlai E. Stevenson, Representative at
the United Nations, and Carl A. Rowan, Director
of the United States Information Agency,
'report' on favorable world reaction to the
Cabinet and to newsmen called in after the
Cabinet meeting. "
Much of the American press, however, generally
greeted the speech with relief - for example despite the
report on the Administration's propaganda efforts a ie
York Times editorial was captioned "New Policy, New
Phase".	 But some British press reports, and observers
such as Alsop and Lipprnann, examined the speech more
critically. In these reports the speech was judged as
propaganda on the grounds of timing - to relieve public
anxiety - and content, for while the latter purported to
signify a policy change, on close examination the 'change'
was revealed to be negligible, a matter of style not
substance, The fact that there were British press reports
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which concentrated on these aspects and which then also
exposed weaknesses in the Administration's basic
propaganda arguments, as for example the Guardian
editorial did on the Geneva Agreements, demonstrated the
Administration's inability to implant its perceptions of
the causes of the conflict and disseminate its basic
propaganda arguments, as well as its tactical propaganda
moves, without critical analysis through some parts of a
foreign, analytical intermediary/audience. Thus the
emotional references in the Baltimore speech to World War
II, and the U.S. defence of "world order" through its
commitment to the "sll and brave" amd independent nation
of South Vietnam, were not having the desired effect on
this section of the Administration's audience, which used
a different set of references with which to judge the
conflict. And in addition to some sceptical British
reports, Alsop and Lippmann - American columnists with a
European audience - writing from opposing viewpoints on
the desirability of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, also came
to the same conclusions about the Baltimore speech: that
it signalled no policy change on negotiations, but was an
effort to deflect criticism of U.S. policy.
However, despite the critical reception given to the
Baltimore speech in some press reports, overall the speech
focussed the public gaze on negotiations rather than
bombing and escalation, and concentrated press attention
now on the communists' response to the Administration's
'offer' . The negative communist reactions should have been
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of considerable use to the U.S. propaganda effort. A
New York Times editorial on 11 April summarised the
situation, pointing to the communist's negative reactions
but stressing that the Administration should continue to
press for peace and decrease the intensity of the war.4
This editorial also gave its own version of the parameters
of acceptable proposals on South Vietnam and perforce
aided the Administration by setting such a limit:
"Publicly, North Vietnam's President Ho Clii
Minh and his Paris representative have echoed
Peking's demand - obviously unacceptable - for
American withdrawal for South Vietnam as a
precondition for a conference.
The New York Times editorial concluded with a
iudgement of the impact of the Baltimore speech and a plea
for peace:
"Within 24 hours last week the Johnson peace
plan basically altered world opinion, which had
become increasingly hostile to American policy
in Vietnam as a result of the bombing and the
gas incident. . . Negative Communist responses must
not distract us from this hopeful peace
offensive.
The British press also reported the negative
communist response, but tended to concentrate on Britain's
peace initiatives and possible role in any negotiations.
On 11 April an Observer report headlined "Seeking peace on
Johnson offer", stated that unofficially the U.S. offer of
"unconditional talks. . . has so far had a hostile reception
from North Vietnam, China and Russia," but the report also
noted:
"Despite these negative public attitudes, the
President's speech has further stimulated
diplomatic activity behind the scenes in many
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world capitals to bring about a negotiated
settlement to the Vietnam war. "°
Britain's own diplomatic efforts were also reported,
consisting of Wilson's request for U.S. clarification of
the "guarantees of the independent, neutral South Vietnam"
mentioned in Johnson's speech, and Patrick Gordon Walker's
forthcoming Southeast Asian trip.& The Sunday Telegraph,
in an article headlined "Wilson Pressing Johnson",
reported that Washington had been asked to "spell out" how
it was "thinking of moving towards a settlement". 	 This
report also noted the lack of response from Hanoi and
Peking to Gordon Walker's request to visit them and judged
that without their involvement the trip "would be little
more than a lightning conductor to deflect Left-wing
Labour unrest at home."
	 On 13 April The Times reported
that western diplomats were now "clearly resigned" to a
communist refusal of Johnson's offer.
On 14 April the Communist reply to the Baltimore
speech, formulated on 8 April, was made public. North
Vietnam set out its provisions for settling the conflict
in Pham Van Dong's Four Points, based on the Geneva
Agreements. The Four Points were publicised in a Xinhua
(China's official press agency) English language report
monitored by the U.S. and reproduced in the New York
The Administration was first reported by the
York Times to be "cool" to the plan and expected to reject
it, but was then reported the following day to be studying
the plan and "not prepared... to dismiss Hanoi's statement
as an empty gesture." 	 The ambiguity contained in Point 3
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of Hanoi's Four Points, concerning the settlement of South
Vietnam's internal affairs " in accordance with the program
of the N,F.L.S.V. t the South Vietnam National Liberation
Front, or political arm of the VietcongJ without any
foreign interference" 	 was simply assumed by U.S.
officials to mean a communist take-over by way of the
Vietcong's political program. That Point 3 could be read
differently, as noted by Kahin and Lewis in their critique
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam published in 197B8, to
mean 'settling South Vietnam's internal affairs without
foreign interference, in accordance with the N. F.L. S. V. 's
program' , was never explored by the Administration. As
noted previously, the business of scrutinising and
dissecting the language of communist statements could
prove useful to the Administration: it was only a
draw-back if there was a genuine desire to find a basis
for negotiations, and at this time the Administration's
terms for negotiations amounted to a North Vietnamese
surrender, notwithstanding the Baltimore speech.
By now the Baltimore speech episode was coming to an
end. Hanoi and Peking had refused to receive Gordon
Walker, thereby vitiating the original purpose of the
trip, which was to seek the views of both sides to the
conflict. However, Johnson later used this rejection to
advantage in his Easter message. But despite this visible
set-back, the New York Times reported from London that the
British Government was still hopeful about the long-term
chances for peace talks because "experts" had detected "'a
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nuance of difference'" in Hanoi and Peking's rejection of
the Gordon Walker visit and thought that North Vietnam's
"more polite" rejection betokened "a shift toward a more
moderate line".
	 The report stated that the reasons given
in London for this apparent shift were the bombing, the
"renewed strength of the American commitment" and the
"diplomatic effects" of the Baltimore speech.° These
"diplomatic effects" were aided by a speech by YLichael
Stewart to the Foreign Press Association, in which he
noted the increasing support for U.S. policy, stated that
he was against finding and emphasising differences between
the U.S. and Britain on Vietnam as the Administration's
statements were becoming more acceptable ) and that the next
move was now up to the communists. 1 The Times noted that
as more people came to support the Administration's policy
on Vietnam, this justified the British Government's policy
of support for the U.S.
	
Thus the propaganda war seemed
to be developing in the Administration's favour.
There was a postscript to the Baltimore episode on 17
April when President Johnson renewed his "unconditional
discussions" offer in an Easter message from his Texas
ranch, 10 days after his original speech. Stating that "we
tried to open a window to peace", Johnson labelled North
Vietnam's response as "tired names and slogans and a
refusal to talk" to the U.S., to a "distinguished Briton"
(Patrick Gordon Walker), or to the United Nations.
Johnson also mentioned the increasing world understanding
of America's "peaceful aim" in South Vietnam and the
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"strengthened unity of American purpose" in Congress, the
press and the people, to resist "aggression", "pursue
peace" and "improve the lives of the people of Southeast
Asia".	 Johnson's reference to "strengthened unity" was
ironic In view of the fact that as he was delivering his
message approximately 15,000 students and academics were
demonstrating against U.S. policy at the White House, and
this irony was not lost on journalists - their reports
juxtaposed Johnson's Easter message with the
demonstration, which the Guardian stated was "one of the
largest ever to be held outside the White House."
While Johnson concentrated on the continuing U.S.
willingness to talk about peace and the communist refusal,
it was Dean Rusk who underlined the continuation of the
bombing and ruled out a suspension of the air strikes on
the grounds that rather than resulting in a cessation of
North Vietnamese "aggression", a suspension would hearten
the North Vietnamese and dishearten the South
Vietnamese.	 In announcing the latter, Rusk drew
attention to public and private efforts which had been
undertaken to ascertain North Vietnam's attitude to a
bombing halt, thereby explaining and reinforcing the
Administration's decision not to halt the air strikes.
For by this time suggestions had been put forward, most
prominently by Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson
and U Thant, that a temporary suspension of the air
strikes might help towards resolving the situation.
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On 18 April Pearson and U Thant were joined by
Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, who also advised a bombing halt. He
did so on the grounds that this might help initiate peace
talks, whereas he believed that continuing the bombing, as
The Times noted in its report, "might cause the North
Vietnamese to dig in - as Britain had done against the
German bombing during the last war - and the Russians to
refuse to talk."	 Clearly Fulbright and the
Administration differed radically in public over the World
War II analogies that applied to the Vietnam conflict.
However Fuibright was merely hypothesising publicly on
what the Administration already knew privately in fact:
that the air campaign so far had not affected North
Vietnam's will to continue aiding the Vietcong. This
should not have been too great a surprise to the
Administration because from the early stages of the air
strikes Johnson's advisors had differed over the likely
effects on North Vietnam's policy and actions of a
sustained bombing campaign: intelligence estimates
suggested on the one hand that North Vietnam might scale
down its activities, but on the other hand that it might
intensify its activities. 0
At the beginning of April, when the decision on
committing ground troops was about to be taken, outgoing
CIA Director John XcCone had argued that if ground troops
were to be committed then the air strikes should be
intensified to "really hurt the North Vietnamese" because
so far the strikes had been ineffective:
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"I have reported that the strikes to date have
not caused any change in the North Vietnamese
policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency,
infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If
anything, the strikes to date have hardened
their attitude. 1171
This evaluation partly accounted for the
Administration's switch to a ground troop strategy - only
partly because several months before the decision was
finally taken Johnson had favoured putting troops Into
South Vietnam over the bombing option. 	 Publicly, of
course, there was no hint from the Administration of its
doubts about the efficacy of the air strikes and its
decision to deploy to ground troops. Instead it was made
known that the Administration would continue, although not
Intensify, the air attacks on North Vietnam, but it would
concentrate mainly on fighting the conflict in the South.
This deliberate, publicised switch of focus, served the
longer-term purpose of beginning to prepare public opinion
for the time when Johnson finally did decide to announce
that great numbers of American ground troops would be
deployed In South Vietnam. Its immediate effect however,
in the aftermath of the hopes raised by the Baltimore
speech and the suggestions of a bombing halt, was to
provoke more press analysis of the reasons for, and
results of, the bombing campaign and indeed analysis of
the basis of the U.S. commitment.
eporting on this switch of focus on 23 April, the
Eivancial Times put forward three reasons for what it
termed "another significant shift in U.S. policy";
firstly, escalating the bombing would weaken a
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pro-settlement faction within the North Vietnamese
Government which the Administration had apparently
detected; secondly the Chinese might send volunteers; and
thirdly public opinion might object if civilian casualties
rose in the North.
	 This report also stated that the
Administration had refused to commit "large numbers" of
American ground troops.
	
Other press reports had also
noted that the bombing appeared to be bringing little
advantage to the Administration. On 21 April in a report
headlined "Washington Counts Cost of Vietnam Bombings;
Division on Policy's Effectiveness", The Times stated:
"The effect of the President's Baltimore
speech is beginning to wear thin and the State
Department has admitted that the response to its
offer of unconditional discussions is
disappointing. The United States in in its third
month of raining death and destruction upon
North Vietnam, a desperate and by any standards
a questionable measure that appears only to have
brought frustration to the Pentagon,"
Discussing the issue of negotiations and the Geneva
Agreements, the Times report then set the conflict within
the wider context of the Cold War frontiers:
"A perusal of the agreement would suggest that
the North Vietnam reading of the Geneva
Agreement is closer to the intentions of tis
authors, and certainly the American recognition
of its authority was suspiciously tardy.
American diplomacy, buttoned or unbuttoned [a
reference to Walter Lippinann's judgement on
State Department diplomacy as unbuttoned], is in
fact applying the bitter experience of military
defeat in the paddy fields and political failure
in Saigon. . . For the Administration it leaves
only one question to be answered: can American
power force Hanoi to accept a solution, the
recognition of the 1'7th Parallel as an
east-west, rather than a North Vietnam-South
Vietnam, frontier without provoking Chinese and
Russian intervention ?h1?'B
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Walter Lippmann's Judgement on the situation,
mentioned in The Times report, was yet more explicit about
the gap between the Administration's version of the Geneva
Agreements and the real provisions in the document. While
acknowledging that North Vietnam had not abided by the
original terms concerning free elections in the North,
Lippmann pointed out that the United States had also
opposed free elections to unify the country "when it
realized Ho Chi Kinh would win them. . . Since that time we
have insisted that South Vietnam is an independent
nation."' Lippmann called this a "cardinal weakness of
our diplomatic position today", emphasised the fact that
the U.S. had not always held the view that South Vietnam
was an independent nation and came to the "bitter truth",
on legal and moral grounds, that the U.S. had no "true and
active supporters" of its policy.
Certainly the diplomatic situation was in disarray,
reflected in confusing press reports about another peace
initiative having foundered - this time a Russian proposal
to its co-chairman Britain to convene a conference on
Cambodia. Britain's delay in answering the Russian request
was attributed to the necessity of securing an answer from
Washington, and Washington's delay was explained in turn
by its need to secure South Vietnam's approval. 	 The
reports on the U.S. attitude to such a conference were
confusing. The Financial Times reported on 23 April that
the Americans had received Wilson's overtures, during his
visit to Washington, "politely" but were convinced that
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there were "serious dangers" in such a conference and that
attempts to persuade South Vietnam and Thailand to take
part were "foundering on their detestation of Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia and their fears that a settlement
would only end in the reduction of American support."
Two days later however, after Prince Sihanouk had turned
down the conference, Henry Brandon in the Sunda y Times
stated that the U.S. had been "on the point of informing
the British Government that it was willing to attend such
a conference" and that South Vietnam would have agreed to
attend.
Thus, due to Sihanouk's negative attitude, the
Administration did not have to articulate a clear public
response to the Cambodian conference proposal. This meant
that the Administration could be reported as favouring the
proposal without having to take any positive action. This
turn of events was fortunate for the Administration, for
if a conference had been convened, the firm U.S. intention
of continuing to bomb North Vietnam while talks were
taking place	 would have destroyed any public goodwill
and belief that U.S. participation in such a conference
meant that it really did want to negotiate. And there
seems little doubt that the Administration did not want to
negotiate, for at the recent Honolulu Conference the
Administration had decided to increase the troop
commitment to 82,000, and was seeking further third
country reinforcements for a protracted struggle against
the Vietcong in the South. The Administration expected to
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prosecute this struggle successfully to achieve its
current objectives of denying victory to the Vietcong and
calculated that it would take "more than six months,
perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the
South.
In addition to the confusing reports about the
diplomatic situation, there were also contradictory press
reports on public support. Stating that the "United States
clearly remains a nation divided over the war in Vietnam",
The Times had judged that the mid-April demonstrators were
"only the articulate few representing a vast mass of
d1sent." 8 Whereas the Financial Times a few days later
had written: "Public opinion, when it is not apathetic,
still appears to be predominantly in favour of the
Presidents's policy."	 In fact The Times view of the U.S.
being divided over the war was supported by Gallup Poll
figures published in the Daily Telegraph on 23 April,
showing that 29% wanted the U.S. to withdraw, or stop
fighting and begin talks; 31% wanted increased military
pressure; and 14% thought the present policy correct,
including a readiness to negotiate.
Concerning the British press, criticism of U.S.
policy had sharpened in those newspapers which had
previously expressed doubts about aspects of U.S.
involvement, In some cases there was now outright
opposition on varying grounds. For instance on the global
effects of U.S.policy, an Observer editorial on 25 April
captioned "Destroying Tomorrow", began:
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The United States is fighting a mistaken fight.
However much we may wish to avoid embarrassing
an ally, however much we may sympathise with
President Johnson's difficulties, the point has
come when polite murmurs of dissent are no
longer appropriate. When you see a friend sleep-
walking on the edge of a precipice, carrying
your only child in his arms, it is your duty to
try to wake him up - even if this involves
raising your voice and making rude noises."'
The Observer's main charge against U.S. policy was
that it was "destroying the only possible basis of world
peace-keeping for the future", by destroying the improved
relations between the U.S. , Russia and the non-aligned
nations, the most important relations being those between
the U.S. and Russia.	 The editorial further pointed out
that U.S. policy was undermining the Russian view that
coexistence with the West was necessary, and because of
the ideological competition between Russia and China, U.S.
actions were forcing Russia to cooperate with China over
Vietnam. 99
 In this situation the Observer suggested that
the U.S. "should be persuaded" to settle the conflict
diplomatically and accept that South Vietnam might end up
with a communist government, in return for Russia
guaranteeing South Vietnam's "military neutralisation,
The editorial concluded that world peace and mankind's
future depended on reversing the present U.S. policy on
Vietnam.
The Guardian used an editorial based on Australia's
commitment of troops to explore the pressure the British
Government was under to follow Australia's example.9
Despite pointing out that Britain was economically
dependent on the U.S. and therefore under obligation to
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some extent, The Guardian suggested that it was time that
the British Government began to criticise U.S. policy in
the hope of influencing it to some small degree, rather
than agreeing in public and endeavouring to ameliorate
U.S. policy in private.
	 Detailing various aspects of
U.S. war methods - the bombing, use of gas, and napalm -
which the British Government had already condoned Th
Guardian wondered: "Where will Mr Wilson draw the
line ?"
The Times, meanwhile, analysed student and faculty
protest in the U.S. over the war and drew attention to the
relationship between Vietnam war protesters and the
idealism of the U.S. civil rights movements.
	 This
editorial pointed out that because civil rights workers
were critical of the U.S. social order they were doubtful
about the type of society that was being defended in
Vietnam; and the two movements had workers in common.
The editorial concluded:
"The war, in fact, is not one to which much
direct idealism can be attached, and a more
restless and critical youth is finding it
difficult to support. The protest may be
negative, ill-defined, and irritating to those
who are closer to the facts. But it has hopeful
aspects.
Thus by the end of April the Administration was
coming under increasing pressure over all aspects of its
Vietnam policy, including forceful complaints from the
York Times that the Administration was deliberately not
keeping the public informed about the conflict. An
editorial captioned "Truth or Propaganda" stated that the
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Administration's "credibility.., has been one of the
numerous casualties of the war in Vietnam" and continued:
"Time after time high-ranking representatives of
government - in Washington and Saigon - have
obscured, confused or distorted news from
Vietnam, or have made fatuously erroneous
evaluations about the course of the war, for
public consumption.
"Mistaken .Judgements are understandable -
though if too frequent, indefensible; but
deliberate distortion or obfuscation, or the
selection or repression of facts for propaganda
purposes, is inexcusable. Americans are dying in
Vietnam and more will die; there should be no
misunderstanding whatsoever about what they are
dying for - or why."9
The New York Times traced the problem from USIA's
attempts to maintain tight control over information
emanating from South Vietnam, back to Washington's
"increasingly restrictive public relations policies" and
particularly singled out the Pentagon for its
"manipulation of facts for 'image' value." 99 The newspaper
then repeated its charges a few days later. '° And of
course these complaints were made at a time when the
Administration's decisions to expand the war greatly and
deploy ground troops offensively were still secret. The
seriousness of these decisions and the deception
surrounding them was of a vastly different order to what
the New York Times was currently complaining about and
when these decisions finally did become public knowledge,
the bitterness and anger expressed by the press was
correspondingly more intense.
To make matters worse for the Administration, the
Dominican Republic crisis had also erupted and U.S. troops
had been dispatched to the island. The crisis was
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short-lived but came at a time when the U.S. could ill
afford to create an impression of a willingness to police
the globe with its troops.
On 4 May, while the Dominican Republic crisis was
continuing, Johnson requested from Congress supplemental
funds of $700 million for the Vietnam war, thus
reinforcing his intention to continue with his policy. The
Times report on Johnson's request pointed to the Senate's
suspicion that this Bill would be used "as evidence of
Congressional support for a "Korea-type war in Vietnam"
and the report further noted the need now felt by many
senators to indicate that they were "not signing a blank
cheque for the Johnson doctrine." 1 In addition, Th
Times stated that the current appropriations request
reminded many senators of the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf
Resolution, which the Administration had used. as evidence
of Congressional support for its current policies in
Vietnam; whereas in August 1964 senators had voted for a
limited retaliation against North Vietnam, not the current
regular bombing programme and dispatch of U.S. troops to
South Vietnam.
The Bill was approved rapidly, but congressional
fears had been publicly aired, with an unsavoury reminder
of the Korean War: a war which the President viewed
primarily as a useful historical analogy for a successful
fight for freedom, but which Congress viewed primarily as
a long and bitter war which had been vastly unpopular with
the American people. The parallel with the Tonkin Gulf
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Resolution also publicised the Congressional feeling of
having been out-inanoeuvred by the President	 in the past
and drew attention to the train of events concerning
Vietnam since the Resolution was passed.
However, by now, according to The Negotiating Volumes
of The Pentagon Papers, Johnson was also considering a
bombing pause, primarily for the purposes of demonstrating
communist intransigence and. thus facilitating U.S.
escalation of the war.10
That the war would have to be expanded to achieve
U.S. objectives had been confirmed for the President by
various intelligence estimates which emphasised Hanoi's
determination to continue its policy of supporting the
Vietcong and its intention to intensify the struggle. 1O
In his estimate of the situation the new CIA Director,
Admiral Raborn, had suggested the bombing campaign should
be expanded carefully, so that North Vietnam could
"explore negotiations without complete loss of face"; so
that the bombing "would not preclude" Russia from
pressuring Hanoi to limit the war; and so that the U.S.
would not have to cope with sudden "extreme world
pressures".'	 In pursuit of this ideal, Raborn stated
that the timing of the air strikes was "of critical
importance" and that advantages would accrue from
expanding the bombing "after, not before, any current
possiblities of serious negotiations have been fully
tested." 10 He also suggested that a bombing pause might
be undertaken "at some appropriate time" in order to
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"test" the communists and to "exploit any differences on
their side." With this recommendation, reinforced by
photographs of Russian SAM missile sites under
construction near Hanoi with the concomitant dangers for
U.S. air strikes, Johnson decided to halt the bombing. 107
As noted already in Section A above, the U.S. had
difficulty transmitting Its message to Hanoi, and the
language employed was brusque and the terms
uncompromising. The bombing pause was not announced
publicly and Washington intended to keep control over
information on the pause by ordering that any queries in
the field be directed to Washington.
When the bombing pause first surfaced publicly on 15
May in The New York Times, the British press was busy
analysing U.S. dissent over Vietnam and the Dominican
Republic; was discussing a forthcoming National teach-in
on Vietnam to be held In Washington; and was dissecting
the President's latest television speech - beamed to
Europe by satellite - offering aid to Asia and
acknowledging that many Vietcong might be fighting f or
Ideals, and not merely conquest. 10B• The Daily Express
focussed mainly on the press, and after mentioning
Johnson's numerous public attempts to explain his policies
- twelve times in two weeks - discussed what it termed the
New York Times' "steady drum±ire of criticism". 109 The
report also mentioned Alsop's defense of the President,
which included a complaint that British newspapers were
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scanning U.S. newspapers in an effort to present U.S.
actions "in the worst possible light."''0
The Times focussed on academic dissent, often
embodied in teach-ins, and the Administration's efforts to
explain its policies to the academic community.111
According to The Times, the "truth squads'" that the
State Department was dispatching to these teach-ins were
not particularly successful, and the irritation that high-
ranking Administration officials felt about the teach-ins
appeared to be reflected in the attitude of these
diplomatic emissaries. 1 ' At the very least, the
exasperation expressed by the Administration about
academic dissent added to the image which was forming of
an Administration that resented criticism and was firstly
unwilling to debate its policy, but secondly, when it felt
compelled to so, was unable to do this without suggesting
that opposition was unpatriotic, cowardly, or just simply
wrong.
Thus the publicity on the bombing pause coincided
neatly with the National Teach-in on 15 May, which was
attracting much press attention due partly to McGeorge
Bundy's expected attendance. In the event Bundy was unable
to attend the teach-in, thus diminishing its significance.
The bombing halt was widely reported in much the way that
the Administration desired. The official reason f or the
halt was reported to be 'operational' but as The New York
Times noted:
"Sources here, even in citing the 'military'
reasons, did not discourage speculation that
they were using the suspension to see whether
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North Vietnam would respond either through
diplomatic channels or through some signals in
Vietnam itself."'
The New York Times report concluded with the
observation that the Administration's "reluctance to
commit itself publicly" to a bombing halt was because the
Administration did not want to get involved in "long and
fruitless negotiations during which it would be pledged
not to bomb North Vietnam while guerilla activity in the
South continues."'	 The obvious inference was a parallel
with the talks during the Korean War, which had followed
this pattern. However, in the case of the Vietnam conflict
this observation did not explain the Administration's
reluctance to publicly acknowledge a bombing pause,
because the Administration had already decided that any
talks would be accompanied by the continued bombing of
North Vietnam.1
It seems far more likely therefore that the
Administration's reluctance to admit to a bombing pause
publicly and thus having to give an official reason for
it, while at the same time encouraging the press to
discuss the possible political reasons for a
'military-operational' pause, was because by using this
back-door tactic the Administration reaped the political
and public advantages of an official pause without the
disadvantages. Because if the Administration had admitted
publicly that it was halting the bombing to test North
Vietnam's response, there would have been great public and
diplomatic pressure on the U.S. to extend the pause as
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long as possible, certainly for longer than the five days
that Johnson was allotting to this unoffical pause. And in
addition the resumption of the bombing would not have been
so easily accomplished after an official pause.
In his memoirs Johnson adds credence to this theory,
because when discussing the proposed bombing halt in
December 1965, Johnson stresses that the one aspect of a
pause that was troubling him most was whether, "if Hanoi
did nothing in return" there would be difficulties with
world opinion when the bombing was resumed, due to the
general dislike of the bombing.' 1 It is reasonable to
assume that this problem was as pertinent in May as it was
in December. It is possible that Johnson was even more
concerned in May about whether public opinion would make
It difficult to resume the bombing after an official
pause. For as Johnson told Ambassador Taylor, the main
purpose of this brief, unofficial pause in May was to
clear the way either for peace on U. S. terms (which the
Administration already knew was unlikely) or military
escalation, in addition to influencing world opinion and
gaining Johnson " some flexibility", and therefore there
was every reason to avoid inviting possible adverse public
pressure at this particular stage.1
The other interesting aspect of the New York Times'
concluding observation on the unacknowledged bombing
pause, was the designation of possible negotiations as
"fruitless". Obviously this was pre-jud.ging the outcome of
any talks before they had begun. But the subtle reminder
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of the pattern of the Korean talks would tend to provide
an acceptable, legitimate and easily understood reason -
saving U.S. soldiers lives - for the Administration's
reluctance to tie its hands with a public statement on a
bombing pause. In addition, the reference to guerilla
activity continuing in the South during a bombing pause
was a straightforward statement that the conununists would
not 'play fair' during Vietnam negotiations - as they had
not done during the Korean War negotiations - before any
attempt had been made by the U.S. to find out whether this
would in fact be the case. Thus the fact that designating
talks as "fruitless" made a mockery of the 	 -
Administration's protestations in favour of peace
discussions, was balanced by these insinuations.
There was wide coverage of the bombing halt in the
British press on 16 and 17 May. In addition to the
operational reason given for the pause, the Daily
Telegraph suggested that it was connected with a recent
Indian cease-fire plan. 119
 The New York Herald Tribune
stated that publicly the pause was to allow the military
to carry out reconnaissance surveys for offensive
planning, but privately the Administration wanted to see
whether Hanoi would respond to the pause in a way that
could lead to negotiations. 1 1
In a lengthy article The Times considered both the
bombing pause and the Washington Teach-in together in a
report headlined: "Failure of Air Attacks on the
North".° The report began with the statement that
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"indications.. . that the Administration is once again
reviewing its policy in Vietnam" were an "admission of the
ineffectiveness of the present policy." The report pointed
out that the bombing campaign had failed as a diplomatic
instrument and although it might have worked if Hanoi and
Haiphong had been bombed, "the logic of ruthless strategy"
was apparently "unacceptable" to Johnson and "most
Americans." Stating merely that there were "many
conflicting" explanations for the bombing pause, the
article mentioned that it was hoped that Hanoi woud.
respond with a "diminution of effort" - it was not
expected that Hanoi would offer to negotiate. The report
also presented the position of the "realists": that there
was no reason why Hanoi should help the U.S. to descend
from an "escalation ladder" that the U.S. did not want to
ascend any further. The article also mentioned that the
way in which the bombing was originally justified, in the
State Department White Paper's "aggressively simple view
of the nature of the conflict", was "also now regretted."
This was a reference to the President's admission that the
Vietcong's ranks contained idealists, and not simply
communist stooges. Finally The Times report summarised the
results of the National Teach-in, stating that it
established the parameters of U.S. policy on two
"unacceptable" points:
"First, that the present known objectives of the
Administration in south-east Asia can be
achieved only by a war with China. Secondly,
that an early American withdrawal would leave a
dangerous vacuum. 1
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The report concluded that further reinforcements
would be sent to Vietnam "if only to achieve a military
standoff as a preliminary to some kind of political
agreement." Clearly The Times still thought that the U.S.
wished to negotiate, in the sense of achieving a
compromise with Hanoi.
However, Hanoi's immediate public denunciation of the
bombing pause, as a trick to provoke a rift in the
socialist camp, demonstrated Hanoi's disinclination to
respond to any U.S. gesture, much less to consider
talks. 12 Hanoi's response was thus most useful for the
Administration's propaganda effort and when the bombing
resumed on 18 May, the British press reaction in general
was to regret that Hanoi had not responded to a genuine
U.S. peace initiative, and had thereby caused the bombing
to resume.	 Where press reactions differed was on the
U.S. diplomatic effort that accompanied the bombing pause,
with The Times stating that hitherto "the diplomatic side
of the American offensive has been weak"; whereas the
Daily Telegraph spoke of the the pause being "backed by
energetic dip1omacy". 1	Various explanations were put
forward to account for the short pause and rapid
resumption of the bombing, such as the approach of the
monsoon season (hampering precision bombing) 1
	and an
anticipated attack by Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops
before the rnonsoon, but U.S. good faith was not
questioned. Indeed a London Times report pointed out:
"Whatever may be said of American policy in the
past, it seems reasonably clear that Hanoi is
not prepared to talk or accept the present
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position until it is convinced that it cannot
win by military means."'
The Daily Telegraph went further than Th Times and
stated that Hanoi's rejection of this U.S. peace
initiative "can be claimed as vindicating, in retrospect"
Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam in his belief
that only military action would make Hanoi negotiate.1
This editorial concluded that: "What cannot be doubted is
American sincerity in seeking an honourable
settlement."
There was little hint in the press reaction of the
possibility that the pause might have been undertaken
primarily as a public relations exercise, designed to
dcemonstrate communist intransigence towards a U.S. peace
initiative. And though the Times editorial which
characterised the U.S. diplomatic effort as "weak" also
noted other anomalies in the U.S. position on talks, the
belief was still expressed that the U.S. wanted
negotiations. For instance this editorial termed as
"naive" the "impression of injured innocence" given by the
U.S. over "Hanoi's lack of interest in the recent
soundings" and continued:
"It was too much to expect a brief suspension of
the bombing to produce an immediate change of
attitude. Nor is it really enough to make
sweeping offers of unconditional
negotiations.
However, the recognition of these anomalies did not affect
the central conviction about U.S. willingness to
negotiate:
"Everyone knows that the United States wishes to
negotiate and would agree to any reasonable
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arrangement, even including, if pushed, some
representation of the Vietcong.
A report which did link the bombing pause with public
opinion was carried in The New York Times on 19 Xay, and
it stated:
"But there are strong indications that another
motive for the pause was the Administration's
desire to convince its critics at home and
abroad that North Vietnam and China were
preventing negotiations, not the United
States. 1
The report was based on "sources familiar with
President's Johnson's views", who stated that Johnson
believed that the "main result of a pause would be to
demonstrate that the Communist governments were not
interested in negotiations while military victory in
Vietnam was possible." 1	However, despite this
contradictory version of the Administration's motives for
the pause, the report still concluded that Hanoi's
denunciation of the pause "appeared to confirm what
officials here have insisted upon privately - that
conciliatory gestures now by the United States will not
produce negotiations."	 Thus the impression was still
held, and disseminated, that the U.S. had been involved
primarily in making a "conciliatory gesture" that had been
rebuffed. A Daily Telegrapk report also noted that the
U.S. felt that "its repeated offers of negotiations and
the temporary suspension of the air raids" had dampened
international criticism, but again the primary objective
of the suspension was seen as negotiations, not public
relations. '
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Thus the bombing pause achieved what President
Johnson desired: Hanoi's blunt rejection of what the
Western world saw as an U.S. peace overture gave the
Administration's propaganda campaign a useful boost in
terms of both support and credibility. In addition,
Hanoi's public intransigence handed the Administration a
weapon for the future on the negotiations issue. For
whereas previously the Administration had demanded that
Hanoi stop its aggression before negotiations should
begin, thereby prompting discussion of the causes of the
war and close examination of the justice of the
Administration's demands, henceforth the Administration
had no need to make any demands and justified the lack of
negotiations simply on the grounds of this obvious
communist intransigence and unwillingness to negotiate.
And U.S. bombing was resumed with no public outcry and no
pressure to prolong the pause.
In fact just after the bombing was resumed it appears
that Hanoi may have responded privately, though
ambiguously, to the U.S. overture through its economic
delegation in Paris.	 Using the services of Canadian
diplomat Blair Seaborn, the U.S. did attempt to explore
this move, but due to continuing ambiguity over whether or
not Phain Van Dong's Four Points constituted prior
conditions for talks and North Vietnamese disinclination
to resolve this ambiguity, nothing came of it.'
The credit that the Administration gained through the
bombing pause was soon to be squandered in the revelation
25?
of the changed U.S. troop role. June began amid press
reports on two related issues. Firstly, that Johnson was
worried over South Vietnamese losses in a recent battle
and Ambassador Taylor was in Washington with the details;
and secondly, coverage of a speech by Vice-President
Humphrey stating that the war had to be won on the ground
and that the U.S. was buying time for the South Vietnamese
to sort out their own problems.	 In Britain, Foreign
Secretary Michael Stewart was briefing the House of
Commons on Britain's fruitless attempts to persuade the
USSR to reconvene the Geneva Conference, and similarly
unsuccessful efforts to convene a conference on
Cambodia. '
All of these developments should have been useful to
the U.S. propaganda effort, beginning to prepare the
ground for the public admission that U.S. troops were
needed in combat to buy time for South Vietnam, and with
Britain reinforcing the official U.S. explanation on the
absence of negotiations. However, time was needed to
establish a case publicly in order to justify and announce
the change in the U.S. troops' role, which had already
been decided secretly two months previously. But time ran
ut abruptly on 8 June when the State Department Press
Officer Robert McCloskey announced that U.S. troops were
now available for combat duty in support of South
Vietnamese troops if such assistance was requested, and
when he confirmed in answer to a question that this was a
new role for U.S. troops. In fact both The New York Times
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on 5 June and The Times on 7 June had reported that U.S.
troops had already been fighting the Vietcong. 10 And the
New York Times had also quoted Administration sources'
private views that "it was only a matter of time - perhaps
days or weeks - before some American troops were committed
to direct combat against the Vietcong". 11 But it was the
official announcement - confirmation in fact of what some
field correspondents had already observed for themselves -
of this new role and the way in which it was announced
that generated an immediate press row. Press criticism
focussed on both of these aspects, but in addition the
reasons for using U.S. troops in combat were also
scrutinised, thus publicising the sharp deterioration in
the military situation and recent heavy South Vietnamese
losses.
Press reports on the State Department's announcement
treated it as a new and particularly critical stage in the
war. 1
	As the Financial Times stated:
"Another turning point in the American policy
in South-East Asia, has therefore been reached
and the way is now clear for the steady onset of
full-scale U.S. participation in land war on the
Asian mainland. This course, leading as it does,
to the old American nightmare of another
Korea " 1
The New York Times, however, decided that the U.S.
was already in a land war in Asia and directed a broadside
at the Administration, not least for the manner in which
the nation was Informed of its new war. 144 And the same
New York Times editorial also reminded Johnson of the
contrast between the rapid escalation of the commitment in
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Vietnam since February and his election platform a mere
seven months ago. The London Times, in a report headlined
"New Offensive Role For U.S. Troops", concentrated mainly
on the need for the American troops in this new role and
quoted McCloskey as saying that it was "probably related
to the new Vietcong offensive in the first week of which
1,900 South Vietnamese troops were killed, wounded, or
captured." 1	The report then discussed the military
situation In South Vietnam:
"By almost any standards, the war there has
already been lost. The Vietcong hold most of the
countryside, and its strength is increasing. The
South Vietnamese Army is weary and weakened by
desertion. In Saigon there is little hope of
establishing a viable civilian government, and
the United States is treating with war lords.
What has to be done is to begin afresh, and
under different ground rules. Hence the
committing of American troops and the talk of no
privileged sanctuary.
Thus The Times highlighted the most serious aspect of
the State Department announcement - the reason underlying
the role change. Finally the report focussed on the
communications side of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Noting
Johnson's constant emphasis on peace in the last few days
and quoting his latest rhetorical question about whether
the other side's response would sound as "'the tread of
marching armies or the footsteps of millions walking
towards peace'", The Times put Johnson' s rhetoric in
context:
"Congress might possibly want to hear a little
more from the White House before the tread of
American marching feet drowns out further
communication." 17
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Clearly the Administration had dug a pit for itself
in changing the U.S. troop role back in April, then
continuously emphasising their defensive posture and now
announcing the change in such a cavalier manner. However,
as if there were not already enough anger arid dismay, the
White House then compounded the error by issuing a
statement on 9 June flatly denying that there had been any
change in the U.S. troop role "in recent days or
weeks hI .*e
 In addition this statement also claimed that
Westmoreland had already been granted the authority to
commit U.S. troops in a combat support role, in the
original mission assigned to the troops.
In effect the White House was saying that since March
U.S. troops had been authorised for combat support and was
using this justification to deny a role change. Both
claims were untrue: the President had authorised a change
in troop role on 1 April, and in March the Marines bad not
been authorised for combat support. On the other hand both
claims were consistent with the information policy that
the President had pursued so far: to keep policy decisions
escalating the U.S. commitment as secret as possible, or
alternatively, if secrecy was impossible, to give as
little information as possible; and then to present such
decisions as consistent with past policy, not a new policy
or stage in the U.S. commitment. Indeed Johnson spent much
time and effort presenting his entire Vietnam policy as
merely an extension of past Presidential policies; and he
referred each individual escalatory step back to previous
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steps, pursuing his middle course and endeavouring to
stifle public speculation and debate on the escalation.
However this was precisely what his secretive approach did
stir up, and the more the Administration's credibility was
eroded, the more Administration statements were
questioned.
Press reaction to the White House statement on 9 June
was incredulous. The Guardian pointed out that far from
denying a change in role, the White House statement
actually confirmed that the Marines' role had changed and
suggested that as a support role had been denied "until
yesterday" by the State and Defense Departments, "there
would seem to have been an astonishing lack of
co-ordination recently" between those departments and the
White House. 149 At the very least this made the
Administration look completely incompetent on a vital
policy issue. Even the Daily Telegraph headlined its
report "Washington Fog on Viet-Nam Policy" and wrote that
the White House statement, intended to "soften the effect"
of the State Department's announcement, had engendered
"worse confusion".'	 The report then highlighted the fact
that "official explanations in Washington are only now
starting, inefficiently, to catch up with what has been a
reality in Viet-nam for weeks."
This view, that the Administration was in arrears
with its policy announcements, rather than deliberately
withholding information, was the general view in the press
reports. There were also recommendations that the
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President should be "more communicative" and warnings of
much graver domestic dissent unless he took his own nation
into his confidence. 1I However, some press reports were
obviously associating 'communication' with • information'
and where the Administration was concerned the two were
not necessarily linked. For the President had on occasions
been most "communicative" on certain issues, about his
desire for peace for instance, but this merely obscured
the Administration's real intentions. And the amount and
type of 'information' he actually gave on the
Administration's real intentions was minimal compared to
the amount and type he could have given, as The Pentagon
Papers clearly demonstrate. In addition, much of the more
accurate information in press reports on future actions or
policy on Vietnam 'emerged' through 'private sources' or
the 'private' reflections of unnamed Administration
officials, thus showing the gap between official
announcements and private views on the war. This may have
been a way of quietly preparing the public for greater
commitments, but it was not the best way to run a
propaganda campaign with the prospect of full-scale war
looming rapidly.
Concerning Britain, this latest propaganda blunder
again focussed press attention on Britain's relationship
with America over Vietnam, and on the nature of the
conflict. Press reports were divided over whether or not
Britain had been Informed of U.S. intentions, and
Whitehall refused to comment directly, leaving the matter
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still open to public speculation.' ss A Tiies report
discussed left-wing Labour pressure and the possiblity of
a Cabinet split over Vietnam, while an editorial analysed
America's decision that the conflict was a test of U.S.
"will to resist communist expansion". Though suspending
judgement on "the final verdict", the Times editorial
suggested that as "past remedies" had failed, it might be
a mistake to persist escalating "beyond the point of no
return.".'	 In the New York Herald Tribune, Walter
Lippinann analysed Europe's lack of confidence in the
"wisdom and competence" of U.S. policy on Vietnam. '	 The
Observer again focussed on the disastrous effects of U.S.
policy in Vietnam on world politics and called for the
Goverxnent to dissociate from current U.S. policy, pointing
out that Britain could not help to end the conflict "if we
appear simply to be clinging on to President Johnson's
coat-tails." 1
	The latter aspect was also highlighted in
The Guardi	 in a column captioned: "Mediator in chains?",
but this comment was balanced by an editorial appraising
the benefits to Britain of Wilson's deliberate policy of
seeking good relations with the U.S.'
Nevertheless, despite the public comment and the
prospect of more party pressure, the British Government
continued its firm public support for U.S. policy. And
amazing though it seemed, President Johnson was still
portrayed as a man of peaceful intentions who was
receiving bad advice, although as a London Times report
from Washington noted about a "general feeling of
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entrapment", doubtless Americans would "eventually" ask
"if the President calculatingly led his country into the
trap. 1
That Vietnam was a trap implying an open-ended
American commitment appeared to be increasingly obvious,
particularly as there had been another change of
government in South Vietnam, highlighting yet again the
chronic political instability of Saigon and its
concomitant inability to pursue the war effectively.
Against this background of inexorably deepening U.S.
commitment, Britain proposed another peace mission,
centring on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference
that was due to be held in London on 17 June. Immediately
before this however, Oxford University held a teach-in on
Vietnam at which both the British Government and the
Administration fielded representatives. Foreign Secreatary
Michael Stewart most ably defended U.S. policy and British
Government support for this policy, using the standard
American arguments. 1	 According to The Times, the U. S.
representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, "misjudged" his
audience, talking about "lavish American aid" and
referring to Churchill, and was "given a much rougher ride
of moans, groans, and bisses hl . 1s9 After this sideshow on
Vietnam came the serious business, apparently, of the
Commonwealth Peace Mission.
The idea was proposed by Wilson and was to consist of
a peace mission by four Commonwealth Prime Ministers, led
by Harold Wilson, visiting Moscow, Washington, Peking,
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Hanoi, saigon, and the International Control Commission
members. ° Johnson approved the mission and publicly
welcomed it on 17 June. But as usual when a peace
initiative was involved, there were reports of
contradictory reactions in Washington, and on 18 June it
was reported that after a Cabinet meeting chaired by
Johnson, Rusk "politely but firmly played down" the
significance of the Commonwealth Peace Mission. 	 And the
Financial Times left its readers in no doubt that the
current beliefs held in Washington about the prospects
for, and basis of, negotiations with Hanoi "seriously
affect the value of any Commonwealth move". 1	This of
course assumes that the Peace Mission proposal was a
genuine attempt to mediate the conflict. For the
Crossman Diaries suggest that one of the prime values of
the Peace Mission for Wilson himself was that it was
likely to ease domestic political pressure and the
proceedings of the Commonwealth Conference. 	 Add to this
the fact that according to The Pentagon Papers
Administration thinking at the time would have rendered
null and void any peace move, and the futility of the
peace initiative becomes apparent. In any case, genuine or
not, and desired or not, the communists once again aided
the Administration by rejecting the Peace Mission a week
later.
An effort was later made in mid-July to persuade the
North Vietnamese to receive the Commonwealth Peace Mission
by sending the British MP, Harold Davies, to Hanoi. But
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this effort also foundered when news of the trip leaked
out after Davies had left, and it ended in recriminations
on the North Vietnamese side.
From mid-July onwards most of the news concerned
speculation about an increase in U.S. forces in South
Vietnam. At a widely reported press conference on 13 July,
the second in only four days, the President helped fuel
the speculation by stating that he was considering the
possibility of a reserve call-up, increasing the draft,
increasing the defense budget and expanding the U.S. troop
commitment. '	 Immediately after this and just before he
was due to go on a fact-finding trip to South Vietnam,
McNamara too held a press conference, reiterating and
emphasising the same points as Johnson.	 The final stage
in the preparation for the Presidential announcement on
troop increases came in another week of publicised policy
review meetings at the White House.
	
On 28 July in a
televised press conference address containing the now
standard references to the need to combat communist
aggression and open unconditional discussions, the
President announced that the troop levels in Vietnam would
be increased by another 50,000, that more troops would be
sent if required and the draft would also be increased,
but that there would be no need to call up the
reserves. 1	 Because of the contrast with Johnson's
earlier press conference remarks and the subsequent press
speculation, Johnson's 28 July announcement was almost
received as good news in America. The Financial Times
captured the mood:
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"It sounds paradoxical to the point of
perversity to suggest that the commitment of
50,000 fresh troops to a land war on the Asian
Continent - with the promise of worse to come -
should be regarded by anyone as a merciful
relief, but there is no other way to describe
the common reaction.
"To some extent this can be explained as an
emotional response to the President's masterly
handling of the anouncement. Having allowed an
unbearable tension to build up during seven days
of highly-publicised conclave with his advisers,
and widespread reports of a massive call-up of
reservists, he let his audience down gently with
a mere increase in the National Service draft
and a refusal to put guns before butter."1
It was a brilliant piece of stage-managing by
Johnson. 170 But the fact that it was recognised as
stage-management was unlikely to help the Administration,
because it gave the accurate impression that the
Administration was quite simply manipulating and
controlling public opinion. It was also a clever
propaganda move because it gave the impression of needing
fewer troops to fight the war than had been predicted,
whereas Johnson was already about to authorise the
dispatch of another 60,000 troops. And in the press
conference following this announcement, Johnson denied
that there would be any change in the U.S. troops
mission. 171
British press reactions to Johnson's announcement V
varied from noting the "sacrifices, human and material"
that the U.S. was prepared to expend defending the "free
world", to noting that the war was being progressively
taken over from South Vietnam by America and that: "Wars
to expel the foreigner are usually successful in the
end.. 11172 For as the U. S. commitment deepened, so the
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differences in the British press on the conflict emerged
more clearly and sharply and this sharpened the debate on
the British Government's role, However, despite the
differences in attitude on the conflict, what was apparent
to all was that the U.S. had now embarked publicly on a
ground war in Vietnam and was set firmly on an escalatory
course.
D.) British Government Reaction and Opinion
Throughout this period of rapid escalation in the
U.S. commitment, the British Government continued t
support U.S. policy publicly, but also coupled this role
to a search for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Thus
the Government proposed a number of peace initiatives,
which yielded nothing in the way of a solution to the
conflict, but which did decrease domestic political
pressure on the Government.
The Government's policy of strong public support for
U.S. policy meant that its own image as an independent
government and ally was tied to, and affected by U.S.
policy and actions in Vietnam. And as the war escalated in
Vietnam, so the role of supporting the U.S. became more
difficult for the Government: domestic pressure in Britain
increased over the war itself, over Government support for
U.S. policy and over the Government's inability to exert
any influence over U.S. policy, which was helping to
create an image of passive acceptance of all U.S. actions
on the part of the British Government. For increasingly,
with escalation of the war, the Government's role and
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image of faithful ally was seen to be overshadowing and
discrediting - in British critics' eyes - its image as an
independent government, engendering domestic criticism on
that aspect and thus increasing the Government's
difficulties over supporting U.S. policy.
However, to some extent the converse was also true,
in that when the U.S. desire for peace was emphasised in
Presidential speeches, accompanied by offers to talk and
develop Southeast Asia, domestic criticism in Britain of
U.S. policy and of the British Government's support for
the U.S. lessened - until the next escalatory step. In
addition, any peace moves undertaken by the British
Government were usually greeted enthusiastically by the
domestic audience and therefore not only eased the
pressure on the Government, but by dint of conforming to
certain expectations about the Government's role, such
moves improved the Government's image among critics -
temporarily. The image improvement was never lasting
because the peace moves always failed and the war
continued to escalate, and thus the problems facing the
British Government because of its policy remained.
On the U.S. side, the Administration was well briefed
by its Embassy in London on opinion on Vietnam and the
problems encountered by the British Government, both
inside Parliament and outside. For in addition to
analysing the pressures on Wilson from his own party, the
Embassy assiduously provided the Administration with
information on the attitudes of the various newspapers. ''
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Thus the Administration was made aware of the effect of
its policies and actions on the British Government's
position as a supporter of U.S. policy. In order to assist
the British Government in maintaining its support for U.S.
policy on Vietnam, which was mutually advantageous, the
Administration undertook to keep the Government informed
about U.S. policy on Vietnam, as a cable dated 3 June from
the U.S. Ambassador in London, David Bruce, to Secretary
of State Rusk on the subject of the British Government
support makes clear. Bruce first outlined the difficulties
entailed by the Labour Government's policy of support for
the U.S.:
"1'ichae1 Stewart's statement to the Commons on
June 3 (on the preparation of which he
personally spent a great deal of time and
thought) indicates how much the British remain
preocupied with Vietnam.
While the Wilson Government will continue to
give us solid support we must recognize that
uneasiness persists and that the domestic
political problem for the Labor Government is
correspondingly difficult. The pressure on
Wilson comes not just from the Left but from
Labor moderates and from the general public as
well. .
Bruce then analysed the particular aspects of the
Vietnam conflict which aroused concern and pointed to the
liklihood of continuing support from the Labour
Government, if only on the negative grounds that the
Government could not afford to offend the Administration.
In passing, he also confirmed that the British Government
did know of the change in mission of the U.S. troops in
Vietnam:
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"With all of this, it is understandable the
British are sensitive to the probelm [sic] of
Southeast Asia. They are very much aware of the
increased US troop commitment and our expanded
combat mission, o± the dangers of the air war in
North Vietnam and of the Russian SAM involvment.
As you know, also, the Dominican Republic
experience has sharpened worries here about
Vietnam. Under the circumstances the temptation
might be to buy some easy political credit at
the expense of the US on the Vietnam issue.
Wilson has not done so and I do not think he
will. If nothing else, self interest dictates
that he must risk no serious split with the
Americans. ' 1 7
Finally Bruce stressed to Rusk the importance of
keeping the Labour Government informed of U.S. policy on
Vietnam, in order to help the British Government continue
its support. Bruce also indicated the type of U.S.
military actions which the British Government would
particularly wish to know about in advance, presumably
because these actions would entail domestic political
consequences that the Government would then have to deal
with:
"In order to manage their own party and public,
however, the Labor Government are depending very
much on our undertaking to consult with them
about any major changes in our policy or in
conduct of the war In Vietnam. If we fail to do
so when there are things they think we should
talk about, it greatly complicates Wilson's
political problems and our mutual relations. . . I
hope we can keep the British fully and currently
informed of our thinking and of our plans in
Vietnam. This applies especially to any
escalation that might involve bombing Hanoi or
even Haiphong, with attendant possibility of
civilian casualties."
The fact that the Administration did keep the British
Government informed about the important features of U.S.
policy, gave the Government the advantage of the prior
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knowledge it needed if it was to "manage", in Bruce's
words, party and public opinion. However this prior
knowledge did not in itself lessen the problems of
supporting U.S. policy, for the foundation of domestic
criticism against supporting the U.S. rested on the war
itself: its nature, its world impact, and increasingly,
the way it was conducted by America.
In addition, where escalatory moves were concerned,
the British Government was placed in the. awkward situation
of being criticised whatever the state of its knowledge.
For, on the one hand, if the public impression was gained
that the Government had not known of such moves in
advance, then this caused an outcry about the U.S. keeping
its ally in the dark while merely requiring slavish
support. On the other hand, if the Government was thought
to have advance knowledge of escalatory moves, then it
could be accused of the same sort of public relations
practices as the Administration - charged at the moment
simply with not keeping its public informed, but with the
obvious possibility ahead of being accused of lying to the
public. In addition, the public criticism of U.S.
escalation was also likely to rub off on the British
Government, due to its support for the Administration.
That the Administration's war policy, coupled with
its information policy, was likely to complicate the
British Government's position was well illustrated by the
furore over the State Department's 9 June announcement of
the changed U.S. troop role. For given that this change
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had been kept secret from the public on the President's
express orders, there was little the British Government
could do to prepare or influence either its party or
public opinion on this issue. The Government was thus
forced to weather the storm, unexpectedly created by the
Administration, as best it could.
E.) British Public Opinion
In March, Gallup Poll1	 had recorded that among the
general public more people approved than disapproved of
"recent American armed action in Vietnam". However, when
this standard question was asked in April, the percentages
were reversed, and 41% disapproved while 31% approved,
with the number of undecided respondents dropping only 1%
to 28%. It Is possible that this reversal was connected to
the aftermath of the gas warfare incident, because the
figures recorded in March were based on fieldwork
completed before this Incident. For immediately after the
gas incident, based on data gathered between 25-30 March,
Gallup Poll recorded that 45% disapproved of recent U.S.
action in Vietnam and thus the April figures, although
still recording a reversal, in fact represented a slight
drop from that level of disapproval. This supposition
about the reasons for the drop in public support in April
is strengthened by the fact that the April figures were
recorded before President Johnson's Baltimore speech and
the figures in May after this speech showed a rise in
public support for U.S. armed action and a corresponding
drop in disapproval.
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National Opinion Polls (NOP)'	 also recorded a
slight drop in April in support for the U.S., asking its
standard question about whether U.S. "handling of the
situation in Vietnam has been too firm, not firm enough,
or about right". The percentages quoted by NOP, compared
with the March figures, showed a 2% percent increase over
the previous 17% in respondents thinking U.S. handling was
too firm, and a 3% drop from the previous 17% in those
thinking U.S. handling was not firm enough. NOP loosely
attributed this "small swing" in public opinion to "recent
events in Vietnam". Presumably NO? was referring to the
gas incident, for the other incident of note in early
March was the dispatch of U.S. Marines to South Vietnam,
and Gallup Poll, which kept a much closer watch on British
public opinion on Vietnam than NO?, had not recorded any
fluctuation in public support at that time.
Gallup Poll's other findings in April showed a 6%
increase in those who did not want Britain to help the
U.S. in Vietnam if asked, now totalling a clear majority
of 56%, while the numbers prepared to send either troops
or war materials had also dropped by 4% and 3%
respectively from the March figures. This pacific trend
was reinforced by the finding that an overwhelming
majority of the public, 71%, thought that Britain's main
task was to try for peace talks on Vietnam, whereas a mere
9% judged it "most important" for Britain to support the
U.S. over Vietnam. On the subject of the liklihood of a
World War, 62% of the public thought there was little
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danger while 20% thought there was much danger. However
the latter figure showed an 11% increase over the
September 1964 percentage recorded in answer to this
question, thus posing the question as to whether the
escalation of the Vietnam conflict might have been one of
the factors responsible for raising fears of a World War,
especially as the Administration's rhetoric on the war,
off icially echoed by the British Government, stressed.the
features of communist aggression and expansion.
As noted above, by Nay, in answer to Gallup Poll's
standard question, the percentages of the general public
approving or disapproving U.S. armed action were now
roughly even at 37% and 36% respectively. As the number of
"don't knows" was only 1% different, it is apparent that
there was a direct correlation between the drop in public
disaproval and the rise in approval. In addition Gallup
Poll also recorded that President Johnson was believed by
69% of the public to be sincerely trying to end the war
with his appeal for unconditional discussions and offer to
develop Southeast Asia.
To judge from Gallup Poll's findings on opinion about
relations with America, fluctuations in public opinion
concerning the Vietnam conflict did not arise from
anti-Americanism, for in May over half of the public, 54%,
considered the U.S. to be "Britain's best friend", with
the runner up, Australia, coining a lot further down the
list with 14%. Also, the public was evenly balanced on the
more sensitive issue of whether Britain should or should
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not work "more closely with the U.S. in its political and
military policies": 31% thought Britain should work more
closely with the same percentage opting for less close
cooperation; 20% opted for no change, while 18% had no
opinion. Thus on these figures over half the public
approved of cooperation with the U.S. In these spheres,
with a preponderant percentage of this half preferring
closer cooperation.
By June, public opinion had again fluctuated, showing
an increase in both approval and disapproval In answer to
Gallup Poll's standard question. Disapproval was
marginally greater at 4O7 compared with 36% approval. What
appeared to have happened was that briefly the number of
"don't knows" decreased at the time of this survey around
27 May-i June, after a big rise immediately before when
Gallup recorded the number of "don't knows" as 37%. These
two sets of figures could possibly be accounted for by the
confusion over the unacknowledged bombing pause of 15-18
May thus causing the percentage of "don't knows" to rise,
while the subsequent communist rejection of this overture
tñen dissipated some of the confusion.
By contrast with previous months, July's Gallup Poll
contained more information than usual on opinion about
events concerning Vietnam. The standard question showed a
slight increase of 2% in disapproval of U.S. armed action,
corresponding to a 2% decrease in approval, giving figures
of 42% and 34% respectively, with the number of 'don't
knows" remaining the same as In June. However, public
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opinion now seemed to be split evenly three ways on the
issue of whether the U.S. should "continue its present
efforts in South Vietnam" or withdraw its troops. This
picture contrasted with the figures in March when 40% had
favoured a continuation of U.S. efforts. Now 33% supported
a continuation, the same percentage favoured withdrawal,
while 34% had no opinion. That the decline in those
favouring a continuation of U.S. efforts was matched by a
rise in the number of "don't knows", suggests that
possibly the Vietnam conflict was beginning to be seen as
more complicated and difficult to solve than at earlier
stages; for it does not seem likely that a portion of the
public which previously favoured continuing U.S. efforts
would simply lose interest in the issue. The figures
recorded when Gallup Poll asked which side was thought to
be winning in the war tend to confirm this hypothesis,
with 39% reckoning that neither side was winning; 33% with
no opinion; while of those who did pick one or the other
side, 19% thought the communists and Vietcong were winning
and only 9% thought the South Vietnamese Government "and
supporters" were winning.
However on the issue of the Prime Minister's peace
mission proposals there were more firm opinions expressed,
with the proposals approved by a §5% majority. On the
other hand, there was much less certainty about whether
the peace mission would succeed for 38% thought that it
would not, while 42% were undecided on the matter.
Possibly this low assessment of the peace mission's
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chances of success accounted for the figures when Gallup
asked whether the Prime Minister's position had been
"improved or harmed" by this peace mission proposal, for
though 38% thought his position had improved, 46% thought
either that his position had been unaffected or did not
know. Finally the Prime Minister's dispatch of Harold
Davies to Hanoi was approved by 49% of respondents with
25% disagreeing with the visit and 26% undecided, thus
confirming that almost half of the general public
preferred to try and settle the conflict peacefully
through talks.
During this period from April to July, NOP evinced
less interest than Gallup Poll in British public opinion
on Vietnam. After the April survey using its standard
question, it next polled public opinion on the same
question in July and recorded an 8% increase in the
percentage of respondents stating that American handling
of Vietnam was not firm enough, correlating directly to an
8% decrease in those who thought either that U.S. handling
was "about right" or who were undecided. Unfortunately NOP
did not distinguish between the latter two categories in
its July poll and simply lumped the two together,
registering the percentage drop. NOP summed up British
opinion on Vietnam at this stage in relation to the U.S.
troop build up and stated that this had not "alienated
British support". On the question of Harold Davies visit,
NOP's figures were slightly different to Gallup Poll's,
registering a lower percentage favouring the visit - 42%;
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much the same percentage disagreeing with the visit - 27%;
but a higher percentage of "don't knows" - 31%. Thus NOP's
respondents seemed to be less convinced than Gallup Poll's
of the value of the Davies visit.
One of the most revealing factors in these general
public opinion surveys was the fairly high percentage of
respondents who were undecided or unconcerned about a
variety of issues concerning the war. However this was not
the whole picture of British opinion on the war, for there
were sections of the British public which were acutely
concerned with, and often opposed to, the Vietnam conflict
and the Labour Government's attitude to U.S. policy and
the war. These sections comprised a mixture of elements,
including groupings such as the high-profile, vociferous
left-wing of the Parliamentary Labour Party (itself a
group with diverse views), an ad hoc liP's Committee on
Vietnam, CND, the Committee of 100, the Communist Party of
Great Britain (CPGB) and its youth wing the Young
Communist League (YCL), individual unions, individual
university committees and an umbrella organisation formed
in April called the British Council for Peace in Vietnam.
This umbrella organisation was chaired by Labour Peer Lord
Brockway and drew its support from a number of other
organisations which included 29 political, religious and
labour groups. 17
In these early days of the Vietnam War, the aims of
most of these groupings concerning the conflict could be
summarised broadly in terms of the aims of the British
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Council for Peace in Vietnam: to help to achieve a
cease-fire, a negotiated political settlement and to stop
the war spreading. © There were of course two constituent
elements that these groups considered when pursuing these
aims: firstly, U.S. policy and conduct of the war in
Vietnam; and secondly, the British Government's public
support for the U.S. over Vietnam. Concern about the
Vietnam conflict was manifested when it began escalating
after the Pleiku attacks. Then, following the subsequent
escalatory moves, the protests against the conflict began.
And whereas the general public's attitude to the war was
not apparently based on anti-Americanism, some of these
groupings were undoubtedly anti-American in character,
such as the left-wing of the Labour Party.
The methods which these groups used to express views
on the war included rallies, marches, demonstrations,
public meetings and lobbying Parliament. Inside Parliament
the methods used included letters to the Prime Minister,
signed motions and the use of Question Time to interrogate
the Government on the Vietnam conflict and its policy. In
addition the letter columns of the newspapers were a more
amorphous channel to express views on the war, sometimes
by well-known individuals, and sometimes protest took the
form of full-page advertisements, often signed by
prominent figures, in a newspaper. 1)
Not surprisingly, where press coverage of these
rallies and protest marches was concerned, it was the
Communist Party organ, the Daily Worker, which carried the
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most information. The Dail y Worker also played an active
part in coordinating opposition to the war by publishing
advance information on planned marches and protests, and
urging attendance. 1	 However, other newspapers also
covered such protests and meetings, particularly if these
were large meetings in prominent public places such as
Trafalgar Square and attended by Labour MP's, whose
presence was likely to embarrass the Government. In
addition, the issue of Vietnam might be raised at other
events - ostensibly unconnected with this subject -
attended by Government figures and these too were covered
by the press.
An example of a rally which attracted wider press
coverage took place in early April. It began in Trafalgar
Square with a Christian Action rally, then the
demonstrators, who included the Transport Minister's
Parliamentary Private Secretary and three Labour MPs,
marched to Downing Street. At Downing Steet a letter was
delivered to the Prime Minister on Britain's duty to
promote negotiations and on the concern felt over U.S.
methods of fighting the war with napalm and U.S.
Ambassador Taylor's statement delimiting escalation.
Although this rally was held in the early days of protests
against the Vietnam conflict, there were still 15 people
arrested, including the well-known figure of Tariq Ali.
And the Daily Telegraph headline revealed what were seen
as the important elements of the demonstration: "15
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Arrests After Vietnam Rally; Labour MPs in March on
Downing Street".
Soon after this demonstration, the Labour Party's May
Day rally in Hyde Park provided a prominent occasion,
unrelated to the Vietnam issue, for the expression of
opposition to the conflict. The Guardian reported that at
the rally Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was unable to
speak over the crowd chants of "Hands off Vietnam", and
finally sat down "white-faced". 1	The Guardian summed up
what it saw as the main effect of this display:
"There can be no doubt now in Mr. Stewart's mind
of the strength of feeling about Vietnam, or of
the hostility that this issue has stirred up
between different sections of Socialist
supporters.
However Stewart was not the only Government figure
who received this treatment over Vietnam on May Day, for
at the Labour Party rally in Hull the Prime Minister too
was heckled on his Vietnam policy. '
As to the importance of this opposition to the
Vietnam conflict and British official policy, at this
early stage the Labour Government had no real cause for
concern. For although the public demonstrations were noisy
and attracted press attention, they were still relatively
small gatherings of that small section of the British
public which was actually concerned about the war.
Nevertheless, there was the obvious danger for the British
Government that this public opposition could grow and
strengthen, and become a real source of embarrassment,
although not a serious political threat.
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The source of opposition that could pose a political
threat to the Government came from within the Labour
Party, but the labour Party opposition worked within
constraints which severely curbed its effectiveness. For
the limit of the Parliamentary Labour Party protest was
defined by the Labour Government's slim majority and there
was no desire on the part of the Labour MPs to bring down
their own Government. In addition to this constraint,
there was also the fact, noted in a 	 nancial Times
analysis, that the Parliamentary Labour KPs who opposed
the Government's policy on Vietnam were not a particularly
cohesive group and occupied a range of positions on the
left-wing spectrum, which tended to dilute the
effectiveness of their opposition. 	 And as this
Financial Times analysis also pointed out, the ability of
the left-wing to influence Government policy depended on
the amount of support that the left-wing could generate in
the rest of the Labour Party, and the left-wing's
"tactician", John Nendelson, well understood what was
required to achieve this support:
"For Nr. Nendelson is extremely careful not to
let the 'Left' seem either sinister or wild. His
tactics are clearly based on the principle that
only by apparent moderation can the Left exploit
the wider misgivings in the Party."198
These constraints worked in the Government's favour,
but nevertheless the Government was careful to emphasize
its desire for, and efforts to achieve, a negotiated
settlement - a goal which broadly coincided with that of
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the Labour left and the 'concerned' section of public
opinion.
However, although Labour MPs inside Parliament were
under these constraints in opposing the Government's
support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there were no
such constraints on groups outside Parliament. Already in
Kay, soon after its formation, the British Council for
Peace in Vietnam had announced a mass lobby of Parliament,
planned for 'Vietnam Day' on 30 June. 1 - The lobby and the
accompanying teach-in in Central Hall in Westminster,
received varying degrees of press attention, with The
Guardian and the Daily Worker concentrating on the lobby,
while the Daily Telegraph reported on the teach-in.
The Guardian report on the lobby caught the
atmosphere at the "highly excited rally", stating that the
audience of approximately 1,500 "came with a lust for
blood; chiefly Mr. Wilson's, with President Johnson as a
close runner-up". 1 ° The Daily Worker however estimated
the numbers at the rally to be approximately 10,000 and
reported that a deputation had had a "very frank
discussion" with Lord Vaiston, Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. 191
Despite two arrests during the mass lobby, this event
appeared to be relatively well ordered. However the
teach-in was a different matter and the Daily Telegraph
caption to its report reflected this: "MP Shouted Down at
Vietnam Teach-in; Gathering Loses Dignity".' 9 The report
stated that Labour MP Dr. Jeremy Bray was "hissed and
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screamed at" and that the meeting quickly "degenerated
into an anti-American free for all"." 9 This was not the
form that the 'teach-in' took in America, where it was
used to examine issues, rather than merely provide a
platform for the noisy expression of anti-American or
anti-government views. This point was made by Professor
Kenneth Boulding of Michigan University who had attended
the Central Hall teach-in and was quoted in the flily
Telegraph; while Professor Hans Norgenthau from Chicago
University, a well-known opponent of U.S. policy in
Vietnam and participant in American teach-ins, labelled
this teach-in a "debacle" with "disgraceful scenes".'
Clearly the issue of Vietnam was capable of provoking
strong reactions among some sections of the British
public. Some of these reactions appeared to be based
primarily on a dislike of U.S. involvement in the
conflict, while others appeared to be based on a dislike
of the conflict itself, in addition to dislike of the
British Government's support for the Americans. Whatever
the combination of dislikes however, while there were
sections of public opinion which disliked U.S.
intervention in the conflict it was obvious that the
protests would continue until the U.S. ceased to prosecute
the war, regardless of British Government policy.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PRESSURE INCREASES: AUGUST-DECEMBER 1965
The Administration's July announcement of increased
troop deployments and draft calls publicly signalled the
beginning of the open-ended war in Vietnam. Now the
Administration could concentrate on its main objective of
fighting and winning the war, pouring in more money and
troops and exploring various methods to increase the
pressure on North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Apart from
military and bombing pressures, some Administration
officials also envisioned a bombing pause as a form of
pressure, to be undertaken prior to escalating the war.
During these months the military build-up continued
rapidly. And with this greatly increased visible
involvement, Administration statements tying U.S. prestige
and honour in general to this war in South-East Asia now
became reality: henceforth U.S. prestige and honour was
inextricably bound to the outcome of this war.
A.) Administration Planning
As with previous announcements on escalation, when
President Johnson Increased the number of troops in
Vietnam he also combined this with a peace move. Thus the
28 July escalation announcement also contained an
invitation to the United Nations to work for peace in
Vietnam. In addition Johnson also stated that he had
dispatched the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, Arthur
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Goldberg, with a letter to United Nations Secretary
General U Thant requesting that all United Nations
resources "be employed to find ways to halt aggression and
to bring peace in Viet-Nam."' Again the impression was
given that the United States was serious in its pursuit of
peace and was prepared to use every method at its
disposal. However, this favourable impression was soon to
be contradicted by public revelations about a previous
United Nations initiative which apparently Administration
officials had rejected, for Johnson was later to state in
private that he had been unaware of the initiative and its
subsequent rejection, 2
Ironically, in view of the later recriminations over
the rejected United Nations initiative, throughout August
1965 the Administration was in contact secretly with the
North Vietnamese (although hints of these 'secret'
contacts may have leaked to the press - see Section C>,
trying to discuss negotiations. These secret contacts,
code-named XYZ, in fact followed on from the ambiguous and
abortive North Vietnamese diplomatic move in Paris which
was made after the resumption of U.S. bombing on 18 May.
Initially a private U.S. citizen, acting on his own
initiative, approached the North Vietnamese in Paris in
mid-July and then the Administration took over the contact
in early August. The fact that President Johnson gave the
task of exploring this initiative to Under Secretary of
State George Ball seems to indicate that this initiative
was treated seriously by the Administration. For George
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Ball was well known in the Administration as an advocate
of withdrawal from Vietnam, and he was thus the official
most likely to take the greatest care in pursuing this
contact thoroughly, to determine whether or not it did
offer a chance for negotiations.
The person Ball chose to continue this contact was a
former Foreign Service Officer, Edmund Gullion, who had
been Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, and who was now a
private citizen. The North Vietnamese contact was the same
diplomat who had been involved in the May initiative, Mai
Van Bo, head of the North Vietnamese Economic Delegation
in Paris. Although the discussions initially appeared
promising during the first three meetings held on 6, 15
and 18 August, with little mention made of the bombing and
apparent agreement on mutual staged troop withdrawals, at
the fourth meeting on 3 September the North Vietnamese
diplomat stated that U.S. bombing must cease immediately
and he then retreated on the staged troop withdrawal
agreement. In fact that was the last meeting between
Gullion and Bo and the end of substantive discussions,
for the North Vietnamese diplomat did not attend the fifth
meeting which had been scheduled for 7 September and
further efforts to rekindle the contacts, using a
different U.S. intermediary, failed.&
On the surface the abrupt end to these contacts
appeared to Justify the Administration's claim that North
Vietnam was uninterested in negotiations. However, the
analyst writing in The Negotiating Volumes of The Pentagon
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Papers suggests a number of possible reasons for the
breakdown in discussions, including the increase in U.S.
troops; the particular bombing targets selected in this
period, a suggestion supported by William Bundy, former
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who
noted in his Oral History Interview that the bombing had
caused flooding in North Vietnam and could therefore have
accounted for the breakdown; the pressure caused by the
differences between the, USSR and China, and possibly
between China and North Vietnam on strategy in liberation
wars, that is, differences over a strategy comprising an
absolute refusal to contemplate negotiations (China's
position), and a strategy including the possibility of
negotiations (North Vietnam and the USSR); and the
possibility that the North Vietnamese had simply been
probing the U.S. negotiating position and had discovered
what they wanted to.' However, in addition to these
possible reasons, there was also the fact that Gullion's
negotiating instructions followed the Administration's
pattern of trying to negotiate on its terms alone, which
included the goal of a separate and independent South
Vietnam:
"The U.S. was sending X with the intention of
seeking peace from a position of strength. X was
to show a desire for ending the conflict along
lines 'compatible with the Four Points, but he
was also to say that the prolongation of the
war' is bound to lead to progressively larger
U.S. prssures and long-term China control of
North Vietnam. X was to convey that pressures in
the U.S. to widen the war were growing and that
'it would be increasingly harder to exercise
restraint. '
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According to the same study, Gullion took these
instructions seriously, to the extent of threatening to
break off the contacts when Hal Van Bo disagreed on
reconvening the Geneva Conference - and it was the North
Vietnamese diplomat who then "demurred" and scheduled the
next meeting. The analyst also noted the North Vietnamese
diplomat's conduct during the discussions:
"Except for the last meeting when R [Hal Van Bo]
grew heated about the recent U.S. escalations,
R was serious and responsive. Throughout and
even at this last meeting, there were no
ideological harangues.
However, despite the indications that both sides were
taking these discussions seriously, in the final analysis
the efforts failed, but for no readily discernible reason,
as The Negotiating Volumes conclude:
"Because the R and X exchanges were so
responsive and productive and because these
exchanges were severed so abruptly, no
explanation is really satisfying."'°
Thus ended what seem to have been the most serious
discussions between the Americans and the North Vietnamese
before the Paris Peace Talks in 1968, for though there
were subsequent contacts between officials of the two
countries, these contacts were far less prolonged and
substantive than the XYZ exchanges. 1 1
In addition to the secret XYZ contacts, there were
two other important events during August. Firstly, on
9 August the news leaked out publicly that in both 1963
and 1964 the U.S. had turned down the chance of
discussions on the conflict with the North Vietnamese.
Initially these revelations caused little stir, but in
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November the 1964 episode was discussed again, in the
context of the death of former UN Ambassador Adlal
Stevenson, and this time they sparked off a press furore
which forced the Administration to acknowledge the claims
and defend its position. Secondly, on 18 August the Senate
approved Johnson's second request for additional defense
funds of $1.7 billion: the U.S. commitment in the war had
started in earnest only six months previously, but already
the financial costs were climbing rapidly.
The war's increasing costs in manpower were also
becoming ever more apparent to the Administration. Before
considering Westmoreland's request for a further 100, 000
men in mid-July, Defense Secretary McNamara had. requested
assurance from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff,
General Earle Wheeler, that the U.S. could win the
conflict in South Vietnam. Following a Defense Department
study, Wheeler duly assured McNamara that "there appears
no reason we cannot win if such is our will - and if that
will is manifested in strategy and tactical operations."1
Interestingly, the definition of 'winning' that had been
provided for Wheeler by Assistant Secretary of Defense
McNaughton harked back to the old idea of "demonstrating
to the VC that they cannot win."	 This passive concept of
'winning' implied both an open-ended commitment to
fighting the war - for as long as the Vietcong carried on
fighting - and also appeared to envisage victory as a
stalemate, both of which were unusual and vague goals to
pursue using such large numbers of troops and amounts of
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money. And there were propaganda problems with this
version of 'winning' , for there was confusion over what
'winning' meant and communicating this to the public. In
addition this concept appeared to contradict the
definition of 'winning' that was implied in Vestmoreland's
search-and-destroy strategy for fighting the war, which,
though equally open-ended, had the concrete goal of
attacking, destroying and defeating the enemy in South
Vietnam. And It was this method of fighting the war that
determined Westmoreland's disposition of resources and
partly fuelled his troop requests which the Administration
responded to.
In pursuit of these tactics and impelled by the
enemy's response, Westmoreland soon requested more troops,
despite the huge increases authorised during July.
Endeavouring to explain Westmcreland's new request for
another 154,000 men in November, The Pentagon Papers
surmises that either the U.S. military reckoned from the
beginning that winning the war would require approximately
1 million troops which would be politically easier to
acquire in instalments, or the U.S. military Command
thought little about U.S. troop requirements and also
underestimated the enemy's rate of build-up. 14 Of the two
explanations The Pentagon Papers analyst opts for the
latter, which merely gives an impression of U.S. military
short-sightedness, rather than deliberate deception. 1&
As The Pentagon Papers study also points out, the
U.S. military apparently underestimated the rate of enemy
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build-up despite the numerous public Administration
statements about the early 1965 rate of North Vietnamese
infiltration into South Vietnam. lB Yet this rate of
infiltration had been cited as the precise reason for U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam and increased involvement in, and
escalation of, the war in South Vietnam. The study makes
no attempt to reconcile this contradiction, but if the
earlier rate of Infiltration had been exaggerated for
Administration propaganda purposes, then this would
provide an obvious reason for the U.S. military's later
miscalculations.
In addition, the Pentagon Papers analyst drew the
conclusion from U.S. military documents that
Westmoreland's overall military plan of action stemmed
from the manpower that would be available, rather than
Westmoreland requesting the troops necessary for a
particular plan:
"'The President's July 28 announcement that the
U.S. would commit additional massive military
forces in SVN necessitated an overall plan
clarifying the missions and deployment of the
various components. [The general's] concept of
operations was prepared to fulfill this
need. " 1
The analyst then concluded:
"'If this is a true reflection of what
happened'...'it would indicate the [sic] MACV's
plan of what to do was derived from what would
be available rather than the requirements for
manpower being derived from any clearly thought
out military plan.
However, while this points to a grievous lack of
thought about the needs of a rapidly escalating war, and
indeed the nature of this particular war, It nevertheless
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remains the case that Westmoreland's aggressive
search-and-destroy military tactics would always have
required huge force levels. For not only was this a much
more active method of fighting the war, but these tactics
were being applied to jungle warfare among a population
that at best was not prepared to aid South Vietnamese and
U.S. forces, and at worst actively aided the Vietcong and
North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese and
Americans.
Thus, against a background of rapid North Vietnamese
and Vietcong build-up and increased combat, Westmoreland's
requests for more troops continued to flow into
Washington. When McNamara was considering Westmoreland's
request in November for another 154,000 troops, the
projected total troop deployment to the end of 1966 was
then close to 400,000.1 On 16 December Westmoreland
requested more troops, which would bring the total for
1966 up to 443,000 and then at the end of January 1966 he
requested another 16,000 men.° And of course, as the
troop levels soared so did the Administration's casualty
projections. In mid-July McNamara had estimated that at
the end of the year U.S. killed-in-action could be
approximately 500 per month, but by the end of November
McNainara's estimate for the coming year was 1,000
killed-in-action per month. ' McNamara also accompanied
this estimate with an evaluation of the results this
policy might achieve:
305
.and the odds are even that we will be faced
in early 1967 with a 'no decision' at an even
higher level,
But despite this gloomy evaluation McNamara recommended
continuing the Administration's current war policy.
The increased U.S. troop commitment was also
accompanied by an expansion in the Rolling Thunder bombing
programme. At this stage of the war the publicly declared
purpose of the bombing raids on North Vietnam was to
interdict North Vietnam's lines of communication and to
reduce its war-making capacity. To achieve this and
"'emphasize American airpower'", the Administration
envisaged a "'slow, steady, deliberate'" bombing campaign,
"'beginning with a few infiltration-associated targets in
southern NVN and gradually moving northward with
progressively more severe attacks on a wider variety of
targets. '"
	 In the period from July to December,
according to figures provided in The Pentagon Papers the
bombing attacks increased greatly, from 900 sorties per
week to 1,500 per week.24
As when the sustained bombing began in March, the
Administration continued to be acutely aware of the
sensitive nature of the bombing programme and still
exercised tight control over the selection and
authorisation of the bombing targets, which were approved
on a weekly basis by senior officials in the Defense
Secretary's Office, the State Department and the White
House. 2
 The only latitude in picking targets that
Washington allowed to pilots was in "armed reconnaissance"
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attacks against certain "broad" target categories, "such
as vehicles, locomotives and barges", which were obviously
seen as militarily useful, but politically harmless
targets.	 And even these "broad" target categories were
decided by Washington.	 There was thus little chance of
sensitive targets being bombed without high-level
Administration approval.
As to the effectiveness of Rolling Thunder, at the
end of July Secretary of Defense McNaniara evaluated the
results of the bombing programme in a Memorandum for
President Johnson.	 McNainara cited the two broad "major
purposes" of the bombing programme as: "to promote a
settlement" and "to interdict infiltration".	 In
promoting a settlement the bombing was expected to
influence North Vietnam to negotiate and to give the U.S.
a "bargaining counter within negotiations." 	 On these two
overall purposes McNarnara concluded that the programme had
not achieved its objectives; for there was no settlement,
and "substantially uninterrupted supply" was continuing
"to meet major North Vietnamese military, industrial and
civilian needs."
	
Only as a bargaining counter did
McNamara view the programme as a success, reckoning that
it "has become an important counter in the current tacit
and explicit bargaining process and will be an important
counter in any future bargaining."	 But, what the
Administration appears to have disregarded is that without
negotiations the bombing was useless as bargaining
counter, and the North Vietnamese had already made it
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plain that they would not negotiate under the threat of
bombs. In addition, McNamara concluded that the bombing
had had no effect on Vietcong activities in the South.
However, despite this negative evaluation McNamara
still recommended continuing the bombing programme, but
with the main emphasis on the threat of "future
destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate
or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations.	 In
other words the Administration was using Rolling Thunder,
among other purposes, to bomb North Vietnam to the
negotiating table - an objective which the Administration
had always denied publicly.
By November the bombing campaign had again been
assessed as ineffective. The Defense Intelligence Agency
reported to McNamara that although North Vietnam's
industry was "'reduced'" by the bombing, "'the primarily
rural nature of the area permits continued functioning of
the subsistence economy. '" 	 This report also stated:
"'The air strikes do not appear to have altered Hanoi's
determination to continue supporting the war in South
Vietnam.'"	 For as The Pentagon Papers analyst points
out:
"'NVN was an extremely poor target for air
attack. The theory of either strategic or
interdiction bombing assumed highly developed
industrial nations producing large quantities of
military goods to sustain mass armies engaged in
intensive warfare. NVN, as U.S. intelligence
knew, was an agricultural country with a
rudimentary transportation system and little
industry of any kind.
"'What intelligence agencies liked to call
'the modern industrial sector' of the economy
was tiny even by Asian standards. . . There were
only a handful of 'major industrial facilities.
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When NVN was targeted, the JCS found only eight
industrial installations worth listing.'"
In addition, the gradual build-up in U.S. bombing had
allowed North Vietnam's industry to be dispersed into the
countryside. These were the concrete reasons why the
bombing campaign could not greatly hurt North Vietnam,
partly explaining why neither the threat of destruction,
nor actual destruction, had so far influenced North
Vietnam's policies in favour of negotiations. Added to
this was the North Vietnamese will to resist the bombing
and to continue fighting the war.
However, despite the demonstrable ineffectiveness of
the bombing, the Administration's view of Rolling Thunder
as both a form of pressure and a bargaining counter, meant
that the Administration continued to use the bombing as a
large part of both its military effort and its diplomatic
effort. Thus, militarily the Administration calculated
that if North Vietnam could not be bombed to the
negotiating table, then it could be lured there with the
suggestion of a bombing halt in return for North
Vietnamese concessions. And obviously this meant that the
bombing had both to continue and to become heavier,
inflicting enough of a degree of 'pain' on North Vietnam
for a bombing halt to constitute a sufficiently attractive
negotiating proposition to the North Vietnamese.
In diplomatic terms, at this stage of the war the
Administration's war objectives and bargaining counter
concept of the bombing ruled out a permanent halt to the
bombing unless, in effect, the North Vietnamese
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surrendered and negotiated on U.S. terms. However, in late
1965 a teznpor'ary bombing pause was viewed as a useful
device to probe North Vietnam's willingness to negotiate
on U.S. terms, and as a demonstration of the
Administration's peaceful intentions in the face of
growing public pressure, prior to escalation. In fact this
was to be a repeat performance of the 'secret' and
unofficial May bombing pause, but with the vital
difference that this bombing pause was 'official' and was
to be conducted with maximum publicity.
According to The Pentagon Papers, the impetus for
this bombing pause came from McNamara, who had proposed
the idea to President Johnson as early as mid-July. At
that time McNamara suggested:
"'After the 44 U.S.-third country battalions
have been deployed and after some strong action
has been taken in the program of bombing in the
North, we could, as part of a diplomatic
initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week
pause in the program of bombing the North. '"
The Pentagon Papers study states that McNainara's
rationale for a longer pause was due to his belief that
the May pause "'had been too short and too hastily
arranged to be effective'" and the study also comments on
the lack of time allowed for Hanoi to reply to the pause
in May.	 McNamara's purpose in proposing a bombing pause
followed the rationale for the May pause: negotiations
favourable to the U.S. , or escalation of the war effort.
Overall, McNamara's concept of a bombing pause was
pressure by another means:
"'As he [McNamaraJ and Assistant Secretary of
Defense McNaughton envisioned it, the pause
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would be used as a kind of "'ratchet,'" - which
the analyst likens to "'the device which raises
the net on a tennis court, backing off tension
between each phase of increasing
In addition, it seems that Administration officials
were certain that this pause would be temporary, because
the terms that were set for a permanent cessation of the
bombing were acknowledged to be unacceptable to Hanoi, as
McNaughton pointed out to 1(cNamara:
"After noting these conditions [for a permanent
cessation of the bombing), l'lr. NcNaughton wrote
that they amounted to 'capitulation by a
Communist force that is far from beaten. '"
However, even a temporary bombing pause was opposed
by the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*
Replying to McNamara's reasons for a pause, Secretary of
State Rusk calculated in early November that at this stage
a pause would merely be using "'a very important card
without receiving anything substantial in return. '" 	 For
as he pointed out:
"'There are no indications that Hanoi is yet in
a mood to agree to a settlement acceptable to
us. The chance is, therefore, very slight that a
pauseat this time could lead to an acceptable
settlement. '"
Rusk also cited the dangers of Hanoi "'indefinitely
dangling the prospect of negotiations'" without actually
intending to achieve an "'acceptable settlement'", in
order to prevent the U.S. resuming the bombing and to
"'demoralize South Vietnam'". 4 Rusk also reckoned that
the Saigon government would be loathe to agree to a pause
because it could "'adversely affect the Government's
solidity.'" 4
 And finally the Secretary of State argued
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that expanding the bombing programme after a pause would
make such an expansion appear much more "'dramatic. . .both
internationally and domestically'", and thus the USSR
would face "'difficult choices'".4'
Despite this opposition, according to Johnson's
xnemoirs by early December the Vietnam 'principals'
including Rusk, had decided that a bombing pause might be
useful and only the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy in
Saigon still opposed a pause.	 Johnson writes that he
been doubtful of the value of a pause when it was first
mooted, citing Rusk's objections.
	
But eventually in
mid-December, despite his fear that resuming the bombing
would be difficult after a pause, Johnson states that he
decided to accept advice proposing a bombing halt and
"risk" a pause before escalating the war:
"If there was a chance, however remote, that
stopping the bombing might open a road to peace,
I was prepared to take a few risks. I knew too
that I faced a serious decision regarding
sending more men to Vietnam. I wanted to explore
every possible •avenue of settlement before we
undertook additional military measures, "°
William Eundy's account of the agreement to a bombing
pause differs considerably however. He states that it was
only on the night of 27 December that Johnson decided,
after previous refusals, on a "'real full pause'", by
extending the Christmas bombing truce "for another
twenty-four of thirty-six hours.&l This last minute
decision resulted in hasty diplomatic cables to both the
South Vietnamese and Russian Governments, informing them
both of the pause and enlisting the former's agreement to
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it.	 After that the Administration "went into wholesale
full gear."	 Bundy's version of events thus endows the
decision on a pause with a much more makeshift character
than does Johnson's version of deliberate discussions with
a decision in mid-December. And Bundy states clearly that
the style of the diplomatic 'offensive' that accompanied
this bombing pause was "very much the President's idea.s4
That is, the diplomatic moves did not follow the scenarios
that had previously been discussed in the
Administration.
This official bombing pause lasted until 31 January
1966, allowing plenty of time for the Administration to
try to achieve its diplomatic and propaganda goals.
As for the results of the pause, previous
Administration judgexnents that Hanoi would not settle the
war on the terms offered, proved to be correct. As a
propaganda move Bundy considered the pause of great value,
stating:
"To me the pause was essential in terms of
domestic things alone, but also had an immensely
useful impact abroad, particularly in
Britain. . .
But Johnson viewed the pause as a failure, reckoning
that his main worry about it had been vindicated, for he
wrote: ". . .we received little credit for stopping the
bombing and heavy criticism for renewing	 In Bundy's
estimate the President felt that the pause was
"essentially a sucker's move" that he had been "talked
into".	 As a result Johnson's attitude on peace efforts,
and the war alike, hardened, and Bundy viewed this as
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something of a "break point in policyI.&9 So, the
Administration's public attempts to open discussions -
even on its own, uncompromising terms - through a bombing
halt, came to an end. The war continued to escalate, the
public clamour about the bombing increased, and the North
Vietnamese public position hardened with the requirement
for the bombing of North Vietnam to be halted permanently
and unconditionally before discussions could begin.
Eventually the U.S. Administration was faced with the
choice of indefinitely escalating a war which it was not
winning, or beginning negotiations on North Vietnam's
terms by unconditionally halting the bombing of North
Vietnam. Thus where the bombing was concerned the
Administration based its attitude to negotiations on a
'bargaining counter' that was essentially non-negotiable
to the North Vietnamese. But it took another two years of
war for the Administration to begin to come to terms with
its misiudgements.
B.) Administration Propaganda Techniques
President Johnson's statement on troop increases on
28 July was a dramatic and highly publicised escalation of
the U.S. involvement in the war. However, this escalation
was 'balanced' by a peace gesture, which was intended to
reinforce the image of the Administration's commitment to
peace, rather than war, and thereby reassure public
opinion. The means chosen to demonstrate the
Administration's desire for peace was a very public appeal
to the United Nations requesting assistance in settling
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the conflict. This appeal was made in Johnson's
announcement on escalation and then followed up in
letters, from Johnson to U Thant, and from the U.S. envoy
to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, to the president of the
Security Council. In his letter to U Thant Johnson stated:
"Your efforts in the past to remove that dispute
[Vietnam] from the battlefield to the
negotiating table are much appreciated and
highly valued by my Government. I trust they
will continue.ta
Goldberg's letter recapitulated the many U.S.
attempts to solve the conflict peacefully; regretted that
North Vietnam "denied the competence of the United Nations
to concern itself with this dispute"; reiterated the U.S.
determination to "search for a negotiated end" to the
"cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of
Viet-Nam"; and reminded the UN Security Council of its
"responsibility - to persist in the search for peace". His
letter concluded with the standard Administration
justifications for aiding South Vietnam - independence,
sovereignty, choice of government and decisions -
accompanied by the equally standard offers of Asian
economic development and U.S. readiness to search for
peace.
The UN Secretary General publicly welcomed the U.S.
President's appeals.	 But Johnson's reference to U.S.
Government "appreciation" for U Thant's peace efforts was
totally at variance with the way in which these efforts
had actually been received by the Administration. For in
September 1964 U Thant undertook a secret peace initiative
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with Washington's concurrence, and obtained North
Vietnamese agreement, via Moscow, to a private meeting
between a representative from Hanoi and Washington. U.S.
Administration officials had then privately rejected this
proposal for a meeting, without Johnson's knowledge. 	 In
addition U Thant's later public proposal for negotiations
had similarly been rejected, but this time quite
publicly.	 Yet now the U.S. Government was referring to
these same rejected initiatives in order to bolster its
image as a nation seeking peace.
U Thant did not comment publicly at the time on this
rejection of his initiative, except for a cryptic allusion
to the event in a press conference in February when he had
put forward his later peace proposal. He had stated:
"' I am sure that the great American people, if
only they knew the true facts and the background
to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree
with me that further bloodshed is
unnecessary. . . As you know, in times of war and
of hostilities, the first casualty is truth,'"
In his memoirs U Thant wrote that this statement
"ended whatever utility I might have as a prospective
ge-between. . . as far as Washington was concerned.
Although it was known in February that U Thant had
been engaged In mediation efforts, for some considerable
length of time the full details of this potentially
damaging episode - particularly the specific reactions of
the U.S. and North Vietnam - were not pieced together
publicly,	 In the interval the Administration continued
to appeal, apparently sincerely, to the UN for assistance.
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However in August, newspapers carried reports of this
peace initiative and the Administration rejection of it.
At this time the Administration had no need to comment on
these reports, which created little public impact. This
lack of impact may have been assisted by remarks
attributed to the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot
Lodge, about U.S. troops staying in South Vietnam even if
the Saigon Government were to ask them to leave, remarks
which had aroused press interest and necessitated a series
of Administration denials. In addition, towards the end of
August the Administration launched a new peace and
propaganda effort, coupling a published vindication of its
Vietnam policy, with press reports of the U.S. desire to
negotiate and televised appearances of top U.S.
Administration officials discussing the war and the basis
for negotiations.
This new propaganda effort began with the publication
on 23 August of a White House pamphlet entitled, "Why
Vietnam", setting out the Administration's case for its
Vietnam policy.	 This official apologia, containing two
addresses by Lyndon Johnson and extracts from
Congressional testimony by Rusk and McNamara, repeated the
standard charge of "aggression by North Vietnam against
the brave and independent people of South Vietnam", while
the U.S. "roots of commitment" which now necessitated
"supporting American military action" were justified on
the familiar grounds of past U.S. Presidents' pledges of
support and America's SEATO comxnitments. 9 Rusk's section
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on diplomacy's tasks detailed the peace efforts made by
many countries, including the abortive Commonwealth Prime
Minister-s 1 initiative. Under the emotive subheading, "The
Bulwark of Peace", were listed the many occasions when the
U.S. and its allies had defended "peace and freedom and
the right of free choice" in Iran, Turkey, Greece, West
Berlin, Korea, had aided the UN in the Congo and had
obtained the removal of USSR missiles from Cuba.
Ironically, "a great and beloved American, Adlai
Stevenson," was quoted in this section using "his last
public utterance," on his refusal to oppose the
Administration's policy in Vietnam and his hope for
peaceful change in Asia.7
McNamara's impressive series of statistics on the
war, demonstrating the need for U.S. troops in the face of
the decline in the ratio of South Vietnamese troops to
Vietcong, were introduced with a simple description of the
war's importance:
"What Is at stake In Vietnam' today is the
ability of the free world to block Communist
armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of
Southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate
consequences could drastically alter the
strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to
the grave detriment of our own security and that
of our allies. '
Just in case the reader had missed the point the
third paragraph again repeated the struggles' "enormous
implications for the security of the United States and the
free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as
well." 7
 And the point was made that Vietnam was a test
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case for national wars of liberation, with the following
consequences:
"Thus the stakes in South Vietnam are far
greater than the loss of one small country to
communism. Its loss would be a most serious
setback to the cause of freedom and would
greatly complicate the task of preventing the
further spread of militant Asian communism. And,
if the spread is not halted, our strategic
position in the world will be weakened and our
national security directly endangered. ""
The insurgency in South Vietnam was stated to be
"planned, directed, controlled and supported by Hanoi",
and this view was also reinforced by what was in effect a
sophisticated admission and dismissal of the endemic
political unrest in South Vietnam:
"True, there is a small dissident minority in
South Vietnam, but the Government could cope
with it if it were not directed and supplied
from the outside."7
Finally, the pamphlet's appendix listed fifteen peace
initiatives undertaken by various countries, all rejected
by North Vietnam and China.
This pamphlet was thus a concerted attempt by the
Administration to justify its Vietnam policy by presenting
a one-sided, and in parts subtly distorted version of
events, But on two counts the pamphlet had unfortunate
consequences for the Administration. Firstly former
President Eisenhower was reported to have objected to the
use of one of his letters to Diem being used to justify
current military support, rather than the economic support
he had originally of fered.
	
Secondly the Administration's
use of Adlai Stevenson to bolster their case was to
boomerang very soon when Stevenson's last interview with a
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U.S. commentator was published, which highlighted the
rejected UN peace initiative with which Stevenson had been
involved.
Thus it was that in mid-November the Rang000n episode
resurfaced, when an American magazine published an
interview by the U.S. television commentator Eric Sevareid
with Adlai Stevenson, and this time the revelations about
the rejection of U Thant's peace initiative generated a
press furor ) forcing a response from the Adm1nistration.
In this situation, when the Administration could no longer
remain silent about this episode, or deny its rejection of
U Thant's efforts, the method It chose to combat the
public criticism was to lay the blame for the U.S.
rejection on what the Administration stated was Hanoi's
own lack of interest in "serious peace talks." 7'8 This
lamentably inadequate explanation merely fuelled the
uproar, for in the early days of the conflict the
Administration had placed the entire blame for the lack of
negotiations on North Vietnamese unwillingness to talk,
and this incident had now contradicted that early
Administration version of events. To add to the
Administration's propaganda and credibility problems,
after the U.S. admission of Its rejection U Thant now felt
free to comment publicly, airing his personal
disappointment on the matter.
The press debate that followed was not confined to
discussing just this Issue, for as had happened with
previous policy and propaganda blunders, all aspects of
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the Administration's policy on Vietnam came under review.
Thus revelations about this rejected peace initiative
sparked off a much wider-ranging debate about the war.
There was much questioning and criticism of the
Administration's information policy, not only on this
issue but also on previous incidents. This was a serious
enough blow to the Administration, but in addition this
line of enquiry naturally widened into querying and
criticising the Administration's credibility in general.
This considerably increased the damage incurred to the
Administration's decreasing reputation for veracity, which
in turn affected its propaganda effort.
That this was yet another propaganda disaster for the
Administration on a crucial issue was confirmed in
retrospect by William Bundy. Bundy judged the peace
initiative itself to be of little significance, but he
assessed the entire incident as "a very damaging
episode.eo I
 However, the point is, that whether or not
this peace initiative could have been a significant
opening to negotiations, the Administration had repeatedly
stated that the North Vietnamese would not consider talks
and it was these statements that were given the lie by
this episode. Thus again the Administration had fallen
into a trap of its own making.
In practice this meant that future Administration
statements about North Vietnamese intransigence on
negotiations would not automatically be believed, even if
these were true statements. Furthermore, one of the
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Administration's 
.1 ustifications for escalating the war -
North Vietnam's unwillingness to talk - had now been
thoroughly undermined, and increasingly U.S. escalation
was shown for what it actually was: a method of fighting a
war, not a means to achieve peace.
That the war was escalating was indisputable. The
dispatch of large numbers of U.S. troops to South Vietnam
had provoked a similar build-up on the North Vietnamese
and Vietcong side and the conflict intensified. Again the
Administration faced the dilemma it had confronted in
March when the war was going badly, and which would always
recur in this war: in order to maintain the combat status
quo, and then perhaps to tilt the balance in its favour,
it would be necessary to dispatch yet more troops.
Following the propaganda technique it used for troop
dispatches prior to the 28 July announcement, the
Administration simply did not announce the authorisation
of vast increases in troops, nor did it publicise
Westmoreland's requests for troops. 91 As a result, press
speculation on the figures for troop deployments ranged
from 200,000 up to 400,000 troops, adding to the confusion
over the true extent of the war, and still leaving a gulf
between what the public could glean of the scale of the
war, as opposed to what the Administration privately knew
was the scale. 8 Added to this the Administration gave no
public indication of the gloomy evaluation of the chances
for success in the conflict, or the predictions on U.S.
casualties.
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In the short term this propaganda technique served
the Administration's war policy well: it was able to
prosecute the war vigorously without informed public
scrutiny of the consequences of these decisions. But In
the long term this propaganda method proved disastrous,
for as the war continued, the Administration required
support from a public that had not been prepared for such
a long and vicious conflict. Additionally, the charges
against the Administration that it had secretly committed
the U.S. to a major war without Congressional/public
consent were bound to be raised again.
Where America's foreign allies were concerned, the
the Administration was well aware of the effects of the
conflict and U.S. conduct of the war on its own image and
on public support for allied governments. Above all, it
was the bombing programme that was the focus of attention
in allied countries. When McNamara evaluated the
effectiveness of the bombing programme in July for
Johnson, he also included this assessment of its Impact:
"The price paid for improving our image as
guarantor had been damage to our image as a
country which eschews armed attacks on other
nations. The hue and cry correlates with the
kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs. napalm), the
kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the
location of the targets (e.g., south vs. north),
and not least the extent to which the critic
feels threatened by Asian communism (e.g.
Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a given
level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now
than it was earlier, perhaps to some extent
helped by Communist intransigence toward
discussions.. . Within such allied countries as
the UK and Japan, pQpular antagonism to the
bombing per se, fear of escalation and belief
that the bombings are the main obstacle to
negotiation, have created political problems for
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the governments in their support of US
policy.
However, the propaganda problems created by the
methods chosen to wage the war were destined to grow,
because the Administration and the U.S. military could
conceive of no other way to fight the war which would not
lead to a rapid defeat, that is, to the very eventuality
which had first dictated the bombing and the troop
dispatches.
With massive troop deployments in the pipeline at the
end of the year, a proposed expansion of the bombing
programme, and the knowledge that the war was escalating
rapidly, President Johnson finally authorised the bombing
pause that McNainara had proposed several months before. As
noted previously, the purpose of the bombing pause was
either to allow North Vietnam the chance to surrender
under the cloak of negotiations, or in the case of North
Vietnam's anticipated refusal, to escalate the war using
this refusal as a public justification, By contrast with
the secrecy on troop deployments and escalation of the
war, this official bombing halt in December 1965/January
1966 was conducted with the maximum amount of noise.
Johnson's memoirs give some idea of the attendant blaze of
publicity:
"We informed our other allies in the Pacific and
several additional governments, including the
Russians. We also advised UN Secretary General
U Tharit..,
I wrote personal letters to many heads of
state and. government leaders describing our
position and underlining our desire for peace.
Vice President Humphrey. . . conveyed our stand to
a number of government leaders, including Soviet
Chairman Kosygin. . . Secretary Rusk talked with
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numerous Ambassadors and foreign ministers, both
in Washington and in foreign capitals.
Ambassador Averell Harriman visited Warsaw,
Belgrade and many other capitals to describe our
views. Ambassador Goldberg did the same in Rome,
Paris and London, as well as the United Nations.
G. Mennen Williams. . . discussed the matter with
African leaders. Tom Mann, then our top man on
Latin American affairs, conveyed our position to
governments of the south."94
Clearly there was no corner of the world that was
overlooked in this overt diplomatic and propaganda
offensive. In addition Johnson mentions channels of
"'quiet diplomacy'" that were used: a message delivered to
the North Vietnamese via the U.s. Ambassador in Burma and
a similar message via North Vietnam's Moscow Embassy.99
As far as negotiations were concerned, the bombing
pause achieved nothing. Hanoi may have responded slightly,
though ambiguously, to the pause, primarily through a drop
in military operations, but the Administration
concentrated on the amount of troops and supplies that
North Vietnam had sent to South Vietnam. 	 Hanoi publicly
labelled the bombing pause a trick and the bombing resumed
on 31 January 1966. In terms of public opinion though, the
pause was useful, despite the problems caused by U Thant's
revelations about the U.S. 'desire' to negotiate. Although
the style of the campaign grated on some observers,
nevertheless the length of the pause and Hanoi's
uncompromising public response created the desired
impression of a genuine U.S. peace initiative that had
been turned down.
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C.) Press Reporting and Reaction
At the beginning of August press reports were
analysing the decisions that the Administration had
recently announced: to send more troops to South Vietnam
and to appeal for UN assistance. The dual nature of the
Administration's approach to the conflict revealed in
these decisions - the dichotomy between its escalatory
actions and its public rhetoric emphasising peace - tended
to be reflected In the press reports, which attempted to
reconcile these mutually contradictory positions.
A Sunday Times editorial, captioned "Keeping the
roads to peace open" , began with this discouraging
assessment:
"Now that the United States has been compelled
virtually to take over the Vietnam war for
itself, it becomes even easier than before to
produce arguments against Its policies and
actions there. The Americans are not fighting
for any vital U.S. national interest; they are
indulging in a thoroughly out-dated war of white
men against non-white men; they are forfeiting
the good opinion of most of that 'third world'
which used to be the apple of the American eye;
they are fighting the unfightable, in the sense
that China's renaissance as a great Asian power,
with a natural sphere of influence, is a fact
which cannot be denied and which only a bigot or
an ignoramus would compare with Hitler's crazy
dreams of domination. On a wider, international
front, the continuance and now stepping-up of
the war places the prospects for world peace
continuously in Jeopardy."
Yet despite this scathing analysis of the very basis
of the war and the U.S. role, the editorial blamed Hanoi
for refusing to negotiate " (except on terms tantamount to
an American surrender)" and stated that because of this
and the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam:
326
"The Americans have, therefore, no reasonable alternative
to what they are doing, however perilous or hopeless it
may look from afar." 88 The editorial then dismissed the
analogy linking Vietnam with Korea, on the grounds that in
Korea the U.S. had acted with allied support under UN
aegis, and noted that allied support for Johnson's Vietnam
policy was "only forthcoming insofar as U.S. actions can
fairly be judged to be milestones, and not obstacles, to
peace." 89 And it was further pointed out:
"Unavoidable though it may be in the
circumstances, sending another O,OOO men to a
theatre of war seems a curious way of bringing
peace nearer."9°
However, after noting this "curious" discrepancy
between U.S. means and declared ends, the editorial
nevertheless comforted its audience with the concluding
observation:
"But until further notice there is still no
cause to doubt that peace really is the American
objective, and that in its pursuit any
initiative is worth trying."91
Thus the Sunday Times managed to point out the
anomalies in the U.S. Government's war policy, but still
preferred to trust and disseminate the Administration's
rhetoric about its peaceful intentions.
An Observer editorial on 1 August set the conflict in
a global framework and lamented the "adverse effect" that
the war was exercising on U. S. -Soviet relations on other
issues.	 The remainder of the editorial was then devoted
to the issue of negotiations, proceeding from the premise
that it was the communists who were now uninterested in
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negotiations, who would press for victory in the monsoon
season and who, until the season was over, would probably
maintain the "impossible condition that all American
troops must withdraw from South Vietnam before
negotiations can start," According to the editorial this
communist intransigence and the current situation in South
Vietnam explained Johnson's recent decisions:
"The American position has been getting steadily
weaker and the South Vietnamese State has been
crumbling away. The Americans are having to
reinforce in Vietnam merely to hold the present
position and stave off col1apse.
On the basis of this pessimistic evaluation, the
editorial predicted the consequences of this latest U.S.
move:
"It is possible that American reinforcements may
help to increase the authority and efficiency of
the Saigon Government. But it is more probable
that the Americans will be forced to take over
reponsibility for running both the war and the
State.
According to the Observer the current situation left
Johnson with only two options. The first would be to
withdraw from South Vietnam, at the cost of casting "doubt
on America's reliability as an ally everywhere else" and
also vindicating "the Chinese thesis in the Sino-Soviet
dispute that national liberation wars can be fought and
won without risking nuclear war. SI9B
The second option open to Johnson was to "use
America's military might to compel the Vietcong to
consider negotiations." 9' There was clearly no doubt which
option the Observer favoured - and any sane reader would
favour - given a choice between the possibility of the
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U.S. protector appearing 'unreliable' with the implied
consequence of more national liberation wars unless
nuclear weapons were used, or the comparatively less
drastic course of forcing a negotiated settlement of the
war. The editorial then pointed to the flaws in Johnson's
chosen method for pressuring the communists into
negotiations, that is, the bombing of North Vietnam:
"It may be that the bombing attacks on North
Vietnam diminish the rate of supplies to the
Vietcong. But it is doubtful whether such
attacks can produce the required political
effect in Hanoi: and it is arguable that their
international disadvantages to the American case
outweigh their military advantages."
It was presumably the thought of these disadvantages
that prompted the Observer to draw the conclusion that
Johnson's decision to increase U.S. troops would enable
Johnson "to resist those who want to extend the bombing
and, when the monsoon season is over, enable him to call
it off altogether as part of a new drive to get
negotiations started." 9 Displaying great faith in U.S.
official rhetoric, the editorial added: "It is certain
that bombing would stop tomorrow if this were Ho's only
condition for talks."'°° And building on this belief in
the U.S. clear desire for peace - although noting
Washington's lack of clarity on the Issue of a settlement
- the editorial then concluded with a discussion of ways
to achieve a neutral Vietnam.
The Administration's peaceful image was enhanced at
this point by the adamant refusal of both North Vietnam
and China to countenance UN mediation in the war. 1QI At
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the same time press articles in The New York Times on 2
and 3 August and The Guardian on 2 August reported that
both George Ball and Dean Rusk had hinted that the bombing
could be suspended if Hanoi was prepared to decrease its
own war efforts. 02 But this 'hint' from the
Administration was ambiguous enough for observers to
perceive what they wanted to, and hence the New York Times
report on 3 August was sub-headlined, "Secretary Hints
Bombings can Halt - Reds Rule Out Any U.N. Intervention";
while The Guardian headlined its 3 August report on Rusk's
press conference: "US not planning to stop bombing"; and
a Daily Express report on 3 August was captioned: "Bombing
goes on, says Rusk", This Guardian article also
highlighted the vagueness of the U.S. appeal to the UN,
when it noted that Rusk had "also confirmed the impression
that Washington, in asking the United Nations to help to
restore peace in Vietnam, has no positive proposals for
action." 10
 The New York Times was clearly looking for,
and finding, signs of a degree of Administration
flexibility that was not reflected in these British press
reports. The Guardian article in particular displayed some
scepticism about the Administration's attitude to
negotiations as portrayed in Rusk's press conference.
In general however, the Administration's insistence
on its desire for peace was eliciting a favourable
response from press columns that had previously criticised
U.S. involvement and policies. For instance a Guardian
editorial on 5 August captioned, "Mr Johnson as a man of
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peace", seized on the U.S. appeal to the UN and the hint
that the NLF might be permitted to attend negotiations, as
evidence that the U.S. had "abandoned" some of its "old
hard attitudes".'° Note was taken of the fact that
President Johnson had recently refrained from referring to
South Vietnam as an independent nation and that he now
appeared to accept the Geneva Agreements with their
provision for elections, prompting the writer to state:
"This suggests that he now sees the war in a new
and altogether more realistic light; perhaps he
has profited after all from all those talks with
Mr Walter Lippmann and his other critics, as no
doubt they have too."10
The editorial did indeed point out the discrepancy
between the Administration's political statements and its
actions:
"Yet while abandoning political terrain at a
rate which he and most members of his
Administration would no doubt have thought
inconceivable at the beginning of the year,
President Johnson Is steadily increasing his
country's military involvment in the war."°7
But this contradiction was rationalised as an example
of the use of Johnson's political style to achieve his
d?s ired, peaceful aim:
"Aiming at a single goal by simultaneously
pursuing two not necessarily consistent policies
is commonly considered to be characteristic of
his successful political methods. And his goal,
which once might have been winning the war, Is
now peace.
Furthermore the editorial posited a distinction
between the Pentagon's objectives and the President's
current aim, thus strengthening the portrayal of Johnson
as a 'man of peace' surrounded by bellicose advisers:
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"We may suspect that high officials in the
Pentagon would do almost anything to avoid an
American defeat. . . President Johnson also wants
to avoid defeat, but we can be fairly sure that
he also wants desperately to bring the war to an
end. He may not be consciously trying to
circumvent the Pentagon; nevertheless, the
effect of his political progression may be the
same • 1 a
And the editorial concluded that these developments
augured well for negotiations:
"The Vietnamese Communists, North and South,
have hitherto dismissed as a 'hoax' his appeals
for discussions; they are afraid (to quote the
old American argument against negotiations) that
their opponents will win at the conference table
what they could not win on the field. But
President Johnson is coming nearer and nearer to
offering what they want, and one day they will
accept. The President's greatest domestic battle
lies before him. It is fortunate for us all
that, as everybody conceded, this is where he
excels." 1 1Q
Thus at this stage a former critic of the
Administration perceived that the absence of specific
references to South Vietnam's status in Johnson's latest
press conference and a declared desire for peace, meant
that Johnson actually wanted peace sufficiently to meet
the communists' terms for negotiations, despite the
dispatch of more U.S. troops to the war. Apparently the
Guardian too was looking for, and finding, encouraging
indications in Administration rhetoric, which at this
point the Guardian believed to be a more accurate guide to
the Administration's 'peaceful' intentions than its
fundamentally escalatory actions.
On 9 August came the first revelations that the U.S.
Administration had rejected the opportunity of talks on
the conflict with the North Vietnamese, Both the Guardian
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and the New York Herald Tribune published long reports on
this espisode, with other newspapers carrying shorter
versions, 111 The Guardian article, headlined "N. Vietnamese
feelers rebuffed by US" and subtitled "Ho Chi Minh was
willing to attend secret talks" , by a correspondent at the
United Nations, began with the blunt statement:
"It has become known here this weekend that
Washington has cold-shouldered at least two
opportunities for contacts with North Vietnam in
the past two years."
Citing "unimpeachable sources" the report stated that
North Vietnam appeared to have been willing to discuss
establishing a "coalition neutralist government" in South
Vietnam after Diem's removal in 1963, and that furthermore
"President Ho Chi Minh wanted a secret meeting with United
States representatives in September last year... "' 	 The
article then detailed Washington's responses to those
proposals:
"In the first case, Washington did not respond
at all. In the second case, Washington waited
for five weeks before delivering a negative
reply, first arguing that a meeting with Ho Chi
Minh could never be kept sufficiently secret to
prevent Mr Goldwater's supporters from making
capital of it during the presidential election
campaign and accusing the Administration of
appeasement; or to prevent violent protestations
in Saigon that might topple the Government
there. "
However, despite the potential for damage to the
Administration's image as government striving for
negotiations and a peaceful settlement, the State
Department chose merely to brush aside questions about
these lost opportunities, as the Guardian reported:
"The State Department, however, seems to be
dismissing the report of Ho Chi Minh's
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willingness to talk last year as irrelevant, it
says that there was no indication that anything
would come of it, and hints that President
Johnson was not involved in the matter at
all II 1 1
After mentioning that Adlai Stevenson knew about
these proposals and had greatly regretted Washington's
response, the article gave the "intermediaries" view of
the consequences of this response, stating that they
"believed the Communist position hardened as a result of
Washington's negative attitude." 11 The report then
concluded with a general discussion on negotiations.
Thus, although the central issues were raised, the
Guardian article did not include any analysis of the
Administration's explanation and nor did it specifically
mention one of the most important features of this
episode: the now publicised contradiction between
Administration rhetoric on negotiations, and reality.
However, the New York Herald Tribune remedied this
deficiency with a report headlined, "U.S. Barred '64 Talks
On Vietnam", subtitled, "Hanoi Accepted; Election a
Factor". 117 This report concentrated on the most recent
proposal in 1964 and began:
"The Johnson Administration last fall rejected
a proposal for Vietnamese peace talks that had
been accepted without conditions by Communist
North Vietnam, it was learned yesterday."119
In the next paragraph came the most damaging
conjunction of Information as far as Administration
propaganda was concerned:
"This information, from reliable sources, is
in direct conflict with President Johnson's at
his July 29 press conference that 'we are ready
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now, as we have always been, to move from the
battlefield to the conference table. '"'
The report produced the same two reasons as the
Guardian accounting for the Administration's rejection and
discussed the peace talks proposal in greater detail. The
article then recapitulated Johnson's latest press
conference statement on U.S. "willingness" for
"unconditional discussions" and his plaintive summary of
the abundant U.S. peace efforts that he said had met with
no communist reponse: "'Fifteen efforts have been made to
start these discussions with the help of 40 nations
throughout the world, but there has been no answer.
Finally there was a reference to the sources' view of the
importance of this rejected proposal
"The sources pointed out yesterday that last
fall's U.S. rejection and Hanoi's acceptance of
a negotiation proposal is now a footnote in
history. They maintained, however, that had a
meeting taken place, a road to peace in Vietnam
might have been mapped out."'1
However, despite the serious contradictions between
Administration rhetoric and events according to other
participants that were revealed in these press reports, at
this time the episode did not generate a press furore, thus
sparing the Administration the effort of trying to explain
the discrepancies with the consequent embarrassment and
damage to its image.
One possible reason for this generally muted press
response could lie in the fact that immediately after
these revelations, the new U.S. Ambassador to Saigon,
Henry Cabot Lodge, was reported to have stated to the
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. troops would
not leave South Vietnam even if the Saigon government were
to ask them to leave.	 This statement received
considerable press coverage and was perceived by the
Administration as a problem that required explanation, for
all U.S. official propaganda had always stressed that the
U.S. was merely helping South Vietnam at the latter's
invitation, in line with past U.S. policy. In turn the
official explanation, advanced by the State Department, and
Presidential press spokesman and supported by Johnson,
that Lodge did not make these remarks, was also widely
disseminated and disputed in the press, 1	Thus the
rejected peace talks episode vanished beneath the welter
of claims and counter-claims over Lodge's statement.
In addition to this incident, press reports from
mid-August to the end of the month depicted a
deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. On 12 August Th
Times published a Washington dispatch headlined, "America
Faces Desperate Vietnam Situation", subtitled, "Saigon's
Power Shrinks In A Hostile Country". 1	Quoting an
"optimistic assessment" of the amount of the country
controlled by the South Vietnamese Government as "little
more than half", with three-quarters of the country "in a
kind of administrative limbo", the report highlighted the
consequences of this for U.S. political and military
policy:
"Political stability in these circumstances is
of course impossible, and there is no longer any
pretence that South Vietnam is a viable state.
Instead, there is the admission that it is not a
national state, that no national consciousness
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exists, and that in effect the United States is
supporting an army in search of a country."1
Summarising the current military situation, the
report mentioned the Vietcong's "especially disturbing"
ability to "replace losses and increase their forces",
contrasting with the "alarming" (although apparently
"improving") desertion rate in the South Vietnamese Army;
and the fact that the bombing had riot impaired North
Vietnam's supply lines to the South. 1	 Drawing
conclusions for U.S. policy from this, the article stated:
"The only comfort drawn from the review [by
the Administration of the situation) is not
likely to be widely shared abroad. The major
American accomplishment is seen to be the
development of a sound strategy based on the
hard realities of the situation.
In other words, the only battle won has been
in Washington. An overall decision, encompassing
many previous ones, has been made to fight a
large war with American troops."1"
This policy of fighting the war with U.S. troops with
the South Vietnamese Army in a 'detection and
pacification' role was expected to be successful, despite
the poor results so far of U.S. military efforts that the
article had just detailed:
"The results of such a strategy should be
inevitable. It is difficult to see how a small
country such as North Vietnam can withstand an
American counter-attack, and sooner or later the
objective of bringing Hanoi to the conference
table should be realized." '
The article was thus reproducing much the same belief
that the Administration presumably held; that despite all
evidence to the contrary, the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong would finally succumb to U.S. superior military
might.
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However, from the point of view of the U.S.
propaganda effort, the most important issue raised in this
article was addressed in the final paragraph, when it was
pointed out that the U.S. dependency on "ambitious Asian
generals with little popular backing" in fact undercut the
U.S. claim to be in South Vietnam at the Government's
invitation, with the result that: "The validity of that
position is highly questionable if no government is seen
to exist." 12 Here the very basis of the U.S. role in the
Vietnam conflict was undercut on a point of principle and
for this very reason was all the more dangerous for the
U.S. propaganda effort, which would then be attacked on
two fronts: both the principle of the war and the means
used to fight it. For already U.S. methods of fighting the
war had caused a certain amount of revulsion, which was
likely to increase as the full weight of the U.S. military
machine was brought into action in Vietnam. In addition
the length of the war would be a factor which would affect
perception of the conflict and the U.S. role, would strain
the U.S. propaganda effort, and would also multiply any
doubts about such factors as U.S. war methods, civilian
casualties and refugees, and the bombing of North Vietnam.
Thus, if the very principle of the war came to be
seriously doubted, as it later was, then U.S. propaganda
faced the impossible task of justifying an enormously
destructive war which observers thought carried risks of a
general conflagration, and which was being fought for none
of the more immediate and principled reasons advanced by
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the Adirmistration, that is, democracy, freedom arid the
'South Vietnamese Government' . In other words, when this
situation came about U.S. propaganda had the task of
endeavouring to justify what some observers had decided
was inherently unjustifiable.
This dilemma over the South Vietnamese Government was
well illustrated in reports towards the end of August. Ih
Times headlined its Washington dispatch, "Vietnam Dilemma
for Washington",subtitled revealingly, ".Should U.S. Run
Country As Well As Defend It?", with the further helpful
subtitle, "Need To Create Viable State In The South".'
Following a lengthy discussion of the problems encountered
by the U.S. in South Vietnam, the article concluded that
the U.S. now had two options. The first option was to
withdraw, as the original conditions for U.S. commitment
in 1954 had not been met by the South Vietnamese
Government(s) (undertaking reforms and responding to
people's "national aspirations"). The second option was to
run the country:
"Withdrawal, of course, is now out of the
question. Too much is involved. Unless some kind
of miracle occurs in Saigon, the United States
will almost inevitably have to run the country.
This at least is the unhappy conclusion drawn
here . "
The Daily Express report from Washington was
headlined, "The bitter truth America is facing now" and
began:
"The United States of America - founded on an
anti-colonial revolution - is today facing up to
a bitter truth in Vietnam. That if Communism is
to be defeated it may be necessary to turn South
Vietnam into virtually an American colony...
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Many leading officials here are talking about
an American civil authority - headed by a sort
of proconsul - which would take over, rebuild
and run Vietnam for perhaps 20 years, as the
only practical way to make it a viable
state. 1 2
And the report highlighted the vital point that
because of t.be situation in South Vietnam, "the
increasingly growing realisation is that even if a huge
American army wins crushing victories over the Vietong
this will not necessarily solve the problem."	 The cause
of this unpalatable state of affairs was stated to be the
lack of a "strong Government in Saigon, genuinely
representative of the South Vietnamese people" and the
need for: "A stable and expanding economy, and an
efficient civil service coupled with effective local
government in the provinces." 	 The South Vietnamese
Government itself was described in this article as
"arrogant, super-sensitive, and totally remote from the
monumental problems." '
However, it was only seven months since the U.S.
first 'responded' to the Vietcong attack on Pleiku in
defence of the Saigon Government, which, it was claimed,
would be able to deal with South Vietnam's problems if
only its Northern neighbour would cease its 'aggression'
Now it was being stated that even if the war was being won
and presumably Northern 'aggression' ceased, South
Vietnam's problems would remain, because firstly the
problems themselves were not caused by the war, and
secondly, the Saigon Government was not capable of
tackling the problems, irrespective of the war. Earlier
340
U.S. propaganda was thus already being contradicted by the
deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam and the
need for an effective solution.
Nevertheless, the 'realities' of the political and
military deterioration in South Vietnam appear to have
been accepted by most press observers as justification for
the possibility of a U.S. take-over, in whatever form, of
the Saigon Government's functions. The general impression
was that this was a necessity, although not all observers
displayed the insouciance of a Daily Telegraph editorial
on 31 August, captioned, "New Realism In Vietnam". ' 	 This
editorial began with a stark reminder of South Vietnam's
chronic political instability and then brushed aside the
Saigon Government's inability to command the support of
its people as now unimportant in the face of the expanded
war, and in effect dismissing one of the main platforms of
U.S. official propaganda - that the U.S. was in South
Vietnam in the service of democracy, freedom and the South
Vietnamese peoples' right to command their own destiny:
"South Vietnam's ninth Government in two years
is beginning to experience the same sort of
domestic trouble as helped to dislodge its
predecessors. . . A few governments ago such
manifestations [a "hostile demonstration"] were
a good deal more disquieting for the Americans
than they can be today. Indeed Washington itself
has in the past anxiously tried to bring about
precisely what the present demonstrators are
demanding: the installation of a civilian
Government in Saigon in place of military
rule." 17
The editorial then encapsulated the difference
between past and present U.S. policy on the issue of
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'democracy' in South Vietnam, and its current relative
unimportance in the list of priorities:
"Political stability and at least some semblance
of democratic forms were seen as an essential
background to successful prosecution of the war.
But with the intensification of the war and
full American commitment this background has
lost its importance. It remains desirable, of
course, as an ultimate objective, but realism
now relegates its possible achievement to a more
distant future after the war is over."1
Concerning the outcome of the war, this editorial
presented much the same analysis as The Times in its
12 August assessment, arguing that the communists had
little chance of military victory in the face of U.S.
military technology:
"Soon the advantage of weather [end of monsoon
season] will be on the other [U.S.] side, and
with it will come more American troops, new
weapons and - as Our Special Correspondent
reports - daily bombing raids against Viet Cong
bases. This is the prospect that now faces the
Communists, confronting them more starkly than
at any earlier juncture with the choice between
continuing a hopeless war and accepting the
negotiation [sic] for which President JOHNSON is
ready "' at the drop of a hat.
As the Daily Telegraph mentioned in passing, there
had again been flurries of activity concerning peace
talks, firstly referring to a private British initiative
and then secondly to Administration attempts.
On 21 and 22 August the press reported that Lord
Brockway, chairman of the British Council for Peace in
Vietnam, had visited Moscow to contact North Vietnamese
representatives. Initially press reports were optimistic
about the outcome of Brockway's talks, with North Vietnam
appearing to make some concessions - for instance the
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Observer headlined its report on 22 August, "N.Vietnam
softens on cease- fire" - but by 25 August North Vietnam
had disagreed publicly over Brockway's version of the
talks that had appeared in the press and denied agreeing
to any form of concession. 1.40
There was, as usual, some confusion over Washington's
reaction to Brockway's efforts. On 23 August USIS
published a summary of U.S. officials' views on the
conflict, optimistically titled, "Vietnam Turning Point
Thought Possible Soon". 141 The thesis advanced here and in
press reports at this time was that due to the increased
U.S. commitment, North Vietnam had now to decide whether
to pursue an expanded, costly and ultimately lost war, or
whether to opt for negotiations. On the issue of peace
probes the USIS report juxtaposed the most contradictory
statements, making it clear - presumably inadvertently -
that Washington intended to be the ultimate judge of the
significance or otherwise of any peace probes, although
still encouraging these efforts verbally:
"At this stage in Vietnam, it also remains
important that those in various world capitals
who are interested in getting the Communists to
the conference table continue their efforts. Out
of these efforts might come some significant
indication from the other side that was worth
probing, the U.S. officials explained.
At the same time, they made it clear that
Washington was not unduly excited on Friday by
press reports reaching here late in the day
about the talks in Moscow between North
Vietnamese representatives, and Lord Brockway,
the British Labour H.P. . II14
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After a discouraging evaluation of the reported
results of Brockway's talks, the USIS report noted
disparagingly:
"The American officials stated that these
reported points could be developed and discussed
at a peace conference. But they questioned how
much of what Lord Brockway stated was his own
formulation and how much was North
Vietnam's. "'
Thus the results of Brockway's efforts were
apparently dismissed officially as wishful thinking. But
on the other hand, The New York Times reported on 27
August that Brockway's discussions had been viewed as "one
in a series of current contacts" and that: "Officials
eagerly studied reports of those talks and thought that
they detected some significant nuances," 1	This seems a
curious assessment in the light of the earlier USIS
report, but of course by this time North Vietnam had
already denied Brockway's statments, and as there was no
longer any danger that the Administration would have to
take this peace initiative seriously then possibly
Administration officials felt able to offer a more
charitable view of Brockway's initiative.
Concerning North Vietnam's denial, The New York Times
stated that the Brockway "incident is thought to have
demonstrated the risks of premature disclosure of the
substance of diplomatic conversations about the war. 14&
Although the Administration was in no danger at this point
of disclosing the "substance" of diplomatic conversations,
nevertheless hints and vague references to current peace
moves, however secret, were often used by the
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Administration to counter criticism - particularly when
military action was being intensified - and apparently
regardless of whether public disclosure in even vague
terms might jeopardise any such peace moves. And at this
juncture the press was discussing in vague terms certain
approaches to the North Vietnamese which the
Administration was undertaking as part of another U.S.
peace 'offensive'. This came immediately after the U.S.
Marines inflicted heavy losses on the Vietcong in a battle
at Chu Lai, amid reports that the communist offensive was
slowing down and the Vietcong were experiencing supply
shortages.
There were several strands to this peace and
propaganda effort, comprising the publication and
dissemination of the Administration's pamphlet "Why
Vietnam?" on 23 August; a televised panel discussion of
the Administration's Vietnam policy with Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy and UN Ambassador Goldberg; and leaks to the press
about current Administration approaches to North Vietnam,
followed by elliptical official references to these
approaches. Press reports covered these developments in
considerable detail, particularly the Administration's
views on negotiations and the current peace moves.
On 24 August The New York Times published a lengthy
report headlined, "U.S. Aides Explain Position On Truce",
which covered both the television discussion and the
pamphlet, but devoted much more attention and analysis to
the former. But there was one point that the report raised
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about the pamphlet that was important, for after a brief
factual description of "Why Vietnam?", the report then
mentioned the "controversy" over the inclusion of an
Eisenhower letter to Diem to justify current U.S. policy,
stating that Eisenhower himself "declared last week that
the message was intended to offer economic assistance, not
military aid.	 Eisenhower's declaration obviously
detracted from the Administration's insistence that its
current policy merely followed past policies
On the television discussion, The New York Times
reported that "experienced observers" judged the
television discussion to be of importance chiefly because
it was such a high profile presentation of the
Administration's "full range of offers", not because "any
clearly new positions had been stated". '" But even so,
the television presentation itself was taken to be a form
of official U.S. diplomacy. After basing the U.S. position
on compliance by both sides with the 1954 Geneva
Agreements, Rusk was reported to be "bidding strongly for
negotiations" when he stated that "'there are many details
[of the U.S. positionJ which can't be elaborated because
we are not at a negotiating table'" • 	 And The New York
Times underlined this point by interpreting this statement
as an indication that "the United States might be willing
to make concessions not mentioned in tonight's
discussion." 1 The next day The New York Times again
reported on this discussion under the headline, "U.S.
Diplomacy by TV". The article began:
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"The Johnson Administration has begun a subtle
effort to discover whether it can agree with
North Vietnam on a broad but deliberately
ambiguous statement of objectives for future
negotiations.
Last night, before a nationwide television
audience that was never fully briefed on what it
was witnessing, leading United States
policy-makers addressed the North Vietnamese
Government in Hanoi and responded, point by
point, to i-ts four-month-old proposal for a
'basis' of settlement. "°
But for all this 'subtle' probing, the
Administration's fundamental strategy for achieving
negotiations had not in fact changed, for as the article
then pointed out:
"The exercise [television discussion] was part
of a new Washington peace offensive that is not,
however, confined to peaceful means. Officials
acknowledged today that their call for
negotiations, "'the sooner the better, ' " was
being reinforced by increased military pressure
against the Communists in both North and South
Vietnam.
However, because the Administration's goal was stated
and seen to be negotiations, these combined
military-diplomatic efforts were portrayed in this report
as a "bid for a peace conference" which "marked the
biggest stride yet away from the Administration's
reluctance of last winter to move toward the bargaining
table and its hesitation, as late as February, even to
utter the word 'negotiation. '"
The Financial Times summed up the Administration's
efforts in a Washington date-lined report, "U.S. Drive To
Get North Vietnam to Negotiate", which stated: "The most
sustained American attempt so far to induce the Government
of North Vietnam to come to a conference is now in full
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swing," 1	And the report also described the
Administrat ion ' s method of communicating its message:
"Official Washington is full of carefully orchestrated
hints and statements indicating the American desire for
peace and flexibility."'
Further proof of this U.S. desire for peace came when
The New York Times carried a long article about
Administration peace moves, which may have referred to the
supposedly secret XYZ peace initiative. First it was
reported that through "a series of unpublicized and
indirect approaches" the U.S. was now "offering to
exchange demonstrations of a desire to slow down the war."
Next the report discussed the channel of communication:
"The North Vietnamese are said to be receiving
unidentified third-party representatives with
evident interest, although they have not yet
given anything that might be construed as a
reply. Some informed sources believe a response
may be received or become discernible within a
week or two ' 1
Then the positions of the two sides was revealed:
"In its indirect aproaches, the Johnson
Administration is said to be urging the Hanoi
Government to consider a withdrawal of all or
part of the 325th Division of the North
Vietnamese Army from South Vietnam in exchange
for a reduction in United States military
actions, including the bombing of North
Vietnam. "
Finally the article explained that North Vietnam was
"being told" that this "exchange of signals. . . could be the
first step toward further reductions in the fighting and
bombing in preparation for more formal negotiations."1
Thus these "unpublicized approaches" had by now
received a fairly thorough and detailed public airing,
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adding considerably to the impression that the
Administration was seriously striving for negotiations.
President Johnson had also projected this image at a press
conference on 25 August when he stated that ". . .peace,
that simple little 5-letter word is the most important
word in the English language to us at this time and it
occupies more of our attention than any other word or
subject."'	 And as the Financial Times noted, he then
remarked: "'\qe do expect they (the Communists) are
listening. . . we do hope they are listening. II1&9 However
the Administration's interest in peace and Communist
attentiveness did not prevent it broadcasting its low
estimate of the chances of success, as The New York Times
reported, and this struck a rather sour warning note:
"Washington sources insist, however, that there is no hint
yet that the reaction will be less negative than
before.
At this point the Administration view of the
Communists' reactions to peace moves, past and future, was
helpfully reinforced by press coverage of a British
Gvernment White Paper which detailed its own and other
countries' unsuccessful attempts to achieve negotiations
during the last six months. 	 The White Paper also
included a note outlining its position that the U.S.
Government sent to the British Government on 8 August.
However this concerted propaganda effort by the
Administration, aided by the British Government, and the
recent U.S. victory at Chu Lai, still did not lead all
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observers to conclude that peace was about to break out.
And more important, not all observers thought that the
Administration was in reality pursuing negotiations, but
was instead projecting an image of such a pursuit. Thus at
the end of August the British press produced radically
differing interpretations of the Administration's
campaign. On the one hand there was an Observer article
headlined, "Peace hope in Vashington", reporting that:
"People with power in Washington are
beginning, just beginning, to allow themselves
to believe in the possibility of a moderately
satisfactory solution in Vietnam.
At his press conference this week the
President. . . expressed a cautious optimism about
the way the war was going.
His hopes are not of outright military
victory. But suddenly this town Is full of
rumours of negotiations and these rumours do not
emanate from Saigon but from the White House.
They come from Johnson's aides, who say nothing
- for the sake of their career survival - that
is not carefully premeditated. There really is
something in the air."12
According to the Observer the Administration's
current "diplomatic offensive" was "shrouded in a secrecy
unfamiliar in recent American history." 1 But this was a
curious view of secrecy, considering the details that had
already appeared in the press. However, after observing
that "publicity would kill" any contacts with Hanoi, the
article nevertheless insisted that: "Something like
preliminary negotiations are now going on and the chief
stumbling-block at present is the uncertainty of the
demands of the other side." 14 Hanoi must have been
pleased that its reported response was being kept so
secret.
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On the other hand there was a Sunday Times article
entitled, "Rumours of Vietnam 'peace' are just eye-wash".
As the headline suggests the view taken of the
Administration's peace moves was highly sceptical, and
this was coupled with what was in fact a much more
accurate account of the situation:
"MR DEAN RUSK, the US Secretary of State, has
been careful in his latest press conference
neither to affirm nor deny that something might
be afoot behind the scenes to reduce the
intensity of the conflict in South Vietnam. But
an assessment of the situation today can only
lead to the conclusion that there is still the
same diplomatic stalemate, the same military
standoff and an undiminished prospect of the war
extending indefinitely into the future."1
But as the article then pointed out:
"That Lassessmnent], however, is just about
contrary to everything that is being fed out
here, publicly and privately. In the past week
Washington has been the theatre of leaks and
hints hardly equalled in modern experience. My
own conclusion is that all this has been mostly
eyewash.
The article then pieced together the components which
had led other observ.ers to conclude exactly the opposite,
first mentioning press conferences by Rusk and MeNamara,
followed immediately by a week of articles in "influential
journals" about the U.S. military effort having "'turned
the corner'" and North Vietnam now having to choose
whether to escalate or negotiate. 1	 Then came the reports
of peace moves and the Administration's encouraging
reactions:
"Comment on television by Mr Rusk and officials,
a sort of comment by silence on the part of
President Johnson in his press conference on
Wednesday, and a comparable acquiescence by Mr
Rusk in his press conference on Friday - all
combined to suggest that something was really
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going on and that, therefore, the prospect of
welcome results had been enhanced,"1
But as the last paragraph of the article emphasised, there
was in fact little change in the situation:
"There is substantial evidence that the Vietcong
are tired and short of supplies. But to proceed
from these circumstances to a judgement that
Hanoi wishes to arrange a face-saving peace is
to fall off the edge of the logical process."'"°
Thus not only did this article disagree with the
hypothesis that a U.S. victory, a tired Vietcong and a
presumably thoughtful North Vietnam added up to a
significant chance for negotiations, but in addition the
Administration' s recent propaganda moves, suggesting that
negotiations were imminent, were effectively dismissed as
misleading.
However, support for the Administration's efforts
came in a major speech by Senate majority leader Mike
Mansfield, defining U.S. conditions for settling the
conflict in Vietnam. Furthermore, because Mansfield's
speech was reported to have been approved beforehand by
President Johnson it was invested with a greater degree of
authority and generated press interest. 171 But in addition
to prolonging the press life 0± the peace moves,
Mansfield's speech was also consciously optimistic about
the length of the war, effectively intimating that
negoatiations could end it soon. In its report on the
speech the Guardian noted:
"Mr Mansfield told reporters before delivering
his speech that he had sent advance copies to
the President and the Secretaries of State and
Defence. The Senator said that the President
felt, as he did, that the American public should
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not assume that this country was irrevocably
committed to a long war in Vietnam."1"2
In the circumstances this optimism was not justified,
f or the Administration had already stated that it expected
little from this current round of peace moves. Thus,
unless the U.S. was prepared either to withdraw
unilaterally or negotiate on North Vietnam's terms, and
first stop bombing the North - neither of which courses
was the Administration prepared to pursue - then the war
was bound to continue. The only other possibility was for
the U.S. to win a quick military victory and this did not
seem likely either in the wake of the desperate situation
that had recently forced the Administration into vastly
enlarging its troop commitment.
The saga of this peace 'offensive' finally came to an
end in early October, with the Administration claiming
that yet again the Communists had shown that they were not
interested in negotiations. This conclusion was generally
supported in press reports - even the Guardian. headlined
its report: "Vietcong as stubborn as ever." 1 " However, as
in the past, the Administration's diplomatic 'failure'
contained a useful bonus, which was highlighted in The New
York Times' analysis of the unsuccessful peace campaign.
Firstly, Hanoi's rejection of the "intensive 10-week" U.S.
overtures again helped pave the way for the Administration
to escalate the war: "Washington officials believe that a
long and costly military campaign is necessary before
diplomats can try again.* And secondly, some of the
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criticism levelled at the Administration had been
countered by the very fact that the Administration had
involved itself in approaches to North Vietnam, had urged
other Governments to lobby for peace and most importantly,
bad been widely reported to be doing all this:
"But they [Washington officials] also believe
that the offers to negotiate have improved the
United States position in many parts of the
world without upsetting the frail political
structure in South Vietnam."1'
These were important results for the Administration,
for though it was only eight months since the U.S. began
sustained bombing of North Vietnam, and of course South
Vietnam, already the destruction was generating adverse
press coverage - even from supporters of the U.S.
corriniitment in Vietnam. This was demonstrated strikingly in
September, for though the border conflict between India
and Pakistan had diverted press attention temporarily from
the Vietnam war, nevertheless both the Daily Telegraph and
the Guardian carried editorials criticising the U.S. air
raids. Noting that 10,000 gift packets from South
Vietnamese children to North Vietnamese children had been
dropped on one of these air raids, and pondering whether
this was a "vulgar, even ghoulish display, of American
wealth and power, a cynical ringing of the changes - bombs
one day, goodies the next", or a "legitimate, indeed
necessary, use of psychological warfare", the Daily
Telegraph editorial stated flatly:
"But the good work [gifts lowering communist
morale] can be completely undone if the
Americans get a reputation for unnecessary
brutality in their bombing raids. Targets must
be strictly military, and accurately pinpointed,
354
despite increased risk. Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese prisoners should be properly treated,
and this should be made known. 111Th
The Guardian editorial was set in the context of the
latest Communist rejection of negotiations, due to which
the editorial was now supporting the British Government's
refusal to condemn U.S. policy and thereby lose its
influence with Washington and its chance to ameliorate the
conflict. But the editorial actually began with a harsh
condemnation of the U.S. military effort:
"Posterity (in America as elsewhere) will find
it hard to forgive the United States
Administration's methods of waging war in
Vietnam." 17
By the end of September the India-Pakistan conflict
was over and Vietnam was once more the focus of media
attention. Just at the time that the U.S. peace campaign
was reported to have failed due to Communist
intransigence, the largest demonstration against the war
so far took place in America on 15-16 october. Other
countries, including Britain, responded to the appeal by
the U.S. organisers, the Vietnam Day Committee, and
organised similar demonstrations over the same weekend.
Though the demonstrations in Britain were relatively
small, they resulted in a number of arrests and once again
attracted considerable press attention. 179
At this stage in the war, in late October and early
November, Administration officials were now reported to be
more optimistic about the outcome of the conflict. Their
optimism was based on the perceived beneficial effects of
the introduction of U.S. ground troops, and the belief
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that these troops and other U.S. military measures had
prevented a Vietcong victory and South Vietnam's military
collapse. McGeorge Bundy also believed that the combat
initiative now lay with the U.S. and South Vietnamese
troops instead of with the enemy forces. ieo But this
off icial public optimism about the fighting was
accompanied by official public pessimism on the possiblity
of negotiations. The Administration's reported view was
that the communists appeared "'determined to slug it out'"
and thus the U.S. would "continue the battle, hitting
harder with a rapidly expanding military force and
increased diplomatic pressure". 11 Against this background
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee suggested another bombing pause in
order to start negotiations.	 In response the
Administration reiterated its willingness to stop the air
strikes if the North Vietnamese indicated that a bombing
halt would lead to negotiations, but the Administration
also made plain its belief that North Vietnam did not
currently want negotiations:
"'But we have had no indication that another
cessation of the military strikes at military
targets In the North would change anyone's mind
anywhere else,' said Bill D. Moyers, the
Presidential press secretary. "'
Fuibright's suggestion was thus dismissed and again
communist intransigence was blamed for the continuation
and escalation of the war. This combination of
Administration optimism about military progress in
Vietnam, coupled with warnings that the conflict would
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intensify before the communists would be prepared to
negotiate, continued into early November. B4 So far press
reports had accepted the Administration's interpretation
of events involving both the conflict and negotations. But
there was still concern about the general level of carnage
inflicted by U.S. methods of fighting the war. A Guardian
editorial Illustrated the price that could be paid, even
entirely accidentally, by South Vietnamese peasants for
U.S. military assistance, when it described the
destruction by U.S. bombers of a South Vietnamese village
because of a map reference error and then stated:
"...villages, in both North and South Vietnam are
suffering day after day the fate of the Inhabitants of De
Duc." 1	Westmoreland too was reported to be worried about
civilian casualties.	 This concern about civilian
suffering Implied that if the Administration's escalation
of the conflict was not perceived to be aimed at, or
achieving negotiations and peace, contrary to repeated
U.S. statements, then on the grounds of human suffering
alone U.S. Involvement in the war would be criticised -
quite regardless of any additional allegations about U.S.
official misinformation or straightforward deception.
On 16 November newspapers began reporting for the
second time on the U.S. rejection of the Rangoon peace
initiative in September 1964, details of which had just
been published in Look magazine. The Administration had
already commented on the magazine article in a press
conference on 15 November by State Department spokesman
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McCloskey, in which he said that the peace talks offer was
rejected, because the Administration doubted that Hanoi
seriously wanted talks and Secretary of State Rusk had
sensitive antenna and would have recognised a serious
peace move. 187 The first press reports merely
recapitulated the facts as presented in the Look article,
including the allegation that it was Defense Secretary
McNainara who bad twice turned down peace proposals from U
Thant, and then reproduced both McNainara's and the State
Department spokesman's rebuttals.' 88 Then on 17 November
the press began analysing the whole episode and its
implications for the Administration. In a stinging
editorial The New York Times commented:
"The details, and just what each person did or
said at the period a year ago when Hanoi sought
a discussion with the United States on ending
hostilities in Vietnam, must and will be sifted
by history. The outstanding - and many will
think devastating - fact Is that Hanoi offered
to talk and Washington refused, This may well
prove a heavy burden for the Johnson
Administration to justify."1
Pouring scorn on McCloskey's reference to Secretary
Rusk' s sensitivity to 'serious peace moves' , and also
revealing considerable anxiety, the editorial stated:
"Secretary Rusk, according to Mr. McCloskey,
has a 'sensitive antenna' and he would have
known - or sensed - when North Vietnam was
really prepared for peace talks. This comment
reminds one of the ancient Roman practice of
drawing auspices from the flight or entrails of
birds. It would be a shuddering thought that the
fate of nations and of thousands of young
Americans depended on Dean Rusk's antenna. Yet
this is what Mr. McCloskey Indicated."°
Finally, after recalling Washington's past reasons for
refusing to contemplate negotiations, due to the
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requirement for a "peaceful gesture in action, not words"
from Hanoi, the need for a strong U.S. stance, and a
"widely held belief" in the domino theory, the editorial
concluded:
"Therefore, it was not until April, in his now
famous Johns Hopkins speech, that President
Johnson asked for 'unconditional discussions.
The might-have-beens of history are forever
incapable of proof. Perhaps nothing would have
come a year ago of some quiet talks with Hanoi.
Yet, as U Thant observed yesterday, much of the
present tragedy might have been averted if 'some
bold step' had been taken last year. The gnawing
thought will never be erased: that opportunity
tapped faintly on the door - and the United
States would not open it."1'
New York Times commentator James Reston began his critique
of the Administration's conduct with the observation:
"In the midst of the most savage battle of the
Vietnamese war, the State Department has
confirmed that it rejected a year ago an offer
to enter into peace talks with the North
Vietnamese in Rangoon, Burma,
This has created such a stir in Washington and
provoked so many charges of bad faith on the
part of the Johnson Administration by foreign
diplomats and others that it is important to try
and sort out the facts."12
Reston then pointed out that at the time of the
Rangoon offer the Administration completely opposed
negotiations and this policy was only reversed with
Johnson's Baltimore speech. But as Reston continued:
"This much can be said in explanation of the
Administation's position, but that is about all.
It has not been caught rejecting the peace talks
it says it wants. It rejected them before it
changed its policy against negotiations, but it
is still in trouble because it has consistently
given the impression that Hanoi was never
prepared to talk."19
Quoting Johnson at a 13 July press conference, In
which he said that "'candor'" compelled him to state that
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Reproducing U.S. press criticism of Administration
statements on Vietnam, the Dominican Republic crisis and
the recent aluminium price war, the Guardian assessed the
future consequences to the Administration of these
inaccurate or misleading pronouncements
"There seems to be a real possibility that the
Administration has done itself serious damage by
thus sowing seeds of distrust among the public,
less ready than most to accept unquestioningly
the statements of its leaders.
This growing distrust coincides with the sharp
escalation of the American military effort in
Vietnam and the imposition of an increasingly
pervasive censorship. Soon 200,000 American
troops will be fighting in Vietnam. It is a
sizeable war. There will be mounting casualties
and there will be setbacks as well as
victories."
The Guardians summary of U.S. press criticism also
noted an observation by a Washington Post commentator that
Dean Rusk "took it upon himself to ignore last year's
approach" without informing President Johnson.	 This
version of events thus corroborated Johnson's private
assertion to U Thant that he had not known of this peace
feeler. However, on the very same day that the Guardian
reproduced this story, a columnist in The New York Times
added an extra twist to it, pointing out that this version
of Rusk's rejection of the peace feeler ran counter to the
current image that the Administration was seeking to
convey:
"Yet of all the beliefs which the Administration
has sought to inculcate in the minds of the
people, foremost among them is that the
President personally passes on every detail
involved in the conduct of the war In Vietnam.
And the tender from Hanoi which was conveyed to
the Government by Secretary General Thant of the
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United Nations was much larger than a
d.etai 1. "
The columnist continued:
"For the President to be represented as having
been kept in ignorance of such a proposal while
a subordinate made the decision on his own, was
damaging to the 'image' of a President in full
command of Government policy that is verified by
the facts as well as by the Administration's
publicity canon that he must be featured in
every official announcement of acts presumed to
be popular with the people."°°
The Administration's solution to this dilemma was, to
"restore the President to the foreground" in an
alternative version of these events, fed by "anonymous
officials" to United Press International, in which the
President's "'top advisers, particularly Secretary Rusk'"
formulated the reasons why the peace feeler should be
rejected and "' The President agreed, III01 The New York
Times columnist rounded off this article with an account
of the Administration's sensitivity to "published news",
concluding that "secrecy is an undiscriminating passion of
this Administration. "°
There were now two versions of how North Vietnam' s
agreement to meet for peace talks came to be rejected,
neither of which reflected any credit on the
Administration. Indeed the second version, in addition to
further eroding the Administration's credibility, also
undermined President Johnson's personal image, both his
own credibility and his image as a man of peace. Thus the
distinction that had formerly been made in the press,
between President Johnson's manifestly peaceful intentions
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and his advisers' bellicosity, was now being blurred,
thereby limiting what had been a useful Administration
propaganda technique to defuse public criticism.
The debate on this episode continued to widen and
inevitably some observers speculated whether the light
thrown on the Administration's past attitude to
negotiations was not also a reflection of its current
attitude. The Daily Express discussed this aspect in a
dispatch from its Washington correspondent on 19 November,
headlined: "The hottest topic in the White House". The
dispatch began dramatically:
"Is the United States now bent only on
bludgeoning North Vietnam to sue for peace after
inflicting a crushing, humiliating military
defeat?
This is emerging from the fog of Washington's
half-truths this week about the history of
repeated peace overtures from Hanoi over 13
months.
These opening paragraphs shaped and disseminated to
the audience the precise Impression of its policies that
the Administration had taken such pains to avoid creating.
The dispatch then dwelt on the diplomatic results of
Washington's "half-truths":
"I find sincere doubt in the embassies of many
allied and neutral nations that the U.S. will
agree to cease-fire talks short of complete
surrender by North Vietnam, the Vietcong, and
the National Liberation Front of all their
interests and claims south of the 17th parallel.
Over the next six weeks a torrent of
reinforcements will build American forces on the
ground to over 200,000.
Early in 1966 the U.S. will have amassed
250,000 troops in Vietnam."°
And the dispatch quoted a Western embassy ambassador
on the "'alarmingly grim'" mood in Washington, a topic the
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correspondent returned to at the end of the article, where
it was suggested that this "mood of frightening tough
intent" was "perhaps. . . deliberately conjured up" by
Johnson "to convince Hanoi that he means business."°
However, as the correspondent also noted, this mood was
"beginning to alarm America's friends perhaps as much as
its enemies."°
Interestingly this report also mentioned the
ambiguous peace feeler by North Vietnam in May following
the unofficial U.S. bombing pause, explaining that
Washington rejected this offer because it was "'woolly'".
Summing up the climate of opinion on peace moves, the
report stated:
"Usually well-informed sources say that the
White House and the State Department will
eventually have to acknowledge that Washington
has rejected several similar Hanoi feelers while
claiming there were none,"
Although wide of the mark, the correspondent's
expressed belief that Johnson would be forced to negotiate
because of popular criticism over these rejected peace
feelers reflects the controversy stirred up by this
rejection. And as the correspondent also noted, pressure
was mounting on the Administration, including another
peace march in Washington planned for 27 November.ae
Not all press criticism of the Administration treated
this episode as a lost opportunity for peace. In the I.
York Herald Tribune, Joseph Alsop, commenting from his
hawkish standpoint, took the Administration to task for
its public attitude to negotiations. Alsop brushed aside
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North Vietnam's "exceedingly vague" negotiation offer,
made at a time when South Vietnam's resistance "was very
nearly on its last legs" and would have completely
collapsed if the U.S. had negotiated "behind" South
Vietnam's back.
	 Stating that this why Rusk had rejected
the offer, Alsop then attacked the Administration's
propaganda on peace talks:
"But these facts [about rejecting the peace
offer] do not exonerate the administration from
all blame. The administration is to blame, not
for rejecting the Hanoi offer, but simply for
creating the public climate in which so much
nonsense is talked.
Unless very high authorities are also very
good liars, the whole prevailing notion of the
official American attitude toward negotiation
about Vietnam is almost completely false and
misleading. The truth is that the president made
his original offer of 'unconditional'
negotiations, and has since repeated that offer,
for the main purpose of disarming the domestic
and foreign critics of his Vietnamese
policy.
After a brief discussion about the meaning of
'unconditional' talks	 the U.S. would continue to bomb
North Vietnam while negotiating - the columnist returned
to the theme of the Administration's '"misleading" public
stance on peace talks. 1
 Quoting a recent speech by Army
Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson about the "mistake" of
the Korean War negotiations, Alsop concluded:
"The fact remains that Gen. Johnson's speech
is almost the only forthright word that has been
officially said. All sorts of wrong
interpretations of the American attitude have
been accepted without rebuttal, and have even,
on occasion, been sedulously fostered. This, it
must be said, is a dangerous thing to have
done. "1
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Alsop's illuminating analysis, revealing the gulf
between the Administration's private and public views on
peace offers, could not have been helpful to a Government
which was intent on fostering the false impressions that
Alsop both exposed and fulminated against.
Uncertain about whether the Administration was truly
as interested in peace talks as its public rhetoric
claimed, press reports focussed again on the growing scale
of the war and increasing casualties. Some reports
pondered where the war was leading and how it could be
stopped, reporting that South Vietnamese refugees "now
total a million." 13 Supporters of the U.S. effort in
Vietnam such as the aily Telegraph, noted the destruction
caused by a war now "in an intermediate phase of maximum
horror" and then focussed on the difficulties caused by
the Administration's attitude to Information on this
destructive war:
"President JOHNSON keeps his own counsel so
closely that It is hard to guage the substance
of reports that he ignored earlier feelers from
the Vietnam Communists, However that may be, he
should not ignore the existence of a good deal
of doubt abroad about the American conduct of
the war which is essentially a Western
confrontation of China. America's effort
deserves support which need not be uncritical
and cannot be wholehearted unless she takes her
allies more fully into her confidence.
The confusion and concern that could be engendered by
top Administration officials' statements on U.S. war aims
was again demonstrated at the end of November, when
McNamara visited South Vietnam on another fact-finding
mission. Press reports at this time reflected the
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increased North Vietnamese commitment, the rising
intensity of the fighting, and the corresponding rise in
U.S. casualties which were now heavier than the average
weekly losses in the Korean War. 1
 A Times editorial
noted that the war was still expanding, that the U.S. was
"slowly" establishing "an ascendancy", that "political
objectives" still required "clarification" and that:
"Negotiation - not victory - remains the American
objective."' However, although The Times was certain
about American objectives, it was clearly uneasy about a
contradictory statement on U.S. objectives which J'IcNamara
made in Saigon. The Times editorial analysed McNamara's
declaration that it was necessary to "'destroy the
insurgency movement'" to preserve South Vietnam's
independence, and concluded that this meant "total
surrender by the guerillas. . . and victory for the
Americans,"' 7' Fortunately McNamara had also stated at the
same time that the U.S. had no plans to incorporate South
Vietnam into the "'western alliance or to maintain bases
in the country'" and The Times was thus reassured that
U.S. goals in the war - "political definitions" - remained
at a "possible and surely negotiable level."1
However, the 'negotiability' of U.S. war goals was
clearly a proposition that the Administration did not
expect to test in the very near future, for McNamara
returned from his Saigon visit admitting that this would
not, after all, be a short war. A New York Herald Tribune
editorial, stating that the Administration still desired a
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"negotiated settlement.. .honorable to both sides", placed
the blame for the lack of negotiations on the North
Vietnamese and expected that negotiations would begin only
as a result of "more effective and more persuasive
military results than we have achieved so far", namely
further escalation and air strikes that McNainara and the
President were assumed to be preparing. 21S This editorial
firmly supported the Administration's propaganda on the
war and negotiations and thus its opening paragraphs on
the Administration's latest public turnaround were all the
more noteworthy because no criticism was intended:
"Defense Secretary McNamara has returned from
his latest visit to Saigon with word that it's
going to be long war. That contrasts sharply
with his previous estimates that It would be a
short one.
Something has obviously gone awry. Increased
American ground and air intervention in South
Vietnam has prevented the war there from being
lost to the Communists; but air strikes against
North Vietnam have failed in their dual purpose
of driving Ho Chi Minh to the negotiating table
and of halting the flow of his troops
southward,
The Guardian too decided that the war would not soon
end, but It drew this conclusion from McNamara's opti.mIsm
after his Saigon visit, which, on past experience, the
Guardian took to be an Indication of Imminent U.S.
increases in troops and weapons. On 3 December in an
editorial captioned, "The bottomless pit in Vietnam", the
Guardian pointedly recalled the Administration's
optimistic statements on the conflict in 1963 and later -
often after a McNamara visit to South Vietnam -
Juxtaposing past predictions with the current reality:
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"By the end of this month "'the major part of
the United States military task'" in South
Vietnam was due to be "'completed'"; at least,
that is what the White House said on Mr
McNarnara's return from a visit to Saigon in
September 1963, Not long afterwards, he
announced the imminent withdrawal of the first
thousand of the 16,000 American "'advisers'" (as
they were then called). But he has made several
visits since, and the 16,000 have not come home.
Instead they have multiplied tenfold, and are
still no nearer success in their "'military
task. '" Meanwhile, however, the country is being
bombed, burned and blasted to ruins. A million
Vietnamese are homeless, and uncounted thousands
have lost their lives in those two years."
Another of McNaxnara's statements in South Vietnam was
also dissected in this Guardian editorial:
"' I have been surprised by the intensity and
the scale of the attacks by the Vietcong and the
North Vietnamese forces in recent weeks, '" Mr
McNamara said in Saigon. He had no right to be.
The confession is a fresh little piece of
evidence that, as his critics have warned him
all along, he does not seem to understand what
the war is about. If they are right, it is no
wonder that his policies have always gone wrong.
But the longer he persists in them, the harder
it is for those critics (or anybody else) to
suggest alternative policies."22
The editorial delineated precisely the vicious circle
which was now U.S. policy: unable to allow the Vietnamese
to solve their own problems because this would seem "too
much like unconditional surrender. . . and they now seem so
committed that they would rather see Hanoi in ruins first"
and even if the U.S. won "they would still presumably be
imprisoned in the desert they had created", so "how, on
their terms, could they ever leave?"
	
Nevertheless, the
Guardian still hoped, against all its own analysis and
logic, that the Geneva Agreements could be revived and
form the basis for a peaceful settlement. And this was the
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solution that the editorial urged the Prime Minister to
press upon President Johnson during his visit to
Washington in mid-December,
The Sunday Times Washington correspondent also noted
that the Vietnam dilemma facing the Administration was
"now more closely resembling a set of antler-s than just
one pair of horns" and at a time when U.S. public opinion
had just been "badly jolted" by recent U.S. casualties,
although the public still supported the war. 	 The
correspondent listed the issues Johnson was considering,
among which were several propaganda problems which related
as much to external opinion as to U.S. domestic opinion:
• . . How to convince the public that a pause in
the bombing might only grant the enemy a
priceless military advantage. How to head off
pressure from the United States Right-wing to
increase bombing.
How to quiet public fears that the war is
developing a life of its own, overwhelming the
power of human decision among leaders of both
power of human decision among leaders of both
sides.
How to soothe the moral disquiet latent even
among many supporting the war.
How to counter the hypothesis that escalation
lessens rather than heightens chances of
negotiation.
While not attempting to supply answers to these
problems, the article outlined the President's "central
Courses":
". . .the commitment of however many troops seem
needed, continuation of bombing, barring
assurance of abated action on the other side in
exchange for a pause, constant probing for signs
of willingness to negotiate, and preparation of
opinion for a long, hard
Also, according to this article the Administration
was now relying primarily on one main propaganda tenet to
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justify its coininitment in Vietnam: "More and more the
basic Government theme is the assertion that aggression
must always be stopped on its first appearance, that
mistakes of the thirties must not be repeated."	 Thus it
appears that as the war grew more complex, killing more
people, devastating greater areas of South and North
Vietnam and requiring ever more U.S. troops, the
Administration at this point tended to concentrate its
propaganda in a simplistic historical analogy. Although in
general a simple propaganda message, which can be easily
remembered by an audience, is preferable to multiple
messages, which might even be mutually contradictory (as
the Administration's often were), to place such emphasis
on this particular analogy was folly in terms of the
Administration's propaganda effort. For this analogy could
be refuted with any number of arguments, not least the
argument that under the Geneva Agreements Vietnam was one
country divided into two zones, and that far from
repelling external aggression' the United States was
intervening in a civil war.
At this juncture, against this background of press
speculation on the latest Administration policy review;
the expectation of further escalation, engendering press
reports suggesting required U.S. troop numbers ranging
from 300,000 up to 400, 00;	 and rising pressure in the
U.S. for another bombing pause, 23° a remarkable series of
articles by veteran British journalist James Cameron was
published simultaneously in the Evening Standard and Ih.
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New York Times. Cameron became the first western
correspondent allowed to visit North Vietnam for some
years, and he compressed his experiences into five
articles which created a tremendous impact when they were
published. Cameron stayed in Hanoi, then journeyed into
the countryside "'fighting areas'" and finally had an
interview with North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong at which President Ho Clii Minh made a brief
appearance. 31 Two important aspects of Cameron's visit
were that he travelled under his own auspices, and that
while he obviously disagreed with the U.S. involvement in
the conflict, particularly with the bombing of North
Vietnam, he was known to be a journalist who recorded
accurately what he saw and heard. Also he had considerable
experience of reporting South East Asian affairs. Thus
Cameron's articles could not easily be dismissed as the
outpourings of a fellow traveller of the North Vietnamese,
or of a naive and gullible writer with no understanding of
developments - although such a dismissal was attempted by
the American magazine Time. In view of what he wrote and
the ensuing controversy, these were necessary credentials
for Cameron to possess. Indeed, the publication of the
first of Cameron's reports on 7 December 1965 was
accompanied by an Evening Standard disclaimer pointing out
that Cameron had a "deservedly high reputation as a
foreign correspondent. But his views are not necessarily
those of the Evening Standard."
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Cameron's most important conclusions concerned the
North Vietnamese attitude to negotiations and the Geneva
Agreements, the effects of U.S. bombing on North Vietnam,
and North Vietnam's war aims, as delineated by Pham Van
Dong. In addition Cameron also interviewed a North
Vietnamese army officer who liaised with the National
Liberation Front in the South.
In his first article Cameron set out his own view of
the war succinctly:
"What is taking place in Vietnam, both South
and North, is an offence to international
decency, both disgusting and absurd, and one of
its chief wrongs is that it is corrupting both
the assailants and victims alike.
Moving on to negotiations and the Geneva Agreements
Cameron then wrote:
"However, what is quite clear in this lunar
landscape of North Vietnam is that the people
have a totally unshakeable determination to win
the war, on their terms. Not to make an end to
it, or find a way out of it, or 'conclude an
agreement' about it. They have the extraordinary
and rather impressive nerve to insist upon
winning it.
Victory, however, has a strièt definition,
which is the implementation of the Geneva
Agreement of 1954, which requires a Vietnam
united under popular elections, and the
elimination of all foreign troops from both
South and North. To Hanoi, winning the war does
not mean the crushing or destruction of U.S.
forces; it means their departure. This they will
achieve, they say, if it takes forever."2
While acknowledging that the North Vietnamese
attitude to victory was "militarily illogical", Cameron
also noted that "the mood is extremely pervasive.
	
And
he pointed out that for North Vietnam the negotiations
"'were concluded in 1954'" and that now mention of
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negotiations for the North Vietnamese " merely mean some
devious strategein to get the U.S. off the hook, to rescue
her from a cruel and intolerable situation."
On the effects of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam,
Cameron's reports confirmed what the Administration in
fact already knew: that the bombing was affecting neither
North Vietnamese morale, nor its capacity to continue the
war, Cameron also analysed the benefits that had accrued
to the North Vietnamese Government:
"One thing is sure, if the bombing of North
Vietnam is designed to terrorise the people into
submission or to crush their economy into ruin,
its effect on both counts is precisely the
reverse.
So far from terrorising the people, the
bombings have stimulated and consolidated them.
By the nature of the attacks so far, civilian
casualties have not been very great, but they
have been great enough to provide the Government
of the Vietnam Republic with the most totally
unchallengeable propaganda they could ever have
dreamed of. A nation of peasants and manual
workers who might have felt restive or
dissatisfied under the stress of totalitarian
conditions have been obliged to forget their
differences in the common sense of resistance
and self-defence. From the moment the United
States dropped its first bomb on the North of
Vietnam, she welded the nation together
unshakeably. Every bomb since has been a bonus
for Ho Clii Minh.""
The only comfort that the Administration could draw
from this account lay in Cameron's confirmation that North
Vietnamese civilian casualties had been limited, and his
observation elsewhere in the article that he had seen only
one bombed hospital during his visit. Cameron also noted
that North Vietnam's economy could not be wrecked by the
bombing and that the "peasant agrarian society" had been,
and still was, "immensely resilient":
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"Every single industrial enterprise In the
country could be ruined - and it would directly
affect about five per cent of the working
population. Vietnam is not Detroit, nor even
Washington or London. Its people can survive the
inconveniences of destruction, dismay and death.
They have learned how, over 25 years."28
Cameron's final article covered his interview with
North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in which
the latter stated North Vietnam's war aims In simple, and
at the same time, emotive, terms:
"'We're not trying to vanquish the United
States, There seems to be some preposterous
belief, in America that we are threatening them
- a poverty stricken little country like Vietnam
threatening the most powerful nation on earth
We are trying to get rid of them. They're on our
soil, and we don't want them there. Let them go
away and the war is over. '"
Pham Van Dong reiterated these aims and also
emphasised the importance of the Geneva Agreements,
driving home the point with a reference to former British
involvement in the Geneva Conference:
"' I wish you could understand how simple our
demands are. . .We don't want thousands of
American corpses or American prisoners. We want
them to go away. We want the acceptance of the
legal agreement - which remember your Government
not only signed, but initiated. It was a British
Prime Minister who presided over our
independence. '"a
However the reference to British involvement in 1954
was no indication of a desire for similar involvement now,
for on the question of whether "any nation group of
nations" was considered "honest enough to initiate some
sort of conference", Pham Van Dong ruled out any form of
British mediation:
"'If you mean your own EGovernmentj, I am
afraid no. Let me go no further than to say that
the British Government's attitude is now so
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clearly a permanent reflection of Washington's
that it can have no standing as a mediator
whatsoever. Any nation of goodwill that wants to
contribute to a settlement must first condemn
U.S. aggression and respect the Vietnamese
people's inalienable rights. There isn't any
half-way.
Pham Van Dong's statement thus confirmed the fears of
some observers that British support for the U.S. vitiated
its ability to mediate the conflict, despite Britain's
formal duties in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva
Conference. His clear and uncompromising insistence on
returning to the provisions of the Geneva Agreements was
also accompanied by a firmly expressed belief that North
Vietnam would win the war, and the opinion that U.S.
soldiers were "unexpectedly easier to fight" than the
French soldiers during the colonial war, implying that the
difference in fighting quality was due to a lack of desire
to fight this war on the part of the U.S. troops.
	 This
view had also been expressed at greater length and in more
detail in Cameron's earlier article on his interview with
the North Vietnamese Army Liaison officer.
In view of Cameron's own strongly expressed opinions
on the war and what he reported, about North Vietnam's
resolve, its belief that it would win the war, its stance
on negotiations, and the apparently gratuitous insult to
U.S. troops, it was not surprising that these articles
created such an impact. And the nature of the articles
elicited strong reactions from the media, tending either
to support Cameron's conclusions in general, or to detract
from them. The American press was first to react, simply
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because Cameron's articles were published in America a day
or two ahead of publication in Britain.
In a round-up editorial captioned, "Eyewitness in
Hanoi", Cameron's co-publisher, The New York Times, stated
that Cameron's reports explained the failure of the
bombing programme to achieve its aims of reducing North
Vietnamese aid to the Vietcong and forcing North Vietnam
to negotiate.	 The editorial also pointed out that the
effect of the bombing in welding North Vietnam together
was what had happened in Britain during the Second World
War,	 The issue on which The New York Times dissented
from Cameron's presentation was that of achieving a
settlement. Although North Vietnam's position was quite
clear, The New York Times was puzzled firstly by North
Vietnam's equating winning the war with a return to the
Geneva Agreements and withdrawal of U.S. troops, and
secondly by its continued rejection of U.S. offers to
negotiate an end to the war. For as The New York Times
pointed out, Johnson had already agreed to return to the
Geneva Accords and withdraw U.S. troops, yet the North
Vietnamese called "'unconditional negotiations'" a
"trick". The only partial solution that the editorial
could provide to this conundrum was to suggest that
another bombing pause might help to achieve negotiations,
whereas escalation would "only prolong the war."
In fact, as Cameron's articles showed, North
Vietnam's position was entirely consistent with the Geneva
Agreements and therefore its attitude to the offer of
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further negotiations was logical as well as strictly
correct. It was the Administration's interpretation of the
Geneva Agreements which was distorted, encompassing its
goal of an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam - and
it was equally logical in these circumstances for the
Administration to desire further negotiations which would
effectively annul the 1954 Accords. North Vietnam realised
this, but The New York Times apparently thought that the
Administration's interpretation of the Geneva Agreements
was correct, and also that it did not differ from North
Vietnam' s interpretation.
However, while The New York Times generally agreed
with Cameron's analysis, the Evening Standard's round-up
editorial displayed more scepticism. For, while noting
that for the Administration Cameron's reports "cannot be
encouraging", the editorial then suggested that North
Vietnam's view that the U.S. would "eventually" leave was
based on a mistaken overestimation of public opposition to
the war, arid an underestimation of the U.S. commitment to
South Vietnam and the possiblity of increasing that
commitment. 2.47
An E1ning Standard. correspondent, writing from New
York, reported the split reactions of the popular U.S.
news magazines Newsweek and Time. Both devoted
considerable space to Cameron's articles, but whereas
Newsweek agreed with his conclusions and his description
of the war as an "offence to international decency",
Time's diatribe described Cameron as a "'conduit for North
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Vietnamese propaganda'" and his articles as "'full of
personal prejudices - all anti-United States and
pro-Hanoi.'"	 Undoubtedly Cameron had relayed North
Vietnamese propaganda from his inteviews with North
Vietnamese figures, just as all journalists relayed U.S.
propaganda from Administration officials' press
conferences and briefings, But the point was that this was
the first time for some years that any Western journalist
had been able to talk to such high-ranking North
Vietnamese officials and Cameron had reported his
conversations in a straightforward manner with no added
personal comments. In fact this unembellished account
should have been far more useful to U.S. officials,
particularly intelligence specialists and propagandists.
Cameron then appeared on U.S. television with other
correspondents in a CBS programme which was devoted to
taking stock of the end-of -year situation in Vietnam. The
Evening Standard's report focussed on Cameron's part in
the programme, devoted to answering-questions about his
trip to North Vietnam, in which Cameron commented that he
did not think that the North Vietnamese would now regard
the halting of the bombing as sufficient to enable
negotiations to start, nd reiterated his observations
about their confidence that they would win the war.9
In Britain the South Vietnamese Embassy also entered
the affray and dispatched a letter to the Evening
Standard, "so that your readers may have the opportunity
to form an unbiased opinion of the events. . . in
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Vietnam."	 The Embassy's letter was published on 21
December and it reproduced the standard South
Vietnamese/U.S. line on North Vietnamese "infiltration and
subversive aggression", distorted the International
Control Commission's report of 1962 by quoting only one
part of it, and presented a biased view of events
immediately after the Geneva Conference.1
Unfortunately for the Administration, the argument
over Cameron's articles was not the only controversy at
this time. On 17 December, after a report in a U.S.
newspaper that the U.S. had rejected another peace move,
the State Department announced that a peace feeler was
currently being explored by Amintore Fanfani, President of
the UN General Assembly, and released the texts of letters
on this matter between Fanfani and Secretary of State
Rusk, dated 20 November and 4 December respectively.
Rusk's letter by no means enthused over Fanfani's message
on North Vietnam's terms to begin negotiations, but he
suggested that Fanfani's sources might contact Hanoi again
and Fanfani himself could discuss the issues further with
UN Ambassador Goldberg. 	 At the same time the State
Department was reported to have "expressed scepticism
about the sincerity of a communist peace feeler" and White
House Press Secretary Bill Moyers supplied the now
standard official comment that there were no indications
that North Vietnam was ready for unconditional
discussions,
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On 18 December Hanoi denied having made any peace
move, and the recriminations began. The New York Times
reported that some UN diplomats, including some from
friendly countries, blamed the U.S. for Hanoi's denial
because since Hanoi's original peace feeler in November
the U.S. had escalated the war and bombed a power station
in the Haiphong area on 15 December. 	 Also the U.S. was
criticised for publishing the letters on Hanoi's peace
feeler, which, it was pointed out, would probably place
Hanoi in a difficult position vis-a-vis China. 	 The
Guardian published two reports on this issue, as well the
texts of the Fanfani-Rusk letters and Hanoi's denial. The
shorter of these reports noted that the effect of the
publicity would "put the whole matter into temporary cold
storage"; that Ruslc's reply to Fanfani "Indicated that
Washington was less than enthusiastic about the prospects
for peace which the latest approach opened up"; and that
U.S. officials doubted that Hanoi would have used two
"untested contacts" such as the visiting Italian
professors to convey a serious peace offer. G Another
considerably longer Guardian report delved into the
complex details of this affair, and concluded that now "an
even larger number" of UN diplomats questioned "the good
faith of the US in seeking negotiations." 	 This
conclusion was based on the belief held at the UN that the
peace feeler from Hanoi was genuine and that President
Johnson knew that "a bombing of Hanoi or Haiphong would
automatically close the door to this approach.' 12s8 The
report then continued:
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"Nevertheless, only hours after the
unenthusiastic and ambiguous reply of Mr Dean
Rusk, the US Secretary of State, had been
delivered to Hanoi, the bombing of an
electricity power station only 15 mIles from
Haiphong was authorised. It is generally
believed here [at the UN], especially by people
closely involved in the recent exchanges, that
it is this bombing rather than the publication
of the story of the Hanoi approach which has
prompted Hanoi's bitter denials of peace
feelers. I2B
The damage to the Administration's image was further
compounded in this report by the additional information
that this latest debacle had prompted UN diplomats to
recall previous peace feelers that had been brushed off by
the Administration - which the report covered in some
detail. 2 ° But not all reports castigated the
Administration. For instance a Times report took a more
favourable view of the Administration's actions in this
affair as its headline demonstrated: "U.S. Doubts Hanoi's
Good Faith In Search For Peace".1
However the fact remained that soon after the
November revelations of rejected peace feelers, the
Administration had once more become embroiled in arguments
on the very important issue of negotiations, and had acted
in a manner which required an evaluation and judgement of
its stance on this Issue. And to some observers and
diplomats its actions again cast doubt on, and undermined)
its credibility.
Press reporting during the remainder of December
focussed on the forthcoming Christmas cease-fire, which
was first mooted as a 12-hour truce by the Vietcong,
reported on 8 December and finally agreed to by the
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Administration on 22 December and extended to 30 hours for
U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. President Johnson was
also reported to have finally ruled out the bombing of
Hanoi and Haiphong, in which decision The Times detected
Prime Minister Harold Wilson's influence:
"The United States has depended heavily upon
British moral support for its war in Vietnam,
and the Prime Minister's refusal to condone the
bombing of North Vietnam cities must have
strengthened the President's revulsion from
advice to reduce North Vietnam to the stone
age.
The Christmas cease-fire pressure was welcomed in
the press, but pressure was also mounting for another
bombing pause and on this issue some observers displayed
considerable scepticism on the reasons for a possible
pause:
"There are many reasons for the pressure C for
a pause], but it is likely to be effective only
because of President Johnson's concern for his
negotiating position. If he is persuaded that a
pause is necessary to regain international faith
in his protestations of peace, the bombing could
stop perhaps for about a month."
All bombing was halted for the period of the
temporary truce, but after ground and air action had
resumed in South Vietnam, bombing strikes on North Vietnam
were still suspended. The Administration initially refused
to confirm that this suspension of attacks was in fact a
deliberate bombing pause and was criticised again for its
secrecy on its Vietnam policies. The Times tartly
observed:
"A lesson could at least be learnt from the
pause in May, which was not announced and was
over before most people knew that it had begun.
If President Johnson does have a decent respect
for the opinions of mankind, it should require
him to declare the causes of his present action.
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At least he could persuade much of the world,
to use his own words, that he is looking for
peace and is not just merely available for it.
The belief here is that little would be lost
militarily even should Hanoi choose to continue
the fight."
The overall atmosphere was gloomy, with some
corrspondents predicting that the bombing suspension would
not last much longer, while others declined even to hazard
a guess.	 U.S. officials maintained a strict silence or
preferred not to comment, although a "well-informed
official American source" did tell the Guardian's
Washington correspondent that "no single initiative for
peace has come from Hanoi in the past five years." 	 This
unnamed official then stated that Hanoi's third point of
its Four Points - relating to settling South Vietnam's
affairs on the basis of the NLF's programme - was the
cause of this war and unacceptable to the American
people. 2	This exposition prompted the Guardian
correspondent to point out a vital distinction - or
sleight-of-hand - which the Administration skated over in
its propaganda:
"In this presentation of their case, however,
these official US sources appear to blur the
picture by inviting us to confuse the North
Vietnamese negotiating position - the demand
contained In their four points - with their
readiness or otherwise to take part in
negotations. Hanoi's conditions for coming to a
negotiation have been confusing. US officials do
not claim to know them with any certainty.
Hanoi's reported private assurances have looked
more favourable than their public
statements.
In fact Hanoi's actions regarding negotiations were
the complete opposite of the Administration's, for the
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latter publicly welcomed negotiations but its private
messages were often much less favourable.
As part of their propaganda effort the
Administration now published a list of 14 points,
representing a compilation of various previous statements
of its position on peace and negotiations. 	 Despite the
Administration's clear effort to improve its image, this
did not lead U.S. officials to welcome the Vietcong's
offer of a Tet holiday truce: the Guardiai noted that the
offer was received with "extreme coldness".29'0
On 29 December the confusion cleared slightly. Ih
New York Times reported that "Administration sources" (the
President and his staff were maintaining silence in Texas)
had "revealed" that the U.S. had indicated to Hanoi that
the bombing pause was in fact a peace feeler, an
opportunity for Hanoi to "show its interest in
negotiations". 71 The following day speculation increased
that the Administration was undertaking another peace
offensive, as correspondents noted the sudden arrival of
U.S. Ambassadors Harriman and Goldberg in Warsaw and Rome
respectively (Goldberg saw the Pope), and that Harriman
was travelling with a large party including specialist
advisers. Vice-President Humphrey was scheduled to tour
Asian capitals, visits which could be used as part of this
diplomatic campaign. The forthcoming visit to Hanoi by a
top-Soviet official, Aleksandr Shelepin, was also the
subject of both Washington officials' and press attention,
and was mixed into press speculation on possible peace
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xnoves,
	
Even at this early stage, when the
Administration still refused to confirm that this was
another peace initiative, President Johnson was firmly
Identified with these diplomatic moves and with any
ulterior motives and. future consequences:
"The entire venture bears the unmistakable
stamp of Johnsonian diplomacy. The President is
determined that his efforts to "'explore every
possibility'" will not go unnoticed.
Should these efforts come to nothing, and
should the President decide to increase the
tempo of the war, he will want to be able to
claim that he tried everything that could be
tried but could not bring the North Vietnamese
to negotiate.
Other press reports too noted the Administration's
need to reassure world opinion that all avenues to peace
had been explored before escalating the war, and this
requirement caused the	 4i	 to ponder whether the
entire "dramatic operation" was not in response to any
move from Hanoi, and rather than aiming for negotiations
was primarily devoted to achieving a "better image for the
United States" .
On 31 December press reports quoted the statement by
White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers that the current
diplomatic activity was Indeed a peace initiative,
designed to "state and restate, to affirm and reaffirm, to
clarify and reclarify our position on Vietnam as
articulated In the President's Baltimore speech in
AprIl." 7 However Moyers refused to connect the
diplomatic moves with the bombing pause - on the grounds
that he didn't want to "unjustifiably" raise hopes.S
From these reports it was also clear that the scope of the
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diplomatic moves had widened, in terms of personnel -
NcGeorge Bundy had already been dispatched to Ottawa and
other envoys were to be sent - and that it was being
conducted both publicly and secretly. In addition it was
reported that President Johnson briefed leaders who had
recently visited Washintgon, including Prime Minister
Wilson. The Guardian's Washington correspondent had been
concerned to discover the genesis of these peace moves,
whether they were a response or simply a U.S. initiative
"for political reasons of their own", and reported a
somewhat vague explanation:
"My understanding is that the truth lies about
half way between these alternatives - that some
information was received in Washingon [sic] -
probably on Monday evening - which fell far
short of a formal suggestion by Hanoi that the
two sides should explore the basis for
negotiations, but which did, nevertheless,
appear to the Administration here to hold out
sufficient hope to make Mr Harriman's mission
and the other steps worthwhile.27
Up to a point the Guardian explanation was correct,
but the version of events gleaned and disseminated by the
correspondent was more simplified and concrete than the
reality. According to William Bundy the Hungarians had
made what he termed "funny approaches" to the
Administration earlier in December, which he states the
Administration did not believe were authorised; then
Secretary of State Rusk had later seen Hungarian charge
d'Affaires Radvanyi and pointed to the bombing pause; then
the President decided to order a full-scale pause and
accompanying diplomatic offensive.
	 This version is
basically corroborated by Radvanyi's own account -
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although he sets the approaches at an earlier date - and
the "funny approaches" Bundy mentioned was a message from
Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter to the effect that
"a few weeks' pause in the bombing would bring about
negotiations"; and when Rusk later saw Radvanyl he
delivered a message on the pause to be sent to Peter.279
It seems that Peter's original proposal, coupled with
a suggestion from Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that a
bombing pause should be tried and the USSR would endeavour
to help - hence the interest in Shelepin's visit to Hanoi
- apparently persuaded Rusk and possibly the President
that a bombing pause would be useful,° And if this
bombing pause was to be official then it was to be
accompanied by diplomatic moves, although previous
scenarios had not envisaged such a noisy and high-profile
campaign as the current operation was already becoming.
This episode well illustrates the tortuous channels
and shadowy nature of many of the •peace feelers during the
war. And the Administration was correct in its original
assumption that the Hungarian approaches were
unauthorised: Radvanyi states that not only were they
unauthorised by Hanoi, but Peter had "acted against their
wishes", for Hanoi had expressly told Peter that this was
not the time for negotiations.292
Another point about the diplomatic offensive which
the Guardian mentioned was that the sudden decision to
launch this initiative had provoked "a certain amount of
criticism here that so little preparation was undertaken
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that the success of the whole exercise may have been
seriously .leopardised. 	 Indeed the whole exercise
already engendered differing press reactions arid whereas
the Financial Times discerned hope in the "mere fact that
someone is now talking", a Guardian editorial took a
longer perspective, noting that there was "little evidence
yet that anyone of them [the concerned parties] has
abandoned enough of its preconceptions to make a
compromise like1y."	 And this editorial further pointed
out that where in previous years "peace makers. . . could
concentrate on getting the United States "'off the hook'",
now "President Johnson has committed his country's
reputation utterly; being unhooked would now mean being
defeated, and that, to most Americans, is as unthinkable
as ever,"	 In the light of the Pentagon Papers and
subsequent escalation, the Guardian's editorial was a more
accurate reading of events.
D.) British Government Reaction and Opinion
During the period from August to December 1965, the
British Government continued its policy of publicly
supporting U.S. actions in Vietnam, while calling for a
peaceful settlement of the conflict. However by
mid-December it had become apparent that the British
Government's policy was in fact vitiating its own ability
to promote a settlement. For in supporting the U.S. so
firmly, in the hope of wielding some sort of influence on
U.S. policy, the British Government had rendered itself
unacceptable to North Vietnam.
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To the North Vietnamese, by December 1965 the
British Government was too closely aligned to the U.S. to
be able to act as a mediator.	 In diplomatic terms this
meant that the British Government could act neither
formally, in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva
Conference, nor informally as one of the many nations
which desired an end to the hostilities, with any hope of
success. Also, according to North Vietnamese Prime
Ninister Pham Van Dong, speaking in December 1965, any
country desiring to mediate would first have to denounce
U.S. aggression. 2	But, the British Government's policy
was based on the assumption that public criticism - let
alone denunciation - of U.S. actions would immediately
diminish any influence that it could exert on U.S. policy,
an eventuality it desired to avoid. There seemed little
chance therefore that the British Government would ever be
be in a position to satisfy the North Vietnamese
requirement, and certainly no chance that it would do so
simply in order to be able to act as a mediator.
However, despite the desire not to criticise and thus
offend the Administration, the Government's support for
U.S. policy was not unlimited. The limit which the British
Government set was that Hanoi and Haiphong should not be
bombed; and if they were bombed then the Government would
be forced to dissociate from this action. When Prime
Ninister Harold Wilson visited Washington in mid-December
the Administration was reminded again of both the limit
and the consequence of overstepping
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The limitations that the Government's policy imposed
on its mediation capability had the propensity to create
more problems for the Government. For one of the ways that
the Government had previously combatted domestic criticism
of its policy - frequently from within the Labour Party
ranks - was to propose, and sometimes undertake, peace
initiatives to achieve negotiations. If, therefore, the
Government's capacity to credibly undertake such
initiatives had been impaired because of-. its policy of
support for the U. S. , then not only would the Government
have lost a weapon to combat criticism, but those groups
who opposed the Government would actually have acquired
another weapon to use against it. For it could now
reasonably be said that as long as the British Government
supported the U.S. , the Government would never be able to
help negotiate the settlement it publicly called for,
For most of this period, the saving grace for the
British Government, as for the Administration, was that so
often the North Vietnamese Government publicly rejected
negotiation proposals. And until the revelations about the
Rangoon peace initiative, followed soon after by the
Fanfani debacle, the circumstances surrounding North
Vietnam's rejections mattered little: it was the rejection
that counted. So while the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
(and Chinese) were perceived to oppose negotiations, the
fact that the British Government was in the process of
rendering itself unable to mediate the conflict was
obscured. And thus in these circumstances British support
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for U.S. policy was even endorsed in a Guardian editorial
at the end of September. Commenting on Stewart and
Wilson's speeches at the Labour Party conference at
Blackpool, this editorial stated:
"But if the war is to end by negotiation, rather
than by unilateral action, then Mr Stewart and
Mr Wilson were right in arguing at the Labour
Party conference yesterday that it is the
Communist leaders who are at present holding the
door closed.
For the British Government, therefore, there
is little point in sacrificing, to the delusive
prospect of mediation, more promising means of
influencing the situation. If mediation becomes
possible, many channels are open; Mr Wilson
listed some of the attempts that have already
been made and that could be revived. But a
Downing Street denunciation of United States
policy would not suddenly make the North
Vietnamese Government or the National Liberation
Front ready for negotiation; what it would do
would be to cut Mr Wilson's line to Washington.
And that would end the only possibility he has
of mitigating the horror of the present
crisis.
Also in September the British Government's policy on
Vietnam was forced into the background by developments in
Rhodesia, which had been simmering for some time and now
assumed the proportions of a crisis as a Rhodesian
Unilateral Declaration of Independence loomed on the
horizon. Domestic and press attention not unnaturally
focussed on this crisis, which was a serious and
protracted one for the Government. And to the extent that
domestic attention was focussed on Rhodesia, the
Government had a slightly easier time over Vietnam.
Nevertheless Vietnam continued to occupy a certain
amount of the Government's attention and it continued to
render what assistance it could to the Administration. For
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instance in late August the Government published a White
Paper detailing rejected peace initiatives, and in
mid-December it published a Blue Book setting out the
Government's involvement in Indochina from 1945-1965.290
The Prime Minister's visit to Washington was only
brief, lasting two days, during which he addressed the
United Nations on the Rhodesia crisis. But in addition to
discussing Rhodesia and other topical problems with the
President, according to the Prime Minister, "Vietnam was
high on our agenda", 1 Vietnam was also still high on the
Parliamentary Labour Party's agenda, and the Prime
Minister was reminded sharply of this when he arrived in
Washington, for he received a telegram from 68 Labour MPs
demanding that he tell the President to stop the bombing
of North Vietnam.	 This action had been sparked off by
reports that the U.S. bad bombed a power station only 14
or 15 miles from Haiphong. And as Wilson noted in his
memoirs, the telegram was signed by Labour ?'IPs across the
party spectrum, not just left-wing MPs.2	 About his talks
with Johnson on the Vietnam conflict, Wilson wrote:
"I pressed the President hard, as I had in a
number of Downing Street-White House exchanges,
at least to suspend the bombing to test the
sincerity of North Vietnamese hints that there
might be a response on their side, possibly
leading to negotiations. It was clear that his
mind was not closed to this, and we discussed
the modalities. At the same time I repeated that
if US aircraft were to bomb Hanoi or Haiphong we
should be forced to dissociate from that action.
It was right that there should be no
misunderstanding or subsequent recriminations
between us."
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The visit generated some useful press comment for the
Prime Minister, not least that he was credited by Ih
Times with having helped to persuade Johnson to refrain
from bombing Hanoi and Haiphong and also to declare a
Christmas truce.	 With these factors in mind and given
that the British Government was publicly so concerned that
the conflict should be settled by negotiations and that
Wilson had urged Johnson to try a bombing pause, it would
be logical to assume that the late December U.S.
diplomatic offensive would be enthusiastically supported
by the Government. Thus the Guardian reported that the
British and U.S. governments had been in "close touch over
the situation in Vietnam and over moves to secure a truce
to bring peace negotiations." 9 It also transpired that
the British Government had been informed beforehand about
the Harriman and Goldberg visits and there was "close
Anglo-American consultation over the attitude of the
Soviet Union and over the special role of Mr Shelepin."9
This all sounded encouraging so far, enhancing the
Government's standing. However, the report then went on to
discuss Whitehall's reactions and a somewhat different
picture emerged. Whitehall was said to understand that the
main purpose of the U.S. diplomatic missions was to
clarify U.S. policy to Communist countries; that it was
"too early to judge whether the chances of peace
negotiations over the Vietnam conflict are improving"; and
that "there was a somewhat sceptical feeling" because
firstly North Vietnam was still not prepared to modify its
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attitude on U.S. troop withdrawal, secondly North Vietnam
was following ",own inclinations" and not China's in
fighting the war, and thirdly the motives of the Soviet
Union in the conflict were still an unknown quantity.
Although these judgements may have been soundly
based, this was hardly the time to air such views,
considering the current delicate diplomatic situation, the
fact that the British and U.S. governments were currently
consulting on the Soviet role, and that Britain
periodically addressed negotiation proposals to the Soviet
Union as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. And airing
these views publicly was no help to the British
Government, for while the Government urged negotations and
pressed the U.S. President to halt the bombing in an
effort to ascertain whether Hanoi was interested, the
Government's own officials prejudged the outcome and
publicly poured cold water on the putative diplomatic
moves, as well as disparaging the Soviet Union, which was
still generally thought to possess some influence over
Hanoi. Whitehall's views in this case would be useful to
Pentagon hawks and the U.S. Administration - when it was
not engaged in a peace offensive - but they were a
liability to a British Government which was endeavouring
to support the U.S. without angering its critics too much.
As before, the U.S. Embassy in London continued to
brief the Administration on sentiment about the war in
Britain and in so doing the Embassy highlighted an
important feature relating to the timing of meetings
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between the Prime Minister and the President and war
developments. At the time of Wilson's visit to Washington
a joint State/USIS telegram informed the Administration
that there was currently strong criticism of U.S. policy
in Vietnam, and by extension British Government support
for that policy, and advanced a number of reasons for the
current criticism:
"A. Underlying fear of many Brits that VN
[Vietnam] may lead to Third world war. This fear
nurished [sic] by war's continued growth. It has
been whipped up recently by apprehension that
furhter [sic] and irreversible escalation
imminent.
B. Belief that as PM [Prime Minister] sees
President Johnson with war on threshold
escalation it Is high time for vigorous
expressions criticism US policy in order to
influence it.
The Embassy also noted the "persistence of relatively
small but well-organized and vociferous group left-wingers
and pacifists who adept at exacerbating these fears and
frustrations", and the "prediliction of press" to "play on
"popular fear themes. . . for all they are worth (in
sales)."° The Embassy concluded Its analysis:
"4. In sum, fear, frustration and
anti-Americanism are continuing, although not
dominant factors which press and pacifists can
quickly whip up whenever VN war escalates and/or
PX sees PresIdent."°1
Clearly the Embassy thought that the British press
wrote about Vietnam mainly to increase sales figures.
However the content and tone of most press articles
indicates that those sections of the press which feared
the consequences of the war, and highlighted its horrors,
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did so for moral arid political reasons, not for commercial
advantage.
E.) British Public Opinion
In the period from August to December, as compared
with February to July, neither of the two main polling
organisations recorded much data on British public opinion
concerning the Vietnam war. Thus while a general trend can
be observed, it is much more difficult in this period to
assess whether public opinion was affected by specific
U.S. actions, either military or diplomatic.
In August Gallup Poll0 asked its standard question
about approval or disapproval of recent U.S. armed action
in Vietnam and recorded that 27% approved; 38%
disapproved; and 35% didn't know. Compared with July, this
was a 7% drop in approval, a 4% drop in dispproval, and an
11% rise in the number of don't knows. This appeared to
indicate that the public was either confused and/or
indifferent to the war. If the public was confused then
this might have been caused by the President's July
speech, increasing the numbers of troops to be sent to
Vietnam, but at the same time calling for negotiations.
National Opinion Polls' only reference to Vietnam in its
August poll, was a passing remark that the economy was of
'more long-term to concern" to the Government than a
"possible left-wing revolt aver Vietnam or immigration
policy" .
In September Gallup Poll questioned its respondents
on four issues, but omitted its standard question. Instead
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respondents were asked whether they would approve or
disapprove if the British Government sent British troops
to fight with the South Vietnamese. A large majority, 69%,
disapproved; 17% approved; and 14% did not know. Obviously
a large majority declined any share of active involvment
in the conflict, but in some ways this was a curious
question to ask. Given that many of Gallup Poll's
questions focussed on U.S. actions and involvement in
Vietnam, it would have been more logical to ask whether
British troops should fight alongside South Vietnamese
and/or U.S. troops. The fact that the U.S. was Britain's
ally in two World Wars and was still seen as a close ally,
might possibly have affected the poll results.
Gallup Poll also ascertained the public's views on
who was to blame for the lack of negotiations: the
Communists, 21%; the Vietcong, 8%; the Chinese, 8%; the
North Vietnamese, 7%; the Americans, 13%; the South
Vietnamese, 1%; others, 1%; and 44% did not know.
Unfortunately this is not a particularly useful set of
figures. Firstly the category of "Communists" was too
amorphous - there was no indication of which countries or
groups either Gallup Poll or its respondents considered to
be "communist". Secondly, whichever countries or groups
were judged to be communist, Gallup Poll implicitly
excluded the Vietcong, the Chinese and the North
Vietnamese from this category by citing them separately,
although they were most certainly communist. Had these
countries been specifically identified as communist, or
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evr had the "Communists" category been differentiated,
then the poll results might have been different, and they
would in any case have had more meaning. The anomaly was
pointed up by the fact that in another question Gallup
Poll produced a category "Communists (Viet-Cong)". In
addition the figures that Gallup Poll produced added up to
103%, instead of 100%, which would make future comparisons
with this set of figures even more difficult. With these
limitations in mind, the poll indicated that the
"Communists" were judged the major culprits for the lack
of negotiations, but that compared with the Vietcong,
Chinese and North Vietnamese individually, the U.S. was
clearly thought more culpable. The large percentage of
don't knows could have indicated confusion, indifference,
or ignorance, or a combination of all three.
On the issue of which side was winning the war, the
South Vietnamese Government or the "Communists
(Viet-Cong)", 43% judged that neither side was winning,
which was a 4% increase over the June percentage; 17%
thought that the "Communists (Viet-Cong)" were winning,
registering a 2% drop compared with June; 11% thought that
the "South Vietnamese Government and supporters" were
winning, registering a 2% increase from June; and 29%
didn't know, registering a 4% drop from June. Thus the
belief that neither side was winning was now held by a
little under 50% of respondents. However of the 28% of
respondents who judged that one side or the other was
winning, a greater proportion judged the Communists to be
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ahead. These two sets of figures seemed to indicate that
U.S. military technology was not thought to render the
U.S. invincible. And it seems that optimistic
Administration statements, echoed in some British
newspapers, that the tide was turning in the war in favour
of the U.S. and South Vietnamese, had either not yet been
digested by the public, or were discounted.
Gallup Poll's last question in September asked
whether the Americans would or would not be be justified
in using nuclear weapons if they could not make any
progress in the war without using them. A vast majority of
respondents, 81% thought they would not be justfied in
using them; 7% thought they would be justified; and 12%
didn't know. Perhaps the surprising figures are that 7% of
respondents either supported the Americans so strongly, or
opposed the other side so bitterly ("Communists
(Viet-Cong), and/or North Vietnamese, Chinese?) that
nuclear weapons were perceived to be justfiable; and that
12% of respondents either had no opinion or were
indifferent.
In answer to a question about the British
Government's policy in Vietnam, National Opinion Polls
recorded in September that 49% of respondents "neither
approve or disapprove" of the Government's policy and NOP
stated that this confirmed its earlier findings that "a
large section of the electorate is not much concerned
about Vietnam." Of those who did express an opinion, 33%
approved of the Government's policy, while 18%
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disapproved. NOP further recorded that a majority of those
who disapproved wanted the Government to "play a more
neutral role". Because NOP's figures were then broken down
on a party political basis, it was apparent that this was
a majority across the Conservative, Labour, Liberal
political spectrum, although the Labour voters registered
the highest percentage in favour of a more neutral role.
Gallup Poll returned to the issue of Vietnam in
December with its standard question on recent U.S. armed
action. Comparing the figures with August°, this poll
registered the same 27% approval; a 1% drop in
disapproval, now registering 37%; and a 1% rise in the
number of don't knows to a figure of 36%. There was thus
virtually no change in opinion since August, with just
over a third of respondents disapproving of U.S. armed
action and much the same proportion having no opinion. It
seems therefore that the U.S. build-up and escalation in
fighting had not had much effect on public opinion since
August. But on the other hand the fieldwork for this poii
was completed between 25-30 November 1965, that is, before
the U.S. bombed a power station close to Haiphong, which
was a more spectacular act of escalation than in the
preceding months. However, on the question of which side
was winning the war, there was a considerable change from
the August period: 36% thought neither side was winning,
registering a 7% drop; 10% now thought the
"Comxnunists(Viet-Cong)" were winning, which was 7% drop;
14% thought the South Vietnamese Government and supporters
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were winning, registering a 3% increase; but the number of
don't knows had increased to 40% from 29% in August. The
considerable fluctuation in the latter figure could well
have been due to the confusing nature of the war. Also a
steady trend seemed to be emerging indicating that of that
small proportion of respondents who judged that one or the
other side was winning, the South Vietnamese and
supporters were believed to be slowly gaining ground -
probably due to the huge U.S. buildup, while the drop in
the percentage of respondents believing that the
Communists were winning could well have been due to the
same factor.
In December National Opinion Poll varied its
September question "fractionally" and apparently recorded
an important change in opinion. Respondents were asked
whether they approved or disapproved of the "British
Government's support for American policy in Vietnam",
which in fact was a much more specific, even 'loaded'
question than September's more general formulation. In
answer, 36% approved - a 3% increase; 33% disapproved - a
12% increase; and 31% didn't know - an 18% decrease. As
NOP noted, there was a striking decrease in the number of
don't knows and a corresponding increase in the percentage
of respondents disapproving. The breakdown in party
political affiliation revealed the same results. And when
NOP polled disapprovers on its supplementary question on
whether the Government should play a more neutral role or
give the Americans more support, a decisive majority, 26%
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(79% of the original 33%), wanted the Government to play a
more neutral role and once again this figure held true
for all three political parties. From these figure NOP
concluded that: "There is no doubt that public hostility
to the war in Vietnam has increased significantly during
the last 3 months." But the September and December
questions were considerably different, not merely
"fractionally different", as NOP stated, and this could
have affected the poll results. NOP's more general
question on the British Government's policy did not
highlight any particular aspect of this policy, and
therefore respondents could as easily recall the
Government's commitment to a peaceful settlement and peace
initiatives, as the other side of this policy - support
for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. On the other hand
December's question was directed specifically to the
Government's support for U.S. policy. Therefore it could
be possible that at this stage NOP's December po11 may
have tapped an anti-American sentiment, as well as an
anti-war sentiment. Because the same questions were not
asked each time and because of the specfic variation it is
difficult to attribute the increase in disapproval to one
factor alone.
During the period from August to December, the
"vociferous group of left-wingers and pacifists" as the
U.S. Embassy in London termed them, continued their
activities. Lord Brockway, chairman of the British Council
for Peace in Vietnam visited Moscow in August and had
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talks with the North Vietnamese Ambassador there. The
North Vietnamese objected to Brockway's publicised. version
of the talks and the peace initiative failed, as it was
probably bound to do, but the visit did underline the
concern felt by some sections of the British public about
Vietnam.
There were also two demonstrations against the war,
the first in October and the second in November, which
attracted considerable press attention. Both of these
demonstrations were timed to coincide with U.S. 'parent'
demonstrations (although the latter were much bigger).
There were two days of non-stop protests organised over
the weekend of 16-17 October, including a march to
Grosvenor Square by 1,500 demonstrators where a letter of
protest signed by the British Council for Peace in Vietnam
was handed over to the U.S. Embassy, a protest rally at
Trafalgar Square attended by the American singer and
activist Joan Baez, and also a protest concert at the
Royal Festival Hall. The demonstrations were promptly
covered by the press - the Sunday Telegraph on 17 October
reported on them - which noted the 78 arrests and the
organising committees, the British Council for Peace in
Vietnam, CND and the Committee of 100.°
The second of these large protests took place during
a week that had been designated International Vietnam
Week, which was to culminate in demonstrations in Britain
and the U.S. an the weekend of 27-28 November. The marches
and demonstrations were well covered in the Sunday
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newspapers. The Sunday Telegraph reported the protest by
several thousand young people in London and similar
protests in Liverpool and Manchester, while the Sunday
Times and the Observer covered the torchlight march in
London.	 The Times report on 29 November focussed on the
11 arrests that took place in Manchester.°7
In addition, as noted in section D above, when U.S.
military escalation appeared imminent, Labour Party MPs
still exerted pressure on the Government, this time on the
occasion of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.
As discussed previously, during this period from
August to December much of the Government, Parliament and
press attention was focussed on Rhodesia. Even so the
Vietnam conflict was still an important issue, but once
the immediate crisis over Rhodesia had passed then it
could be expected that Vietnam would again be a major
focus of attention, Involving the same close scrutiny of
developments by all concerned.
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CHAPTER 6
CROSSING THE RUBICON: JAN1JARY-JULY 1966
By December 1965, after 10 months of almost
continuous bombing of North Vietnam, large increases in
the U.S. troop commitment, and steady escalation of the
intensity of the fighting, the Administration was still no
nearer to achieving its war objectives. On 3 December the
Central Intelligence Agency had analysed the results of
U.S. actions to date and predicted North Vietnam's future
response to the continuing war:
"'Present Communist policy is to continue to
prosecute the war vigorously in the south.
The Communists recognize that the U.S.
reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination
to avoid defeat. They expect more U.S. troops
and probably anticipate that targets in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area will come under air attack.
Nevertheless, they remain unwilling to damp down
the conflict or move toward negotiation. They
expect a long war, but they continue to believe
that time is their ally and that their own
staying power is superior.
Thus the Administration was left in no doubt by at
least one of its sources of information and intelligence,
that North Vietnam intended to continue the struggle come
what may. But, just as in the previous year, despite this
and other depressing estimates in early 1966, the
Administration's response was to escalate the war, The
most spectacular act of escalation involved the bombing of
strategic targets In the Hanoi and Haiphong area in late
June. As the British Prime Minister had earlier warned
President Johnson, this was an action that the British
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Government could not support, and the Government
dissociated from this bombing. The limit set by the
British Government had been crossed, and so for the first
time America's major ally publicly opposed a U.S. action,
creating something of a watershed in official British
support for the Administration's policy in Vietnam. Given
the escalatory logic of U.S. military action, it was
unlikely to be the last time the British Government would
be forced to dissociate.	 -.
A.) Administration Planning
The bombing pause that had been declared at the end
of December 1965 continued until 31 January 1966. While
the Administration's envoys toured the world, discussing
the possibility of negotiations in various capitals, the
efficacy of the bombing programme was once more under
discussion by the President's advisers. According to the
New York Times edition of The Pentagon Papers, in
mid-January Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton
drafted a memorandum which again h1hlighted the failure
of the bombing programme to achieve its objectives of
interdicting North Vietnamese supply routes and reducing
North Vietnam's aid to the South, and noted that North
Vietnam could still sustain the struggle. McNaughton then
drafted a second memorandum - which the Pentagon Papers
analyst stated complemented and modified his first
memorandum - analysing the current developments and
outlining possible results:
"'The ARVN [South Vietnam Army] is tired,
passive and accommodation-prone. . . The PAVN/VC
[North Vietnam Army/Vietcong] are effectively
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matching our deployments. . . The bombing of the
North...xnay or may not be able effectively to
interdict infiltration (partly because the
PAVN/VC can simply refuse to do battle if
supplies are short)., .Pacification is stalled
despite efforts and hopes. The GVN political
infrastructure is moribund and weaker than the
VC infrastructure among most of the rural
population. . . South Vietnam is near the edge of
serious inflation and economic chaos. '"a
From this grim picture McNaughton moved on to
consider why the U.S. was still involved in Vietnam:
"C. The present U.S. objective in Vietnam Is to
avoid humiliation. The reasons why we went into
Vietnam to the present depth are varied; but
they are now largely academic. Why we have not
witbdrawn from Vietnam is, by all odds, one
reason: (1) to preserve our reputation as a
guarantor, and thus to preserve our
effectiveness in the rest of the world. We have
not hung on (2) to save a friend, or (3) to deny
the Communists the added acres and heads
(because the dominoes don't fall for that reason
in this case), or even (4) to prove that 'wars
of national liberation' won't work (except as
our reputation is involved). At each decision
point we have gambled; at each point, to avoid
the damage to our effectiveness of defaulting on
our commitment, we have upped the ante. We have
not defaulted, and the ante (and commitment) is
now very high. It is important that we behave so
as to protect our reputation. At the same time,
since it is our reputation that is at stake, it
is important that we do not construe our
obligation to be more than do the countries
whose opinions of us are our reputation.
Thus McNaughton dismissed most of the
Administration' s propaganda on the reasons for the U. S.
commitment in Vietnam, focussing on one intangible, but to
the U.S., vital, factor: the way in which other nations
perceived the U.S. , its world image. It should be noted
however, that other advisers did not share McNaughton's
views, for his colleague in the State Department,
Assistant Secretary f or Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy,
422
still clung to a version of the domino theory as the
underlying rationale for the U.S. coxnmitment.B
Under the heading, "'Ye are in an escalating military
stalemate'", McNaughton stated in his memorandum that
there was "'an honest difference of judgement as to the
success of the present military efforts in the South'",
but his own analysis concluded: "'the best judgement is
that, even with the Phase hA deployments, we will be
faced in early 1967 with a continued stalemate at a higher
level of forces and casualties.'"
Positing a revised commitment - or as McNaughton
termed it "'the softest credible formulation of the U.S.
commitment'" - to South Vietnam that precluded only a
forcible North Vietnamese seizure of power, NcNaughton
outlined some results that would be less than a U.S.
military victory, but which could still be acceptable:
NPb. A coalition government including Communists.
c. A free decision by the South to succumb to
the VC or to the North.
d. A neutral (or even anti-U. S. ) government in
SVN.
e. A live-and-let-live 'reversion to 1959.'
Furthermore, we must recognize that even if we
fail to (sic) in achieving this 'soft'
formulation, we could over time come out with
minimum damage:
f. If the reason was GVN gross wrongheadedness
or apathy.
g. If victorious North Vietnam 'went Titoist.'
h. If the Communist take-over was fuzzy and very
slow. '"
Despite this pessimistic analysis and the
all-important conclusion that damage to the U.S. image
could be minimised. even if North Vietnam achieved victory,
McNaughton's final recommendations followed the previous
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pattern: increases in troops, in bombing, stronger support
for the South Vietnamese Government and a greater
pacification effort.° These surprising recommendations
followed from NcNaug]aton's fear that if the U.S. was known
to have lowered its "'sights from victory to compromise'"
then South Vietnam would come apart and North Vietnam
would "'smell b1ood'". And NcNaughton further concluded
that the U.S. would have to be prepared to escalate the
war if North Vietnam should "'miscalculate'" and interpret
U.S. "'willingness to compromise'" as a sign of being "'on
the run'".'°
However, McNaughton's recommendations, far from
facilitating a compromise solution, were a recipe for
achieving what he himself had termed in his memorandum an
"'escalating military stalemate'".
The Pentagon Papers analyst notes that these
recommendations roughly agreed with those of the Saigon
Embassy and U.S. military.' 1 This was an interesting
convergence because U.S. Ambassador Lodge held views on
Vietnam that were diametrically opposed to McNaughton's:
Lodge believed that the U.S. had a "strong interest" in
Vietnam and that in order to avoid a Third World War the
U.S. might "have to decide how much it is worth to us to
deny Viet-Nam to Hanoi and Peking - regardless of what the
Vietnamese think."	 Thus these two advisers arrived at
the same recommendations by totally different routes and
for quite different reasons, and forwarded the same
proposals on the war to the decision-makers.
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According to the New York Times summary of Th
Pentagon Papers, on 24 January Defense Secretary McNamara
submitted to the President a revised versIon of his
November memorandum on the bombing which "echoed much of
his Assistant Secretary's pessimism. "'
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were also concerned with
the failure of the bombing campaign to achieve its
objectives and they used this failure as an argument to
bolster their case for bombing North Vietnam's petroleum,
oil and lubricants - termed P.O.L. - stores in Hanoi and
Haiphong. Since the autumn of 1965, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had urged that the scope of the bombing be widened
and changed into "'a program of strategic bombing aimed at
all industrial and economic resources as well as at all
interdiction targets.'"' The Joint Chiefs had maintained,
in a November memorandum to McNarnara, that while there
were "'constraints'" on the bombing "'only limited success
in air operations in D.R.V./Laos'" could be achieved, and
therefore what was needed "'is an immediate and sharply
accelerated program which will leave no doubt that the
U.S. intends to win and achieve a level of destruction
that they will not be able to overcome.'"' The effects of
attacking North Vietnam's P.O.L., the Joint Chiefs stated,
"would be more damaging to the D.R.V. capability to move
war-supporting resources within the country and along the
infiltration routes to SVN than an attack against any
other target system. . . The flow of supplies would be
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greatly impeded.. .recuperability of the D.R.V. P.O.L,
system from the effects of an attack is very poor. '"
In January the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC),
Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, sent the Joint Chiefs an even
more persuasive assessment of the effects of P.O.L.
attacks, stating that they would "'bring the enemy to the
conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from
lack of support.'" 1
Clearly the U.S. military expected great results from
P.O.L, attacks, results that had so far eluded the U.S.
despite huge increases in troops, weapons, and bombing.
However, not only was the Joint Chiefs' assessment of
P,O,L. attacks not shared by the Central Intelligence
Agency, but according to The Pentagon Papers the CIA had
also discounted the effects of virtually any type of
bombing, including strategic bombing:
"'The Chiefs did so [pressed for a strategic
bombing prograimme], it may be added, despite the
steady stream of memoranda from the intelligence
community consistently expressing skepticism
that bombing of any conceivable sort (that is,
any except bombing aimed primarily at the
destruction of North Vietnam's population) could
either persuade Hanoi to negotiate a settlement
on U.S./GVN terms or effectively limit Hanoi's
ability to infiltrate men and supplies into the
South.
On the effects of bombing P.O.L. the CIA had
estimated: "'It is unlikely that this loss would cripple
the Communist military operations in the South, though it
would certainly embarrass them. III1 Nevertheless McNamara
eventually accepted the recommendations to bomb P.O,L.
targets and submitted this proposal to Johnson in March.
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But it was not until late May, "in spite of the near
consensus among his top advisors on its desirability" that
Johnson agreed to the proposal. 	 The Pentagon Papers
analyst suggests that the delay was occasioned by the
severe political crisis in South Vietnam which erupted
early in March and was not resolved until mid-June; and by
a variety of international leaders' attempts at
peace-making which had begun in February and continued
until June, encompassing some 15 proposals for
negotiations.
In late May the President also informed British Prime
Minister Wilson of the proposed P.O.L. strikes and
arranged a special, but ultimately unsuccessful, briefing
for Wilson on the strikes in order to enlist the latter's
support. Wilson thanked Johnson and then explained why he
would be forced to dissociate; the main, interlinked,
reasons being that the "'political disadvantges'" would
outweigh the "'possible military benefits'"; that this was
an undeclared war; and that the strikes were incompatible
with the declared U.S. aim of a negotiated sett1ement
Though the Administration did not want to lose British
support, nevertheless the persuasive military estimates of
the effects of the P.O.L. bombings - that is, that the
bombings would cripple the North Vietnamese war effort -
were more important still to the Administration. And so,
despite the knowledge that Wilson would dissociate, the
P,O.L. air strikes were carried out.
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The original date set for the P,O.L. attacks,
apparently 10 June, was also delayed, at Rusk's request to
the President, to avoid prejudicing a peace probe that the
Canadians were then undertaking with U.S. concurrence.
The terms of Rusk's subsequent explanation to McNainara
reveal both his concern about the damage that could be
caused to the U.S. image, and his desire not to interrupt
the flow of events too greatly with his request:
"'.. .1 am deeply disturbed by general
International revulsion, and perhaps a great
deal at home, if it becomes known that we took
an action which sabotaged the Ronning [Canadian
diplomat] mission to which we had given our
agreement. I recognize the agony of this problem
for all concerned. We could make arrangements to
get an immediate report from Ronning. If he has
a negative report, as we expect, that provides a
firmer base for the action we contemplate and
would make a difference to people like Wilson
and Pearson [Canadian Prime Minister]. If, on
the other hand, he learns that there is any
serious breakthrough toward peace, the President
would surely want to know of that before an
action which would knock such a possibility off
the tracks. I strongly recommend, therefore,
against ninth or tenth [June]. I regret this
because of my maximum desire to support you and
your colleagues in your tough job,'"
The P.O.L. strikes eventually took place on 29 June
under strict operational guidelines aimed at ininimising
civilian casualties - which the Joint Chiefs and CINCPAC
had estimated would be "'under 50'", as opposed to the CIA
estimate of "'200-300'" - and avoiding damage to merchant
shipping in the port of Haiphong. As the Pentagon Papers
analyst points out: "The execution message is a remarkable
document, attesting in detail to the political sensitivity
of the strikes".27
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The Administration initially judged the strikes to be
successful, and assessed international reaction as
"relatively mild".	 But this appears to be a
misjudgement, in view of the subsequent flood of
international comment and criticism, by governments and
press; and in view of the fact that in Britain's case
there was violence for the first time at an anti-war
demonstration after the P.C.L. strikes (see Sections C,
and E, below), In addition, by the end of the summer it
had become clear that the strikes had failed to achieve
their objectives: the P.O.L. attacks had eliminated '76% of
North Vietnam's bulk storage capacity, but sufficient
P.O.L. was contained in dispersed sites, supplemented by
imports, to meet North Vietnam's requirements;
infiltration continued and North Vietnam kept up the
fight.
There were other important events in this period in
addition to the P.O.L. strikes. On 31 January, after the
large-scale and well-publicised Administration peace
'offensive' , the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed, As
justification the Administration claimed that there had
been no response from North Vietnam to this peace
initiative, passing over a North Vietnamese statement on 4
January that might have been a faint indication of
interest, also brushing aside signs of a drop in North
Vietnam's military effort, and focussing instead on North
Vietnam's South-bound supply efforts during the period of
the bombing pause.
	 Almost immediately after the bombing
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resumed the North Vietnamese representative in Rangoon
contacted the U.S. Ambassador there to arrange a meeting.
The U.S. Ambassador had previously delivered a message
secretly to the North Vietnamese representative during the
bombing pause. No new proposals came from this meeting,
and although North Vietnam initially appeared to want the
contact to continue, it ended the contact abruptly soon
after.
On 4 February, the same day that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee was due to hold its second open
Hearings session on U.S. policy in Vietnam (the first was
held on 28 February and McNamara bad been asked to attend
the second session, but had been forbidden to do so by
Johnson 2), President Johnson announced that a summit
meeting between the U.S. and South Vietnam was to be held
in Honolulu from 6-B February. The arrangements were made
hurriedly and the meeting concentrated on the non-military
side of the U.S. effort: pacification, economic and social
reform, and elections. The joint Declaration and Final
Communique emphasised these aspects.
The strong U.S. support for the Saigon Government
manifested at the Honolulu Conference had the unfortunate
consequence of helping to spark off the next round of
political turmoil in South Vietnam - the worst for some
time.	 For the Conference had been so hastily arranged
that the Saigon Government appeared to be there at the
U.S. Administration's command, and this, coupled with
President Johnson and South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ky's
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embrace, which to the South Vietnamese public underlined
the client state relationship between the two governments,
damaged Ky's prestige in South Vietnam. Briefly, the
Saigon Government, bolstered by this recent public U.S.
commitment, attempted to remove what it saw as a political
rival by dismissing a powerful and popular South
Vietnamese Buddhist Army Commander, General Nguyen Chanh
Thi, whose area of command, I Corps, included Danang and
Hue. U.S. Ambassador Lodge concurred in this move, and he
and Westmoreland played a role in the subsequent events,
advising and supporting the Saigon Government.
General TM's dismissal led to popular protests in
Danang, Hue, and Saigon, which the Buddhist Struggle
Movement then politicised, demanding elections and a
civilian government to replace the military junta,
Although Thi was returned to his command area, the unrest
continued. Ky promised the Buddhist leaders accelerated
elections and a civilian government and a week later went
back on his promise. Demonstrations erupted in Hue and
Saigon against the Saigon Government with a distinct
anti-American theme. At Lodge's prompting on 5 April the
Saigon Government prepared to try and crush the opposition
in Danang, mustering 1,900 troops and various equipment at
the U.S. air base, but Ky was out-manoeuvred by the new I
Corps Commander, General Nguyen Van Chuan, and, faced with
the option of fighting numerically superior forces, was
forced to withdraw. The Hue commander had also stated that
he would fight if the Government troops arrived in Hue.
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There followed some weeks of political manoeuvring,
with more Saigon Government pledges on elections,
eliciting Buddhist action to quieten the unrest, which was
then followed by Ky again reneging on these promises. On
21 May a second Saigon Government assault was undertaken
against Danang, with U.S. support, and after bitter
fighting Ky's troops regained the city. At this point the
Buddhists retaliated by sacking and burning the USIS
Library and U.S. Consulate in Hue on 26 and 31 May
respectively. Hue then came under attack by Ky's troops
and was regained by mid-June. Finally, Buddhist opposition
in Saigon was completely crushed, the leaders arrested and
imprisoned.
Thus, for four months the Saigon Government was
busily engaged, with U.S. help, in fighting for its
existence against the opposition of its own people. While
the Saigon Government was so engaged, the U.S.
Administration undertook yet another major review of its
objectives and options in Vietnam and South East Asia in a
series of meetings which ended around 20 April. On the
results of these meetings the New York Times edition of
The Pentagon Papers states: "What new decisions these
meetings produced is not clear from the record, the
Pentagon study says."4
During this period, from January to July,
Westmoreland continued to request more troops. As noted in
Chapter 5, on 28 January Westinoreland asked for an
increase in troops to bring the total for 1966 to 459,000.
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In June 1966 McNamara approved a schedule for deployment
of 391,000 U.S. soldiers for 1966, with a projected total
of 431,000 for 1967.	 However, McNamara had no sooner
approved this schedule than Vestmoreland petitioned for
another 111,588 troops which would bring the total for
1967 up to 542,588.	 The new request reached McNamara on
5 August, but for the first time the Defense Secretary
requested "a detailed, line-by-line analysis" proving
that these new requirements were "truly essential to the
carrying out of our war plan," and he further commented
"Excessive deployments weaken our ability to win by
undermining the economic structure of the RVN rSouth
Vietnam] and by raising doubts concerning the soundness of
our planning." 7 Although further troop requests were
authorised later, McNarnara refused this request in
0ctober.	 The period of virtually automatic approval of
troop increases by McNamara had come ta an end.
B.) Administration Propaganda Techniques
The combined bombing pause and peace initiative that
President Johnson launched at the end of December 1965 was
the most intensive and public effort to-date by the
Administration to emphasise its peaceful intentions and to
actively search for peace. However, the high-profile
approach that the President had adopted, and the
last-minute nature of the venture, had drawbacks. Firstly,
the sheer drama of the spectacle of U.S. envoys touring
the globe had already prompted some press correspondents
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to ponder whether this peace offensive was really an
international and domestic public relations exercise prior
to escalation of the war: in other words a propaganda
stunt. 9 Secondly, the fact that this was such a strident
diplomatic campaign tended to detract from the seriousness
of its purpose. And thirdly the haste with which the
campaign was begun, and its initial makeshift character,
were perceived to be inimical to its success, and thus
these features of the campaign were criticised publically
even as the campaign was starting. ° Chester Cooper later
assessed the peace offensive and summed up the overall
effect:
"...the style and method adopted in December and
January were plainly unsuitable. Where finely
tooled instruments were required, we used a
sledgehammer. Where confidential and careful
advance work was necessary, we proceeded with
all the subtlety of a Fourth of July parade.
Where a dramatic, surprise proposal may have
stirred Hanoi's interest, we made a public
spectacle of every melodramatic move. Instead of
maximizing the effect of our fourteen-point
peace package, we buried it in the razzmatazz of
sudden, noisy, and florid VIP trips. In short,
the President was acting like the ringmaster of
a three-ring circus, rather than as the focal
point of a carefully worked out exercise in
diplomacy. I41
Thus, according to Cooper, who was a participant in
these events, the style of the peace campaign not only
contributed to its failure, but also overshadowed another
major part of the Administration's propaganda effort - the
publication of the fourteen points.
The North Vietnamese denounced the bombing pause, and
when President Johnson announced the resumption of the
bombing of North Vietnam on 31 January he emphasised the
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themes of North Vietnamese aggression and unwillingness to
talk.	 Mentioning that the South Vietnamese, U.S. and
Allied troops were "engaged in South Vietnam with
increasing strength and increasing success", Johnson
explained that the bombing would have to resume because
otherwise "the cost in lives, Vietnamese lives, and
American and allied lives, will only be greatly increased
in the light of the words and actions of the Government in
Hanoi for more than 37 days now."
	
Finally Johnson
repeated the pattern of previous propaganda moves and in
this same announcement stated that UN Ambassador Goldberg
would be requesting "an immediate meeting" of the UN
Security Council and would be reporting to it and
presenting "a resolution which can open the way to the
conference table." 4 Once again Johnson had 'balanced'
military action with a peace initiative.
The next day the UN Security Council considered the
U.S. draft Resolution and North Vietnam promptly rejected
this new UN intervention, as it had done in the past. This
rejection added credence to the Administration's claims
that while the U.S. wanted peace, North Vietnam wanted
war.
The beginning of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee open Hearings on U.S. policy in Vietnam posed a
considerable problem for the Administration, for the
committee had called on several top Administration
officials to testify, including McNamara, Rusk and former
Ambassador Taylor. On 4 February the President's sudden
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announcement of the Honolulu Conference, convening from
6-8 February, coincided with the second of these Hearings
at which McNainara had been due to testify until the
President vetoed his attendance. Undoubtedly this sudden
and unexpected announcement focussed attention on the
forthcoming conference rather than the Hearings, but there
was a price to be paid: the impression gained and
disseminated by the press was that the Conference had been
announced primarily to detract attention from the
Hearings. The lack of preparations, the short time between
announcement and Conference, arid the absence of allied
heads of state, also added to this impression. Thus the
mere fact that the press identified this either partly or
wholly as a propaganda ploy diminished its effectiveness.
Also the Conference itself came under close scrutiny, as
observers endeavoured to determine whether it was
justified by its results.
Chester Cooper recalls that in answer to the charge
that the conference had been arranged as a type of
'spoiling' operation, President Johnson "insisted that a
Honolulu meeting had been planned for several months,"4
Cooper explained that Johnson "was neither altogether
right nor wrong", for Cooper bad floated the idea of
Johnson attending a meeting in Honolulu in mid-1965, but
this was to mark the anniversary of the East-west Center
there, the appointment of a new head, and it was thought
that Asian leaders could be invited offering the chance
for "private talks. . . particularly with Sukarno who was
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being especially troublesome at the time."
	
Cooper states
that Johnson "rejected the idea" but "this was probably
the 'conference' he had in mind many months later when he
parried reporters abouth the timing of his meeting with Ky
and Thieu."	 Nevertheless, whatever Johnson thought, the
Honolulu Conference was a very different affair to the
original concept, at which Sukarno was intended to be the
main quarry in a general conference; whereas Honolulu was
a specifically U.S,-South Vietnam meeting - excluding even
their fighting allies - and dealing exclusively with South
Vietnamese issues.
Another problem concerning this conference surfaced
later, when South Vietnam was again in the throes of
another political crisis: correspondents were not slow to
connect the strong U.S. support for the Saigon Government
at the Honolulu Conference with the eruption of this
political crisis. In effect this meant that the
Administration was forced to answer, and deny, the charge
that Its own political ineptitude was partly to blame for
this latest crisis.
Coming soon after the Honolulu Conference, the
lengthy bout of political upheaval centering on South
Vietnam's three principal cities, Saigon, Hue and Danang,
was a source of yet more problems for the Administration.
For while U.S. official propaganda portrayed South Vietnam
as a nation striving for democracy, endeavouring to create
a new and better society - facets emphasised at the
Honolulu Conference - during the period of the crisis the
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world witnessed the elevating spectacle of Saigon's
military junta attacking its own people with weapons
provided by the U.S. to fight the war. And the subsequent
attacks by the Buddhist students on the USIS Library and
Consulate were quite clearly anti-American actions, both
disturbing and embarrassing. Previous U.S. official
propaganda thus had a hollow ring to it by comparison with
the events in South Vietnam, and the Administration now
had the task of reconciling what was fundamentally
irreconcilable: its words, and the South Vietnamese
Government's actions. The answer was to stress the
'fledgling' state of the South Vietnamese nation, still
struggling to achieve democracy in difficult times.
However, commentators tended to recall the long line of
past crises, pointing out that this, and other crises,
demonstrated just how little the Americans could influence
events in general. But there was another facet to this
particular crisis which also surfaced publically - that
this time the U.S. Embassy had been heavily involved in
the political turmoil, having supported the Saigon
Government in its desire to remove General Thi. Thus the
Administration was charged both with being inherently
unable to prevent these outbursts, but also with having
interfered, thereby helping to spark off this specific
crisis. Effectively the U.S. Embassy in Saigon helped to
make a mockery of its own Government's propaganda on South
Vietnam.
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During this period, beginning in February with
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's visit to Moscow,
there were many attempts by international leaders to
initiate peace negotiations. The Administration had to
respond to these efforts in such a way that the U.S. could
not be accused of rejecting any peace moves. But, on the
other hand, neither was the Administration prepared to
negotiate on anything but its own terms. This was most
strikingly apparent on the issue of bombing, and Th
Pentagon Papers highlight the Administration judgements
which dictated the U.S. propaganda line:
"Concerned that the current spate of
international peace moves might entice the
Administration in another bombing pause,
[William] Bundy reminded the Secretary [Rusk]
that,
during our long pause in January, we pretty
much agreed among ourselves that as a practical
matter, if Hanoi started to play negotiating
games that even seemed to be serious, we would
have great difficulty in resuming bombing for
some time. This was and is a built-in weakness
of the 'pause' approach. It does not apply to
informal talks with the DRy , directly or
indirectly, on the conditions under which we
would stop bombing, nor does it apply to third
country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself
believe that our past record sufficiently
stresses that we could stop the bombing only if
the other side did something in response. Thus,
I would not at this moment favor any additional
public statement by us, which might simply
highlight the issue and bring about the very
pressures we seek to avoid. !h1A9
Bundy concluded that there "'must in fact be a
trade'" to stop the bombing and no bombing pause "'under
existing circumstances. '"	 Bearing these precepts in
mind, and considering North Vietnam's diametrically
opposed conditions for negotiations, the international
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conirnunity's efforts were bound to fail. The Pentagon
Papers describe how the Administration ended this wave of
peace moves: "the State Department closed out this
international effort on June 23 (the day after the
original POL execute order), stating that neither oral
reports nor public statements indicated any change in the
basic elements of Hanoi's position."
In mid-June, when Westmoreland was putting in another
of his unpublicised requests for more troops, the
Administration began preparing public opinion for the
imminent P.O.L. strikes. Already a special effort had been
made to enlist the British Prime Minister's support at the
beginning of June, and although this had failed the
Administration knew in advance what the British
Government's reaction would be, and had been warned of the
likely effect of these strikes on British and West
European public opinion.	 This advance knowledge would be
useful to the Administration, enabling it to prepare its
public defense of these strikes. At a Presidential press
conference on 18 June, Johnson made a statement on
Vietnam, in which he explained that U.S. "national
interest" necessitated continuing the "present policy" in
Vietnam, using the necessary "ground, naval and air
strength required to achieve our ob.jectives."	 Johnson
continued:
"I must observe that this does not mean that
we shall not increase our forces or' our
operations. It is not good national policy
publicly to declare 'to those conducting
aggression that there are particular limits on
how we shall act to defeat that aggression."
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After recapitulating the limited objectives the U.S.
was fighting for, Johnson then quoted the latest casualty
figures and stated:
"Our attacks on military targets in North
Vietnam have imposed a growing burden on those
who support the insurgency in the South. We must
continue to raise the cost of aggression at its
source. And that is the sole purpose of our use
of air strength against military targets."
Undoubtedly these were hints that the Administration
considered itself free to use whatever military method it
chose - over and above its present operations - to achieve
its carefully articulated objectives. When questioned
directly by a correspondent about why Hanoi and Haiphong
had not been bombed and whether it would not be more
understandable to people if they were bombed, Johnson
declined to comment "on the tactics or strategy at this
point" and stated that he would "have to be guided" by his
"best judgement in the matter."
	 What was noticeable
however was that he did not rule out such an action.
After the P.O.L. strikes on 29 June the
Administration presented them publicly as an action to
reduce infiltration from North Vietnam to the South; to
persuade Hanoi of U.S. determination to continue the
fight, and equally to persuade Hanoi to give up. The
Administration also maintained that these attacks were not
an escalation of the war because they were against
military targets, in line with former U.S. bombing
strategy and tactics. And the attacks were assessed as
successful.
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At the end of June, following an abortive peace
attempt by the Canadians, 	 another secret peace
initiative was launched involving the Polish
representative on the International Control Coininission,
the Italian Ambassador in Saigon, and U.S. Ambassador
Lodge. Code-named 'Narigold', it was a particularly
intricate exercise in diplomacy which finally foundered in
December 1966, amid angry charges that the U.S. had
wrecked the initiative, primarily by bombing Hanoi. So the
Administration was once more in the dock over its public
and private attitude to negotiations.
Throughout this period the Administration was
generally publically optimistic about the course of the
war. Naturally, the pessimistic assessments of McNaughton
and NcNamara, confirmed by Westmoreland's troop requests,
were never hinted at in public. Instead the Administration
partnered its vague hints of necessary military escalation
with news about South Vietnam's economic and social
progress. Nobody could have concluded from the
Administration's public statements that the war was
stalemated and would remain so at ever-higher troop
levels. And it would have been difficult to imagine, given
the huge amounts of U.S. troops and materiel poured into
Vietnam, that the war would eventually end in defeat for
America.
C.) Press Reporting and Reaction
Throughout January the dominant theme in press
reporting was the bombing pause and the accompanying peace
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offensive, which were discussed in minute detail and
virtually on a day-to--day basis. The views expressed on
these events were by no means uniform, with observers
differing over the true purpose of the peace offensive,
what the chances were for negotiations, and how long the
pause would last. On 1 January it was reported that after
his visits to the Pope and President de Gaulle, U.S.
Ambassador Goldberg would be stopping off in London to see
Prime Ninister Wilson. For all that Britain was
co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference and America's main
ally, in late December when the U.S. peace initiative
began there had been little indication that any of the
U.S. envoys would be visiting the British Prime
Minister.	 On the surface it could have appeared strange
that the U.S. almost failed to involve its main ally in
these peace moves, and while press reports did not
explicitly discuss this aspect, their treatment of the
Goldberg-Wilson talks highlighted two important factors:
the actual relationship between Britain and the U.S.
concerning information on the war, that is, that Britain
was kept informed; and the necessity that at the very
least, Britain should not appear to be consulted less than
other countries. The Times, focussing mainly on the former
aspect, explained that it was an American suggestion that
Goldberg should see Wilson, and then pointed out:
"The British Government were fully informed at
the outset of the views of the United States
Administration, but President Johnson wished the
British Government to be given an up-to-date
account of the discussions which Mr. Goldberg
has had since leaving the United States."
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The Daily Telegraph, however, concentrated on
appearances and noted one of the reasons why it was
important for Britain to be involved in this diplomatic
offensive:
"News of the visit brought relief to
Government supporters. It was beginning to look
as if every national leader had been consulted
except the British Prime Minister.
Mr. Wilson is known to be anxious to play a
role in any real attempt to end the conflict.
In addition to his natural desire to help, he
has become increasingly aware in recent weeks
that the Labour party's Left wing has grown
acutely restive on this issue. They have been
looking to him for action.
In a party political broadcast on radio last
night, Mr. Wilson promised that Britain would go
on trying to end the war, whatever the
consequences. " '
The Sunday Telegraph on 2 January also commented on
similar lines, stating: "An interesting feature of last
week's busy scene has been the almost total passivity of
the British Government", and the report continued:
"Though Britain is co-chairman, with Russia,
of the Geneva Conference, no initiative or even
contacts were made on this network, either in
Moscow or London.
Though not diplomatically significant at the
moment, this passivity is optically disturbing.
To bring Mr. Wilson 'in from the cold'
President Johnson doubtless authorised last
night's meeting in London between the Prime
Minister and one of his itinerant envoys, Mr.
Goldberg.
Other press reports and editorials were more
concerned with the peace offensive itself, and some of the
doubts expressed about it in December were still current.
On 1 January, in a gloomy editorial captioned, "The right
response to a peace offensive", The Guardian began:
"It is yet another bitter irony of the
Vietnamese war that when at last the United
States Government does what its critics have for
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months been urging it to do - suspend the
bombing of the North, set its diplomatists to
work - misgivings about its policies seem more
justifiable than ever. For what is now being
done fits almost too perfectly into the pattern
recently talked about in Vashington."
This editorial then pointed to the pre-Christmas
evidence that the Administration was under pressure to
escalate the war but that the hawks "conceded to the doves
that this new escalation. . . would look better if it were
preceded by another bombing pause, and a fresh
proclamation of President's Johnson's willingness to talk
peace - just such measures, in fact as are now attracting
the world's attention." The editorial accepted that this
was putting matters "too crudely", and that many officials
and diplomats and the President himself would want the
offer to be taken up.
	
But The Guardian argued that
because the President "shows no signs of understanding
what the war means to the Vietcong and many other
Vietnamese", and the fact that even if a settlement could
be forced on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong this would
not spell the end of the war while there were foreign
t roops in Vietnam, then the war would continue to
expanc1.	 And The Guardian further argued that foreign
troops would not be able to leave and the "Americans'
successive disappointments over the past year are all
evidence that the task they have set themselves [in South
Vietnam] is impossible".	 According to the editorial,
until Johnson realised this "the hawks will go on getting
their way, and the war will go on expanding, with ever
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greater danger to Indo-China, China, the United States,
and the world."
The Guardian's Washington correspondent focussed on
the relaxed attitude in Washington about the length of the
pause, remarking that "there is no disposition here to
force the pace, or to appear to give Hanoi an unreasonably
short period in which to take their decision."	 The main
reason for this attitude became apparent when the report
noted that officials were emphasising that the U.S. "has
avoided any appearance of having faced Hanoi with an
ultimatum", but although it was "hardly in doubt" that
bombing and escalation would follow, the U.S. had not
repeated the mistake of the May pause by putting this in
writing. ° For as the report observed, the May message had
recently been made public and "With some justice this
message was regarded by Hanoi as an ultimatum and was
rejected by them." 71 Thus the public's attention was being
drawn to both the Administration's past error and the
difference in the way the current pause was being handled.
Although the bombing pause was only 8 days old and
the peace offensive a mere 6 days old, already there were
press articles, based on the U.S. envoys' reports about
their peace missions, expressing doubts that the peace
offensive would be successful. Indeed the Observer
commented: "Hopes for the success of this operation, which
were never high, are now dwindling." 7 Hanoi's
denunciation of the bombing pause and peace offensive
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added to the doubts and also vindicated the pessimism
displayed by the U.S. envoys.
As to what was the true purpose of the peace
offensive, this topic evoked varying reactions from
correspondents. For instance the Sunday Telegraph,
detailing the dire consequences in the U.S.should the
peace offensive fail	 a declaration of a state of
emergency, reserves mobilisation and price controls - and
discussing various aspects of the peace -•moves, noted the
President's conflicting anxieties: to convince China and
North Vietnam that "his desire for peace is sincere", but
also to convince them that this U.S. desire for peace
should not lead them to misclaculate the strength of U.S.
commitment to South Vietnam. 	 The article then concluded:
"Shorn of diplomatic subtleties all this means
is that so far every party to the Vietnam
conflict is standing pat.
The inescapable conclusion at this stage
therefore is that the perigrinations [sicJ of
peace envoys are directed more towards
persuading bystanders than the enemy of
America's desire for peace. "'
The Financial Times also supported this
interpretation of the travelling peace envoys, but then
added that "the true probe Is being conducted now, and in
secret - the efforts by the Governments of Europe, of
Africa and of Asia to do whatever they can to bring the
two sides together. "' The Guardian's Washington
correspondent expressed two very different viewpoints in
the space of two days, thereby demonstrating the speed at
which opinions on the conflict could change and be
disseminated on acquisition of new information. On 3
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January a Guardian report on the peace moves, headlined
"The Johnson brand of instant peace offensive", analysed
the style of the diplomatic offensive and concluded that
though this might "seem rather larger than life - perhaps
a little flamboyant", there was "no need to doubt the
sincerity of his peace offensive." 	 On 5 January Th
Guardian's report was headlined, "Mr Johnson's Vietnam
peace moves over dramatised", and after explaining that
the message that the peace envoys were carrying around the
world had now been made public, the article continued:
"The publication of this three-page document
seems to put this whole so-called peace
offensive for the first time in its proper
perspective. And it is clear that it has been
greatly overplayed. It has been endowed with
more drama than substance, The document, indeed,
looks suspiciously like that which must have
been used by a 'well informed official American
source' to brief a group of foreign
correspondents here - including me - on the
Monday evening after Christmas.
It is generally agreed that it was a little
later this same evening that the decision seems
to have been taken to launch the 'peace
offensive' after massive telephoning by the
President from his Texas ranch. Indeed, I and my
colleagues appear to have been honoured with the
first dry run-through of the document which then
became the basis of the President's 'peace
offensive.
The article then continued with a discussion of the
Administration's hopes for the peace offensive: that at
worst it would convince doubting foreign governments that
the U.S. did want unconditional negotiations; and at best
that the peace offensive would generate enough pressure of
world opinion to persuade Hanoi to negotiate. The report
noted that the Administration reckoned that if after the
peace offensive Vietcong operations continued at the same
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level as previously, then the U.S. Image "both at home and
abroad, would be considerably improved, and sympathy for
Hanoi would be greatly reduced." 	 The article concluded
with an analysis, based on Walter Lippmann's column, of an
issue of great importance for the Administration's
propaganda effort. Citing Lippmann, the report stated:
"He [Lippinann] agrees that there is no need to
doubt Mr Johnson's sincerity, but he considers
that sincerity is not the crux of the matter.
The crux is whether the President is ready to
negotiate a truce which confirms to the
strategic realities of the military situation.
If he is not ready then Mr Lippinann believes
that he will find that friends and foes alike
will regard 'the whole spectacular business not
as the action of a statesman but as the device
of a showman.
Unless the President defines his terms of
peace, confidence in his leadership, Mr Lippxnann
says, will become gravely weakened. And he
doubts if the Administration has yet worked out
its peace terms.79
The Guardian's correspondent then extrapolated from
Lippmann and suggested that the Administration might have
an "even more acute" problem than Lippmann had outlined,
for the Administration had publicly agreed to return to
the 1954 Geneva Agreeinents.° However, according to the
fluardia correspondent no one in Washington "seriously"
believed that the U.S. would permit elections throughout
Vietnam if a Communist government looked likely to be
elected, and the article then assessed the probable impact
of this factor on North Vietnam, particularly in view of
past events:
"The North Vietnamese know this as well, if
not better, than anyone else, They feel that
they were grossly cheated in 1954 when the
Saigon Government, aided and abetted by
Washington, refused to carry out this provision[all-Vietnam elections] of the 1954 agreement.
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Unless and until Washington can convince the
North Vietnamese that it will see that a similar
provision in a new agreement is scrupulously
honoured, Hanoi is most unlikely to see any
merit in a new negotiation."81
Thus between them, the Guardian correspondent and
Lippinann exposed and publicised the weaknesses in the
Administration's propaganda on negotiations: the lack of
realistic negotiating terms, the probable lack even of any
attempt to define these; and a view of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements which was inherently unacceptable to North
Vietnam. In fact Lippmann was correct in his surmise that
the Administration had not seriously addressed the issue
of negotiations, as Chester Cooper made clear:
"More to the point, however, Washington was
unprepared for negotiations. Little work had
been done in blocking out a negotiating
strategy, very few position papers on key
negotiations issues bad been prepared. For its
part, the government in Saigon had hardly spent
an hour addressing its own negotiations
stance.
In addition, The Guardian's exposition of North
Vietnam's view of the non-existent elections post-1954,
amounted to a dose of counter-propaganda. The
Administration's version of events after 1954 was being
challenged again and its propaganda rallying cry on
negotiations - a return to the Geneva Agreements - had a
hollow ring in the light of this analysis.
Nevertheless, as The Times demonstrated, it was
possible to recognise such factors, but to rationalise
them in such a way that the Administration's case was not
undermined. On 8 January a Times editorial also deemed the
issue of the President's 'sincerity' a "profitless
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argument", making the same point as Lippmann that the
President was perfectly sincere. 9 But there agreement
ended, for where Lipprnann argued that the current
diplomatic offensive would appear to be mere show if the
President had no real negotiating proposals to offer, Ihe
Times simply assumed that the President's proposals thus
far were adequate and supported the Administration's
interpretation of events. Thus, though The Times perceived
the peace offensive to be aimed at public opinion, it did
not perceive that in the circumstances this might be the
only function possible for this peace offensive, for Ihe
Times supplied the link between means and what it
automatically assumed to be the Administration's
reasonable and attainable ends:
"It is perfectly obvious that he [President
Johnson] is desperately sincere, that he is
sickened by the war, and that he would grasp
eagerly at any opportunity for genuine
negotiations. It is equally obvious that he will
continue the war until he can find an honourable
solution.
The peace offensive is an attempt to rally
domestic and foreign opinion to the American
side and to put some public pressure on North
Vietnam, It is an exercise in public relations
rather than strict diplomacy. But that does not
make it less useful as an adjunct to diplomacy.
The question is whether it is enough, and
whether it is the best means to entirely
honourable ends.
This standpoint enabled The Times to point out the
"curious feature" of the conflict whereby both the U.S.
and North Vietnam insisted on a return to the Geneva
Agreements; to remark that the difference between the U. S.
and North Vietnam centred on timing and the type of
government in South Vietnam until reunification; to note
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that the North Vietnamese "believe that they were tricked
after the 1954 agreements, when the Americans were backing
a man they knew would refuse elections" and that they
feared the same thing would happen again; and then to
conclude that:
"The main criticism of PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
efforts so far is that they have not
concentrated sufficiently on the issue of the
South Vietnamese Government. They have been too
rigid in refusing to recognise that the Vietcong
represent an indigenous force in South Vietnam
as well as an arm of North Vietnam. The basis of
any settlement will have to be a South
Vietnamese Government that is acceptable to both
sides. This will be appallingly difficult to
achieve, because any such Government would be
extremely vulnerable to pressure from each side
to win its allegiance. It would clearly require
some sort of interim agreement by outside
powers.
Clearly this editorial supported one of the U.S.
goals in the war: an independent South Vietnam, Dismissing
the confusion engendered in the debate by "too much talk
about containing China and proving that national wars of
libration do not pay" - major U.S. propaganda arguments -
and noting that Hanoi regarded the conflict as a
continuation of the 1946 anti-colonial war, the editorial
then revealed the extent of its sympathy for the U.S. case
in its conclusion:
"The natural corollary of this is that Hanoi
must understand American concerns. The United
States has a commitment that it cannot be
expected simply to shuffle off. It has an
interest in the balance of power in Asia. It
also has a wholly admirable determination to
prove that force is not the way to settle
disputes in the modern world. If its methods can
sometimes be criticised, its ends cannot. Until,
therefore, the North Vietnamese are willing to
put their case at the conference table they
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cannot expect the understanding which they might
otherwise receive. "
This conclusion can only be termed a triumph for U.S.
propaganda, if only because 11 months of U.S. escalation,
already involving great destruction, was being perceived
as a desire not to settle a conflict by force. In
addition, U.S. geo-political concerns were also being
endorsed and the North Vietnamese attitude was again
presented as the sole obstacle to negotiations.
While The Times editorialised in support of the
Administration, its Washington correspondent was reporting
the "military pessimism" that was apparently now rife in
Vashington, leading to suggestions that B-52 bombers
should be used if Hanoi ignored the U.S. negotiations
offer.	 This was a suggestion that the correspondent took
to be indicative of a pessimism "now tinged with despair"
- because so far all measures had failed in Vietnam. GB The
correspondent described the horrors of war in Vietnam for
the South Vietnamese and linked this to the U.S. pessimsim
about the current state of the battle
"No fighting men in history have been better
served than American soldiers in Vietnam. Even
company actions are invariably supported by air
strikes and artillery barrages, and they are
dropped into battle by helicopter. A platoon
commander can call down napalm, phospherous
bombs, and tear gas on the smallest target.
The disciplines that normally apply when
fighting in inhabited areas have been withdrawn.
Anybody who moves or anything that looks
suspicious can be shot at. Such actions are
regularly reported in the American press.
Reproducing an account by a Washington Post war
correspondent of a "profitless attack which ended with the
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useless destruction of a farm" in South Vietnam, the Times
correspondent concluded bleakly:
"Multiplied a thousand times, the result of
such an action can only bring pessimism and
despair. The United States could, of course,
obliterate North Vietnam, but the price would be
high - the obliteration of its great humanistic
traditions.
The war, with or without new measures, will,
of course, continue if Hanoi does not respond to
the invitations to negotiate. There can be no
doubt about that, but it will be a long one,"9°
However, the general atmosphere conveyed through
British press reports at this stage was supportive of the
U.S. peace offensive, always excepting of course the
Communist countries responses. In an effort to be helpful
the British Government contacted the Russians in order to
testify to the 'sincerity' of the U.S. Administration's
appeals for negotiations. 1 The Soviet Union returned the
compliment and handed the British Ambassador to Moscow a
message concerning the whole situation in South East Asia
- apparently unconnected to the British message - which
was "described as as 'a diatribe'" from USSR Foreign
Minister Gromyko.
	 Such incidents apart, the peace
offensive and bombing pause were mostly producing the
results the Administration wanted, and this process was
further aided when the Administration let it be known that
the Vietcong could be accepted as a political party in the
South in the event of a cease-fire, thereby removing,
according to The Times, "the last political obstacle to
peace negotiations if indeed the Vietcong and North
Vietnam are willing to accept a peaceful solution."
	 Ih
Times further stated that:
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"The clarification amounts in fact to a major
shift in American policy. The Administration has
long insisted that the conflict in Vietnam is
not a civil war but external aggression.
Acceptance of the Vietcong or its National
Liberation Front as a South Vietnamese political
party demonstrates that this fundamental, if
contestible [sic], position has been changed."
The Times also noted that the Administration still
refused to negotiate with the Vietcong on the grounds that
"only Governments can take part in international
conferences", but pointed out that the U.S. had no
objection to the Vietcong appearing as part of a North
Vietnamese delegation.	 In essence the Administration was
publicly recognising what was already a fact of life, in
that the Vietcong/NLF was a political party, but this did
not necessarily mean, as the Times correspondent assumed,
that the Administration would not still insist that the
war was primarily a result of external aggression directed
by North Vietnam, and therefore not a civil war. And
neither did it mean that the Administration had abandoned
its goal of an independent South Vietnam.
An Observer editorial took a much more critical look
than The Times at the Administration's presentation of its
case, and assessed what the peace offensive should mean in
terms of negotiations:
"Finally, if the President's peace campaign is
to make more impression on America's adversaries
and carry more conviction with her friends, the
purposes of American policy need to be
clarified.
It is a waste of time for President Johnson
and Mr Rusk to try to persuade the great
majority of non-American opinion that the whole
problem is simply a question of Hanoi's
aggression as part of a world-wide campaign
inspired by China. If negotiation now is to be
meaningful, it needs to be related to the
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present military and political facts of a
complex civil war inside South Vietnam. It has
to be narrowed down to specific, practicable
objectives. The 'Heart of the Matter' [the title
of the message the U.S. peace envoys were
carryingJ, to use the hackneyed White House
phrase, is how a conflict between the Vietnamese
about their political future is to be settled by
negotiation rather than by force. But this is
what has to be attempted and it means,
inevitably, that the Vietcong have to be a party
to the negotiations.
However, despite this analysis the Observer concluded
that a U.S. acceptance of a neutral South Vietnam, an
offer of withdrawal of U.S. troops provided South
Vietnam's independence could be guaranteed, and U.S.
acceptance of the need for free elections, added up to a
package which did not conflict "in theory with the four
points of Ho CM Minh." 9
 Thus, though the Observer
quarrelled with the Administration's propaganda and echoed
Lippinann on the need for negotiations and military and
political realities to match, nevertheless a central tenet
of the Administration's case - the independence of South
Vietnam - appeared to have been dIgested as an
incontrovertible fact. And unless the Observer's
concluding reference, to the need to work out how to
supervise and guarantee South Vietnam's "neutrality,
non-intervention and free elections", was intended to
refer to a stage preparatory to the reunification of the
country, then anything else would contravene both the
original Geneva Agreements as well as Hanoi's Four
Points.
As January slipped by, hopes that the peace offensive
and bombing pause would produce negotiations slowly faded.
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On iO January both The Guardian and The Times carried
articles from their Washington correspondents on a report
on Vietnam that Senator Mansfield had presented to the
President, in which the choice now open to the U.S. was
either "an unsatifactory negotiated settlement or to
extend the war to the point when general war in Asia
becomes a serious poss1blity." 9
 And The Times, in its
article, stated that the publication of the Mansfield
report "must be assumed to be connected to the budgetary
request and the decisions which now face the
President." 1	The budgetary request to which The Times
referred was another supplementary defence apropriation to
be presented to Congress and the decision facing the
President was this possibility of a general war "to bring
Hanoi to its knees." 101 The Times decided that the budget
request "suggests that President Johnson is ready, no
matter how reluctantly, for general war. Most of his
advisers can see no other alternative unless the Soviet
Union is prepared to use what little influence it has in
Hanoi to limit the war."10
There were still occasional articles which
tentatively raised hopes again, as when the Guardian's
Washington correspondent reported on 15 January that
President Johnson had remarked that Vietcong incidents had
fallen, but he didn't know whether this was connected with
'the peace offensive. The correspondent pondered whether
this reduction came within the terms of the President's
State of the Union address alluding to a "reduction in the
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use of force", and concluded that this could not be taken
as an indicator that Hanoi had scaled down the war,
Interestingly this report also stated that aerial
reconnaissance over North Vietnam had shown that the North
Vietnamese priority during the bombing pause was the
repair of its rail links with China; there was no public
stress at this stage on increased North Vietnamese
infiltration southwards. 104
By 20 January, 27 days after the bombing was first
halted, pressure was beginning to build up for the
Administration to continue the bombing pause. 10E The Times
noted that the U.S. peace envoys had all brought back this
message on extending the pause and that this had created a
"cruel predicament" for the U.S. , for if Hanoi thought
that "international opinion can influence or limit
American strategy, it might well be encouraged to believe
that American political objectives will also be
influenced." 10 The Times summed up the problems the U.S.
faced:
"Intransigence can hardly be rewarded by an
extended bombing pause, and if the bombing is
resumed it will shatter the peaceful atmosphere
created as well as much of North Vietnam. What
is more, the United States will probably have to
bear the odium, and not North Vietnam. Another
resentment is also evident. The peace efforts
have released a fresh flood of advice from many
directions, and this is seen to threaten
American control of the situation. The intention
was to persuade other Governments to bring
pressure upon Hanoi, and not upon the United
States." 107
Towards the end of January press reports reflected
the discouraging tone of Administration remarks on Hanoi's
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attitude to the peace offensive. On 22/23 January the Iw
York Herald Tribune wrote that Secretary of State Rusk had
stated that "there had been no encouraging response from
Hanoi", while Secretary of Defense McNainara detailed
Hanoi's rebuilding projects during the pause. 1O
Furthermore the New York Herald Tribune suggested that
Rusk's statement "appeared designed to prepare Americans
for more hard fighting in the weeks and months ahead,"'°
The Guardian noted thatPresident Johnson had stated that
Hanoi was "hostile" to the peace offensive and had
continued its infiltration. 110 An interesting comment on
the Administration's own attitude to reinforcements during
the bombing pause was contained in a Guardian editorial on
24 January which stated that: "The month of the bombing
pause has coincided precisely with Operation 'Blue Light,'
said by the US Air Force to be the biggest troop air lift
in history, from Hawaii to Pleiku." 1 TheGuardian then
pointed out that the Communists had "also" been using the
pause for their own preparations.	 Thus, as a matter of
propaganda tactics, the President and his top advisers
publicised the Communists' activities during the pause,
but naturally kept a much lower profile on their own huge
reinforcements. The U.S. troop reinforcements also added
to the overall picture of American involvement in Vietnam,
and The Guardian assessed the implications of this and its
likely impact on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong:
"But they [North Vietnamese and Vietcong] chose
to regard the peace offensive as a trick.
One can understand why. For even in this
country, let alone Hanoi, it does not much look
as though the Americans are going to withdraw in
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the foreseeable future, peace or no peace; too
much has been invested, politically and even
economically. The building of the base at
Camranh, for instance, is no short-term
proj ect. 1 1
Thus, according to The Guardian, the very scale of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam undermined the credibility of
its public statements about seeking no permanent foothold
in South Vietnam and being prepared to withdraw if, and
when, South Vietnam's future was guaranteed.
On 26 January the press reported that friendly
governments had been informed that Hanoi had not responded
to the peace offensive, that the safety of U.S. troops was
being .jeopardised by the pause, and that Johnson had also
met with the Congress party leaders, 11 On 27 January the
Financial Times Washington correspondent began a report
with the firm prediction that this meeting "makes it quite
certain that in the absence of some last minute repentance
by Hanoi, American bombing of North Vietnam will be
resumed shortly." 11 On the basis of U.S. war aims, the
correspondent also calculated that the war would expand
considerably:
"However,- everything now points to a renewed
effort to get the upper hand in the South. This
will naturally entail further massive
reinforcements of American forces and the figure
of 500,000 in South Vietnam this year no longer
seems fantastic. It will also involve more
intense bombing of the North than hitherto."11
The correspondent's speculation about 500,000 troops
for 1966 was considerably more than the actual total
number of 389,000 troops at the end of 1966, but the mere
fact that a figure of 500,000 could be perceived as a
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possibility was a recognition of the depth of U.S.
determination to attain its goals - however many troops
might be required. This figure was also a reminder of the
speed with which the war had already expanded.
The signs that the bombing would be resumed were even
stronger around 29 January and The Times described the
Administration' s tactics:
"The Administration is now preparing the
United States for a resumption of the bombing of
North Vietnam With small private briefings and
other recognizable devices, President Johnson is
passing the word that it is no longer a question
of whether the United States should resume
bombing, but whether future raids should be
heavier than they were in the past."''
The Guardian's Washington correspondent, however,
preferred to delve deeper into the mechanics and details
of the Administration's propaganda run-up to the bombing
resumption:
"Other straws which seem to show which way the
wind in the White House is blowing are the pains
that officials are taking to explain:
1. The agonising character of the decision
which President Johnson is facing;
2. The industry with which he is seeking out
the widest possible counsel;
3. The fact that the pause has already lasted
longer than most foreign Governments had
proposed;
4. The great pressure being exerted by those
who believe that the pause in endangering
American lives;
5. The President's personal responsibilities
to the 200,000 young men now fighting in South
Vietnam; and
6. The President's concern that Hanoi and
Peking might have wrongly interpreted the pause
as a sign of American weakness!h1
As these Times and Guardian reports and other
articles noted, this expected resumption of bombing was
not unopposed in the U.S.. Seventy-six Democratic
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Representatives and 15 Senators had recently appealed to
Johnson to extend the pause; Rusk was being rigorously
cross-examined by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
and one cross-examining Senator was widely reported to
have stated that he was "'scared to death we are on our
way to World War III.I1h1 But there seemed little
prospect of the President heeding these appeals and fears,
or anyone else's, particularly as his reply to the 15
Senators consisted of a reminder of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf
Resolution,
In the wake of the visit to Washington by British
Foreign Secretary Stewart and Defence Minister Healey,
which ended on 28 January, the Times report of 29 January
noted that: "Britain clearly supports the decision to bomb
again, no matter how reluctantly." 11 Commenting on the
defence talks between the British and U.S. about the
West's main task of containing China, and about Britain's
troop deployments in South East Asia, the report raised
the nightmare of renewed U.S. pressure on Britain to send
troops to Vietnam:
"All this [defence provisons relating to
Singapore] strikes the Americans as eminently
sensible, but meanwhile they continue to eye
enviously the 50,000 British troops in Malaysia.
Should the Indonesian confrontation end soon,
Britain can expect increasing pressure to send
them to Vietnam.
It could prove to be an irresistible
pressure. " 1
At this point North Vietnam again announced its terms
for peace and negotiations in a letter from Ho Chi Minh to
many Heads of State which was sent on 24 January and made
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public on 28 January. The letter demanded U.S. acceptance
of Hanoi's Four Points, proof of this acceptance through a
permanent end to the air strikes, and U.S. recognition and
preparedness to deal with the NLF. ' Three days later, on
31 January, against the background of intensive
discussions in the Administration on the war, the unease
expressed by certain Democratic Senators - most notably
Fulbright and Nansfield - and the knowledge, conveyed by
the peace envoys, that ending the bombing pause would be
ill received by many nations, President Johnson ordered
the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and
proposed UN mediation of the conflict. The blame for this
resumption was laid squarely on Hanoi and Peking's
rejection of the peace offensive, Hanoi's persistent
aggression, and the need to limit American and allied
casualties.
The President's announcement was widely reported and
brought swift reactions. 	 The British Foreign Office put
out a statement on the evening of 31 January, reported in
the press on 1 February, noting that the North Vietnamese
hd refused negotiation offers and therefore "HM
Government understand and support the decision of the US
Government to resume the bombing which they had suspended
in the hope of reaching a peaceful settlement. It is still
open to the North Vietnamese to bring hostilities to an
end by expressing a genuine wish to negotiate."1
Mentioning a letter which Ho CM Minh had addressed to The
ueen, and which had demanded that the NLF be recognised
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as the South Vietnamese people's sole representative, the
Government statement said flatly: "This is an impossible
condition for negotiations, because it requires the United
States to abandon and even to repudiate their South
Vietnamese allies before negotiations even begin." 1	The
statement concluded with an affirmation of the British
Government's "determination to do their utmost" to effect
a negotiate settlement. 17 The Administration could have
asked for no stronger an expression of sympathy and
support than was contained in this statement - which was
precisely why it engendered a row in the Labour Party. For
while the Government was backing the Administration to the
hilt, approximately 94 Labour and Liberal MPs had signed a
telegram to Senator Fuibright deploring the resumption of
the bombing, asking him to continue his opposition to
extending the war, and supporting the proposal for UN
mediation.
The British Government's support for the U.S. and the
Labour MPs action was much discussed in the press. In a
general round-up of first reactions, The New York Times'
London correspondent, in a report headlined "Foreign
Reaction To U.S. Step Mixed", subtitled, "British Back
Raids but India and Canada Regret Action", noted that the
British Government's support was "consistent" with its
former policy, and then described the Labour MPs action
and the Foreign Office statement.' 9 Supporting the U.S.
decison, a Daily Telegraph editorial termed the resumption
of bombing a "matter of moral rather than strategic
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necessity", arguing that the 13.3. "must continue to
impress on the Communists that they cannot win, and on her
Southern allies that the war is not going to be restricted
to their own scarred territory."° Other British press
reports fastened quickly on the implications for the
Government of the Labour MPs telegram, and also on the
extraordinary possiblity that the Prime Minister had not
been aware that the Foreign Office was going to issue a
statement on the bombing. On 2 February -The Guardian
carried a report headlined, "Labour rebels renew attack
over Vietnam", which began:
"Mr Wilson is expected to face a renewal of
back-bench criticism of his Vietnam policy when
he addresses a full meeting of the Parliamentary
Labour Party at Westminster this morning.
It was already clear last night that the
Vietnam 'revolt' in the Labour Paty Is again in
full spate and organised pressure is now being
brought to bear on the Governminent to allow a
full day's debate on the war in the Cominons."11
Discussing the Labour MPs reactions to the Foreign
Office statement, The Guardian noted an unsuccessful
attempt by a Labour MP to adjourn the House for an
immediate debate on this issue, and stated that this
attempt "underlined the irritation of many Labour MPs over
the statement issued by the Foreign Office in support of
US bombing attacks. They regarded the statement as a
gratuitously provocative step in view of the large number
of MPs who bad expressed anxiety over the resumption of
bombIng."	 Pondering the effects of all this, Ih
Guardian speculated:
"Some of this atmosphere may have percolated
back to Downing Street, for it was made clear in
Whitehall yesterday that, although members of
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the Prime Minister's staff had been aware of the
Foreign Office's intention to issue a statement,
the Prime Minister was not.
There was no suggestion in Government circles
that Kr Wilson disagreed with the statment in
any way - it merely restated well known British
Government policy. But it is not difficult to
detect the implication that Mr Wilson might not
have endorsed the issuance of the statment at so
delicate a moment had he been aware of the
Foreign Secretary's intention."'
The idea that the Prime Minister had not known about
this statement was also reinforced by a Guardian editorial
on 2 February, captioned "More support from the Foreign
Office", which opened with the question:
"Who authorised the Foreign Office statement
expressing the British Government's
understanding and support of the American
resumption of bombing over North Vietnam ? Very
sternly worded it was too - it did not even
allow poor President Ho Clii Minh a 'Kr' to his
name. That should teach him. Presumably, Mr
Michael Stewart approved the statement, if he
did not instigate it,"1
Discussing Stewart's support for U.S. policy in Vietnam
and wondering when the bombing would "become intolerable"
to the Government, "as Vietcong methods rightly seem to be
already", the editorial returned to the wording of the
Foreign Office statement, complaining:
"One can see why the Foreign Office should
'understand' the resumption of bombing; and that
ought to have been enough. The additional phrase
'and support,' with the rest of the statement,
may be read to mean that by its suspension of
the bombing for 37 days, and by its 'peace
offensive, ' the United States Administration is,
in the view of the British Government, absolved
from further responsiblity for the continuation
of the war. Perhaps Mr Stewart does believe
that. But it is not only the more Left wing of
his party colleagues who disagree. Nor (though
he may be tempted to think so) is it only 253
voters of Hull North; many more may still not
have wished to see Mr Kevin McNamara defeated.
Perhaps Mr Wilson will once again use his
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special gifts to overlay the simple Foreign
Office view with his own subtler nuances. At any
rate he ought to make it clear to the US
Government In private that the Foreign Offcie
statment does not mean what it says."'
The editorial remark about Hull North referred to a
recent by-election there, where the opposition to Labour
Party candidate Kevin McNamara Included an anti-Vietnam
war candidate, Richard Gott, backed by CND and other
anti-war groups. The Labour candidate won the seat and
increased Labour's majority, but Gott's attempt attracted
publicity. 13B
As predicted the Prime Minister's meeting with the
Parliamentary Labour Party was dominated by the issue of
Vietnam, According to The Guardian, Wilson devoted most of
his speech to this issue, complaining that the MPs who had
signed the telegram to Fuibright had bypassed the proper
channels for party grievances; stating that they "were
ignorant of the backstage efforts which had been made by
the British Government in the search for peace"; and then
reminding back-bench MPs that "he had not yet made up his
mind" on the next election date and that "it was vital
that he should not have the options narrowed by the
actions of his followers". 17 Wilson also stated at this
meeting that he had known and approved of the Foreign
office statement in advance. '	 However this remark was
presumably for public consumption, for, according to
Wilson's memoirs, he had not been informed of this
statement:
"Then, suddenly, the Labour Party was deep in
a new crisis over Vietnam. Hanoi had made no
response to the continued American bombing-pause
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and on 31st January President Johnson ordered
the resumption of air attacks. The Foreign
Office, falling over itself to get into line,
issued a press statement supporting the
President's action. By an error, this was not
submitted to me for approval. I would not have
agreed to a statement In those terms. The Left
was justifiably outraged..
The public speculation on this matter brought forth,
in addition to Wilson's remarks, a Foreign Office denial
that there had been a "clash" over the statement, and a
reaffirmation that the Prime Minister's staff had. been
informed in advance. Id But, despite these denials and
affirmations, at the very least the impression given was
of a lack of coordination on a very Important statement
with international implications. And in practical terms
the statement had embroiled the Prime Minister in a bitter
row within his party's ranks, which simmered for several
days and on 7 February culminated in a motion, signed by
35 Labour 1'lPs, condemning the Government's support for the
resumption of the bombing. 	 Although the House of
Commons debate on South East Asia on 8 February did not
occasion a left-wing revolt, 14 nevertheless it was very
obvious, as U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara had earlier
noted,	 that support for U.S. policy was made more
difficult for the British Government by the bombing.
While Labour MPs were giving vent to their
dissatisfaction over the Government's Vietnam policy, the
U.S. Administration had in the meantime convened the
Honolulu Conference, with its heartening emphasis on
non-military topics. Both the Administration and the
Saigon Government now required some sort of boost, for the
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resumption of the bombing had naturally focussed attention
and criticism on the war itself, U.S. goals and the South
Vietnamese regime it was defending. A long Observer
editorial assessed U.S. policy after the bombing pause and
reached some disturbing conclusions:
"Judging by his reactions, there is a danger
that President Johnson has drawn the wrong
conclusion from the failure of his 37-day 'peace
offensive' to draw a favourable response from
Hanoi: that the only way of persuading North
Vietnam to negotiate is by a crushing display of
American power. Similarly, there , is a grave risk
that Mr Johnson may ignore the other possible
explanation for this failure: that America is
setting about ending the war by the wrong
methods and with the wrong aims.""
Discussing the type of war that the U.S. might be
fighting, the editorial evaluated U.S. fighting methods:
u1f one is convinced that this is simply a war
of conquest by Hanoi, then it might make some
sense to bomb North Vietnam - though it is still
possible to question the effectiveness of
bombing on a non-industrial, predominantly rural
community. But if one believes that the conflict
is essentially a civil war - with Northern
intervention just one element - then America's
present policy is self-defeating.
For if this is a civil war then both the means
and aims of American policy are wrongly
conceived. Large-scale bombing (whether in the
North or South) and the use of other weapons of
mass destruction like napalm may cow people. But
a South Vietnamese Government which cannot count
on the loyalty of its own people - and has no
proper state apparatus - is not going to be
saved by the presence of American troops. "
This editorial also disposed of the Idea that the conflict
could be resolved with a separate South Vietnam:
"Indeed the real question is whether it is
realistic to think of a Korean-type solution for
Vietnam, with a separate American-backed
anti-Communist State in the South. If this is a
political and logisitic (because of the jungles)
impossibility, It is unlikely that Hanoi will
agree to negotiate - whether the peace offensive
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last 37 days or 37 months, whether the Americans
bomb the North or not."1
The remainder of the editorial concentrated on the
deleterious effects of the war on the international scene,
the problems created for U.S.-Soviet relations, and
China's use of the war to stir up anti-American sentiment.
The Observer's solution to preventing the conflict from
worsening was for Johnson to reduce the intensity and
scale of the war, although a peaceful settlement would
come "only as the result of a gradual evolution in
attitudes" on both sides, and this meant that the U. S.
would "have to go through the painful process of
re-examining her political aims.
Unfortunately for the Administration, the Honolulu
Conference completely failed to direct attention away from
the worrying aspects of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and
in fact spotlighted a number of of problems. Initially,
while the conference was deliberating, on past experience
it was thought that the the primary topic for discussion
was an expansion of the war. The Times stated this on 7
February, in a report headlined, "Extension of War Against
Vietcong Predicted", which also mentioned the "commotion"
caused by the hasty convening of the conference and the
conse cluent suggestion that it was to "distract attention"
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings - a
suggestion denied by the White House.' 9 But when the
Conference had finished the headlines and reports in the
presè were scarcely more encouraging.
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An Evening Standard report, headlined "This May Be A
Trap For Johnson", began discouragingly: "The immediate
reaction in Washington to the final stages of the Honolulu
'summit' is that for all its fanfare and panoply, it is
long on words and short on detailed agreement." 19
 The
report noted that the "official ten-point communique
becomes unusually fuzzy" on military programmes,
"referring grandly to agreement on 'growing military
effectiveness'"; that there was a gap between what the
U.S. "would compromise in the cause of peace and what
concessions the South Vietnamese are prepared to make" - a
reference to Prime Minister Ky's public refusal to ever
talk with the NLF; and that there was also a gap between
the U.S. adherence to its version of the Geneva Agreements
entailing free elections, and Ky's reminder that Saigon
Government had never signed the agreements and his
dismissal of them as "'just a ceasefire agreement'". °
Furthermore the report stated that "more gloomy observers"
reckoned that "President Johnson may conceivably have
stepped into a political mantrap by his weekend embrace of
Vietnam's leadership," with the result that:
"The U.S. Administration has now committed
itself in the most flamboyant and public way
with the present political and military
leadership in South Vietnam - in particular
Prime Minister Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, the
Chief of State. . . EKy impressed the Americans;
Rusk has high hopes of his future as a
statesman]
But South Vietnamese politicians are not
famous for their stability or endurance. The
unfortunate memory of Defence [sic] Secretary
McNamara publicly embracing Prime Minister Mm
Nguyen Khanh has been revised as a commentary on
the events this weekend.
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Khanh is now a not very notable ambassador to
Madrid.
The Times article headlined, "Cool Reception In U.S.
For Honolulu Declaration" (the Declaration emphasised
pacification, reconstruction, and democracy in South
Vietnam, that is, non-military topics) opened with a brief
summary of U.S. press reaction: the Washington Post's
remark that "'there was perhaps less to the conference
than met the eye'", and The New York Times' "much harsher"
reaction which "complained of the impression of impulsive
improvisations inspired in part by domestic political
considerations. The impression was that the President had
no clear strategic policy.I1S2 The Times exonerated
Johnson of the charge of Improvising the conference to
detract from the Senate Hearings - but on the grounds that
Johnson's visit was "necessary" because without a "social
revolution" the "only alternatives are withdrawal or utter
dependence on military destruction." 1
	Thus the Times
defence of Johnson dismissed one charge only to highlight
a much worse aspect - the grim conditions in South
Vietnam. This report too mentioned the "belief here that
President Johnson did wrong to lend the prestige of his
office to such a man". 1 &4 The Guardian' s Washington
correspondent concentrated on the implications of Ky's
refusal to talk with the NLF, noting that his refusal had
"compounded the existing confusion" on this "vital issue",
on which the U.S. Administration "has been deliberately
vague" arid which had occasioned contradictory remarks by
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Johnson and his officials, 1&&
 And the Financial Times
observed that:
"President Johnson returned to the White House
this morning to find that his trip to Hawaii has
if anything intensified the prevailing mood of
doubt about his Vietnam policy.
Neither Congress, nor the diplomatic community
here, seems at present able to detect anything
in the Honolulu meeting, more than just another
hastily put together expedient designed
primarily for domestic consumption.hls
The report noted the Administration's "astonishingly
inept handling of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
subpoena of the Defense Secretary, and the President's
intemperate attack on his critics as 'blind to experience
and dead to hope'" and stated that these two factors "have
given a real impression, perhaps for the first time since
the war was intensified, that Mr Johnson feels out of his
depth." 1	The report termed this a ' 1 dangerous situation
for a Democratic leader who faces critical decisions and
may well have further unpleasant measures to put before
the country."1
Perhaps the most sombre review of the Honolulu
Conference and U.S. policy came in a Times editorial,
captioned, "After Honolulu", which summed up the
Conference as "another variant on his double-barrelled
approach to Vietnam.
	
The editorial continued:
"Just as an appeal to the Security Council went
with the resumption of bombing at the end of
last month, so now the renewed determination to
fight on is being accompanied by an effort to
make South Vietnam a place more worth fighting
for, A start on the 'revolutionary
transformation' of the country is to be made at
once, and MR. HUMPHREY is already on his way to
explain to the friendly parts of Asia what it
all means."1°
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Stating that the U.S. had "given up hope of immediate
peace talks", noting that "they must consolidate if they
are not to get out", the editorial assessed their
"prospects" in Vietnam for being able to provide what the
Vietnamese needed: "food and justice." 1	The answer to
this, the editorial concluded, required answers to two
other questions:
"First, is the present Government of South
Vietnam really interested enough in the proposed
reforms to implement them ? It has made no
secret of its belief that bombs and bullets are
the only things that really count. Secondly,
will there not have to be strategic changes too,
with military as well as social efforts
concentrated in enclaves 7 One thing which is
surely obvious is that the South must abandon
the use of torture. The fact that the Communists
have been as brutal in this ruthless war is all
the more reason for the South to give up
brutality. Others have found that you cannot win
minds when you are at the same time torturing
bodies. "
The Daily Telegraph's Washington correspondent did
find a positive side to the conference, as the article
headline proclaimed: "Honolulu Clears the Air". The
correspondent maintained that "three things" were now
"plainer"
"The United States Government is not the
prisoner of the Saigon Government in matters of
strategy and negotiations.
President Johnson has invested much of his
prestige, and with it some of the American
popular support for the war, in the stability of
the Saigon regime and Its success in 'pacifying'
the countryside.
As long as he sticks to roughly the present
level of military action, as he shows every sign
of doing, and puts his weight behind the reforms
in South Vietnam, his critics in Congress will
be as far as ever from finding some alternative
policy."
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However, the very fact that the article discussed these
factors pointed up the problems the Administration faced,
An Observer editorial, using the framework of its 6
February analysis of U.S. policy and South Vietnam, simply
remarked that there was no sign that the U.S.-South
Vietnam Honolulu conference stategy would improve matters
because "it is an illusion to imagine that, however
sincere the American effort, the Great Society can be
built in South Vietnam - without the framework of a viable
political state existing there." 1	While agreeing with
the effort to improve life in South Vietnam socially and
economically, the Observer pointed out that "this is hard
to reconcile with the continued bombing and shelling of
South Vietnamese villages and the allegedly widespread use
of torture by the Saigon troops." 1	The editorial
concluded with the observation that as the facts suggested
that it was not possible to create a non-Communist state
"able to stand on its own feet", then Johnson's "broad
policy is tragicallly mistaken" for: "American power is
certainly able to destroy either half of Vietnam: but it
may be genuinely unable to create the South Vietnamese
State that it seeks to build up, no matter what methods
are adopted."
Thus, the Honolulu Conference had already well and
truly boorneranged in propaganda terms, actually adding to
existing doubts on U.S. policy; focussing attention on
differences between the U.S. and South Vietnam on
negotiations; highlighting the poor state of South Vietnam
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socially and economically; and engendering speculation as
to whether South Vietnam's Government was interested,,or
capable of coping with the tasks.
Towards the end of February Senate opposition to
Administration's Vietnam policy acquired another burst of
publicity when Senator Robert Kennedy appeared to suggest
that the NLF should not only be involved in negotiations
but should take part in a post-war coalition government in
South Vietnam. These remarks were controversial and the
Senator subsequently modified his views, but the
administration had in the meantime agreed to free
elections in the South and support for the government that
emerged.	 As for when the fighting would stop, this was
hard to estimate, for the President's perspective on the
war appeared to alter according to the occasion and within
a matter of days, and press reports did not always focus
on the same aspects. For instance, on 24 February a Times
report on a Johnson speech in New York highlighted his
remark that "'the high hopes of the aggressor have dimmed
and the tide of battle is turning'"; whereas other reports
fastened on his remark that there would be no "'mindless
escalation'" of the war. '
	
On 28 February the President's
message at a press conference as reported in the Times was
that "'we will have a long and hard road'", whereas the
Sunday Telegraph's correspondent emphasised that the
President "is confident that he has Congress and the
Country behind him over America's involvement in
Vietnam. "
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March began with another apparent about-turn on
Vietnam by the Administration. The Guardian reported that
in a speech on 1 March at the anniversary of the Peace
Corps, President Johnson "implied that he would agree to
the holding of free elections throughout North and South
Vietnam, leading to the reunification of the country, if
this was the will of the people."' 7 ' As The Guardian
noted, it was the Diem regime's refusal "to agree to
all-Vietnam elections in 1956, which. .. was largely
responsible for the present conflict. "' T]ae Guardian
concluded cautiously that "today's statement appears to
suggest a greater US flexibility on the question of the
ultimate reunification of Vietnam to match the small step
forward which the Administration has recently taken on the
question of including the Vietcong in peace
negotiations." 1	James Cameron, writing in the Evening
Standard, was much more forthright in demonstrating the
implications of this latest Johnson statement, as the
headline to his article asked: "Well, now - what in hell
is the Vietnam war all about, anyway 	 Cameron stated
that it was the "absolute refusal of the U.S." to consider
free elections that "started this war in the first place
and has kept it going all these bloody years", and then he
highlighted the pivotal nature of Johnson's statement and
the manner of the announcement:
"This is the whole of the Hanoi case - and
here we have President Johnson conceding it, as
a throwaway line in a minor speech, without
anyone visibly batting an eye. I am in an
endless state of wonder at the capacity of a
democracy not only to accept these extraordinary
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things, but apparently hardly to noUce
them. 1
Cameron moved on to a discussion of U.S. policy at
the time of the Geneva agreements, suggested that the war
was about "self-perpetuation" since Johnson now agreed
with the solution sought by North Vietnam, and recommended
that it was time for Hanoi to speak out.
Despite the implication of Johnson's speech, Th
Pentagon Papers make it clear that the Administration's
goal was not simply free elections in South Vietnam but
defeat of the Vietcong and North Vietnam. For in the
background (as noted in Section A above), the President's
top advisers were now recommending the P.O,L. strikes on
Hanoi and Haiphong, the aims of which were to cripple
North Vietnam's war-making capacity and to keep South
Vietnam independent. Thus the concession in the
President's speech was only apparent, and any free
elections would be held after the Administration had
achieved its primary objectives. But, as the press had
noted, the Administration appeared to be demonstrating
flexibility.
It was in March also that General Maxwell Taylor,
former Ambassador to South Vietnam, suggested in his
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Coinmitee
Hearings that Haiphong harbour should be mined. Soon
afterwards it was reported that the Joint Chiefs of staff
were pressing for air raids on Haiphong. " 	 Both Taylor
and the Joint Chiefs were publicly censured by
Presidential aide Bill Moyers for making public their
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views that the war should be expanded. Moyers then denied
that there had been any unanimous recommendation from the
Joint Chiefs to bomb Haiphong "although he indicated that
such a move formed a part of the Administration's
contingency planning."17B However, according to Ih
Pentagon Papers the Joint Chiefs had been pressing since
autumn 1965 for the P.O.L. storage tanks in Hanoi and
Haiphong to be bombed.
s 'arch enied and April began, the political unrest
in South Vietnam started to surface in the press. A
Guardian editorial stated that as with the "agitation that
ended in the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem", the
current unrest began in South Vietnam's northern provinces
with "militant Euddhists and spread outwards to other
communities".	 &oting that the disorders had a "more
overtly anti-American tone than has been usual hitherto",
the editorial observed:
"Whether or not they culminate in the overthrow
of the Prime Minister, Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen
Cao Ky and his colleagues, they have already
demonstrated that in spite of the euphoria
induced by nine whole months without a coup
d'etat, the Americans have not begun to master
the political aspect of the task they have set
themselves in Vietnam; and that helps to explain
why their military efforts, notwithstanding the
gigantic scale, have not brought them success
either. "181
Pondering further on the political instability in
South Vietnam and the fact that the U.S. "simply could not
afford any more coup d'etats" - hence Johnson's public
embrace of Ky - the editorial stated that Johnson had now
"put himself in the position of demonstrating, if there
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should be another, that events are outside his
control. II 1 B2
A Daily Telegraph editorial captioned, "Split In
Vietnam", remarked that "a situation that would be
unmistakeable civil war does seem to be threatening to
develop. . . The kernel is straightforward personal
rivalry."	 The editorial stated that the Americans were
"rightly holding aloof" from the "rivalries", "although
they are reported to be helping with an airlift of
Government troops to Danang".	 Depicting the U.S.
dilemma, and anxious that this unrest was an obstacle to
fighting the real war, the editorial advised the Americans
that their commitment to Ky should not prevent them from
dropping him in favour of a better alternative:
"No one has striven more earnestly than they
(the Americans] to establish civilian government
in South Vietnam; but the overriding essential,
while the war lasts, is that the country should
have a strong Government. It is because the
armed forces constitute the most solid organised
power that President JOHNSON backed Marshal KY
and his council of generals. If a viable
alternative emerged, American commitment to
Marshal KY should not stand in its way. But what
is happening now seems less likely to produce
such an authority than to weaken the basis of
political authority itself."'
While editorials and articles were commenting on the
implications of the unrest in South Vietnam and the
population's "genuine disgust and the growing hostility to
the war", 19
 The New York Times reported that the U.S. was
busy reassuring the West about its policy on Vietnam,
using a relatively sophisticated version of its war
objectives propaganda - buying time for South Vietnam:
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"The United States has been giving an uneasy
Western Europe an earnest but basically
optimistic account of its prospects in the war
in Vietnam.
The forecast is more confident about military
operations than about the political picture in
Saigon, but it counts upon gradual success in
the war to gain time for building a viable South
Vietnamese society. ''
This long report noted that "the war itself is essentially
remote from the consciousness of Europeans", but then
detailed the areas where it did in fact impinge on
European interests:
"But the war does touch indirectly on some of
the vital issues in the diplomacy of the
Atlantic Alliance and even the internal politics
of Europe. For that reason, American officials
passing through Europe, such as Under Secretary
of State George W. Ball this week, make it a
point to reinforce the more frequent reports
given to the allies through ambassadors in
Europe and in Washington and in the Council of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
Paris." 1B8
Analysing European attitudes on a national basis, the
report stated that:
"In Britain there is a stout defense of the
American war effort, dictated In part by
conviction and in part by the wish to maintain
good relations with Washington. The British
blame the Communists in Moscow and Hanoi as well
as Peking for not contributing to a peace
conference, but they also question Washington's
willingness to compromise if the opportunity
ever presented itself.."19
Detailing the U.S. arguments on Vietnam and that
Europe was " being asked. . . to accept as realistic the
American hope that the military situation will gradually
improve and even without negotiations produce what could
be called a 'military solution'" through "disintegration
of the Vietcong forces" or by a North Vietnamese decision
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"to let the conflict wane", the report noted the
Europeans' deep-seated doubts:
"10 time schedule is given the Europeans for
such a solution. And the Europeans express doubt
in turn not only about the underlying
justification for the war but about Washington's
capacity to measure its own chances any better
today than in other recent periods of
optimism. '1190
Such a composite analysis of its allies' attitudes
should have been useful to the Administration,
particularly as a decision on the bombing of Hanoi and
Haiphong was now under consideration, and this action
would be regarded as a major escalation by the rest of the
world - as the Administration knew. Indeed, by 7 April
press articles were already beginning to appear stating
that Johnson was studying plans to bomb Hanoi and
Haiphong's P.O.L. storage facilities. 191 A Times report
also linked this proposal to the intention to regularly
use E-52s for bombing raids in an effort to "redress the
balance of strength painfully acquired after months of
fighting, and now threatened by the recent civil disorders
in the south and the reported communist reinforcements
from the north. II19
In fact, the "recent civil disorders" to which Th
Times referred were soon to erupt again, for South Vietnam
was now merely enjoying an interim phase of quiet before
Ky reneged on his pledges to the Buddhists and
demonstrators and plunged the country into even greater
chaos and much bloodshed. As for the U.S. role during the
March disturbances, which had earlier been construed as
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that of bystander, at the end of April the Observer
Foreign News Service carried an article on the part played
by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The article stated that
Ambassador Lodge was due in Washington for another
"reappraisal of the Vietnam situation", a review which
might be "the most agonising one yet, because Lodge
carries with him the somewhat tattered remains of the
glossy blueprint President Johnson sketched at February's
Honolulu conference for a Vietnamese 'Great Society' ."'
The article noted the events in South Vietnam since
Honolulu and remarked that "the U.S. Embassy looks guilty
of tactical blunders." 14 Describing the Embassy
speculation that Lodge and other Embassy staff might
resign the article continued
"In fact it is the Thi affair that has sullied
the Embassy's reputation. For publication but
not for attribution, Embassy officials claim
that the United States neither encouraged nor
discouraged the ruling Directory to fire Thi.
They claim that American advice was confined to
saying 'Do it if you think you can get away with
it.
In fact, it seems that Lodge strongly urged
the generals to fire TM from the ten-general
directory on the grounds that Thi's
insubordination was weakening the fragile
framework of the central government."
Thus the U.S. Embassy, in view of its role in the
disturbances - the second act of which was soon to begin -
must also be held responsible for the subsequent shambles
and its effects on U.S. policy, as described by William
Buridy:
"Just at that moment of time [when Johnson might
have tried to set the country more on a war
footing] the South Vietnamese loused it up well
and proper, through Ky's dismissal of General
Thi and the sympathy Thi had and all that went
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into the Buddhist and so-called 'Struggle
Movement' that took over Da Nang and Hue and
hung fire until early June. You had four months
of having your hands tied, of having the whole
cause made uncertain, by ineptitude and division
within the ranks of those who were supposedly
fighting Hanoi and the Viet Cong in South Viet
Nam. And that seems to have been one of the
great setbacks. In the end it all worked
out. . . "
But as Bundy makes clear, although it "worked out" in
the end, it was an episode the Administration could well
have done without. For all the weaknesses of the Saigon
regime - America's protege and reason for fighting the war
- had been exposed. And in British political life, the
unrest in South Vietnam and the rumours of intensification
of the war prompted the Left-wing of the labour party to
put forward another motion censuring the British
Government for not referring to the intensification of the
war in The Queen's Speech, following the General Election
on 31 March in which the Labour government had increased
its overall majority from 4 seats to 97. '" The Labour
left-wing were also concerned with the periodic reports
that the U.S. would ask for, and possibly receive, British
troops, warning that this would affect the Government's
majority.
The Administration policy review at the beginning of
May occasioned more press reports about the possible
bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. On 10 May The Times, in a
report headlined, "President faces a solemn choice on
Vietnam" stated that Johnson now had to choose between
intensifying the air war "to a level where the United
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States wi2.l lose much of the reluctant support of its
friends, and perhaps their respect", or "massive
redeployment of American forces throughout the world" with
"widespread repercussions at home." 19 Analysing the
reasons for this drastic choice, the report stated:
"In spite of all the costly ground action and
increased bombing and gassing, the games theory
approach has again failed. The pacification
programme is almost at a standstill, and the
infiltration of North Vetinam troops has
continued to increase frEn a previous estimated
total of 4,500 a month to perhaps 7,000.
If the games theory approach has failed, it
has not been discarded by the President's
advisers. This is evident by their response - a
choice of alternatives, both of which are
further steps up the escalation ladder."°
The report also noted that South Vietnamese Prime
Minister Ky had made remarks which "have cast some doubt
on the possiblity of early elections", now reportedly
causing "Buddhist dissatisfaction" and though Rusk
exp.lained Ky's remarks, the overall effect constituted
"another reminder that the President is being urged to
intensify a war in defence of a democracy that still does
not exist."° 1 The New York Herald Tribune carried two
reports on this issue on the same day, the first report,
headlined "Johnson seen Near Decision on Bombing Hanoi Oil
Depots", and the second with a headline, "Bombing Decision
Iirnninent".° And on 15 Nay the Sunday Times carried a
short report by Henry Brandon: "Johnson pressed to step up
air war in Vjetnam".°
In mid-May South Vietnam erupted into political
turmoil again, as Ky moved against opposition elements in
Danang, Hue and Saigon. The Daily Telegraph assailed Ky
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once more, recalling the past instability in South Vietnam
in its disappointment with the current events:
"Each successive Government in South Vietnam
has embarrassed its American allies either by
being too authoritarian or by being too weak to
rule. Marshal KY, it seems, has contrived to
indict himself on both counts."
A Guardian editorial depicted the uncertainty in
South Vietnamese political life and the effects of the
war:
"Whatever the outcome of the civil war within
the civil war in Vietnam, it is hardly likely to
be elections in August or September. But they
looked phantasmagorial even when they were first
promised last month; who can ever forecast what
will happen in Vietnam one week ahead - let
alone 'three to five months' ? Like rural
pacification - winning the hearts and minds of
peasants by giving them a better life - the
holding of elections is an admirable aspiration.
One might even say that the war cannot be won
without these things. The trouble is that in
practice they have not unexpectedly proved to be
quite incompatible with the other methods used
to win the war; and, as those methods have
increased in intensity and pervasiveness (a
process roughly corresponding with the growth of
the United States forces to a quarter of a
million men), so the political aspects of the
struggle have seemed more and more to exist in a
dream world.
The Guardian also pointed out the irrelevance of
Rusk's recent statement that Ky's remarks "about hanging
on to power" had been "misreported", whereupon Ky "said
the same thing again louder and clearer." 	 A Times
editorial, captioned "War Within A War", focussed on the
South Vietnamese opposition accusation that the U.S. was
responsible for the currrent strife, dismissing the
accusation as "absurd" and stating that "AIR VICE-MARSHAL
KY had gone behind their backs in trying to crush the
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rebels by force,"° 7 In view of what was known about past
U.S. conduct in South Vietnamese affairs, such as the
overthrow of Diem, this assertion displayed considerable
faith in U.S. integrity, although the impression given was
that the Americans had not the least idea of what was
going on in the country. The Observer, as often in the
past, placed the Vietnam war in a global context, stating:
"The deepening chaos in Vietnam and the
threatened disintegration of Nato in Europe now
face the United States, and, willy.pilly, their
allies, with decisions of the utmost gravity.
America is teetering between desperate
choices. In Vietnam she is being pushed towards
an ever more catastrophic involvement in war or
toars an equally catastrophic sudden
abandonment. [In Europe the U.S. is being urged
toward more military reliance on West Germany,
or gradual withdrawal into neo-isolationism. . .]
In Vietnam, President Johnson's policy of
trying to bring the North Vietnamese to
negotiate by means of heavy bombing (now heavier
than that in World War II) has plainly failed.
It is not North Vietnam or the Vietcong who have
cracked under the weight of increased American
intervention, but the rather fragile politcal
structure of South Vietnam."°9
The Observer noted that Ky's forceful extinction of
the rebellion "is obviously not the last word in the
struggle within the South. It has only made even clearer
the narrow military and sectarian basis of the Saigon
regime on which the U.S now relies for lack of anything
else."° In the light of the worsening situation in
Vietnam a Guardian editorial returned to the issue of
Prime Minister Wilson's support for U.S. policy,
explaining first the basis for British support:
"Hitherto the unspoken premise of Mr Wilson's
foreign policy had been that Atlantic unity
comes first. He has muffled his feelings about
Vietnam because, for Britain, it was a secondary
issue. American backing of NATO, the nuclear
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guarantee to Europe, American support for
sterling, American cooperation over Rhodesia -
these have ranked higher in British priorities.
Therefore Mr Wilson has spoken softly on
Vietnam. Can he go on doing so ? Ought he to do
so any longer ?"°
The editorial then catalogued the mistakes and
consequences of U.S. policy:
"If uninhibited, the Prime Minister would
probably say that American policy on Vietnam has
been wrong on almost every count. The events at
Da Nang - with Marshal Ky's men shooting down
people whom the Americans are supposed to be
protecting - is the latest proof that the
Americans are building on sand. They went into
Vietnam with honest and idealistic motives. They
saw intervention there as part of a world-wide
responsibilty to contain communism. But in
practice the hope of stability in South Vietnam
has long disappeared. Today, America's
involvement has only hurtful consequences. It
has trapped the US in one of the most barbarous
wars of this century. It is destroying life in
the country that it was meant to defend. So long
as it lasts, it poisons the prospect of better
relations with the Soviet Union. And it diverts
American attention from urgent tasks
elsewhere, I1 1
Dwelling on the cruelty of the war, the tonnage of bombs
dropped and the increasing numbers of casualties, the
editorial concluded with a query about the effects of
Wilson speaking "plainly", pondering whether this would
endanger Anglo-American relations, and whether President
Johnson's "might be vindictive. uSI Despite this
possibility, the editorial recommended that "Mr Wilson
ought to take the risk of speaking plainly", in private to
begin with, although "a change of Britain's public stand
will have to come soon" , for:
"Even if President Johnson turns against us,
others in the United States will see the force
of our argument. Common humanity cannot longer
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tolerate the degree of violence now accepted in
Vietnam.
It is possible that the anxiety displayed in many
ritish res organs over events in Vietnam was sharpened
by the occasional rumours that British troops might be
dispatched to help the U.S. The latest rumours in early
and late May were occasioned by a relaxing of tension in
the Indonesia confrontation, with the suggestion that
British troops not needed in Malaysia would be sent ot
Vietnam. Again the British Government had to publicly
scotch these persistent rumours.
In South Vietnam, Ky's crushing of oppositon in
Danang created yet more resistance, including the
self-immolation of several Buddhists protesting against
Ky's actions and U.S. support for the Saigon junta. On 30
May President Johnson deplored the suicides and reiterated
U.S. determination to continue the war. 1 President
Johnson's declaration prompted another j.jrdian editorial
stating that the Prime Minister should "speak out" against
U.S. policy, out of his "loyalty to the alliance, and his
concern for the wellbeing of its leading member I . 2lB
 Ih
Guardian concluded: "There is no virtue in cheering on a
friend marching blindly into a swamp." 217 In fact, at this
very moment Johnson was privately endeavouring to persuade
Wilson to support him in a giant step into the swamp - the
bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.
Johnson's grim public message was matched by North
Vietnamese President Ho Chi Mmli's declaration in English,
during an interview for an Independent Television
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programme, that North Vietnan would "'fight to the end'"
and would not surrender to U.S. boinbing, 8
 As these
events unfolded the unease in the Labour Party was growing
stronger, as the Guardian recorded on 5 June:
"Left-wing activity, both inside and outside
Parliament, designed to change the Government's
East of Suez policy and to dissociate Britain
from American action in Vietnam, reached a new
peak at the weekend, with renewed calls from 1(Ps
for a curb to defence spending, and the setting
up in London of a Vietnam Solidarity
Campaign.
Discussing the actions under consideration by left-wing
MPs to force a debate on Vietnam, the report explained the
reasons:
"MPs are being forced to consider this drastic
action partly because they have become very
conscious of the growing gap between opinion in
Parliament and that in the country, which is
rapidly polarising between apathy arid extremism.
Some groups outside are so filled with dismay by
the Labour Government's continued support for
American bombing that they have been reduced to
inaction. Others are moving towards outright
support for the Vietnamese National Liberation
Front and total rejection of American
policy.
However, dissatisfaction with the Government's policy
reached higher than backbench NPs, for the Sunday Times
reported on 19 June that three left-wing Labour ministers
were preparing to "warn" the Prime Minister and "other
Labour Party leaders" that "a major showdown over Vietnam
must be expected when the Government reports to this
year's Labour Party conference." 	 The report stated that
the Ministers' "concern over Vietnam will be strengthened
by the flood of resolutions. . . for debate at the 1966
labour conference. . . Vietnam is mentioned more than any
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other topic by the local parties and trade unions which
have already submitted resolutions. '•	 Considering
Wilson's reaction, the report stated: "What is uncertain,
however, is how willing Mr Wilson will be to alter his
present stand over Vietnam to accommodate party
pressures."	 Thus at this stage it appears that Wilson
was still assumed to be capable of following his own
policy, if he so chose, despite party pressure.
!t the same time that Wilson was being warned of
major political storms ahead, hints of new peace moves on
Vietnam were made public, accurately citing Canadian
diplomat Chester Ronning's visit to Hanoi, and mentioning
Averell Harriman's trip -to Ottawa. The State Department's
reaction "to a flurry of activity in world capitals" was
reported to be "extremely cautious," 4 This was the last
of the international peace probes before the
Administration bombed Hanoi and Haiphong. As The Pentagon
Papers relate, the date set for these strikes was
postponed because of Ronning's mission, in order that the
Administration should not be accused of wrecking it and
thereby incur more international censure.&
On 26 June there were signs that the Administration
was about to escalate the conflict. Also the
Administration's true aim of an independent South Vietnam
was being made public, with the consequent implication for
both the conduct and duration of the war - unless North
Vietnam surrendered. The publication of this stance
indicated a hardening of the Administration's attitude,
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rejecting former public signs of 'flexibility'; and it
also publicly undercut any basis for negotiations, for it
was widely known that North Vietnam would not agree to
negotiations in which the sole purpose was to achieve a
permanently independent South Vietnam, and thereby
awarding the U.S. at the peace table what it could not
achieve on the battlefield. In the abserver it was
reported that the Administration had "taken a momentous
policy decision about Vietnam":
"In a marked toughening of policy, President
Johnson has ruled out all ideas of a political
settlement based on a neutralised Vietnam, He
has decided to settle for nothing less than a
Korean-type partition solution which would
maintain South Vietnam, like South Korea, as a
separate non-Communist State under American
military protection.
Pointing out that this "policy shift" appeared to
"reverse the acceptance of a neutral Vietnam in President
Johnson's earlier 14-point peace plan", the article stated
that this aim had not been "made explicit" to the U.S.
public because of the forthcoming mid-term elections.
Almost in passing, the article mentioned reports
"circulating today" that the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
was "imminent", and then stated that the "most hopeful
official estimates" for this expected war of attrition
were "12 to 18 months."	 The article concluded with a
short paragraph explaining that where Britain was
concerned "at the highest level in the State Department
there is an unconcealed conviction that the United Kingdom
is welshing on its obligations.	 Thus, the President's
public stance that Britain was excused from sending troops
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because of its role as Geneva Conference co-chairman, was
clearly not the view taken by his own top off icals. On the
same day the Sunday Times carried a report from Washington
by Henry Brandon that: "There has been an anguished
exchange of communications between President Johnson and
Mr Harold Wilson over the next step in the escalation of
the air war in Vietnam." Brandon then evaluated Wilson's
support for Johnson's policy, implicitly assessing the
impact of any withdrawal:
"To President Johnson, the backing Mr Wilson
has afforded him so far has been extremely
important and he has not failed to show his
appreciation. But now some sort of cross-road
seems to have been reached in the risk-taking of
escalation. The President hinted at this at his
press conference a week ago when he said 'We
must continue to raise the cost of aggression at
its source.
Brandon then went on to discuss the arguments put
forward to support the bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong
oil storage facilities, stating that President Johnson
would have used these arguments to attempt to enlist
Wilson's suppport, but "To the President's considerable
disappointment, however, Mr Wilson has explained that he
would not be able to put his stamp of approval on the
broadening of these air attacks." 21 The day before the
air strikes on Hanoi and Haiphong the Daily Express joined
the chorus of press articles on escalation with a report
that Johnson planned to increase U.S. troops by another
100,000 in order to try and end the war sooner - "in
months instead of years".	 Ever supportive, the Daily
Express also reported that "American troops have already
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seized the initiative" and that due to U.S. "superior fire
power they are taking an ever-heavier toll of the Vietcong
and their North Vietnamese allies."
	 The current U.S.
military strategy was reported to be "attack and punish",
for "military advisers" were "convinced that the
Communists can be ground down in the test of stamina."24
The indications were unmistakeable now that the
Administration intended to carry on fighting for as long
as necessary to achieve an aim - a permanently independent
South Vietnam - that North Vietnam was equally dedicated
to frustrating.
On 29 June the major P.O.L. storage depots at Hanoi,
Haiphong and a smaller storage depot at Do Son estimated
to contain 60% of North Vietnam's storage capacity, were
bombed and reported to be 80% destroyed. Conforming to
past practice, the Administration insisted publicly that
this action was not a new escalation of the war, but was a
response to Hanoi's escalation, and fielded McNainara to
defend the Admi.nistration's case with his statistics.
The announcement unleashed a flood of mingled comment and
criticism.
Reacting swiftly, the British Prime Minister issued a
statement which firmly dissociated the Government from
these attacks, expressed general support for the U.S.
assistance for South Vietnam and U.S. proposals for
unconditional negotiations, and blamed North Vietnam for
the lack of negotiations and the continued fighting.
Many of the British press reports' headlines focussed on
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Wilson's dissociation, thus emphasising the event, while
also discussing the Administration's justifications for
the air strikes. The Times' headline stated: "?lr. Wilson
deplores Vietnam bombing"; The Guardian headlined its
report, "US on defensive over Hanoi raids", with the
subtitle, "Grieved by British 'dissociation'"; the Daily
Telegraph headline stated: "Wilson Disowns U.S. Bombing",
while its subtitles revealed the party differences, "Tory
'double cross' charge resented", and "Left Wing Signing
Critical Motion".	 And The New York Times too headlined
a report, "Wilson Deplores Latest Attacks", although its
subtitle noted, "Backs General U.S. Policy - Thant Scores
Raids on 'Populated Areas'" •
Despite the reiteration of British official support
for U.S. aims in South Vietnam, The Guardian remarked the
"deep chagrin" in the Administration over the dissociation
and the Financial Times observed that President Johnson's
reaction to the British dissociation was unlikely to be
anything less than intense irritation. 	 This observation
in turn generated speculation as to the effects this would
have on Anglo-American relations in the future, including
a forthcoming visit by Wilson to Washington in mid-July.
But on the subject of the visit Whitehall reportedly
"brusquely discounted the theory" that Johnson might want
Wilson's visit postponed. °
Other reports recounted the domestic effects of
Wilson's statement, as in the Financial Times article
headlined, "Wilson stand on Hanoi bombing mollifies the
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Left". 4 However the Left was not so mollified as to
refrain from tabling a Notion calling on the Government to
withdraw all support for the U.S. policy in Vietnam, a
course of action which Wilson refused to follow. The Daily
Telegraph pointed out that Wilson's "apparently
contradictory statement" had left him open to charges from
the Conservatives that he was "'going to double cross'"
the President, and questions from his party's Left-wing
about how he could dissociate from the bombings, the
"major stategy" for fighting the war, but continue to
support U.S. general policy. 2	Wilson's statement was in
fact another attempt to steer a middle course and keep
both his U.S. allies and his domestic critics happy. At
this delicate and problematic juncture, Wilson decided to
launch another peace initiative involving an approach to
Moscow. As the Daily Express stated so succinctly in its
headline, "Wilson's Dilenmia", with the supertitle, "Bombs:
Peace bid next as Left wing revolts" .	 The New York
Times also noted this planned initiative: "Well-placed
sources said that the shock effect of the United States
bombing of oil storage Installations near Hanoi and
Haiphong made it urgent, internationally and domestically,
for the British Government to make a move."
Concerning the Administration' s ultimate reasons for
bombing the storage depots, that is to reduce North
Vietnam capacity to continue the war and infiltration
southwards, a Times editorial stated that if the bombings
shortened the war then the Americans would be "fully
496
justified. 4S But the editorial questioned whether the
bombings would have this effect:
"Bombing alone has never yet won a war. The
North Vietnamese have shown great endurance and
ingenuity in coping with the most intensive air
bombardment that has ever been launched •They
have had good time to make preparations for
meeting a new threat."
The editorial ended on a sombre note, remarking that:
"President Johnson believes that bombing the
supply dumps will shorten the war. He may well
be wrong. If he Is wrong, his next decision
could be even more ominous than 'this one."247
International reaction to the bombings was summed up in
a New York Herald Tribune report on 1 July, headlined
"Bombing Protests Spread", which began: "Critics
throughout the world today were louder than supporters of
the U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong." 2	Despite the
international reaction, President Johnson declared that
the intensified air strikes would continue. Meanwhile the
Administration publicly endeavoured to minimise the
effects of the British dissociation by stressing the
general support still offered in Wilson's statement, and
dismissing fears of heavy civilian casualties.
Nevertheless, The Guardian still predicted that the Prime
Minister's statement would lead, in the words of its
headline, to a "Cool US reception now for Mr Wilson",
noting that the bombing had "cast a cloud over
Anglo-American relations, S2&O And The Guardian surmised
that Britain's dissociation would lead to the very result
that Wilson had tried so hard to avoid - even in his
statement:
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"Britain's first public opposition to an
American action in Vietnam is going to mean that
President Johnson will be even less prepared
than in the past to listen to any advice or
proposals for a Vietnam settlement that Mr
Wilson may wish to discuss with him. '2&1
Henry Brandon's article in the Sunday Times on 3 July
tended to confirm the suspicions that relations between
the two allies would be more difficult after the British
dissociation. He noted the Administration's surprise at
the speed of Wilson's dissociation, and concern over his
mention of "'targets touching on the populated areas of
Hanoi and Haiphong' when even the Russians, it is pointed
out with slight irritation, referred only to targets on
the 'outskirts. '"	 Brandon also recorded the White
House's dominant reaction to the dissociation, which
ungraciously suggested that Wilson had given the President
an inflated view of his own political abilities:
"Nevertheless, most of the comments made around
the White House are more in sadness that Mr
Wilson did not feel strong enough to take a more
muted line, that he does not seem to be as much
in charge of his party as he privately likes to
reassure the President he is."2
Although Brandon observed that compared with the
Senate opposition which was truly "damaging and annoying",
Wilson's dissociation was "viewed with a certain amount of
charitable equanimity", he still judged that it was "as
well that Mr Wilson is not visiting Washington this week
(as had been suggested earlier before the arrangements for
late July were made)..
A week after the bombings the Financial Times carried
a remarkabay jaundiced report from its Washington
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correspondent on the Administration's public efforts to
rally support, and on the air strikes themselves:
"The campaign to steady American opinion
behind the war effort in Vietnam is now going
full blast. Yesterday there was President
Johnson's statement that diplomatic reports
indicate that Hanoi no longer expects a military
victory. To-day Mr. George Ball, Acting
Secretary of State in Mr. Dean Rusk's absence,
called a press conference apparently designed to
amplify the point."
Paradoxically, the article stated that the
Administration's "performance", stressing North Vietnam's
"greater war-weariness", "confirms the general impression,
which Government officials scarcely bother to deny, that
the main object of the decision to bomb the oil depots was
psychological."	 The article mentioned that the raids
had "considerable military value" but the main purpose was
to ward off a "feeling at home . that the Administration
was 'playing at war,'" and also to persuade North Vietnam
"that its hopes of a collapse of American will were
groundless. "7 Evaluating the Administration's public
statements, the report observed harshly:
"The present spate of calculated optimism Is
part of the same pattern. It, like the bombing
itself and like the President's tough speeches
in the mid-West last week, may make negotiation
more difficult. But never mind. It will
demonstrate to the country that the President is
not only not playing but is actually getting
somewhere.
All this may sound unnecessarily cynical, but
it is hard to find any observer in Washington
who does not agree that the Government' s line
has now reached heights of special pleading far
beyond the mundane.
The fact is that it is many months since any
responsible official here has really believed
that the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese
Government thought they could gain a complete
victory by military means.
499
The report then analysed the "actual foundation" of
the Administration's optimism and concluded that it was
"equally suspect", for Hanoi's determination to continue
the war was obvious and "it is hard to find any sign -
outside the public utterances of high American officials -
that it is weakening."	 The paradox lay in the fact that
the Joint Chiefs had actually proposed these air strikes
to the Administration on the grounds that they would
effectively cripple the North Vietnamese war effort. But
observers perceived the strikes to be pyschologlcal
because of the Administration's persistent stress on its
commitment to South Vietnam and the generally held belief
that as the North Vietnamese no longer believed they could
gain a military victory there was no overriding military
reason to bomb the oil depots. What the Financial Times'
correspondent and other observers apparently overlooked
was the possiblity that the Administration was trying for
an outright military victory. But even without this
suggestion appearing publicly this Financial Times report
was a searing indictment of the Administration, not ,just
the air strikes and the public statements on them.
Throughout July the effects of these air strikes
continued to reverberate in Britain and around the world.
The Labour Government was forced to agree to a
Parliamentary debate on Vietnam and though an Opposition
otion was defeated and the Government's own Motion,
"which followed the Labour manifesto's policy on Vietnam"
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was supported, it was with a considerably reduced majority
due to left-wing Labour XP abstentions.°
There were demonstrations in Britain which resulted
in casualties for the first time - five policemen were
injured on 3 July after a march by 4,000 to the U.S.
Embassy in Grosvenor Square in London, and 31.
demonstrators were arrested.' This was also the day that
a Sunday Times report suggested that casualties in Hanoi
"had been relatively heavy." 6 On 18 July there were
15,000, demonstrators at a Trafalgar Square rally
organised by CND.
The Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, from 16-19
July, was preceded by student protests at Sussex
University where he collected an honorary degree, and by a
visit by 2 Labour MPs to the U.S. Congress to discuss
Vietnam.	 Wilson's JOSCOW talks produced no solutions to
the Vietnam problem, although according to Wilson's
memoirs it may have helped to prevent Hanoi from putting
captured 3.S. pilDts on trial.	 In any case, the
dministration had again run true to form, and had been
reported as publicly welcoming the peace moves by Britain
and India, while being privately sceptical.
The Russians protested that the raids endangered
their merchant ships in the port of Haiphong, cancelled an
athletics meeting with the U.S., and, in concert with the
Warsaw Pact, issued a statement. offering volunteers for
the war if Hanoi wanted thein. 67 Rusk's reply was a blunt
warning to "Stay Out".
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As if further proof were needed, on 24 July,
President Johnson again reiterated the U.S. commitment,
this time in a spirit of battle, as The Guardian reported:
"He has decided to abandon his defensive stance on the war
and embrace Vietnam before the people as a holy war. . .
It was, however, to be a holy war within strict
boundaries, for when Prime Minister Ky suggested that
forth Vietnam should be invaded the State Department
quickly reaffirmed the U.S. desire not to widen the war.
This U.S. denial prompted The Guardian both to remember
Ky's previous request, and to sketch a frightening
scenario for the future:
"Almost two years ago to the day he was urging
that North Vietnam should be bombed. That too
was not part of public US policy at the time,
yet within a fortnight the first Northern oil
installations had been bombed, and within eight
months US aircraft were hard at it day after
day.
If the war continues, Air Vice-Marshal Ky will
no doubt once again be getting his wish; and
then, when that, too, had failed to produce the
results he hopes for, his further desire may be
gratified - to see the Americans take on the
Chinese. In this sense, if in no other, time is
on his side,"
Finally, Wilson's visit to Washington on 2 July
appeared to contradict the predictions that the Prime
Minister's reception would be less than warm. According to
Wilson's memoirs the visit passed off with no difficulties
- although the President had once more just been refused
the token British force that he had long desired - and in
fact the President toasted Wilson in hugely flattering
terms.1 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the
British dissociation did affect the relationship between
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the two allies' leaders, and that it could be expected to
further affect the reception accorded by the
Administration to British peace initiatives - a reception
which had been erratic at the best of times, and was often
unenthusiastic.
It was now clear to most observers, and abhorrent to
many, that the war in Vietnam was set firmly and
irreocably on a course iTlVOIViTig ever-greater escalation
and. carnage, and. that the Johnson administration's
statements on a 'limited war' referred to geographical
limits, not to the scale of the destruction. Furthermore,
the bombing of the P.O.L. depots was perceived as a new
step in the escalation of the war. And it was this U.S.
willingness to continue escalating the conflict, at the
risk of inflicting civilian casualties on North Vietnam,
that had caused Britain, its closest ally and staunchest
supporter, to publicly regret this action and to reaffirm
its support for 1J..S pOliCy with a pointed reference to
the aim of a negotiated settlement, thus effectively
defining the type of military conduct of the war that
Britain would, and would not, condone.
D.) British Government Reaction and Opinion
In the months from January to July 1966 the British
Government encountered two major difficulties in pursuing
its policy of support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The
greatest difficulty was caused by the U.S. escalation of
the war when it bombed North Vietnam's P.O.L. storage
facilities, which outraged the Government's Left-wing
O3
back-benchers. The second major difficulty occurred
earlier, when the U.S. resumed the bombing of North
Vietnam at the end of January, which infuriated the
left-wing. However, as a Labour Prime Minister attempting
to balance the demands of the Labour Left-wing against his
own policy requirements and the needs of his U.S. ally,
Wilson also ran into another problem Whitehall's
propensity to support U.S. policy more strongly than the
Prime Minister and most of the Government. This phenomenon
manifested itself publicly in the summaries of
'Whitehall's views' which appeared from time to time in
the press, and in Foreign Office statements. In the case
of the latter, this also tended to place the Foreign
Secretary publicly on one side of a fence which the Prime
Minister was clearly trying to straddle in the interests
of domestic political harmony.
A clear example of this t'gpe o problem occrreô. at
the end of January when the U.S. resumed the bombing of
North Vietnam after a 37-day pause and the Foreign Office
put out a supportive and sympathetic statement, which was
subsequently criticised by Labour MPs and led to the
tabling of a Motion to censure the Government. As Wilson
makes clear in his memoirs, and as press reports suggested
at the time, he was consulted in advance neither about the
intention to issue a statement nor about the wording.
Nevertheless, as Prime Minister, it was Wilson who was the
prime target for criticism over the Government's policy of
support for the U.S. and who was called upon to defend
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this statement in concert with the Foreign Secretary.
Probably any Government statement on the resumption of the
bombing which did not deplore this action would have
antagonised the labour Left-wing, but the wording of the
Foreign Office statement was virtually certain to enrage
it. Thus, this statement involved the Government in a
quite unnecessary row with its back-benchers.
although the kamiriistration knew its terms for
negotiations were unaccptab1e to Hanoi,. amounting to
surrender, it is evident that on occasions the
Administration used the British to undertake diplomatic
probes on negotiations. In February 1966, just after the
resumption of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Rusk sent
a message to British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
about indications from the Russians "within the last 24
hours" that Hanoi "wishes to maintain contacts with us"
and might be interested in a reconvened Geneva
Conference.	 Rusk suggested that the British approach
the Russians:
"nile we cannot yet guage the validity of
these indicators, we remain eager, as HMG knows,
to explore every opening and exhaust all
possibilities of getting negotiations started.
Therefore, it seems to us that another probe by
UK of Soviet willingness to join them as
co-chairman in convening a new Geneva Conference
is worthwhile. Goldberg took up this matter with
Caradon this morning. [Caradon was a Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs in the British Foreign
Off I c e]
As UK knows, UN SC [United Nations Security
Council] has adjourned subject to call of
President while consultations are undertaken. We
are quite content to let adjournment continue
while private efforts to get talks going are in
train and have no desire to let formal SC debate
cut across such efforts. We would hope that
soundings of this kind could be undertaken
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expeditiously so we can get clearer picture
among other things, of how to play SC
adjournment,
This message from Rusk helps to explain the British
Government's insistence, despite evidence to the contrary
on occasions, that the Administration was really
interested in negotiations. This effort to reconvene the
Geneva Conference sank without trace, as did all the
others. However, in February 1967, the British launched an
attempt to get negotiations started with the help of
Soviet Premier Kosygin who was visiting Britain. The
attempt was an embarrassing, and einbittering, failure, due
In part, it seems, to British over-eagerness and U.S.
distrust.	 But, it did enable the British Government to
gain first-hand experience of the difficulties encountered
be
by other would;mediators when dealing with the U.S. on the
subject of negotiations.
In June 1966, Wilson dissociated from the U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam's P.O.L. depots around Hanoi and
Haiphong. Although Wilson had previously informed Johnson
in December 1965 that he could not support this action,
President Johnson still made considerable efforts in May
and June 1966 to persuade Wilson to change his mind.
Wilson again refused, in strong terms, and the President
then sent a special envoy to brief U.S. Ambassador Bruce
in London, and if Bruce judged it wise, also to brief
Wilson on the proposed bombings in the hope of changing
his mind. 7
 After this briefing Wilson sent a letter to
the President thanking him and explaining why he would
still be forced to dissociate:
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"However, . . . I am bound to say that, as seen
from here, the possible military benefits that
may result from this bombing do not appear to
outweigh the political disadvantages that would
seem the inevitable consequence. If you and the
South Vietnamese Government were conducting a
declared war on the conventional pattern
this operation would clearly be necessary and
right. But since you have made it abundantly
clear - and you know how much we have welcomed
and supported this - that your purpose is to
achieve a negotiated settlement, and that you
are not striving for total military victory in
the field, I remain convinced that the bombing
of these targets, without producing decisive
military advantage, may only increase the
difficulty of reaching an eventual
settlement. . . .
Thus, the Administration's decision to fight an
undeclared war had not only facilitated Senate criticism
and opposition, but, in conjunction with its rhetoric
stressing its desire for negotiations, formed the primary
reason why its major ally would now have to denounce a
U.S. military action and specify the terms o± its
continued suppart. For while the U.S. military saw no
reason to limit either weapons or types of operation to
fight and win the war, and had persuaded the
Administration to agree to this, the British Prime
Minister clearly perceived the disparity between the
declared limited ends of U.S. policy - a negotiated
settlement - and the unlimited means used to achieve this,
when the U.S. and North Vietnam were not officially at
war. Furthermore, as the Prime Minister also perceived,
the means used by the U.S. would put the desired goal even
further out of reach.
In his letter Wilson reiterated that despite "our
reservations about this operation", Britain would continue
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to support U.S. policy as defined in President Johnson's
Baltimore speech, and he then predicted the consequences
of the bombings for the British Government:
"But, while this will remain the Government's
position [support for U.S. Baltimore aims], I
know the effect on public opinion in this
country - and I believe throughout Western
Europe - is likely to be such as to reinforce
the existing disquiet and criticism that we have
to deal with."9
In the light of the earlier episode in January, it is
noteworthy that when Wilson dissociated from the U.S.
bombing of the oil depots in Hanoi and Haiphong, the
statement was issued first from 10 Downing Street, and
then repeated in Parliament. And as Wilson's memoirs make
clear, the Foreign Office would have preferred him to
issue a much 'softer' statement:
"On the night of 28th-29th June the bombs
fell. . . I decided that I would not wait for the
inevitable private notice question. My office
gave notice to the Speaker that I would make a
statement. But before that I had prepared a
statement to issue from No. 10. for the world's
press were demanding answers from Downing Street
and the Foreign Office to their questions. The
Foreign Office were warned that there should be
no private enterprise comments - even on
non-attributable terms - such as had occurred
the previous January over the end of the bombing
pause.
The Foreign Office sought to water down my
draft, At the very last they were hoping for a
less forthright statement. Hopefully, they
prepared a counter-draft of the controversial
passages. Politely, but firmly, I indicated to
them into which part of their filing system they
were free to put it"°
The Foreign Office's efforts to "water down" Wilson's
draft presumably indicated not only its desire to support
U.S. policy through issuing a not too-strenous
dissociation statement, but also some anxiety as to U.S.
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reaction to this statement. Although Wilson states in his
memoirs that there was absolutely no indication during his
visit to Washington after the P.O.L. bombings and his
dissociation, that relations between him and President
Johnson - and thus to some extent between the U.S. and
Britain - bad changed on the Vietnam issue, William Bundy
thought otherwise when considering the P.O.L. raids and
the aftermath:
• . of course, that was the break point in the
President's relationship with Wilson too. And
the files will show that we told Wilson well and
truly what we were going to do and why we were
going to do it, and he said, 'Well, I don't like
it, I may have to dissociate myself from it,'
arid in -the EVELt he did dissociate. And there's
no doubt that in the President's mind this
established .1iLson, as far as I know
unchangingly, as a man not to go to the well
with.
According to Bundy the President's perception of
Wilson after the dissociation also added to his distrust
of Wilson's attempts at peace-making. Discussing the
British-Soviet attempt in February 1967 involving Wilson
and Soviet Premier Kosygin, Bundy explained the
President's attitude on an important message on the U.S.
ngotiating position that he had just sent to 1orth
Vietnamese President Ho Clii 1'inh:
"So we had, in effect, to have Wilson give the
same message to Kosygin that the President had
sent in the letter to Ho, but without telling
Wilson or Kosygin, but Wilson particularly,
about the letter because the President just
didn't trust Wilson, particularly since the
Haiphong POL disassociation. He thought he was
trying to make time politically, and I have no
doubt that was as far as it went a correct
.1 udgement .
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Thus, the Administration perceived Wilson's
dissociation almost as a form of betrayal, despite
receiving ample prior notice of his intention, and despite
the fact that the U.S. Embassy in London had kept the
Administration fully informed of the political
difficulties that the British Government faced on this
issue. 8
 The Embassy's analysis was reinforced in a U.S.
Department of State Intelligence Note of 15 July,
evaluating Wilson's forthcoming visit to Moscow, in which
it was stated that:
"From the moment that the United States bombed
POL facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong, Wilson
faced a serious left-wing revolt within his own
party. Many Laborite MP's were already disturbed
by Mr. Wilson's incomes policy, his 'east of
Suez' defense policy, and his slide toward
favoring UK entry into the EEC. Although the
Prime Minister immediately dissociated the UK
from the US bombing action, the left-wingers
called for a complete disavowal of the US policy
in Vietnam --a step which Wilson resolutely
refused to take."8
Nevertheless, even though Wilson's difficulties were
acknowledged in Washington, Henry Brandon's comment in the
Sunday Times after the dissociation seems an apt summary:
"The difficulty with President Johnson is that
he Is full of understanding of the domestic
political problems of other statesmen as long as
they do not conflict with his own. The British
Government's dissociation from this new stage in
the war has given Mr Johnson's critics new
ammunition and anything that tends to weaken the
President's hand at this stage rankles."
It seems that Wilson's dissociation marked a more
important turning point for Johnson in some respects than
It did for the British Government. For the Government
still endeavoured to support U.S. policy on Vietnam within
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the limits defined in the dissociation statement, whereas
Johnson's distrust admitted of no ameliorating factors.
B.) British Public opinion
In January 1966 Gallup Poll
	 put its standard
question to respondents on approval or disapproval of
recent American armed action in Vietnam and compared the
figures with the November 1965 poll The January poll
recorded a plurality of 45% who disapproved - a 12%
increase; 31% who approved - a 4% decrease; and 24% who
didn't know - a 12% decrease. Thus the decrease in the
number of don't knows roughly corresponded to the rise in
disapproval, indicating that the majority of the public
was now taking a stance on the war and tilting the balance
against the U.S. . This decline in either apathy or
ignorance was reinforced in Gallup's next question on
whether the U.S. should continue its present efforts in
South Vietnam or pull out its forces with 39% in favour of
the U.S. pulling out - a 6% increase over the June 1965
figure; 35% in favour of continuing present efforts - a 2%
increase over June; and 26% who didn't know - an 8%
decrease from June. And again the percentage opposing U.S.
efforts in Vietnam had grown.
In February Gallup posed the question of whether
respondents would approve or disapprove if the British
Government were to send troops to fight alongside the
South Vietnamese in Vietnam, registering 78% disapproval,
compared with the figure of 69% in August 1965. The
desire to keep British troops out of the war was clearly
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strengthening. Gallup Poll also conducted a Top Gallup of
"610 names. . . selected at random from the 1965 edition of
Who's Who" and discovered that a large majority - 71% - of
these repondents, unlike the national poll cross section,
favoured the U.S. continuing its present military efforts
in Vietnam. However, in answer to a question on which side
was winning 64% judged that neither side was winning,
suggesting that the U.S. Administration's optimism and
military build-up had been discounted. This was further
reinforced in the figures for those favouring one side or
another, for 14% thought the Communists were winning,
while 10% thought the South Vietnamese were winning -
which was the exact inverse of the national poii's result
in November 1965. A vast majority of Top Gallup
respondents - 94%- thought that the U.S. would not be
justified in using nuclear weapons in the war. And on the
lack of negotiations, 44% reckoned that the Chinese were
responsible; 31% the North Vietnamese; 24% the Vietcong;
13% the Americans; 8% the Russians; 3% the South
Vietnamese; and 18% didn't know. Thus the Chinese were
seen as the main, culprits, followed by the other Communist
countries, with the U.S. being blamed by a small
percentage.
In May Gallup polled public opinion on the topic of
British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. The public was
almost evenly split, with 34% stating that Britain was
right to continue its support; 32% stating Britain was
wrong; and 34% who didn't know. There were no previous
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figures for a comparison, but considering that America was
regarded as Britain's closest ally, these percentages
suggest unease about British support for U.S. policy.
In June Gallup again asked whether the U.S. should
continue its present efforts or pull out. The figures
differed only marginally from figures published in
January. The same percentage - 39% - still thought the
U.S. should pull out; but those who favoured the U.S.
continuing its present efforts had dropped 2% to 33%;
while the don't knows had increased by 2% to 28%. By
contrast with this set of figures, 40% now thought that
Britain was right to continue supporting U.S. policy in
Vietnam - a 6% increase over the previous month; the same
total of 32% reckoned Britain was wrong; and the
percentage of don't knows had decreased proportionately,
by 6% to 28%. This small fluctuation in favour of
supporting the U. S., co-existing with the growing number
who actually wanted the U.S. to pull out of Vietnam, could
have been indicative of a type of 'rally round the ally'
syndrome, provided, of course, that supporting the ally
did not involve British troops, a course which drew its
customary large percentage - 75% - of disapproval.
Gallup also produced a survey of company directors in
June and recorded 70% of respondents in favour of
continued British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. This
result contrasted strongly with the general public's
attitude in June, which only marginally favoured continued
support over non-support, with a relatively high
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proportion of don't knows. It seems that it was the issue
of Vietnam which attracted specific support from the
company directors, for on questions of general foreign
policy there was no strong demand to work more closely
with the U.S.. Possibly this was because Vietnam was a
concrete problem involving an ally and was thus felt to
demand a specific response, or possibly it was the
anti-communist framework that the U.S. set the conflict in
that drew this reaction. However, as the survey noted,
this question was put to company directors before the U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam's P.O.L. depots and the British
dissociation.
In June National Opinion Polls2B? covered the topic
of Vietnam, but only in passing, as one of a number of
"issues on which Labour has been less than united."
Despite the problems that the Labour Government had had
with its Left-wing on the issue of Vietnam, it seems that
NO? had not thought the issue even worth mentioning until
June and still did not bother to conduct a poll.
July's Gallup Poll registered another fluctuation on
the question of British support for U.S. policy in
Vietnam, this time a 6% swing towards disapproval, now
totalling 38%; with a 7% drop in approval, to a level of
33%; and a 1% rise In don't knows, standing at 29%. As the
fieldwork for this survey was completed before the U.S.
P.O.L. bombings, this fluctuation could have been related
to the political turmoil in South Vietnam, the latest, and
most violent, phase of which had begun in mid-May and had
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just ended during the week that this report was compiled.
However, when respondents were asked whether it was most
important for Britain to support the U.S. In Vietnam or to
attempt to get peace talks started, an overwhelming
majority - 81% - deemed the latter option the most
important for Britain. The remainder were almost evenly
split between support for the U.S. - 9% - and don't knows
-10%. Thus the vast majority of the general public thought
It far more important to settle the conflict than to
support Britain's ally.
On the issue of support for the U.S. continuing Its
efforts in Vietnam or pulling out, there was still a
plurality in July favouring a U.S. withdrawal, up 1% from
June to 40%; however the number of don't knows had
declined by 5% to 23%, while the number of respondents who
favoured the U.S. continuing its present efforts had risen
to 37% from 33% in June. Again these figures were recorded
before the P.O.L. bombings, but undoubtedly public opinion
appeared to be polarising over Vietnam, with a lesser
degree of apathy or ignorance.
Gallup Poll's next question was put during the week
of the P.O.L. bombings (30 June-S July), and registered a
majority of respondents, 72%, who thought that the U.S.
should agree to peace talks even if there was a risk that
South Vietnam would be taken over by the communists. Only
13% of respondents thought that the U.S. should not agree
to talks, while 15% didn't know. This again demonstrated
the public's overriding concern with ending the conflict,
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whatever the outcome in South Vietnam. And the public
disapproval of sending British troops to South Vietnam had
now increased by 6% from June's published figures, to 81%;
with only 8% in favour of sending troops, a decrease of
5%; and 11% with no opinion, a decrease of 1%.
In July National Opinion Polls did conduct a survey
of public opinion on Vietnam, compiled after the
Government's dissociation from the P.O.L. air strikes. NOP
compared its July figures on whether or not "Britain
should support the Americans in Vietnam" with those
recorded in December 1965, in answer to a slightly
different question on whether respondents approved of
"British support for American policy in Vietnam." This
comparison showed that disapproval had increased by 12% to
reach 45% in July; approval had also increased, by 7%, to
total 43%; and the number of don't knows had dropped by
19% to a figure of 12%. These figures, registering a
sharper polarisation on the issue of support for the U. S.
led NO? to conclude that: "It seems that public opinion
has moved against the United States." However, these
figures differed considerably from Gallup Poll's July and
August findings on its own question of British support for
U.S. policy in Vietnam, which still showed the public to
be more evenly divided three ways. This discrepancy poses
the question as to whether NOP' surveys were polling more
politically involved respondents, for their findings were
always broken down on a party political basis, whereas
Gallup Poll's surveys did not show any political party
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affiliation. Thus, it is theoretically possible that
Gallup Poll's answers came from respondents with less
interest in or knowledge of politics - although as Gallup
Poll's respondents were quite clear on the issues of
peace, the U.S. pulling out, and no British troops for
Vietnam, this theory seems unlikely to account for this
discrepancy. The other possibility is that the precise
question asked had something to do with the answer, for
NOP's question in December about support- for U.S. policy
in Vietnam had elicited a result that bore more
resemblance to Gallup Poll's findings asking the same
question in July and August - principally a three-way
division with a slowly declining proportion of don't
knows. In any case, NOP's July question on support for the
U.S. did show a marginally greater percentage opposing
British support for the effort in Vietnam.
On the issue of bombing military targets in North
Vietnam, a majority thought that the Americans were right
to do so - 58% - as against 30% who thought they were
wrong, and 12% with no opinion. However NOP also polled
respondents on whether the Americans would be justified in
bombing civilian targets In North Vietnam, and recorded a
huge majority opposed to this course: 87% thought they
would be wrong; 6% thought they would be right; and 7% had
no opinion. As NO? pertinently remarked: "In the context
of Vietnam the difference between a military and. a
civilian target may often be small, but it seems
reasonable to infer that if the bombing causes heavy
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casualties Britain [sic] opinion will harden still further
against the Americans.
Asked whether Britain should send troops to Vietnam
if the Americans requested them, 65% thought troops should
not be sent; 23% thought they should be sent; and 12% had
no opinion. Compared with Gallup Poll's findings for July,
NOP's figures registered 16% less disapproval of this
proposal, and 15% more approval, with roughly the same
percentage of don't knows. The difference in the figures
could once again be due to the difference in the questions
which were asked, for where NOP asked its respondents to
consider the dispatch of British troops at American
request, Gallup Poll asked its respondents about the
dispatch of troops 'to fight alongside the South Vietnamese
- and whereas America was Britain's ally, South Vietnam
was not.
Gallup Poll's August survey incorporated more data
recorded after the P.O.L. bombings. Asking its standard
question on U.S. armed action in Vietnam, this poll
registered a clear trend towards opposing U.S. action -
49% now, which was a 4% increase over the last time this
question was asked in December 1965 (appearing in the
January 1966 survey). Approval had remained static at 31%,
so it was the don't knows which were decreasing, now
totalling 20%. Now, almost half of the British public
disapproved of U.S. action in Vietnam.
The percentage of respondents favouring a U.S.
withdrawal was also rising - 41% in August, compared with
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40% in July's poll; those in favour of the U.S. continuing
its present efforts had dropped 2% to 35%; while the don't
knows increased by 1% to 24%.
Curiously, the percentage of respondents approving of
British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam had risen 9%
since the figures published in July (based on June
fieldwork) and now stood at 42%; with a 1% decline in
those opposing British support, now 37%; and an 8% drop in
the number of don't knows to 21%. Thus, although the
British public favoured a U.S. withdrawal and disapproved
of armed action, there was still a tendency to want to
support Britain's ally in general terms. Nevertheless,
Wilson's public disapproval of the "recent American
bombing in North Vietnam" was approved by 64% of
respondents; disapproved by 23%; while 13% had no opinion.
Public opinion had not greatly changed on the issue
of British troops fighting with the South Vietnamese: 75%
still opposed the Idea, a marginal decrease of 6% since
the immediate impact of the P.O.L. bombings; 14% approved
- a 6% increase; and the same 11% percent didn't know.
The large majority which judged it more important for
Britain to get peace talks started than to support the
Americans had increased 6% since the P.O.L. bombings to
87%; with a 1% decline to 8% in those favouring support
for the U.S over peace talks; and a drop from 10% to 5% in
those with no opinion.
Posing a much simpler question than that published in
the September 1965 poll, Gallup ascertained that the North
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Vietnamese and Vietcong were blamed by a majority of 31%
for the lack of negotiations; with 11% blaming the South
Vietnamese Government and Americans; 12% blaming unnamed
"others"; and 46% being unable to vouch an opinion. Thus
U.S. Administration propaganda blaming the North
Vietnamese and Vietcong exclusively for the lack of
negotiations was believed by only a third of the public,
disbelieved by a tenth, and a source of confusion or
indifference to almost half,
Finally, on the question of which side was winning
the war there was a clear trend to believing that there
was a military stalemate. Compared with the figures
published in December 1965 (based on late November
fieldwork), 56% now judged that neither side was winning -
a 20% rise. Of those who opted for one or the other side,
16% thought the South Vietnamese Government and Vietcong
were winning - a 2% increase; while only 4% thought the
North Vietnamese and Vietcong were winning - a 6%
decrease. The number of don't knows had declined by 16% to
24%. Thus, it seems that the U.S. military build-up and
public optimism on the war had not persuaded the majority
of the British public that the U.S. was winning - more of
the public were venturing an opinion and this was
increasing the overall percentage of the public perceiving
a military stalemate. However, among the minority of
respondents who did not believe there was a stalemate, the
U.S. and South Vietnamese were believed to be gradually
gaining ground and, as might have been the case in
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December, this could have been a reflection of the
increased amounts of U.S. weaponry and troops, which were
perhaps perceived as validating the U.S. official
optimism.
Thus, by July and August 1966 a majority of the
general public no longer approved of U.S. armed action in
Vietnam; thought that the U.S. should withdraw; believed
that Britain's main task was to get negotiations started
rather than to support an ally; preferred the U.S. to
start peace talks on Vietnam even if a communist
government were the outcome; and approved wholeheartedly
of Britain staying out of the war. In fact, the general
public was beginning to part company with the British
Government over the issue of Vietnam.9
That section of the British public which had
manifested Its concern and disapproval about the war more
vociferously and tangibly, grew more vigorous In its
opposition. From the time that the Americans resumed the
bombing of North Vietnam after the 27-day pause, the
demonstrations of opposition outside and inside Parliament
multiplied. There was a demonstration on 6 February
organised by the British Council for Peace in Vietnam
which drew hundreds to Trafalgar Square, after which there
was a march to the U.S. Embassy to hand in a petition, and
then a rally in Hyde Park. 	 Labour Ps censured the
Government's Vietnam policy and Stewart and Wilson were
heckled at a party meeting. On 13 February there was
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another protest against the war outside Parliament, during
which 21 people were arrested.
When Wilson went to a private dinner party in Oxford,
on 22 ?arch, he was heckled by a crowd complaining of his
failure to keep his election promises and his support over
Vietnam, and 150 policemen had to be sent to Oxford in the
very early morning to control the crowd. 9 The next day
Wilson was heckled about Vietnam at a Labour Party rally
in Ayr.
On 17 April it was reported that the Stars and
Stripes bad been torn down from Westminister Abbey, where
the Washington Cathedral choir was due to sing during the
900th Abbey anniversary.	 On 18 April a BBC "Panorama"
prgramme was shown on television on the training of IJ.S.
soldiers for Vietnam. The programme occasioned horrified
letters to The Times and Th Guardian, protesting that
Americans were being trained to use torture in Vietnam.
The U.S. Embassy then had to issue a denial, stating that
the American troops were being trained to withstand
torture, not inflict it. 4 On 25 April a number of
well-known figures - academics, arts figures and trade
unionists - published a full-page advertisement in The.
Times entitled "Labour Voters and Vietnam", which
expressed opposition to U.S. policies in Vietam and the
British Government's "endorsement of those policies. '•9
On 26 April It was reported that Labour NPs had tabled a
Motion regretting the lack of reference to Vietnam in The
Queen' s Speech.
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denouncing the bombings and calling on the Government to
dissociate completely from U.S. policy in Vietnam, and
then pressured the Government to hold a debate on Vietnam.
In the light of the uproar, the Government conceded and
the debate took place on 7 July. Though the Opposition
amendment was defeated and the Government's motion passed,
the abstentions by 32 Labour MPs indicated the depth of
dissatisfaction among the Labour left-wing with the
Government's Vietnam policy, and held the promise of more
trouble in the future.° The Communist Party rally in
London on 3 July took place as planned, attended by
between 4,000 and 5,000 demonstrators. Violence erupted
outside the U.S. Embassy; 5 policemen were injured and 31
people were arrested.	 The Times carried letters of
protest on 4 and 5 July from academics at Cambridge
University and Liverpool University. On 5 July Ih
Guardian reported an anti-bombing march by 1,000
demonstrators. Also on 5 July, The Times and. The New York
Times reported that the American Independence Day
celebrations in London were gatecrashed by 2
demonstrators, cne of whom toasted the "dead and dying in
Vietnam" before being escorted out. The Sunday Telgrap
reported that there were 50 or more organisations
concerned with Vietnam, the majority of which the
newspaper classed as "pro-Hanoi and violently
anti-American", and some of which supplied aid to the
Vietcong.° On 17 July CND organised another protest
rally in Trafalgar Square with 15,000 participants and a
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Labour MP as a speaker on the platform; letters were
delivered to the three political party headquarters after
the rally, calling for dissociation from U.S. policy in
Vietnam.	 At the end of July, on the eve of the Prime
Minister's visit to Washington there was a lobby of XPs at
Westminster, urging them to reverse the Government's
policy of support for the U.S. over Vietnam.
Thus, by the end of July opposition to the war had
grown both in scope and. intensity. Many well-known and
respected figures had articulated their anxiety and
revulsion over U.S. policy in Vietnam, a principal focus
of which was U.S. war methods, particularly the bombing.
The size and frequency of demonstrations was increasing,
as was the attendant rowdiness. U.S. escalation of the war
could always he relied on to provoke a series of
demonstrations, but in the meantime the fact of the war
itself, and the Government's support - even though
'qualified' - provided the reason for the demonstrations
to continue and escalate.
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COYCLUSI ON
This thesis examines the Administration's propaganda
campaign on the Vietnam War between January 1965 and July
1966 and its impact on its British audiences, both
governmental and public. When the Administration began
escalating the war in February 1965, it was supported by
both the British Government and a majority of British
public opinion. But by July 1966, the British Government
had been forced to dissociate from the P.O.L.. bombings,
thus publicly defining those U.S. policy objectives in
Vietnam, and the military methods used to attain them,
that the Government felt it could still subscribe to and
introducing a more public element of .judgement and
restriction on its future support for U.S. efforts in
Vietnam. And British public opinion now opposed the U.S.
venture and fluctuated on the British Government's policy
of even defined and limited support for the Americans. The
British Government's dissociation was a blow to the
Administration and thus, ultimately, the U.S. official
propaganda campaign failed to retain the degree of British
Government support that the Administration wanted. 1
The failure of the U.S. campaign was not due to a
lack of effort or awareness on the Administration's part,
for The Pentagon Papers show clearly that the
Administration assigned an important place to propaganda
in its war policy, was aware of the difficulties faced by
its ally in supporting U.S. policy, and made considerable
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efforts to keep this ally - and others - 'on board'. 2 The
Administration was initially aided in this task by much of
the British press, which performed a dual role, in that it
relayed Administration statements to the British public,
but also formed part of the British audience for U.S.
propaganda and analysed Administration statements on the
war, drawing and presenting its own conclusions to the
British public. The press also constituted a valuable
source of feed-back for the Administration on other
government's and public's reactions (including its own) to
U.S. official statements and actions during the conflict.
When the conflict began to escalate, the main
sections of the British press were not unsympathetic to
U.S. policy in Vietnam - in fact the Daily Telegraph and
Daily Express were strong sympathisers - and accepted the
use of U.S. military might as legitimate in pursuit of the
Administration's goals of a South Vietnam free of its
neighbour's 'aggression', which would then result in
'peace'. Most of the British press thus began by relaying
the Administration's interpretation of events in South
Vietnam, blaming the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for the
conflict and the unrest in South Vietnam, and accepting
thereby the U.S. interpretation of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements. In addition the effects of this sympathy,
combined with an assumption that the Administration
possessed Integrity and credibility, also showed In press
reports that for some considerable length of time gave the
Administration the benefit of the doubt on the many
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occasions when its public rhetoric was directly
contradicted by its actions - for instance on escalation
of the war - or was contradicted by later revelations -
for example its public attitude to peace negotiations
compared with the Rangoon revelations, Other early
propaganda errors, for example the gas warfare episode and
the secrecy over the Marines' role from March to June
1965, generated much agitated press comment but sympathy
for the U.S. cause still survived, despite the
uncoordinated, contradictory, and at best, confused
reactions that the Administration invariably displayed in
response to press and public questioning and criticism.
Most press criticism of Administration actions or
statements during this early period was offered in a
spirit of sorrow, or exasperation, not anger or rejection.
The Guardian's editorials were an exception to this
initial general climate of sympathy, for The Guardian's
leader writer early advocated a return to the Geneva
Conference to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, disseminated a different and more accurate
interpretation of the Geneva Agreements, and disagreed
with the Administration's presentation of the war as a
case of North Vietnamese aggression and invasion, stating
instead that it was a civil war. The Guardian's editorials
therefore constituted an alternative viewpoint to set
against the Administration's views on the conflict.
However, the devastation caused by U.S. methods of
fighting the war was an aspect of the conflict which
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disturbed most of the British press - including outright
supporters of the U.S. war effort - from the beginning of
the escalation, a feeling that grew into horror as time
passed and the war expanded, bringing with it mounting
pressure for negotiations. As the pressure grew for
negotiations, so did the strain on the Administration's
negotiating posture - the Administration's propaganda
demanded that the blame for the lack of negotiations
should rest on the North Vietnamese and Communists. The
issue of negotiations was also important for the British
Government, for it was expected by press and public to
actively seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict. As
the war continued, and expanded, British press opinion -
as expressed in editorials - divided on what the British
Government's role should be. For the Daily Telegraph and
Daily Express, the Government's primary duty was to
support the U.S. in its fight against communist
aggression, with the lack of negotiations blamed upon the
communists. Other newspapers such as The Guardian and the
Observer were less concerned with blaming one or the other
side for the absence of negotiations, but as time passed
without negotiations, while the war continued to expand,
and there were reports about the occasional clash of
uninvited British Government peace initiatives, or talk of
them, with the Administration's policy - all this helped
to erode the early faint hope that by not criticising the
Administration openly the British Government could
influence and moderate U.S. policy. When this hope had
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been extinguished by spring 1966, coupled with ever more
war devastation, these newspapers were more interested
then in urging the British Government to openly voice its
concern over the conflict.
The passage of time also worked against the
Administration in more direct ways, because many of its
propaganda techniques and propaganda lines, such as
silence, secrecy, a one-sided interpretation of the Geneva
Agreements and an insistence that it sought no wider war,
were suitable only for the short-term. Some of these
techniques were exposed and contradicted by events - such
as the admission about the changed Marine role in summer
1965 and the general expansion and. Intensification of the
war. Other propaganda lines were contradicted by press
analysis - such as the interpretation of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements, the Administration's historical analogies with
Munich before World war II, the long line of attempted
connnunist take-overs after the war and the Korean War -
for as the conflict lengthened It inevitably generated
more press comment and analysis. And as the press
untangled the web of emotive analogies, with most
newspapers deciding that the roots of the Vietnam conflict
lay in a civil war (the Daily Telegraph and the Daily
Express editorials were the exceptions), the
Administration's argument that the Vietnam conflict was
part of the communist 'bloc's' expansionist conspiracy
also began to unravel. This resulted in even more
attention being concentrated on the regime in South
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Vietnam, on which so much U.S. money was being expended
and to whose aid so many troops and weapons had been
dispatched. Naturally U.S. propaganda on South Vietnam
also came under closer scrutiny, and was again
contradicted by events. Its claims for South Vietnamese
democracy and the peoples' freedom to choose their own way
of life free from coercion, were all nullified by both the
political turmoil in South Vietnam, with a series of
short-lived governments, and by the repression practised
by the South Vietnamese military junta.
Paradoxically however, while the Administration's
claim that the conflict was inspired by communist
expansionism was disbelieved by much of the press, there
was nevertheless considerable anxiety about the conflict's
effect on International relations In general, because of
the involvement of the U.S. and the USSR - and China - in
backing their respective client states. The worst fears
focussed on the possibility of Vietnam igniting a third
world war, • but instead of producing solid support for U.S.
policy In Vietnam - as the Administration had hoped when
harping on the Importance of the war for the rest of the
world - these fears led to increased pressure on the
Administration to begin negotiations and so lower the
level of tension and ward off a potential flashpoint.
British fears on this score were sharpened by the
occasional rumours that British troops might be dispatched
to Vietnam, giving the British press even more reason to
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be concerned about the outcome of the Administration's
policy in Vietnam.
Concern about U.S. policy on Vietnam also focussed on
the manner in which the Administration executed this
policy - and other policies - for by the end of 1965 the
Administration, particularly the President, was being
criticised for being too secretive in general. This charge
was levied not only by critics, but also by supporters of
U.S. policy in Vietnam, who time and again complained that
America's allies needed more information to support the
Administration effectively. The Administration's secrecy
about its policy-making, long-term planning and ultimate
goals in Vietnam was one of the biggest obstacles to an
effective, long term propaganda campaign, but this secrecy
was a deliberate choice from the beginning and became a
virtual necessity. For the Administration neither declared
war openly on North Vietnam - preferring to rely instead
on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution as authority for its
policy - nor publicly admitted the extent of its
involvement and contingency planning when the war
escalated in February 1965. Thus, while the Administration
had retained a free hand in constructing and implementing
its Vietnam policy away from any possible public pressures
and criticism, it had placed Itself in the awkward
position of having to enlist the support of its own
public, and other allied governments and publics, for what
it privately knew would be a long and hard war which was
already escalating, but which it had not publicly
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acknowledged. Even when the war had expanded far beyond
the March 1965 bombing and troop levels, the
Administration still tended to obscure these aspects of
the war, mentioning them only occasionally in 1966. And
there were other reasons for this Intention to divulge as
little real information as possible, such as the
President's desire to protect his Great Society
legislation from possible pressures, and, it seems, his
personal preference for secrecy. Moreover, the intention
to present this Administration's policies as a
continuation of past Administrations' policies reinforced
the desire to minimise information on the escalation of
the conflict, and thus also information about the
Administration's entire war planning. This last injunction
naturally covered such aspects as the gloomy evaluations
of the bombing programme which then generated more
intensive bombing, and the equally gloomy estimations of
the ground war which involved voracious demands for more
U.S. troops, simply in order to maintain the status quo at
an ever-higher level of troops and intensity of combat.
Nevertheless, even under these conditions, initially
the Administration still managed to enlist the support of
its own public and, publicly, its main ally Britain. But
there was no firm foundation for this support, for as the
President had been warned in July 1965 the U.S. public
supported him on Vietnam because he was the President, not
because South Vietnam was of great interest or concernG -
and in effect the 'rally-round-the-President' syndrome was
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being expected to generate sufficient support to fight a
major, vicious, war with rapidly increasing casualties.
And the British Government supported the Administration
because a good relationship with the U.S. was perceived as
necessary by Prime 1inister Wilson to carry out his own
policies. However, not even the desire for good relations
could persuade Wilson to dispatch British troops to
Vietnam and thereby incur the wrath of his own party and
public. And eventually Wilson decided that U.S. war
methods were overstepping the bounds of what was
permissible in an undeclared war.
Although some of the President's advisers wished to
warn the U.S. public about the length and expected
difficulties of this war, this recommendation was Ignored
and the U.S. public was not informed that the U.S. was now
entering a major war In Asia. The U.S. public gleaned its
information on the war from what the press could prise out
of the Administration. So the Administration made and
implemented its crucial decisions in secret, invariably
suppressed as much information on these decisions for as
long as it could and on occasions deliberately misled the
press and public in Its vague statements or its abrupt
denials of rumoured. actions. Thus, when subsequent events
inevitably contradicted U.S. official 'information' -
particularly on negotiations and the steady escalation of
the war - the Administration was open to a wide range of
press and public criticism: a pitfall that the
Administration had dug for itself! Effectively the
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Administration helped to erode its own credibility. Just
as important for the Administration's propaganda effort
was the fact that this mode of handling 'information'
became the recognised norm, and therefore when the
Administration wished to depart from this pattern in order
to emphasise publicly some current aspect of its policy or
actions, the press focussed upon the very fact that this
was a departure from the norm, highlighting this and
scrupulously dissecting the reasons for the
Administration's unusual bursts of public eloquence. It
was only a short step for the press to label these
particular Administration statements as propaganda,
thereby immediately diminishing their effectiveness. Thus
on the one hand the Administration stood accused of being
too secretive, and on the other hand of providing
information purely for public effect in order to calm
public fears or disarm criticism.10
Finally, the Administration's propaganda campaign had
an additional burden to cope with during the Vietnam War,
for there was rarely a time when the war went well for the
Americans, notwithstanding Administration statements to
the contrary. Both the U.S. and British press were aware
that the constant escalation of the war, in numbers of
troops and the tonnage of bombs dropped on North and South
Vietnam, was designed to stave off defeat. And as the war
lengthened and this cycle continued, it became ever more
apparent that the Vietcong and North Vietnam were not
going to give up the struggle, despite the terrible
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devastation in both halves of the country. Yet it was
equally plain that the Administration intended to continue
the policy which entailed such destruction. The picture of
devastation was hauntingly described by Martha Gelihorn in
her series of articles in September 1966 about the effects
of war on South Vietnam:
"We are not maniacs or monsters; but our
planes range the sky all day and all night and
our artillery is lavish and we have much more
deadly stuff to kill with. The people are there
on the ground, sometimes destroyed by accident,
sometimes destroyed because the Vietcong are
reported to be among them. This is indeed a new
kind of war, as the [U.S.] indoctrination
lecture stated, and. we had better find a new way
to fight It. Hearts and minds, after all, live
in bodies."11
When the Administration's more 'concrete' reasons for
fighting the conflict, such as South Vietnamese democracy
and freedom, were undermined by events, 1 this left only
the more intangible reasons for the U.S. commitment - the
fear of communist expansion, that is, the domino theory,
and the Administration's rhetoric about the need to
protect its reputation as a guarantor of, effectively,
world peace. The Administration had no intention of
testing the accuracy of Its predictions, and thus busily
engaged in destroying another country. The paradox was
that while observers did riot initially subscribe to the
Administration's dire predictions of the consequences of
'losing' South Vietnam, they subsequently recognised that
U.S. intervention had so raised the stakes in the battle
that the Administration's statements were likely to become
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hence the fears that the U.S.
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might be risking a general conflagration with its
commitment to the war in Vietnam. And by overstating the
importance of the loss of South Vietnam, the
Administration paved the way to damaging its own
reputation as a guarantor when it finally pulled out -
having also in the meantime severely shaken its allies
confidence in its political judgement in investing such
resources in this particular war. In many ways therefore,
U.S. official propaganda was eventually called upon to
Justify what to many observers was already inherently
unjustifiable.
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NOTES TO CONCLUSIONS
1. See Chapter 6, Section D.
2. For instance early Administration planning on the
escalation of the war in February/March 1965 in Chapter 3;
and the periodic briefing of other heads of State.
3. The international effects of the conflict were of
particular interest to the Observer which constantly
lamented the deterioration in international relations
caused by the war; however one of the most startling
expressions of fears about Vietnam War came during the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings in February
1966. See Chapter 6 Section C.
4. For instance the Daily Telegraph's editorials took the
Administration to task on this issue.
5. See Kahin, Intervention, P321.
S. Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation Of Human
Decisions; Document 208; "Memorandum To Johnson From
Mansfield", 27 July 1965.
7. See Chapter 1, Chapter 3 Section D.
8. See f or instance Chapter 3 Section A; McGeorge Bundy's
suggestion that it should be made clear to the U.S. public
that the struggle would be a long one.
9. The Administration's statements about peace initiatives
at the end of the bombing pause in January 1966 were
classic examples. See Chapters 5 and 6.
10. See the press comment in the aftermath of President
Johnson's Baltimore Speech in April 1965.
11. The Guardian, 12 September 1966: "A New Kind Of War".
12. The period from March to June 1966 in South Vietnam
constituted the prime example of such events.
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APPENDIX
The following graphs showing British public opinion
on the Vietnam War during the years 1965-1966, are based
exclusively on Gallup Poll surveys, as National Opinion
Polls did not conduct a sufficently systematic survey of
public opinion on this issue to enable useful graphs to be
drawn up. The Gallup Poll data chosen for the graphs show
opinion on the questions most regularly and frequently put
by Gallup, and even so, with some questions there are long
gaps between the relevant figures, when the public was not
polled on a question for several months. However, it is
possible using Gallup Poll data to gain some idea of the
trends in British public opinion on the war during this
period. Note that the figures used in the graphs are those
published in Gallup Poll's monthly surveys: the graphs do
not take account of interim figures compiled by Gallup for
comparison.
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